Meeting in Tokyo: Dmowski and Piłsudski – a imagination duel in the shadow of war

In July 1904, at the another end of the world, in the capital of Japan, there was an event that became past as 1 of the most symbolic clashes of the 2 largest Polish political currents of the first half of the 20th century. Roman Dmowski and Józef Piłsudski – political antagonists, met twice in Tokyo. It wasn't just a conversation. It was a confrontation of the thought that weighed on the further destiny of Poland – the enslaved 1 and the 1 that was to be reborn.

The Russian-Japanese War, which began in February 1904, was a spark of hope for Polish political elites. erstwhile the carat entered into conflict with the dynamically developing Japan, the Polish political environment gave emergence to the thought: to exploit Russia's weakness for its own purposes.

Dmowski and Piłsudski, although agreed on the request to regain independence, represented completely different measures and strategies. Dmowski wanted to play the Polish issue internationally – legalistically, rationally, based on alliances and diplomacy. Piłsudski sought his way through armed action, uprising and sabotage.

The leader of the appointment left Europe in April 1904. Through Canada and the US, he reached Yokohama on May 15. He had talks with nipponese diplomacy from the beginning, offering intelligence and analysis on Russian military potential. Dmowski prepared 2 memorials in English for the nipponese general staff: 1 on the socio-political situation in Russia, the another on the Polish case. Thanks to them, the nipponese government made an appeal to Poles serving in the Russian army to abandon the tsarist ranks. Dmowski saw this as a real tool for weakening Russia from within.

In June Roman Dmowski visited a prisoner of war camp in Matsuyama on the nipponese island of Sikoku, where Polish soldiers were imprisoned during the Russian-Japanese war. Having learned of their destiny from General Kodam, Dmowski obtained approval from the nipponese authorities to visit. He departed Tokyo on June 17 and reached Matsuyama after a forty-four-hour train and ship trip. He was accompanied by Toshitsune Kawaka, a future MP of Japan in independent Poland. Poles stayed separately from the Russians in the Buddhist temple of Unshōji – initially 46 people, and before Dmowski's departure this number increased to 73. Dmowski interviewed them in Polish and prepared a report, published later in the series "Among the Prisoners in Japan". Matsuyama was the first prisoner of war camp created after the 1899 Hague Treaty, and Japan took care of an global image in terms of the treatment of prisoners.

Piłsudski arrived in Tokyo on July 10. Titus Filipovich accompanied him. Both wanted support to organize an anti-Russian uprising. They offered nipponese cooperation: sabotage of railways, attacks on garrisons and anti-car propaganda.

The first gathering took place accidentally – 11 July, on 1 of the Tokyo streets. Piłsudski came across Dmowski and offered to talk. The gathering took place 3 days later, on July 14, at the Metropol Hotel. The conversation lasted almost 9 hours. She was intense, full of emotion, but above all – she showed a completely different knowing of independence. However, we do not know the details, neither 1 of the interviewors has always made a public statement.

Dmowski most likely warned against the revolutionary movement. He felt that Poland, bleeding and deprived of institutions, would not bear the uprising. He proposed patiently building the position of the nation, acting by influences in the Russian parliament, working at the base and diplomatic designation of the Polish origin by the West. Piłsudski, in turn, believed that only the armed conflict could break the structure of the carat and lead to national awakening.

The nipponese were intrigued by Polish emissaries – both had something to offer. Dmowski gave access to analysis and geopolitical cognition about Russia. Piłsudski offered a real diversion. Colonel Motojirō Akashi, a nipponese intelligence officer, was peculiarly curious in Piłsudski's conspiracy – he even donated funds (estimated at 10,000 yen). But eventually, the nipponese MFA gave up a deeper commitment.

Why? Dmowski convinced them that the support of radicals could do more harm than good. The nipponese authorities did not want to make a precedent to support “wild national revolutions”. They played carefully. Their goal was to win with Russia, not chaos in Central Europe. After gathering Piłsudski, Dmowski sent a summary of his argument and informing against supporting revolutionary elements to Baron Jutarō Komura, the Minister of abroad Affairs of Japan.

The Russians, although not officially commenting, learned about the meetings. The Russian Embassy in Tokyo followed Piłsudski and was aware of his plans. Carat treated this as a margin—a revolutionary incident, not a systemic threat. Interestingly, the Japanese, although sympathetic to antipathy towards Russia, considered Dmowski a policy of predictable and professional – worth talking to.

In Europe, the gathering in Tokyo passed almost without an echo – at the time no of the heroes was yet a figure known in the salons of planet politics. However, among the emigration and conspiratorial environments, information about the nipponese mission rapidly ran around Polish environments – triggering emotions and deepening division. For PPS Piłsudski, Dmowski was a typical of the “national defect” – a collaborator of the Carat. For the endeks Piłsudski was an irresponsible hazard taker who exposed the future of the nation to repression.

In 2023, on the occasion of the anniversary of those events, the National thought Heritage Institute published the play "A Long Day in Tokyo" – a drama that brings this historical episode closer again, although the course of the conversation shown in the play is literary fiction. The play shows not only the characters, but besides the clash of ideas. alternatively of inexpensive symbolism – we get an in-depth image of political tension, clashing arguments, dramatic conflict.