Many people associated the arrival of president Donald Trump in the White home with expectations of a fast end to the Russian-Ukrainian war. This brought Ukrainians hope for the restoration of peace and a average life, and European and American politicians and businessmen hope for the restoration of the position quo destroyed by Russian aggression.
However, Trump’s first 100 days have not only failed to meet these expectations but have besides brought many surprises for which the planet was unprepared. A sharp change in US policy both in terms of protecting its allies and trade relations has revealed that the old planet order no longer exists. Constant curtseys towards the Russian dictator Vladimir Putin have forced us to think about the nonsubjective reasons that push the US and Moscow into an embrace, creating threats to peace, democracy, free trade and human rights.
Strategic goals and red lines
“War is nothing but the continuation of policy with another means,” said Clausewitz. Russian politics is based on the fact that this is the last colonial empire and is driven by a desire to preserve this empire from collapse. As a result, it is trying to gain back the liberated colonies of the erstwhile USSR and its region of influence in east Europe. any reasons for how this Russian re-imperialization became possible can be found in this article.
Considering the positions of Russia and Ukraine in the negotiations, we see that they do not fundamentally overlap. Russia demands from Ukraine, first of all, demilitarization and “denazification” (this interesting word in practice means the return of Russian agents to Ukrainian politics under the cover of Russian media, political, spiritual and cultural organizations). This fundamentally means the creation of conditions for the continuation of aggression and the capture of all of Ukraine. Obviously, these conditions are unacceptable to Ukraine. The deficiency of area for compromise makes hopes for fast agreements futile. We see that even the American-Ukrainian proposal to start with a full-scale ceasefire for 30 days does not find support among the Russian leadership, at least at the time of writing this article.
In specified conditions, it is futile to hope that attractive offers of trade or investment projects by western businesses in Russia, invitations to reconstruct the place of Russia in global organizations, etc. will encourage the Russian leadership to change its strategical goals. And even more so, attempts to teardrop Russia distant from China (a “reverse Nixon”) or to plant the seeds of democracy in Russia are fundamentally unrealistic.
The situation after 3 years of war
Putin has not been able to accomplish any of his strategical goals in 3 years of full-scale war. Russia has not captured a single regional centre (except for Kherson, liberated by Ukraine in the same year); has not destroyed the Ukrainian energy sector; has not collapsed the Ukrainian economy; has not secured dominance in the air or at sea; has not divided Ukrainian society and forced it to surrender, etc. In fact, today’s Russia is further from its strategical goals than 3 years ago.
So why is Putin not ready for negotiations? The reason is that he inactive has resources to wage the war. There is inactive money although the National Welfare Fund has been reduced to 2 thirds of its first size. There are inactive people to draft, although not in the essential quantities, so North Koreans are necessary. There is inactive any old russian military equipment left, although it is utilized much little on the battlefield. The economy is inactive holding up, although problems are rapidly growing. Tankers are moving and oil is being sold. Schemes for circumventing sanctions on the supply of components to produce weapons are working at the moment. And last but not least, there is the regular advancement of the front line, although this is now little and less, reaching minimal noticeable gains (just 1 per cent of Ukrainian territory has been captured since early 2024 with immense losses).
At the same time, after Trump’s efforts to end the war by fast track, there is almost no strategical uncertainty left. What do we know at the moment?
- Russia has failed to defeat Ukraine utilizing military methods. Minimal advances with immense losses do not solve any of Russia’s strategical goals. Putin needs major cities, not tiny villages, and has zero chances of achieving that.
- Russia has besides failed to exhaust and divide Ukrainian society and force it to surrender.
- In the absence of a military or political victory, Russia has no chance of achieving its strategical goals or at least legalizing territorial gains.
- The inclusion of Ukrainian regions (with territories where a Russian soldier has never set foot) in the Russian constitution makes it impossible for Moscow to exit the war. Russia’s withdrawal from the war is impossible as long as Ukraine exists.
- Changing the political and legal reality without the defeat of 1 of the parties, exclusively at the negotiating table, is impossible. Ukraine will not quit its territories and citizens and Russia will not quit its ambitions to control them. There can be no fast diplomatic victory.
- Even in the event of a complete cessation of American aid, according to sociological surveys, 70 to 80 per cent of Ukrainians are determined to proceed their resistance. As American officials say, Ukraine has been constantly underestimated.
- A frost on military operations is possible only with the consent of both sides. Ukraine is ready for a ceasefire, while Russia is not ready. The reasons are explained above.
- Thus, it is impossible to end the war without the defeat of 1 of the sides.
