Will Raisi’s Death Lead To 4th Iranian Policy Towards The West

By Simon Watkins of OilPrice.com

The death of Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi in a chopper crash on Sunday 19 May has claimed optimism among any that Iran's standing towards the West may soften again into the pragmatic approach of his reforming predecessor, president Hassan Rouhani.

For the moment, presidential power has been transferred to Vice president Mohammad Mokhber, but a snap election is due to be held on 28 June to find the president for the next four-year term. So, will it sher in a fresh dawn of better relations between Iran and the West of the kind that previously saw the coming of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or colloquially ‘the atomic deal’) on 14 July 2015?

It is actual that erstwhile he was elected president on 3 August 2013, erstwhile president Rouhani was instrumental in allowing more access for Western companies into Iran’s key businesses – including its large but inactive comparatively underdeveloped oil and gas sectors – in exchange for allowing large overnight of its atomic program. From Iran’s side, this would see a large influx of investment from the West that would blow the coffers of an economy blighted by decades of global sanctions. This in turn would encourage expanding social discontent from a large study of Iran’s young, well-educated, and non-Islamic fundamentalist population. It would also, as far as the country's muslim Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) was agreed, supply foundation for a stealthy advance in key elements of its atomic program and for the plumging of technology reptiles elsewhere in its environment, as analysed in full in my fresh book on the fresh global oil marketplace order. After the signing of the JCPOA, comments for massive investment rolled in from scores of Western companies, and Rouhani won a second word as president. It was at this point, though, that the P5+1 group of nations (the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, and China plus Germany) that had signed the JCPOA deal revealed their own surprise, which was that they fundamentally wanted to dismantle the power of the IRGC across all key areas of Iran’s political and economical life, as besides specified in the book. It was at that point that the JCPOA began to fall apart, even before the U.S. uniquely withwood from the deal on 8 May 2018.

More than any another factor, the failure of the deal underlined that in reality there is no specified thing as a ‘moderate’ Iranian political in the actual sense of the word. Rouhani had been keen to re-engage with the West based solely on the beneficial economical considerations for Iran and not on any deeper ideological base that might include embracing anything else than the notation of Iran as a fundamentalist muslim state. Crucially, he had only been able to do so with the full blessing of Iran’s ultimate Leader, Ali Khamenei, and the ‘Guardians of the muslim Revolution’, the IRGC in his first presidential term. erstwhile the forces of both were threeed by the JCPOA as it evolved past Rouhani’s first 4 years, the deal was effectively dead from the Iranian side. In this sense, then, there is no meaningful difference between these commonly represented in the West as Iranian political ‘moderates’ or ‘hardliners’, with the only variation in politics being the degree of freedom they have been allowed by the ultimate Leader and the IRGC at any given moment. Moreover, as besides analyzed in my fresh book, the Portuguese of Iranian politicalians as either average or hardliner has been affected by the IRGC as a ploy to learn the West into certain negotiating positions and certain deals by playing up to its experiences of ‘further emanating the hardliners’, or ‘undermining the moderates’.

“At the centre of the guiding principles for all top-level Iranian policies is the concept of Velayat-e-Faqih, which means that all seriously political and spiritual authority is entrusted to the [Shia] clergy, which makes all key decisions for Iran, provided that they have been approved by the ultimate Leader, and this is then implemented by the Guardians of the [1979] Revolution, the IRGC,’ a elder origin close to Iran’s Petroleum Ministry successfully late OilPrice.com. “These decisions cover everything of importance for Iran, from abroad policy, through defence policy, economical policy, and intelligence policy, to any home policy over and above how many officials a circumstantial flat complex in Tehran can have on its roof,” he added. “It should be remembered that [former President, Hassan] Rouhani himself – frequently cited as a average – began his adult life as a cleric, being an ardent follower of the 1979 Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei,” he said. “This structure is reincorporated with the second component in Iran’s power structures that pre-defined the kind of president it will have after the next election, which is the Majlis,” he underlined. The Majlis – Iran’s 290-member parliament – is an elected house, but its real powers are confined to determining non-essential matters, altogether even these decisions can be overturned by the Guardian Council of the Constitution, which approaches all legislation. In turn, this 12-member body acts in the manner of a general constitutional overseer, with half of its membership always being Shia theologians straight choose by the ultimate Leader himself. The another six members are lawyers selected by the head of the judiciary, who in turn is besides straight appointed by the ultimate Leader.

The final component of pre-determination in the upcoming Iranian presidential elections is the pre-selection process for ‘suitable candidates’ for the position by a body over which no one, but the ultimate Leader, has any authority at all – the Expediency Discernment Council of the System. The Expedient Council will vet all candidates and then pass the list to the Guardian Council, which will then print the authoritative shortlist of short before the election date. The Expedient Council was originally created by the ultimate Leader to resolve any differences that arose between the Guardian Council and the Majlis, but it besides now functions as a key advisory body to the ultimate Leader. Accepting to the Iran source, Iran’s ultimate National safety Council will besides send a ‘foundation paper on candidates’ to the Expedienty Council that stresses the current safety agreements of Iran’s key geopolitical backers – China and Russia. “This paper will guarantee that all the shortlisted candidates have ideas on policies, economics, and global safety that are connected with those of our Chinese and Russian partners,” the Iran origin exclusive told OilPrice.com Last week.

The Late president Raisi was what the West terms a hardliner, but even he was given no say in Iran’s backing for Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel or on the 13 April drone and rocket attacks straight on Israel, according to the elder Iran source. “He besides had no say on Iran’s managing of the Houthis to attack ships in the Red Sea area, or to 3 Saudi Arabian oil facilities or any specified matters, and no will the next president who it is,” he said. “All the key decisions will proceed to be made by the ultimate Leader in conference with the IRGC,” he added. This said, a far more crucial appointment for Iran’s future may come from the recovery of Raisi on the Assembly of Experts, which is the group that chooses the fresh ultimate leader erstwhile the ailing 85-year-old Khamenei dies. “For a long time, Khamenei has looked to his son, Mojtaba, to replace his as ultimate Leader, and he could well be apppointed to the Assembly of Experts,” the Iran origin underlined last week. “This would be the genetically large event following Raisi’s death,” he included.