Russian: “It is better for us not to have any relation with the West than to become an opponent of China” (part 1)

"It is better for us not to have any relation with the West than to become an opponent of China" (part 1)

October 3, 2026 by Évy Pélinachdenxeiten

While traveling to Moscow Ms Péli talked to many leading political scientists, diplomats and geopolitical analysts about the fundamental reorganization of planet politics. In the first part of a two-part exclusive interview, a well-known China expert Vasily Kasyn (director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and global Studies in HSE) examines the final collapse of the old trade model, the motives behind changing political direction Germany and explains why Moscow deleted the West before it could drive a wedge between Russia and China.

Éva Péli: Mr Kashin, for a long time relations between Russia and Germany have been based on close industrial and energy integration. In Berlin, this bridge is now considered irreparably destroyed and Russia seen as a permanent threat. How do Russian abroad policy and academic elite view this historical breakup?

Vasily Kasyn: We are faced with the end of the old political and economical model, which existed in both Russia and Europe, and especially in Germany. This process has a long past and is partially linked to political and ideological changes, but besides partially to changes in economical geography and the economy of both countries. Firstly, Russia is and will stay primarily an exporter of natural materials due to existing factors of production.

Raw materials are usually consumed where there is simply a strong manufacturing sector, especially in energy-intensive and material-intensive industries. It was these industries in Europe that began to collapse in the 1990s. Today, this decline has increased considerably. Since the late 1990s, we have seen a virtually continuous increase in Russian exports to Asia and Russian trade with Asia. (especially with China), While Russia's overall share of trade with Europe has decreased. Of course, under more favourable political and safety conditions, the process could be much slower and possibly even hampered. But that did not happen.

Secondly, the current model of relations was not truly beneficial for Russia. Russia consistently exported more goods to Europe, and especially to Germany, than it imported, and the remaining measures reinvested back in Europe. Russia expected that specified a model of relations would enable it to meet the challenges of deeper economical and industrial integration. Examples of Russia's actions in this direction are the effort to get a large share of the European airline EADS and the effort by the Russian state-owned Sbierbank to acquisition the German car maker Opel after his bankruptcy. In both cases, Russian bids were rejected for political reasons.

No effort to accomplish deeper integration, interdependencies or technology transfer has been successful, while, for example, China easy acquired all assets in Europe during this period, including those in the high-tech sector. In any cases, the Chinese easy even purchased assets in the dual-use technology sector, which took place in countries specified as Germany and Austria. This naturally led to disappointment in cooperation.

And since, in addition to these fundamental economical causes, relations did not make in the political sphere, it could be said that breaking up was inevitable. I say without political contradictions there would simply be any confusion, but cooperation would continue. However, as the European Union besides pursued a hostile policy towards Russia, the breakup was very violent. Of course, relationships won't go back to the 1990s and 2000s. In the foreseeable future, and most likely, they will never return.

This process has continued since the late 1990s, but has become very clear and acute about 10–15 years ago. Fundamental factors related to the structure of the economy are besides involved. I think that the processes taking place in the European economy, specified as the collapse of manufacture (which we are seeing peculiarly in Germany), as well as a very active policy promoting a "green" agenda and reducing the consumption of all kinds of energy and materials, are, by nature, eliminating the conditions of our close cooperation. We sale energy, metals and agricultural products. no of these markets in Europe are growing; they are all shrinking. Therefore, the prospects of our relation would inactive deteriorate. For each exporting country, natural materials, regardless of their political orientation, the main outlets are Asian markets. This applies to both Australia and Russia.

From the Russian perspective, Germany strives for historical militarisation, stationing American weapons and striving to take the lead in European defence. How is this direction seen in Moscow?

