Beyond the event horizon: The evolution of Chinese military space capabilities.

Analysis briefly:

• The usage of space for military purposes involves considerations beyond conventional war. The Earth orbit as a fresh domain has a crucial impact by utilizing satellite technology for communication, observation, reconnaissance and possibly offensive activities.
• The People's Liberation Army of China (ALW) has a increasing space component – the Reformed Aerocosmic Forces (PLAASF) working on their own expansion, quality and palette of equipment as well as tasks in which they can operate in peace and armed conflict.
• PLAASF activities include land designation and monitoring, communications, SSAs, possible demolition or obstruction of enemy satellites, surveillance and training of world-class space personnel, operation of microplanes, satellite constellations of various (double) applications, investigating and implementation of hypersonic systems.
• In the face of the increasing rivalry of the powers, the key advice for Poland is to accelerate the construction of sovereign capabilities in the space domain, which is simply a essential condition for maintaining the resilience of the state. It is besides essential to actively monitor Chinese dual-use technologies, including net megaconstellations and anti-satellite systems.

China has been independent in space since 1970, erstwhile they successfully sent the first satellite into orbit. They are besides 1 of 3 countries that self-fired a man into space – it was Colonel Yang Liwei, a taikonaut aboard a spaceship Shenzhou (神舟 chinese. Divine Łódź/Divine Vehicle) in October 2003. Despite the importance of this accomplishment and fast information in the mainstream media, the most crucial technological periodical dealing with space policy – Space Policy – needed over a year and a half to print a text on China's ambitions in this field ("Will China become a military space superpower?" by S. H. Liao of Tamkang University in Taiwan) [1]. This time hold clearly speaks of the leading approach of the Western planet to Chinese achievements and goals in space [2].

Why is that important?

The treaties governing the activities of states in space were established in the 1970s. Since then, due to the deficiency of will of the parties, it has not been modernised or created a fresh binding space law. At the same time the economical activity of states, organizations and even companies in orbit and in distant space is growing. Legal and political ambiguity can lead to a possible space arms race, involving respective of the most developed countries. However, the transformation of space into the domain of combat in the 21st century is simply a phenomenon that could have far-reaching consequences for the remainder of humanity [3]. Its usage for military purposes involves considerations beyond conventional war. Space as a fresh field has a crucial impact through the usage of satellite technology for communication, reflection and possibly offensive activities [4] [5].

The spread of the alleged drone war in the 21st century leads to the transformation of battlefields [4], revolutionizes the collection of information and impact operations, and can supply a pararel for the militarization of the Earth's orbit. It is crucial to identify the wider implications of this process from destructive actions, through intelligence to competition and technological sanctions [6]. In addition, it may have implications for the sovereignty and dynamics of geopolitical forces.

	Manned Space Program	Orbital Navigation System	Space station	Moon Program	Manned lunar flight	Rocket atomic systems	Space budget [mold $]	Annual start count
USA							25,4	109
China							14	67
Europe							16	3
Russia							6.6	19
India							1,5	7

Source: OECD, data for 2024*

The apparent catalyst for this impact is the interplay of investigation space programs with military technology through the usage of rocket propulsion and satellites – declassified military improvements flow into the civilian sector, in return technological data drive the improvement of weapons, reconnaissance and mobility systems of the armed forces [2].

The Military Meaning of Space

Space militarisation, peculiarly by China, gained considerable attention in literature and became an increasingly worrying subject in global governance [7]. China's ambitions to become a planet power and to strengthen its military capabilities through space-related investigation are constantly highlighted [8] in Chinese economical strategies, state papers and defence institutions of the PRC. This includes the dominance of Chinese state enterprises (SOEs) in the production and distribution of space resources, with emphasis on the nonsubjective of building public awareness of improvement and the resulting pride, and the world-class military and its global operational capabilities. In addition, China's activities are in line with the wider trend of large powers, the USA, Russia and France, developing their military capabilities through advanced technology to militarize space [8] [9].

