Introduction
It's been a year since Assad was overthrown. The unexpected offensive of Syrian rebels in late November 2024 led to their triumph on 8 December after 10 days of fighting. The anniversary was solemnly celebrated by the government, and millions of Syrians attended the celebrations, but people are divided in the assessment of changes. present Syria is simply a very different country, but in many respects the situation remains the same.
Economy and humanitarian situation
The demolition of war and the consequences of severe sanctions imposed on Syria during Assad's regulation stay the most crucial factors affecting the conditions of life in that country. 90% of Syrians live below the poorness line, which reduces spending on basic goods specified as water, food, education and healthcare[and]. The deficiency of food safety is simply a problem for 9-10 million people out of 25 million Syrians, of which 3 million face a advanced food insecurity. Access to many basic goods is restricted to all, including those who have adequate money. Insufficient access to sanitation and hygiene means is simply a problem for about 14 million Syrians nationwide[ii]. This has contributed heavy to the spread of infectious diseases, including cholera[iii] and may consequence in fresh outbreaks. 16 million Syrians are in request of humanitarian aid under these overwhelming conditions[iv].
Data on the Syrian economy confirm the post-war disaster. According to information provided by the planet Bank, Syria's nominal gross home product fell from $67.54 billion in 2011 (according to the current exchange rate) to $19.99 billion in 2023. At the same time, GDP per capita of Syria fell from $2952.1 in the current US dollars to $847.4 in the current US dollars in 2023. Data are only estimated; accurate statistic are hard to obtain. surely the collapse of oil and gas production is the most severe failure to the Syrian economy. As noted in the study Syria Macro-Fiscal Assessment prepared in June 2025 by the planet Bank, "the yearly oil extraction in Syria fell by 90% (from 381,000 barrels a day to 63,000), while the yearly gas extraction fell from 8.4 billion cubic meters to 3 billion m3 in 2023, which was mostly due to harm to energy infrastructure during combat and frequent changes in control of key resources." Another immense challenge faced by the transitional government was hyperinflation. In 2010, 1 US dollar was worth 47 Syrian pounds, while by the end of 2024 the Syrian currency marketplace rate was 14 800 SYP per dollar[v].
Despite these challenges, many Syrian refugees have returned home since 2017[vi]And for a immense part of them, the fall of the Assad dictatorship is another crucial reason to return to the homeland. This is simply a challenge for the fresh Syrian authorities due to the additional request for resources and the simplification of the inflow of remittances, which are an crucial origin of supply for Syrian families[vii]. In the long term, however, it will strengthen the economy of Syria.
Provisional governments led by president Ahmad Ash-Shara implement liberal economical reforms, inspired by experience in the regulation of Idlib Province. 1 of the first economical reforms of the HTS government was to limit import restrictions. This led to an influx of inexpensive abroad agricultural products, lowering the price of food (cost of expanding abroad competition for Syrian farmers). Another crucial early decision of the fresh authorities was the liberalisation of currency exchange[viii]. This decision led to a cash liquidity crisis, causing a deficiency of money in ATMs in an economy dominated by cash transactions[ix].
The overthrow of Assad brings extremist ownership changes. The planned privatisation is accompanied by the nationalisation of the assets of Assad supporters[x]. This is the case after years of confiscation of the property of Assad’s opponents before the change of power[xi]. Reporters and many Syrians fear that the envisaged changes will bring disproportionate benefits to the fresh ruling circles, resulting in a fresh oligarchy composed of erstwhile muslim militants and personalities with good contacts among the fresh elites, including rehabilitated members of the erstwhile regime[xii]. This is simply a typical problem for the various states governed by the fresh elites and implementing extremist economical reforms.
This year there has been a crucial simplification in the economical isolation of Syria. The United Kingdom and the European Union have abolished most of the sanctions imposed on Syria[xiii], while most US sanctions have been suspended[xiv]. It is simply a milestone on the way to rebuilding Syria and attracting abroad investment. Qatar and Saudi Arabia besides repaid Syria's debt to the planet Bank to let Damascus to borrow fresh credits[xv]. With highly advanced uncertainty, real GDP in Syria is expected to increase by 1% in 2025, after a decline of 1.5% in 2024.[xvi].
Internal policy
Syrian politics is dominated by erstwhile rebel leader Ahmad Ash-Shara (in a conspiracy period known as Abu Muhammad al-Djaulani). He was announced as president for a transitional period by the commanders of Islamist militants during the Syrian Revolution Winners' Conference on January 29.[xvii].