It is absolutely clear that the European Union is seeking to usage the Russian threat argument for interior transformation. Moreover, it is actively utilized to justify various interior policies. In particular, the ruling elite in Germany is actively utilizing this argument to justify its policy towards the right-wing opposition – Alternatives to Germany. In fact, Russia's capacity to influence German or European interior policy is very limited, but of course it is always beneficial to exaggerate external threats, as this importantly extends the scope for manoeuvre in interior policy.

The European Union has been seeking to make a common policy in the military and defence sectors for years. This started long before the Ukrainian crisis, but the European Union has never succeeded in making crucial advancement in this area due to the fact that national governments do not want to quit powers and elements of sovereignty. This is inactive a hard task, but we see that, in the face of the war in Ukraine, the European Union has taken any crucial steps in this direction - more than before, but inactive insufficient. Problems are serious. 1 example is the collapse of the French-German partnership in a fresh generation fighter task a fewer months ago, after which Germany began to search a fresh partner not in Europe, but in Japan.

Of course, we are carefully monitoring the European Union's military transition. It is understandable that Germany is trying to lead this process and will drastically increase its military spending, which we take into account in our military planning. The main concerns are those aspects of German armament that could jeopardise strategical stableness – specified as plans to produce and acquisition medium-range missiles, especially American maneuvering missiles, and the deployment of American missiles. Russia will respond to this by expanding its own weapons.

It would most likely be wise at any point to discuss measures guaranteeing safety and stableness in Europe so that, as in the Cold War, despite hostile relations and military rivalry, it does not cross the border of direct confrontation. It is our common interest to prevent a direct military clash in Europe, despite highly hostile political relations.

We have a long period of confrontation, a fresh cold war. Germany is expanding its armed forces and announcing them directed against Russia. Russia, in turn, will grow its armed forces against Germany and we will see each another as possible opponents. The military will conduct appropriate planning, maneuvering and developing fresh weapons.

However, it was in these circumstances that Europe lived between 1945 and 1990. It must be said that this period has shown that under specified conditions you can live long, comparatively calm and rather well. Looking back to the 1960s and 1970s, Europe experienced a period of prosperity that is mentioned with nostalgia; it was common to believe that it was much better than it is today.

So we just gotta accept it as inevitable and learn to live with it. But there are no illusions: we request to realize that for a very long time we will proceed to live on the brink of war and just gotta adapt to it. We will have hostile intentions against each other, and we cannot have the illusion that this will change.

In the West, relations between Moscow and Beijing are frequently portrayed as a monolithic block. Where is the border between the pragmatic partnership for convenience and Russia's increasing asymmetrical dependence on the Chinese economy today? Is stopping in the "Syberian Power 2" task a manifestation of structural submission or simply Chinese caution?

China is the world's largest economy. Measured by purchasing power parity, it is actually the world's largest economy; their manufacture is larger than the US, Japan and Germany combined. Therefore, all economical relations with China are naturally asymmetric. Does this mean that we have become politically dependent in any way? No, no, due to the fact that all our cooperation with China is commercial. We do not receive any assistance or loans, we do not request any concessions and we are not dependent on China for security.

Of course, there is simply a very wide scope of issues concerning planet order, in which our positions and Chinese positions are almost identical. At the same time, we have repeatedly declared at the highest levels – both Russian and Chinese – that these relations are not an alliance and will never be. Each country has its own position on Asian policy issues: for example, we do not support China in their territorial conflicts with another Asian countries (such as India, Vietnam and Japan), but China besides does not support Russia in its conflicts in Europe.

All decisions relating to economical projects, specified as the ‘Syberian Power 2’, now renamed ‘Baikal Power’, are made solely on the basis of economical viability. As far as I know, there are any political obstacles to the implementation of this task in China. They are due to reasonably strict Chinese rules on the degree of dependence on 1 origin of essential natural materials (in any cases, as far as I know, these provisions have been in force since the 1990s or earlier). In fresh years, China has partially breached these provisions with respect to oil supplies from Russia, as this has been beneficial to them but at the same time strives to comply with them.

