Sitting on the edge

Indeed, 2024 ended with an exceptionally strong accent. Will events in Syria make the situation in the mediate East one more time go on?

But she has been standing on her head for a long time, and the fall of Assad's far-fetched situation has only further confused. 2 basic scenarios are possible. Syria may simply fall apart. Hajat-Tahir asz-Sham (HTS), an organization that has overthrown the Syrian regime, is simply a combination of various factions and nationalities. Among them are the Kurds who were in a tactical alliance with Asad. Will HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Jaulani manage this coalition in the following months? It's a truly large mystery. If peculiar interests happen in Syria, another civilian war will heat up. And the ecclesiastical powers don't gotta look at it idle. It is not hard to imagine that Turkey sends further subdivisions to Syria to yet deal with the KurdsAnd the Israeli army approaches Damascus. After all, Israel wants to safe its borders and to maximise the weakening of muslim militias. Nor should we forget the United States. Americans do not want to let extremist terrorist movements from the muslim State to be reborn in Syria. And ISIS can usage Syrian chaos to rebuild its influence.

Israel has indeed already begun armed action against Syria.

It's true. His troops seized Golan Hill, and respective days after the fall of Assad raids were started, targeting military magazines. Israel simply disarms Syria. This is simply a preventive action, although under global law it is hard to defend it. After all, Syria, although unstable and on the verge of decay, is inactive an independent state.

But the Syrian script does not should be negative for Israel. Asad's government was openly hostile to him, sympathizing with Iran. Hezbollah militias were rampant in Syria. And now the organization has taken over clearly into the old order reluctant. It is difficult, indeed, to anticipate an open relationship with Israel or the West – at last HTS in a consecutive line, although under a different name (Jabhat al-Nusra), originates from Al-Qaeda, but... we cannot regulation out that there will be any beneficial changes in Syria. possibly the country will become more unchangeable after more than a decade of chaos. Of course, it's all speculation, fortune-telling from the fuzes...

Meanwhile, Donald Trump, the American president of the elect, urges the X portal: “The United States should not get involved. This is no of our business!’ Is this a foreshadowing of what awaits us in his reign? Are we going to have a modern version of Monroe's doctrine? Recall, in the 19th century it became the basis of American isolationism.

I wouldn't go that far. The U.S. is present a global power that has interests worldwide. It is hard to imagine that it abruptly turns its back even from Southeast Asia. More importantly, the Americans will shortly become even more active there. In this context, it does not substance what kind of president sits in the White House. This process will be at the expense of another regions of the world, specified as Europe or the mediate East.

The mediate East has remained crucial for the US for decades due to oil and outbreaks of terrorism that could possibly endanger them. As far as oil is concerned, Americans step by step become self-reliant, expanding their extraction from their own deposits. According to Council on abroad Relations estimates, in 2023 oil production in the US first exceeded 13 million barrels a day, making the United States the largest maker of this natural material in the world. On the another hand, in the fight against terrorism, Washington is increasingly based on the alleged proxies – local actors, which it provides logistical and financial support. That was in Iraq and then Syria. Americans, of course, will not quit military presence in the mediate East, but the simplification in the number of armed forces is clearly visible. A akin trend can be observed in Europe. Donald Trump has repeatedly said that she should take greater work for her own safety. This does not mean that the United States will leave NATO behind its presidency or will liquidate its military bases in Europe overnight, but Trump will surely effort to increase the force on Germany, France or Italy to rise the force on arms. To a lesser degree this concerns Poland, which spends comparatively much money for this purpose. However, whether we want it or not, the US is becoming a increasing precedence – political and military – to be present in Southeast Asia and to compete with China.

TrumpLet it goUkraine?

I don't think so. Trump was in a hard situation. He publically announced that after taking office he would end the war within 24 hours, and that no 1 could do so. The Russians have gained an advantage on the front. They bear tremendous human and financial costs, but they are moving forward. How, then, can we force Putin to sit down and talk? Americans have a fewer more tricks up their sleeve. They may impose further sanctions on Russia, but that is not enough. In addition, it would be essential to persuade president Zelenski to donate parts of Ukrainian lands to Russia. For Zelenski himself, it is very uncomfortable, due to the fact that how could he explain to his own society that here he is moving smoothly from a policy of fighting for all metre of territory to a policy of concessions. Finally, the last thing – a situation where Putin in 1 form or another announces his victory, would be hard for Trump to accept for image reasons. Thus, the end of the war in 2025 is improbable to be expected.

Dr Wojciech Michnik, political scientist, assistant prof. at the Department of global Relations and abroad Policy of the UniversityJagielloński and editor of fresh east Europe.