Currently, the most crucial legal act in the Syrian arabian Republic is the Constitutional Declaration introduced by president Ahmed al-Shara on 13 March. The paper serves as a constitution on a temporary basis, and was prepared by lawyers selected by the head of state. The Constitutional Declaration is akin to the Constitution of 2012, the main difference between them constitutes a larger number of provisions on civilian liberties in the fresh basic law. Just as an old paper declares that muslim law is the main origin of law in the state[xviii]. On 5 October, parliamentary elections were held and a fresh legislative assembly was elected. The election was indirect and the electorate colleges elected 2 thirds of the representatives. The remaining 1/3 members of the Assembly were to be elected by the President. The parliament was to have 210 deputies, but the elections were not held in areas controlled by Kurdish and Drusian separatists. As a result, any of the seats in the People's Assembly are vacant. The recently established assembly is to prepare fresh electoral ordination and constitution[xx].
State institutions are converted and even replaced by fresh ones, specified as the military. The old Syrian army was disbanded and the fresh 1 was built on the basis of erstwhile rebel troops. The process of integrating them faces challenges and the Ministry of Defence maintains small control over individual units[xxx]. This situation weakens the control of authorities over large parts of the country. another old state institutions met mass layoffs[xxi]. Islamism is part of the reforms. Her examples are police training powerfully inspired by religion[xxii]changes in curricula[xxiii] and the ban on wearing bikinis and another western beachwear on public beaches[xxiv]. Many members of spiritual minorities fear possible discrimination and persecution caused by the increased function of Islam in the state. The situation of minorities has indeed deteriorated, but this was not due to legal changes.
For various reasons, there has been an increase in spiritual force in Syria this year. spiritual minorities are exposed to social exclusion, demolition of places of worship, and even physical attacks on members. Sometimes the same thing happens to Sunni Arabs. The worst examples of spiritual force were the massacres on the coast in March and bloody fighting in confederate Syria in July. The Government Commission and the United Nations Committee on Syria have already concluded investigations into force in Latakia, Tartus and Hama provinces on 6-10 March. The UN study confirms the work of both the Proasadian forces and the Syrian army for killing civilians and involving armed civilians in crimes. About 1,400 people died, most of them were civilians of the Alavian religion. The study denied the existence of orders demanding the killing of civilians, stated that force was the consequence of a spontaneous outbreak of hatred[xxx]. akin conclusions are drawn by the study prepared by the Syrian government committee[xxx]. Trials of those liable for crimes have already begun[xxvii]. Investigation into the massacres in the south, especially against the Drusian people Suwaids are inactive in progress.
Violent force against alawits (including murder) did not end with the end of the asadists' revolt[xxxiii]. By many Sunites, all alawites are seen as supporters of the erstwhile dictatorship. This condition and motives strictly religiously are the main causes of hatred against the Alawic community. To a lesser extent, the same applies to another spiritual minorities. A peculiar kind of spiritual force is terrorist attacks. An example of this was the suicide bombing of St. Elijah's Church in Damascus in June. This was the largest confirmed attack on Christians in Syria since the fall of Assad. Terrorist attacks are organised by the muslim State and smaller extremist muslim groups specified as Saraya Ansar al-Sunna[xxx]. specified organizations and post-Saxon rebels are the only organized opposition to the fresh Syrian authorities.
There is no evidence that any of the attacks on spiritual minorities took place in favour of government approval. The Syrian authorities let different spiritual groups to keep temples and guarantee the safety of places of worship as they have done in the past[xxx]. However, the capacity of the government is very limited. Central authorities have small control over the country, which leaves Syria very unstable. Problems caused by civilian war strengthen the power vacuum and proliferation of weapons to many gangs, armed groups and average civilians[xxxi]. All rankings place the present Syria among the most dangerous countries in the world. However, thanks to military reforms and strengthening police and safety forces, Syria could stabilise and become a safer place for all its citizens, including representatives of spiritual minorities.