- Kyiv’s defeat can be ensured in the event of a complete embargo on aid to Ukraine, which Putin demands repeatedly. But this is improbable to happen due to the fact that it opens Europe to a Russian strike. In addition, direct US participation in the defeat of Ukraine will lead to tectonic consequences for planet politics and economics.
- Russia’s defeat can be ensured in a reasonably short time by sanctions; blocking ways to circumvent sanctions on the supply of components to produce weapons; closing oil exports; and supplying Ukraine with weapons to destruct Russian middle-range logistics.
Trump’s shuttle diplomacy has proven that there are no magic solutions. Any diplomatic changes in Moscow or Kyiv, Washington or Berlin will not change the underlying interests, motivations, limitations and aspirations of the parties.
To complete the picture, 2 things request to be added. First, the accumulation of problems in the Russian economy. I will not dwell on this issue, as many publications are devoted to this topic. Russia is gradually approaching a deep economical crisis.
Secondly, Ukraine is gradually and with large effort building up its military capabilities. The actual withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea Fleet from the war; offensive operations on Russian territory; the accomplishment of an highly advanced failure ratio; the demolition of a large part of the Russian army’s possible in dense equipment; constant deep strikes on Russia’s military industry, as well as oil refining and logistics facilities; the gradual demolition of air defence in temporarily occupied Crimea; and another factors are well described by military experts.
It must be clearly stated that despite the fact that Ukraine is bleeding, Putin is now approaching not his victory, but his defeat.
Trump created a window of chance for Putin to exit the war with any face, but he did not take advantage of this chance. The next specified chance may not arise.
What scenarios are possible?
The base script is simply a gradual decline in Russian capabilities, leading at any point to Russia agreeing to frost hostilities and a ceasefire. This is improbable to happen before the end of 2025.
The second script would see Russia incapable to halt the war in time, which at any point would trigger a way to a Russian defeat. advanced uncertainty has produced a reasonably wide range of scenarios, any of which carry unacceptable risks for Europe and the United States. At the same time, others, on the contrary, minimize risks and promise benefits. Europe and America request to halt being afraid to talk about Russia’s defeat and start actively analysing scenarios to be prepared for specified a development. This would minimize the likelihood of negative scenarios and increase the likelihood of affirmative ones.
At the same time, it is essential to loudly declare the presence of a serious threat to Europe as a 3rd scenario. incapable to accomplish strategical goals in Ukraine and unwilling to stop, Russia may change its overall goal. The dramatic shift in American policy has created a situation of strategical vulnerability for Europe. The current size of European armies looks like an invitation to invade.
It should be noted that fast innovations have radically changed the battlefield. However, generals, as is known, are inactive preparing for the last war. First, it should be noted that the battlefield has become completely transparent to observation, making the covert preparation of operations and concentration of mass, which has been the basis of warfare for millennia, impossible. Second, armoured vehicles, which were the basis of offensive operations for over 100 years, have lost their value, and the same is happening with large warships. Third, high-precision weapons, which have been the basis of western power for the past 30 years, do not work in battlefield conditions of intensive usage of electronic warfare. Fourth, conventional air defence does not defend against massive drone attacks. Fifth, aviation no longer dominates the air as it did in the 20th century. Missile-carrying drones and even drone-carrying drones have already appeared. The improvement of electronic warfare is rapidly leading to the creation of full autonomous combat platforms. In 3 years, all the military experience of the 20th century has become irrelevant.
Thus, no European army is ready for modern high-tech warfare at the moment. But the Russian army is ready. This creates a window of chance for Putin. Russia cannot simply bring home over half a million soldiers from the Ukrainian front who only know how to kill, as they will destruct Russia itself. They must be given a fresh target.
This means not only the request to rapidly prepare European armed forces for war, adopting Ukrainian experience in conducting combat operations and rapidly expanding military innovations. It besides means direct communication with societies. This may come with political costs but is essential for expanding resilience. The lessons of Ukrainian resilience are irreplaceable for Europeans, and the Ukrainian mistake of early 2022, erstwhile they reassured society that there would be no war, should not be repeated.
The best way is to rapidly increase European investments in the Ukrainian defence industry. This will simultaneously solve the task of expanding the time for Europe to deploy its own capabilities, adopting innovations and reducing the risks that war will spread to fresh territories in Europe.
Valerii Pekar is simply a president of the board of Decolonization NGO, the author of 4 books, an adjunct prof. at the Kyiv-Mohyla Business School and Business School of the Ukrainian Catholic University, and a erstwhile associate of the National improvement Council.
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