I think they are not ready to carry out this task yet, but it is their own economical logic; they have their own discussions and that is completely normal. We can wait as long as necessary. This task may never be implemented, or it can be realized very rapidly – only a very narrow group of people know the real state of affairs. But even if it never is, it will not fundamentally change Russian-Chinese relations. They have their limitations, but they are very crucial to us. China's share of our trade is now about equal to what the European Union had about 10 years ago. It is so an crucial partner, but at the same time we are actively looking for another markets, as the Chinese care not to be entirely dependent on us for crucial supplies.

The thought of utilizing Russia as ‘brake against China’ persists in the Western strategical circles – for example German Vice Admiral Kay-Achim Schönbach openly called for cooperation with Moscow to keep Beijing in check. How do you measure this thesis and do you think it is impossible for Russia to always take up the function of buffer again?

This is completely impossible and Russia will never agree to this. This is due to the fact that Russia and China have 1 of the longest land borders in the world, and any situation in which we begin to see each another as a threat would have disastrous consequences for both the economy and security. During the Cold War, after the deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations, both countries allocated immense funds to build a defensive strategy along thousands of kilometres of border. In fact, the military burden of the russian Union was not mostly due to American inventions, from which the Americans are as arrogant (as “Star Wars”) but alternatively to the necessity of building a defence strategy along the border with China, which runs through hard terrain and is highly long. The russian Union was forced to station there and keep a immense land army, and the Chinese had to do the same.

I believe that both Russia and China have learned from this disastrous experience, erstwhile both countries have almost led to common destruction. Therefore, we will never take any steps against China. We will fulfil all the provisions of our agreement with China in 2001, which forbids us to participate in alliances against each other, to let any action against each another from our territory and to exert any force on ourselves. For us, it is better not to have any relation with the West than to become an opponent of China due to the fact that no of the Western countries borders straight with China and we do.

Washington has repeatedly expressed its intention to drive a wedge between Russia and China through "a reversed Nixon maneuver". Do you consider this calculation realistic and how Moscow sees specified U.S. trials?

The concept of ‘inverted Nixon’ and the claim that Nixon allegedly ‘distributed’ The russian Union and China, attest to a complete deficiency of knowing of past by those who preach specified views. At the time president Nixon began developing relations between the US and China, Soviet-Chinese relations had practically not existed for a decade (the collapse of cooperation occurred between 1959 and 1960). The normalization of American-Chinese relations was initiated by a series of contacts from 1969 to 1971, and at that time China had been de facto an opponent of the russian Union for a decade; both countries even engaged in insignificant armed clashes. These are so completely incomparable situations.

Russia is curious in maintaining constructive and friendly relations with China due to the fact that it is simply a question of its physical survival. Similarly, the Chinese are curious in maintaining constructive and friendly relations with Russia. If we become common enemies, no 1 will succeed, and we can destruct each other. That's why we'll never do it. The only thing that can change is the depth of our cooperation on military and political issues – we can act more actively in different regions of the planet or simply limit ourselves to average interstate relations. The depth of cooperation depends mostly on the state of relations between Russia and the West, as well as between China and the West. However, these relations will always be friendly and constructive.

Mr. Kashin, thank you very much for this highly interesting insight into the Russian perspective.

Vasily Kasyn manager of the Centre for Comprehensive European and global Studies (CCEIW) at the Moscow State investigation University "HSE". He is besides a elder academic at the Centre for Studies on China and Regional Projects at the Moscow State University (MGIMO), a lecturer at the Department of global safety at the Moscow University's planet Policy Department (MSU) and a candidate for political science. He is simply a associate of the abroad and Defence Policy Council (SVOP).

Part 2: W announcement second part of the conversation Éva Péli extends its position to macro-geopolitical level. Vasily Kasyn analyses the strategical restraint of China, discusses the hazard of escalation at sea and in a atomic context, and presents observations on circumstantial diplomatic lines concerning Ukraine.