Why is that important? The Military Meaning of Space

The militarisation of space creates a scope of opportunities for the countries taking it. The most crucial of the already available are [10]:

• Orbital reconnaissance: satellites are free from air reconnaissance problems – coverage limitations, pilot/vehicle vulnerability to shooting down. For intelligence purposes, optical and radar photography (mainly SARs – radars with synthetic aperture; reflection of moving objects, aircraft, terrain through clouds and in unfavourable weather) or infrared scan (detecting rocket launch and testing, vehicle and ship drives) are used.
• Communication: Satellite connectivity is immune to Earth's crises, limitations in infrastructure and site sculpture. From outer space it is possible to carry out secret communication with the most valuable resources: submerged submarines, ultimate management, another satellites, units during the mission.
• Navigation and positioning: Navigation orbital constellations (GPS, Galileo, Beidou, GLONASS) enable global, precise positioning and timing for troops and institutions, including the ability to accurately control fire and logistics.
• Early Warning: Satellites can detect launching ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles at advanced altitude and inform against strategical attack.
• Combating cyberattacks: Isolated satellite channels can be utilized to supply delicate government networks with cyberattack protection by transmitting data encryptedly and independently from another infrastructures.
• Research: Satellites in geostationary or distant space orbits can carry out technological measurements of military-technology significance, e.g. meteorology, investigation on fresh materials or innovative telecommunications.
• Kinetic weapons: In advanced form, spacecraft, hypersonic orbital missiles or huntsman satellites can destruct hostile space infrastructure.

All these tools may be utilized to supply advantage, get information about the opponent, weaken or impede its strategical actions [11].

Chinese sword in space

Fig. 1. The campus of Beijing University of Aviation and Space Beihang (photo: K. Karwowski)

Chinese word hángtiān (航天chin. navigating/sailing across the sky) refers not only to flights into space, but besides to rocketry and the full rocket technology and related to rocket weapons. According to ASPI reports, all Chinese Aviation and Space Universities and Aviation Departments of the best polytechnics (so-called 7 Sons of National Defence) are associated with the improvement of inventions of dual, civil-military destiny (dual-use). China itself calls the close cooperation of high-tech business with the army a "civil-military fusion" [12] [13] [14]. planetary astronomy since 2022 treated as a strategical discipline—an effort to make it a first class discipline. The close scrutiny of PhDs and researchers in this area indicates Chinese concerns about influence and espionage in this technological field [13] [15] [19].

The People's Liberation Army. Space component.

General-Major Cai Fenzhen of the Military Sciences Academy and General Liu Jixian of the Air Force are liable for the foundations of doctrine [11] [16]. Both since 2006 correctly foretell the existence of alleged informatics (信息化战争) and technologically supported (技术辅助战争) war activities. On the foundation of their theory, China has been building capabilities since 2015, erstwhile the People's Liberation Army (ALW) has separated the strategical Support Force (PLASSF) liable for carrying out activities “under computerized conflict conditions”. These forces, as an independent type, were divided into 3 formations in 2024 [17]:

• Information Support Force (PLAISF);
• Cybersecurity Forces (PLACSF);
• Aerocosmic Forces (PLAASF).

The improvement showed, on the 1 hand, the request to act in a more specialised way, on the another hand, the direction and area of interest of China in the area of securitisation of the Earth's orbit and deeper space [2].

Figure 2. Decision-political strategy of the space programme of the PRC (Development of K. Karwowski) [18]

China's capability in space

In addition to the empowerment and precedence of the cosmos in Chinese military doctrine, the already existing capabilities developed by the Chinese in fresh years – especially after 2003 [17] [18] [19] should be discussed.

• Satellite designation and monitoring of Earth [20] [21]

China can usage spy satellites placed around the Earth to monitor another countries' military activities, including deployment of troops, defensive installations and fleet traffic. China has an active satellite program that includes exploratory satellites capable of monitoring military activities in another countries. Their surveillance strategy allows tracking the deployment of troops, defence installations and fleet traffic. The Chinese satellite program is the foundation of Beijing's ability to carry out activities within the multilayer strategical designation architecture. The key component of this strategy is the constellation Yaogan (遥感 chinese. distant detection), forming the core of Chinese orbital intelligence (signal and imaging depending on the function of individual satellites), which uses both optical sensors and SAR radars, allowing monitoring of targets in all weather conditions and recognition of electronic signals of enemy marine units. This is complemented by a series of Gaofen (高分 chinese. advanced resolution), which although formally functions within the civilian Chinese advanced Resolution Earth reflection strategy (CHEOS), provides military images of critical operational importance with a submeter resolution (less than 1 m resolution) of imaging, perfect for precise mapping of defence installations and critical infrastructure.

The strategy plays a key function in strategical warning Qianshao (前哨chin. Przyczółka/Plakowka), which focuses on detecting ballistic rocket launch and monitoring electromagnetic activity in geostationary orbits. China besides develops specialized constellations specified as Zhang Heng (张衡 – the name of the Chinese philosopher, geographer and inventor of the first seismograph), who despite his technological facade associated with the monitoring of the earth's crust and atmosphere, has the possible to detect anomalies generated by submarines, shelters and underground structures or monitor the effects of atomic weapons tests. The full architecture is supported by innovative projects focusing on real-time communication and data processing technologies, which drastically shortens the decision cycle from mark detection to data transfer to impact units. specified a network allows the PRC to proceed to supervise key theatres, with peculiar emphasis on the Indo-Pacific region.