Northeastern parts of Syria are controlled by the alleged Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), dominated by Kurdish Armed Forces – People's Defence Units (YPGs). Autonomy (de facto The independent region) is popularly called Rozhava. According to its reports, the Independent global Committee of Investigation for the Syrian arabian Republic, during the Syrian civilian War, YPG came to power in the ethnically Kurdish territories through the brutal elimination of another Kurdish factions and continues to keep power by force and through political repression. The organization is besides liable for war crimes in its occupied areas[xxxii]. The repressive policy is directed primarily against the arabian population, the overwhelming majority in the areas controlled by the SDF. The organization represents only a tiny part of the population of controlled areas, so it cannot be an equal partner for Damascus. The equitable transformation of Syria requires the trial of YPG war criminals, just as the Assad military war criminals are tried.
Foreign relations
The biggest external threat to the fresh Syrian authorities is the Israeli invasion. After the fall of Assad, Israel expanded the business of Syria for Golan Hills and formed a alleged buffer region in areas adjacent to Golan Hills. The Israeli army besides organizes trips into confederate Syria and many nalotins of various targets in the territory of that country to weaken the fresh Syrian army[xxxiii]. According to the Syrian authorities, Israel has carried out 1,000 raids on Syria since the fall of Assad[xxxiv]. For now, the Syrian army is besides weak and disintegrated to respond to these attacks. In July, a ceasefire was made between Israel and Syria[xxxv]But it didn't last long.
Iranian policy is besides a immense threat to Syria. Iran is hostile to the fresh Syrian government, which is dangerous for Damascus due to Iranian influence in Iraq. However, Ash-Shara's attitude to the muslim Republic of Iran besides contributed to the crisis between the 2 countries.[xxxi]. Syria's relations with the pro-Iran Lebanese Hezbollah are besides tense, leading to clashes between the parties[xxxvii].
Relations with Russia, formerly Assad's second major ally, stay good. Following a visit to Moscow on October 15, president Asz-Shara announced that Syria maintains all the agreements concluded by the erstwhile regime. Russia keeps its bases in Chmeymi and Tartus[xxxviii] and is considering restoring military patrols in confederate Syria (with government approval)[xxx]. Syria sees Russia as a state whose support is essential at a hard time of reconstruction and regional tensions. However, the future of common relations remains unclear and Damascus will proceed to renegotiate relations in its favour.
Syrian abroad policy under the regulation of Ash-Share is characterized by closeness with the Sunni countries of the mediate East. Riyadh was the mark of the first abroad visit by Syrian leader[xl]. Since this visit, Saudi Arabia has become an crucial economical partner of Syria, implementing projects as crucial as the reconstruction and improvement of Syrian oil fields[xli]. The Kingdom besides provides political support to the fresh Syrian authorities; it is the successor to the throne of Saudi Arabia that Prince Mohammed bin Salman persuaded the president of the United States Trump to abolish American sanctions against Syria[xlii]. another Persian Gulf monarchs, in peculiar Qatar and the United arabian Emirates, besides support Syria[xliii][xliv]. However, most members of the Gulf Cooperation Council feared the jihadist past of ruling Syrian politicians. another arabian leaders fear it, too. These fears do not concern Turkey, which in the past was 1 of the main supporting muslim opposition movements in the mediate East. Ankara trains Syrian soldiers and promises to deliver arms to the Syrian army. Military cooperation between Syria and Turkey has continued since the fall of Assad, but developed after the parties signed the defensive cooperation pact on 14 August[xlv]. However, this cooperation is limited. president Erdoğan did not aid Syria fight the Israeli invasion. specified behaviour and activity of another leaders reduce Ankara's chances of becoming a major partner and even a Syrian protector, which could have been expected a year ago.
Syria's relations with the West have improved, but their further approximations are crucial obstacles. Western states, unlike Sunni Muslim states, do not combine common political and spiritual characteristics or equally strategical interests with the fresh Syrian regime. Any deficiency of respect for democratic principles by Syria and the renewed emergence in spiritual tensions in the country can rapidly lead to a deterioration of common relations. Despite any common objectives (e.g. preventing Iran from regaining influence in Syria), US policy objectives in Syria are on a number of issues another than the EU. The United States seems to be curious in extending its network of allies to Syria, or even the wide beginning of Syria to American companies. For many years American troops have been stationed in Syria, mostly in SDF controlled areas to defend American oil interests[xlvi]. These American actions are waiting for appropriate regulation or restrictions. Syria and the United States have already established intelligence cooperation, which is of large importance for both sides[xlvii]. US president Donald Trump is besides curious in joining Syria in the Abrahamic Agreements. The second is improbable (especially due to territorial dispute over Golan Hill). president Asz-Shara's visit to the White home was historic[xlviii], but it did not have many consequences but for Syria's accession to the Global Coalition against the alleged muslim State[xlix].
