US attack on Venezuela: Maduro captured! Facts and consequences

thefad.pl 3 weeks ago

On the night of Saturday to Sunday, the United States conducted a coordinated operation in Venezuela's territory, hitting targets in Caracas and respective another cities. U.S. president Donald Trump announced that Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores were detained and transported to fresh York City where they are to hear the charges. This is simply a minute that can decision the crossover in hemispheric politics and test the boundaries of global order.

Nicolas Maduro on board the USS Iwo Jima. pic.twitter.com/omF2UpDJhA

— The White home (@WhiteHouse) January 3, 2026

What happened that night?

Relations with Caracas talk about a series of explosions, power outages, and attacks on military facilities, and power facilities. Venezuelan authorities have declared an emergency and called on loyalist structures to "defensive mobilisation". Washington claims that the operation had been prepared for months and was ‘precise’ and Maduro's detention took place in the course of peculiar operations. Disinformation recordings and photos began to circulate online, a part generated by AI tools, which further obscures the image of the first hours after the attack.

An urgent UN safety Council gathering was held today. In the capitals of the region there is simply a tense crisis diplomacy and European governments print positions between calls for a political solution and criticism of the usage of force. Security, access to fuel and continuity of public services in affected cities stay key for citizens.

Why now: Criminal Law, Oil and Geopolitics

The legal subject has been ready for years. U.S. law enforcement authorities keep drug and transnational crime-related indictments against Maduro. This gave a political framework for the "snatch and grab" operation, although this structure remains highly controversial from an global point of view. In the energy dimension, Venezuela has the largest documented oil resources and its export, after periods of sanctions and partial relaxation, has returned to play in a global mix. In Washington, there has been a increasing belief that the "sanction policy without end" has no effect, and the window of chance closes with a dense network of support for Caracas from Russia and Iran.

Geopolitically, the operation has a signal dimension. The U.S. makes it clear that the era of purely financial whips and diplomatic notes is over. Hence specified sharp responses in Latin America and Europe, where the fundamental question returns: whether the fight against transnational crime and the defence of regional governance can justify a violation of the prohibition of force against a sovereign state. This contradiction will fuel disputes in the UN and in Parliament for weeks.

Shadow of Beijing and “arm of shadows”

Although Washington's attention focuses on Moscow and Tehran, the hardest chess game will be played with Beijing. China is the largest creditor of Caracas; oil-paying debt was a pillar of the relation and securing multi-billion-dollar loans. U.S.-declared export control is simply a blow to Chinese energy and financial interests. Beijing's logical consequence will not be military but diplomatic and economic: force on the safety Council, caution in recognising the fresh administration and signals on the markets that safety contracts for deliveries to Asia stay binding. If Washington in practice makes it hard to receive a “ropo-rat”, the dispute will decision to courts and arbitration forums.

At the same time, removing the leader does not disassemble the system. "Colectivos" – armed, semi-legal groups loyal to the Bolivian Revolution – controls part of the barrios and can paralyze metropolises. Any effort to install "transitional management" without neutralising these structures threatens to transform the capital into a theatre of long-term urban fighting. Under these conditions, the technological advantage shrinks rapidly and the "precision operation" turns into bloody stabilisation.

Legality: between the NZ Card and War Powers

Article 2(4) The United Nations Charter prohibits threats and uses of force against the territorial integrity and political independency of states. The exception is self-defense or the mandate of the safety Council. Washington may effort to trust on an extended explanation of self-defense against transnational threats and on American indictments, but under global law it is simply a rough ground. From the U.S. law point of view, the dispute over the President's mandate remains open: the current AUMF does not include Venezuela, and War Powers Resolution requires notification and limits the duration of action without Congress' consent. In practice, there is simply a conflict for legality that will rapidly become a political dispute.

Humanitarian account and migration

Venezuela was already in a humanitarian crisis before the operation: collapse of public services, shortages of medicines, long-term escape of citizens. Any breach of energy supply and food chains can trigger a fresh migratory impulse. Colombia and Brazil will be the most burdened, then Trinidad and Tobago, and then Central America. This is the argument that opponents of the operation usage most loudly: the destabilisation of 1 country can translate into force on the borders of the full continent within days. If the transition plan does not take into account humanitarian corridors and backing of basic services, the wave of escapes will become a political fact.

Fog of War 2.0: AI, deepfake and the first 48 hours

Disinformation is no longer a background noise, but an operational tool. erstwhile there is inactive no hard evidence from the court, and the first images “from detention” are generated by the AI, single deepfakes can trigger real reactions on the streets: from apparent calls to opposition to false “capitulation statements”. The first 48 hours are the time erstwhile field commanders and civilians trust most on social media; this is where the information advantage and reliable sources decide. all further dementation comes besides late, and correction seldom pursues an impression.

Venezuela after Maduro? organization strength versus street power

Taking out a leader doesn't solve an institution crisis. The economy remains fragile, the safety apparatus is shredded with loyalty, and the state-owned PDVSA has been facing investment collapse for years. The constitutional succession leads formally to the vice president, but the real arrangement of forces will depend on the attitude of armies and services. Local revolts and sabotage of energy infrastructure may happen in the crack scenario. In the loyalty script – a protracted impasse, guerrilla and hazard of political “freezing” under the umbrella of abroad presence.

Oil and Markets: hazard premium and title dispute

The specified announcement that the US will "provisionally steer" the export of Venezuelan oil raises the hazard premium. In practice, this means a dispute over title, state immunity and contract enforcement, from the Orinoko Belt to the refineries in the Gulf of Mexico. Traders will respond to any incidental in Venezuela and the Caribbean, and charter companies will start calculating sanctions and insurance risks. If there is an effort to usage CITGO-related assets as a political lever, we are facing a long legal war that will keep an increased volatility in quotations.

Region and the World: a test of rules

Colombia and Brazil are afraid of spreading chaos across borders, and Caribbean states are returning to dispute over the boundaries of the "war on drugs" and the presence of US fleets. Europe faces a dilemma: how to combine dislike of the Maduro government with defending the rules of global law. Russia and Iran condemn the attack and signal support for Caracas, while Beijing calculates how to safe its claims without escalation. Whatever the declaration, it will not be a short story; its dimension will find the ability to build a broad mandate and the pace of real reconstruction of the state's institutions.

What's next: 3 scenarios and 1 constant

The first script is simply a fast political transition with global supervision and a "stabilization package" for the oil sector. The second is simply a protracted tense game: a dispute over legality in the UN and in the U.S. Congress, negotiations with any elites in Caracas, and persistent instability on the streets. The 3rd is escalation: sabotage of infrastructure, retaliatory attacks, and the creation of a grey region that will impede any election. There is 1 constant: without a political and financial plan, this crisis will not end in fast victory, and the cost of mistakes will be borne primarily by Venezuelans.

DF, thefad.pl / Source: Reuters; Associated Press; The Guardian; CBS News; Sky News; EBU/AFP fact-check

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