• Communication [22]

The efficiency of the Chinese designation strategy is inextricably linked to the construction of a reliable data transmission infrastructure, in which the constellation plays a central function Tianlian (天链chin. The Heavenly Chain). Acting as a relay satellite strategy in geostationary orbit, Tianlian is the backbone of the cosmic communications network, allowing for an almost continuous transfer of data between low orbit reconnaissance satellites (LEOs) and command centres on Earth, eliminating the limitations resulting from the request to fly over native ground stations. This real-time retransmission capability is crucial for operational command, allowing instant transmission of images from satellite networks Yaogan–Gaofen straight to decision-makers, which in the war doctrine of the PRC represents a predominance in the velocity of closing the decision loop (kill chain). The Chinese satellite navigation strategy itself Beidou (北斗 chinese. large Bear) besides exhibits dual-use potential, mainly for precise positioning, navigation and timing for Chinese armed forces, improving their ability to operate in areas with mediocre navigation infrastructure and guidance of weapons systems specified as rockets, conventional ballistic missiles, atomic forces.

• Space Situational Consciousness [23] [24]

China's approach to space situation awareness (SSA) is inextricably linked to the national safety paradigm and the pursuit of full data sovereignty. The State of the mediate has developed a specific, highly hybridized operating model, which is based on close synergies between armed forces, technological centres (observatories, telecommunications centres) and state SOEs. Although originally these competences were embedded in the structures of the ALW strategical Support Force, the current improvement dispersed them between the Aerocosmic Force and the ALW Information Force. As part of this strategy, Beijing focuses on respective key priorities. First of all, it strives to closely monitor Western activity, following both military and civilian orbital objects. In parallel, China is building its own safety architecture for critical infrastructure, placing peculiar emphasis on protecting the global strategy Beidou. In order to increase its detection capacity, the PRC is intensively developing a global network of ground and space sensors, an example of which is constellation construction Xingyan (星眼chin. Star Eye) and implementation of technological missions specified as Shiyan 27 (实验 china. Experiment). The eventual nonsubjective of these activities is to completely destruct dependence on Western technology and to become dominant in creating fresh global method regulations on safety in space.

• Satellite demolition [25] [22]

Parallel to the improvement of reflection systems, China is intensively developing offensive capabilities called anti-satellite weapons (ASAT). They are a key part of their strategy of deterring and possibly paralyzing the enemy's resources. RPO technologies (Rendezvous and Proximity Operations) implemented by alleged satellites-inspectors (perhaps in the future satellites-hunters), capable of straight approaching another objects in orbit for inspection, interception or physical damage. The satellite series plays a peculiar function in this context Shijian (实践 Chinese. Practice), officially serving technological purposes and technological tests specified as cleaning space debris. However, technological demonstrations in which these units (e.g. Shijian 17 is Shijian 21) usage robotic arms to capture and transport inactive satellites, give emergence to the concern of experts, suggesting their dual-use as precise tools for neutralising abroad infrastructure – the possible for e.g. pushing western satellites into useless cemeteries or bringing into the atmosphere. In combination with ground-fired kinetic rocket tests and the improvement of disruptive systems, the ASAT Chinese arsenal creates a palette of capabilities to challenge western dominance in space in the first phase of possible conflict.

Attention should be paid to the increasing problem of space debris. China is increasingly moving distant from primitive methods of kinetic demolition of objects for sophisticated hybrid aggression. Created by ASAT attacks, debris clouds endanger all space users – in the same Chinese. Now, having its own space station and building giant satellite constellations, Beijing sees space debris as a direct threat to its own infrastructure and billions of investments. For this reason, Chinese doctrine evolves towards actions "below the threshold of war", specified as precise signal interference, cyber attacks on control systems or physical, but destructive manipulations in the future – "quite neutralisation" of hostile satellites without generating fresh shrapnel. This model allows China to paralyze its opponent's resources while maintaining the purity of its orbit, which has become a critical economical and military resource for them [30].

