No more impunity of the shadow fleet?

The border is beginning to move

The Swedish side's communications indicated that the activities active the request to check the method condition of the ship whose crew reported the engine failure. However, the fact that Adler was subject to sanctions remained in the background, which automatically gave the full case a dimension beyond regular shipping safety checks. In practice, this meant that boarding was not only a reaction to the possible threat to maritime traffic, but besides part of the enforcement of global restrictions imposed on Russian entities.

“When the ship enters our waters in this way, we have the right to check what is on board – so Martin Höglund, spokesperson for the Swedish Customs Administration, explained why the Swedish services decided to inspect Adler. The unit proved to be clean and was released on 22 December.

Until now, European countries have avoided direct action against Russian merchant ships, limiting themselves to financial, administrative and pressures on the insurance and port sectors. However, Adler's intervention has shown that this boundary is beginning to move. Even if the formal reason was a failure, the decision to board a sanctioned unit itself was a clear signal that tolerance to Russian shipping operations was decreasing significantly.

Säpo's involvement, the national safety service, was peculiarly important. Its presence indicated that the Adler case was seen not only in method or customs terms but besides as a possible strategical threat. In this sense, the incidental was part of a broader debate in the Baltic Sea region, where attention is increasingly paid to the operation of Russian vessels operating on and sometimes completely outside the border of law.

Under the inexpensive flags

The force on the Russian energy transportation network has been expanding for months. This is the network – frequently referred to as ‘Shadow floats’ “It is increasingly at the centre of the attention of Western countries and Ukraine, which treats it as part of the Russian war effort.

In practice, the concept of "shadow float" refers not to one, formally defined entity but to a distributed network of ships which, following sanctions on the Russian energy sector, have taken over the burden of oil and petroleum transport.

"The shadow fleet ships are being utilized by Russia to circumvent sanctions and proceed to finance their oil exports, which undermines the efforts of Western states to reduce Moscow's influence on energy resources," said Winston Peters, fresh Zealand's head of diplomacy in October.

These are mostly old, frequently changing owners and flags, operating on or completely outside the global regulations. Their common feature is limited transparency, both in terms of ownership and the actual scope of their activities.

The mechanics of operation of this fleet is based on bypassing key elements of the trading control system. Ships are registered under alleged low-cost flags, belong to companies established in low-transparency jurisdictions, and their operators frequently rename units and home ports. In many cases, these tankers quit the services of reputable classification societies and insurers associated with Western markets, which allows them to avoid restrictions resulting from sanctions, but besides increases method and environmental risks.

One of the most commonly utilized tools is manipulating the AIS automatic recognition system. Disabling transponders, giving false positions or changing port data make it hard to monitor actual routes. These activities are complemented by ship-to-ship cargo transfers carried out in global waters or in under-supervised areas specified as the east Mediterranean and Black Sea areas. It is at these points that oil changes the ‘identity’, then reaching customers in Asia, Africa or the mediate East.

The scale of the phenomenon remains the subject of dispute. Estimates vary according to methodology, but maritime marketplace analysts indicate hundreds of units that have been included in this informal strategy in fresh years. any operate regularly on routes from Russian Baltic and Black Sea ports, others appear occasionally, depending on the request and level of control in the region.

End of safe zones

In fresh months Ukraine has begun to treat these ships not only as a legal or economical problem, but as a legitimate operational objective. A series of attacks were recorded at the turn of November and December, erstwhile Ukrainian unmanned, most commonly referred to as Sea Baby, hit at least 3 units associated with Russian networks of sanctions avoidance.

The first of these strikes took place on 28 November 2025. According to communications from the safety Service of Ukraine (SBU) and media reports, 2 tankers from the Russian shadow fleet – Kairos and Virat – were hit by Ukrainian sea drones in the northern part of the Black Sea. Both ships sailed towards the Russian port fresh Russian with the intention of loading oil or petroleum products, but at the time of impact they were empty and ran with the transponders off, making it hard to track them.

Kairos, which was located about 28 nautical miles off the Turkish coast, suffered serious harm and ignited, and the full 25-member crew was evacuated by Turkish naval services. Virat was hit the next morning and damaged above the waterline, but continued to float on the water.

A fewer days later, on December 10, Ukrainian drones again hit the Russian tanker from the shadow fleet. The Dashan unit, flying the flag of the Comoros, was hit in the economical region of Ukraine close Crimea while headed for the port of Novorosyjsk with the AIS strategy disabled. Recordings published by Ukrainian sources showed explosions in the rear of Dashan's hull which caused its ‘critical damage’, which was to exclude the ship from operation.

Moreover, Ukrainians seemingly grow theatre activities. A clear signal of this change was the attack carried out in the Mediterranean on 19 December. Qendil, operating in global waters, more than 2,000 km from Ukraine, was then hit. According to the information provided by sources in SBU, the attack utilized drones that hit the ship, causing serious hull harm and a applicable shutdown of the unit.

At the time of the attack, the tanker was empty, which reduced the hazard of pollution, but the incidental itself had a clear demonstration dimension, showing that Ukrainian actions against the Russian shadow fleet were no longer limited to the Black Sea. The attack in the Mediterranean besides showed that Ukraine has the ability to identify and plan operations outside the direct theatre of war. This required not only adequate method means, but besides access to information on ship routes, their owners and links to the Russian energy sector.

For shipping marketplace observers, this was a signal that anonymity, on which the fleet of shadows was based for a long time, was becoming increasingly illusory. For Russia, this incidental meant the failure of another comparative safety area. To date, the Mediterranean has remained a space where Russian tankers and transport ships could operate without fear of direct military action by Ukraine.

A fleet pushed out of the shadows

However, the force on the Russian shadow fleet is not limited to actions taken straight by Ukraine. At the same time, the second stream of influence, implemented by the Kiev support countries and global institutions, which, although acting by another methods, prosecute the same objective: to hinder the operation of a network of ships bypassing sanctions and to rise the costs of their operation to a level which will make this work little profitable.

Increased port and coastal controls have become 1 of the most visible instruments. Countries on the Baltic Sea, North Sea and Mediterranean Sea began to look much more closely at vessels calling at their ports or flowing through delicate waters. Not only the method condition of ships is checked, but besides the cargo documentation, ownership structure of shipowners and compliance of cruises with applicable sanctions. Although formally within the framework of maritime law, these actions are increasingly affecting individuals associated with Russian oil exports.

Western insurers, banks and financial institutions are increasingly pressured to avoid any link to the transport of Russian natural materials carried out in violation of sanctions. At the same time, sanctioning lists covering not only ships, but besides their owners, operators and financial intermediaries are being extended.

In fresh months, sanctions have increasingly been imposed on circumstantial vessels under exotic flags that previously remained outside the interest of supervisory authorities. For the shadow fleet, this means the request for further changes in names, flags and ownership structures, which increases operating costs and limits the anticipation of long-term voyage planning.

In this context, intelligence cooperation and exchange of information between countries supporting Ukraine are increasingly important. Monitoring of voyage routes, analysis of ship-to-ship transfers and recognition of ownership links let for an increasingly fast consequence to attempts to circumvent sanctions. The fleet of shadows, which has enjoyed distraction and anonymity for a long time, gradually loses this advantage.