The European Union focuses on humanitarian aid and economical measures to accelerate the reconstruction of Syria and to guarantee the benefits for European businesses. The EU advocates ending its Russian presence in Syria, but is little curious in securing Israeli strategical interests than the US. Of the EU members, France was the most curious in cooperating with the Syrian government. The consequence was a visit by president Asz-Shara to Paris in May 2025.[l].
Summary and recommendations
Following the collapse of the dictatorship of Assad Syria, it is in a transitional period characterised by political change, instability and the persistence of economical and humanitarian problems caused by civilian war and sanctions. The weakness of the state leads to increased violence, including attacks on members of various spiritual communities. While there are any signs of recovery and stability, it is unclear whether the overall situation of the country will improve in the coming years. The future function of religion is besides unknown, but the country will surely become more conservative than in the past. Syrian leaders have an active abroad policy aimed at breaking the erstwhile isolation and uncovering partners in reconstruction and allies in maintaining territorial integrity threatened by warlords, separatists and abroad powers.
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[xviii] Syrian Constitutional Declaration of 13 March 2025 available at https://cassioun.org/news/item/82565-2025; erstwhile Constitution of 24 February 2012 available at https://egov.sy/page/en/137/0/Constitution.html; accessed both 6.05.2025 at 12:15.
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[xxi] S. Nowacka, M. Wojnarowicz, A. M. Spancerska, op. cit.
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[xxx] "UN Syria Commission finds March coastalviolence was widespread and systematic: outlines urgent steps to prevent future generations and reconstruct public confidence", Office of the United Nations advanced Commissioner for Human Rights 14.08.2025 https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/08/un-syria-commission-finds-March-coastal-violence-was-widespread-and; accessed 26.11.2025 at 17:42.
[xxx] ‘More than 1,400 killed in sectarianviolence in coastal Syria, study finds’, Al Jazeera 22.07.2025 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/22/more-than-1400-killed-in-sectarian-violence-in-coastal-syria-report-finds; accessed 26.11.2025 at 17:42.
[xxvii] ‘First Public Trial Session for Coastal force Concludes in Aleppo’, The Syrian Observer 19.11.2025 https://syrianobserver.com/syrian-actors/first-public-trial-session-for-coastal-violations-concludes-in-aleppo.html; accessed 26.11.2025 at 17:47.
[xxxiii] ‘Thousands of Syria’s Alavites protest against what they say is discrimination by the government’, Associated Press 25.11.2025 https://apnews.com/article/syria-alawites-sectarian-protests-latakia-tartus-ghazal-5960b4cddf0660dd7af2e26770cf787; accessed 27.11.2025 at 13:48.
[xxx] Read more about this in: M. al-Lami, "Explainer: fresh militant group in Syria mark Alawites, Assad loyalists", BBC Monitoring 13.02.2025 https://monitoring.stage.bbc.co.uk/product/b0003bt5; accessed 7.05.2025 at 12:28.
[xxx] K. O’Malley, ‘The terrorist attack that didn’t happen’, Mission Network News 13.08.2025 https://www.mnnonline.org/news/the-terrorist-attack-that-didnt-happen/; accessed 9.12.2025 at 18:17 p. m.
[xxxi] S. Hartley, M. E. Picard, CalibreObscura, ‘Every weapon Was Taken’: Syria Should Fuel Arms Trafficking Crisis’, Inkstick 1.07.2025 https://inkstickmedia.com/every-gun-was-taken-syria-could-full-arms-trafficking-crisis/; accessed 25.11.2025 at 12:29.
[xxxii] Reports Independent global Investigation Commission for the Syrian arabian Republic https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-body/hrc/iici-syria/documentation; accessed 10.12.2025 at 6:55.
[xxxiii] F. Tomb, ‘Report from Syria’, fresh Europe Institute 28.05.2025; accessed 3.12.2025 at 19:53.
[xxxiv] L. Al-janidi and B. Yilmaz, ‘Israel ranks drone strike in Damascus countryside, raids in confederate Syria’, Anadol Ajansı 3.12.2025 https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israel-stages-drone-strike-in-damascus-countryside-raids-in-southern-syria/3761416; accessed 3.12.2025 at 19:57.