• Flying personnel, space station personnel [24] [26]

A complement to the Chinese model of cosmic force is the strict control over the corps of taikonuts (Chinese astronauts from Chinese. 太空人), which until 2023 had a purely military character. Traditionally, all flight crew members came from the ALW Air Force ranks, which means that all Chinese astronaut was an active officer, formed by rigorous flight training and straight subject to military structure and command ideology. Though with the mission Shenzhou 16 In 2023 and the establishment of the 4th selection group in 2024, civilian cargo specialists and engineers from academic centres, the operational core of the space station began to be included in the program. Tiangong (天宫/天宫空间站chin. The Orbital Station of the Heavenly Palace) remains the military domain. Even civilian researchers operate in a strategy profoundly integrated with the army, and mission commanders stay invariably experienced military pilots. This individual model besides brings to head the smooth implementation of dual-scientific and defensive tasks within the single chain of command.

• Microplane Space [22] [27] [28]

Another key component of Chinese dominance strategy is improvement Shenlong (神龙 Chinese. Divine Dragon) is simply a mysterious, unmanned microplane space reusable. This machine, frequently referred to as a Chinese space shuttle and being the functional equivalent of the American Boeing X-37B, is an crucial link in the ARW's quest to gain full operational freedom in orbit. Shenlong is an autonomous shuttle carried vertically at the top of a rocket (usually Long March 2F) or launched under the wings of a strategical bomber that returns to Earth and lands horizontally on the runway after the mission is completed. Although its specification is classified, it is estimated to have a plan allowing it to be in space for hundreds of days. Since 2020, the vehicle has already carried out at least 3 missions, the longest of which lasted 276 and 268 days respectively (completed in September 2024). During flights Shenlong demonstrated the ability to advanced orbital maneuvers, including tallness changes and inclinations (prone to the equator) of the orbit. Officially, Beijing declares that the task serves peaceful research, but the operational structure and engagement of the ARW indicate military targets. Shenlong can service as a mobile reconnaissance platform, a combat micro-loader or a tool to test technology to avoid detection by Western systems.

• Hypersonic gliders [29]

Project improvement Shenlong there were most likely attempts that China conducted on 27 July and 13 August 2021 2 launch tests of objects that remained in orbit for about 100 minutes (possibly longer missions), after which they returned with a supersonic glider flight and crashed in Sichuan. US services identified tests as possible demonstrations of suborbital hypersonic weapons (conventional and possibly nuclear).

The Future

In conclusion, Chinese space capabilities have evolved towards a comprehensive, militarized ecosystem that challenges the existing order in orbit. Their foundation is simply a hybrid structure (civil-military fusion, Chinese SSA) allowing precise monitoring of western operations in orbit, and an offensive anti-satellite arsenal, covering both kinetic systems and sophisticated "satellite-hunters".

Looking to the future, the Chinese expansion goes far beyond the low Earth's orbit, aiming to strategically master the cislunar space between Earth and the Moon. The exploration of the Silver Globe is not just a prestigious race for Beijing, but an effort to take advantage of the strategical positions that can be utilized in the future to deploy resources and orbital motion control systems. The dominance in these areas promises access to breakthrough technologies and information – which will dramatically increase the effectiveness of monitoring the opponent and safe Chinese sovereignty [30]. China's military usage of space presents a global community with complex challenges that combine global safety with the legal and social dimension. Even ambitious technological missions become a forward-looking component of a zero-sum game, where the acquisition of groundbreaking investigation data straight translates into a military advantage on Earth. In this fresh reality space ceases to be simply a sphere of discipline and becomes a key operational domain in which China, through innovation, seeks to impose its own rules [31] [32].

In the face of the increasing rivalry of the powers, the key advice for Poland is to accelerate the construction of sovereign capabilities in the space domain, which is simply a essential condition for maintaining the resilience of the state. Poland should give precedence to the improvement of national Earth reflection systems, specified as the constellation of PIAST microsatellites or the MicroGlob program, which let independent collection of intelligence without relying on allies exclusively. It is besides essential to actively monitor Chinese dual-use technologies, including net megaconstellations and anti-satellite systems [33], which can be tested or flown over Poland. Poland must besides search deeper integration with European safety structures, specified as the EU Space Surveillance strategy (EUSST). Investment in the national space sector should not be seen simply as a prestigious project, but as a strategical ‘buy list’ of the government. Only through synergies with the EU, NATO and the European Space Agency can Poland respond effectively to the challenges, securing its interests on the fresh orbital national safety front [34] [35].

Figure 3. Simulation of Chinese station Tiangong (source: CNSA Photo/Xinhua) [36]

* OECD sources are safe, yet conservative respect. It is worth remembering that real Chinese spending is hard to estimation due to civil-military merger.

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