February 24, 2022 The Russians besides hit Poland. The attack took the form of a disinformation run conducted with the intention of creating panic among Polish citizens. “We will shortly run out of fuel and LPG!” said Russian trolls operating in the Polish infosphere. The transmission referred to a widespread combination of war and fuel deficit. Hundreds of thousands of Poles were under force – long queues lined up in front of petrol stations. Buying as a spare has conquered prices – at the end of the first day of full-scale invasion in Poland were places where the price of the popular "ninety-five" jumped from PLN 5.5 to PLN 10.
Soon there was a respite, the panic expired, but any were ashamed to admit that they had succumbed to the sheep's momentum. Nevertheless, Moscow had its first success in this war on the “Polish section”. Let us look at its mechanisms, due to the fact that they are universal and repetitive. And most importantly, they're inactive used.
Although the first disinformation sources were Russian, the news went into the planet not so much due to Russians as Poles. People that can be divided into 2 categories. In the first place, I would place people with a privileged position, caring for Russian interest by influencing local public opinion and institutions. Politicians, scientists, actors, businessmen, journalists; all of whom, according to their fellow countrymen, matter. So besides the stars of the internet, operating exclusively on its base – bloggers, youtubers, owners or service administrators, thematic pages and forums. In another words, influence agents, who execute their functions consciously, though for various reasons—criminal (shanty), financial or ideological.
I'd put "usable idiots" in category two. Vladimir Lenin, the author of this term, utilized it for Western journalists who praised the Bolshevik revolution a 100 years ago, omitting, deliberately or not, various distortions of it. But this epithet besides fits with modern netizens, propagating narrations beneficial to Moscow, and frequently doing so in accord with their own perception of reality and without awareness of the usage of Russia, but – contrary to their anti-Russian views.
Many years ago, the Kremlin realized that Russia was incapable to compete with the West in the field of classical military technology. Moscow has so set itself on a ‘generational leap’ – but not in the classical sense of this phrase. She did not focus on designing and implementing revolutionary, kinetic weapon systems – due to the fact that she could not afford it (in the financial, method and intellectual dimension). She reached for mediocre weapons, that is, disinformation, spread through the media, cultural institutions, diplomatic representations, but mostly via the Internet. All Russian peculiar services were active in long-term disinformation campaigns. Their aim was and is to bring about a situation where the problems of “enemy” states – interior and relations with another nations – will begin to “play” in Russia's favor. This is what fosters feud and undermines assurance in governments and belief in the sense of democracy and integration – both military and economic.
Russia's "enemies" have facilitated this by giving freedom of expression the position of inalienable law and creating an appropriate technological environment. It was not Russia who invented the Internet, but it was her specialists since the information war that rapidly understood the prospects of the global network. It made it possible to distribute fake and fabricated content, quickly, through many channels, thus creating seemingly multiple sources. This appearance is the consequence not only of the mass nature of actions, but besides of their extended automation. surviving people couldn't handle a giant number of social accounts. So much of these tasks were assigned to bots – on an ongoing basis improved programs, capable of increasingly replacing people. This is how all the online grids were created, consisting of many entities, for which only sometimes Russian service workers or influence agents stand behind. The essence of these nets, outside the bots, remains mentioned “useful idiots”. They are participants of the exchange of information, not necessarily pro-Russian, but cultivates useful Moskalom resentiments (anti-Semitism, ukrainophobia, anti-Americanism, aversion to democracy, a planet of western values, etc.), supporters of conspiracy theories or average atencios who like to respond to what they generate.
All of this company became known in the first week of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. At that time the main hit was carried out in Ukrainian refugees and their privileges, broadcast allegedly at the expense of Poles. But questioning the facts besides afraid the situation at the front. Animators of prokremlian communicative denied the disgrace of the Russian army and its atrocities, while smuggling all the time the crème de la crème of anti-Ukrainian propaganda – content resembling Volyn and UPA crimes. On this occasion, we could see where the point of gravity of Russian misinformation was located. A brief analysis of social profiles of the most active trolls revealed that in February and March 2022 they switched from the position of pandemic denilists to positions seeking “truth” about the conflict in the East. Already the nobility of this intention has seduced many incapable to challenge its sincerity of "useful idiots" – and this is 1 of the most crucial reasons for the constant presence and distribution of pro-Russian content in Poland.