[xxxv] ‘Syria: message by the spokesperson on the casefire agreement’, EEA 19.07.2025 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/syria-statement-spokesman-casefire-agreement en; accessed 3.12.2025 at 8:05 p.m.
[xxxi] ‘Iran and Syria: Will regional developments break the freeze?’, Shafaq News 3.12.2025 https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iran-and-Syria-Will-regional-developments-break-the-freeze; access 3.12.2025 at 20:18.
[xxxvii] M. Zerrouky, ‘Fighting between Syria’s fresh army and Lebanon militias rages on border’, Le Monde 10.02.2025 https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/02/10/fighting-between-syria-s-new-army-and-lebanese-militias-rages-on-border 6737999 4.html; Access 14.12.2025 at 11:30.
[xxxviii] I. Delande, ‘Syria’s fresh leaders keep Russia in play’, Le Monde Diplomatique 5.12.2025 https://mondediplo.com/2025/12/05syria-russia; accessed 13.12.2025 at 17:07.
[xxx] M. Qawas, ‘Why Are Russian Monitoring Forces in confederate Syria?’, Progress Center for Politics 26.11.2025 https://www.arabprogress.org/en/why-Russian-monitoring-forces-in-Southern-syria/; accessed 3.12.2025 at 20:35.
[xl] ‘Syria’s president al-Sharaa meets Saudi Arabia’s MBS in first abroad trip’, Al Jazeera 2.02.2025 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/2/syrias-president-al-sharaa-meets-saudi-arabias-mbs-in-first-foreign-trip; accessed 12.12.2025 at 6:03 p.m.
[xli] "Saudi companies sign agreements to make Syrian oil and gas fields", Arab News 10.12.2025 https://arab.news/2ae7f; accessed 12.12.2025 at 18:10.
[xlii] Y. Guzansky, C. Valensi, ‘A New-Old Partner in Damascus: Is Qatar Rebuilding Syria in Its Image?’, INSS 21.08.2025 https://www.inss.org.il/publication/qatar-syria/; accessed 12.12.2025 at 18:15.
[xliii] Ibid.
[xliv] ‘UAE, Syria deepenties in talks focused on stableness and economical recovery’, The arabian Weekly 8.07.2025 https://thearabweekly.com/uae-syria-deep-ties-talks-focused-stability-and-economic-recovery; access 12.12.2025 at 6:20.
[xlv] L. Kenez, ‘Turkey trains Syrian Army in air defence utilizing Turkish associations as militaryties deepen’, Nordic Monitor 24.09.2025 https://nordicmonitor.com/2025/09/turkey-trains-syrian-army-in-air-defense-using-turkish-munitions-as-military-ties-deepen/; access 12.12.2025 at 18:35.
[xlvi] K. R. Rosen, ‘Who Benefits from a U.S. Oil Deal in Northeast Syria?’, The Washington Institute for close East Policy 18.09.2020 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-benefits-us-oil-deal-northeast-syria; accessed 13.12.2025 at 21:08.
[xlvii] "Syria: Transition and U.S. Policy", Congressional investigation Service 9.05.2025 https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL33487; Access 14.12.2025 at 11:45.
[xlviii] A. Damon, Ö Özkizilcik, ‘Two views on the Syrian president’s visit to the White House—and what’s next’, Atlantic Council 11.11.2025 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/two-views-on-the-syrian-presidents-visit-to-the-white-house-and-whats-next/; accessed 13.12.2025 at 9:06.
[xlix] G. Cafiero, M. Khurma, ‘Syria joining the anti-ISIS coalition is simply a westward pivot—with opportunities and risks’, Atlantic Council 21.11.2025 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/syria-joining-the-anti-isisis-coalition-is-a-westward-pivot-with-opportunities-and-risks/; access 14.12.2025 at 17:50.
[l] G. Blackburn, ‘Syria’s interim leader Ahmad al-Sharaa visits Paris in first authoritative journey to Europe’, Euronews 7.05.2025 https://www.eurnews.com/my-europe/2025/05/07/syrias-interim-leader-ahmad-al-sharaa-visits-paris-in-first-official-trip-to-europe#:~text=Al%2DSharaa’s%20visit%20to%20Paris%20on%20on%20is,willingness%20to%20engage%20with%20Syria’s%20new%20leadership.; accessed 13.12.2025 at 21:10.