Unless Ukraine without arms supplies falls Or the Russian economy won't stand for sanctions. Because, contrary to optimistic reports from the Kremlin, any analysts point to rising inflation and increasingly weaker ruble. Others, recalling the example of Syria and Assad, add that dictatorships frequently fall rapidly and unexpectedly.

Of course, specified a improvement cannot be excluded, but in my opinion, it is unlikely. Donald Trump, even if he importantly reduces military aid to Ukraine, will not retreat completely from it. At least not right away. The fall of Ukraine and, consequently, the increase in the importance of Russia is not in his favor. Similarly, the destabilisation of a Europe that could happen would be detrimental to Washington. for the failure of Ukraine. I presume that, ultimately, Trump will effort to more effectively encode the transfer of arms for Ukraine to European allies. And I don't think they're going to be able to walk past specified expectations. The current situation of Ukraine is undoubtedly difficult. However, even if the Ukrainians were to trust solely on aid from Europe, which has been maintained at the present level, and on the arms of their own production, while at the same time implementing Zelenski's ideas on expanding the number of recruits, they would be able to sustain themselves for another year. Of course, specified a script would be risky and unfavourable for both Ukraine and its European partners. More importantly, in the long word – in the two- or three-year position – it is not sustainable.

As far as Russia is concerned, it is indeed struggling with the increasingly annoying effects of war. However, it is hard to compare it to Syria. Above all, it has much more economical resources and China is besides behind it. The Beijing authorities, contrary to what Putin utilized to suggest, are not an unconditional ally of the Kremlin. It may even be hard to talk about an "unlimited partnership" due to the fact that this relation is based on unequal principles. Russia is increasingly dependent on China, but to any degree they have a common interest. It is the weakening of the United States and the West while expanding the importance of non-Western powers. Which is why I don't think China will let Russia fall. Beijing will not send its troops to Ukraine, but it will supply additional support to Russia if necessary.

For now, China is setting itself up for crises and wars as an observer and as mantra repeats calls for their deescalation and peace. On the another hand, they clearly indicate that they are ready for the armed annexation of Taiwan. Can they do that in 2025?

I don't think so. Paradoxically Taiwan can aid Trump's unpredictability. I'm convinced that, if necessary, Joe Biden's administration would besides be active in defending its Asian partner, but... there is simply a question of scale. The Chinese don't know how far Trump can go. They realize he's impulsive, and he seems much more vital than the current president. And in the calculations of authoritarian regimes, specified issues are important. Trump announced a return to the economical war with Beijing before taking office.

China will not quit its plans to take control of Taiwan, but they will gotta wait for a convenient opportunity. The window could open for them if, for example, Russia defeated Ukraine and then hybridly hit the NATO country. The US would necessarily gotta focus more on Europe and Beijing would have gained more freedom for a while. But, like I said, it's not going to happen anytime soon. Only the Chinese can wait.

So they wait, and under their side, another crisis ripens. Kim Jong Un, the dictator of North Korea, exacerbated rhetoric towards a confederate neighbor. In the Constitution, he ordered the entry of a evidence that South Korea calls an enemy state. On the another hand, things aren't good in Seoul either. president Yong Suk Yeol made an unsuccessful effort to introduce martial law, and in consequence the parliament removed him from office. Can war happen in the coming months?

I'd be skeptical here too. Watching further increases in tension on the Korean Peninsula, we should always ask ourselves what China thinks about a possible war. Would they want for open military action at their borders? Action, let's add, which would undoubtedly trigger Washington's reaction... In my opinion, no, due to the fact that the confrontation between the 2 Korean countries could be a origin of over-regional conflict. There are over 28,000 American soldiers stationed in South Korea. And that's not the end of it. For Biden's presidency, the US and South Korea reactivated high-level consultations on extended deterrence under the American atomic umbrella. They besides increased the scope and scale of combined military exercises, including involving Japan. Submarine ships capable of carrying atomic weapons began to appear more frequently around the Korean Peninsula, and the United States yet imposed fresh unilateral sanctions on North Korea.

So, although Kim Jong Un does quite a few irresponsible things, the Chinese and the Americans won't mess up at the same time. Thus, in the coming months, the Korean Peninsula can be expected to see further hits of the hybrid war, specified as in the form of hacker attacks or border provocations from the North Korean regime, but the conventional conflict, specified as in 1950–1953, will not happen.

YesWell,ifIt's goingo global security, shouldn't 2025 bring revolution?

There is small to be said, but Syria and the mediate East. But again, the situation in the planet is so complex and uncertain that in a fewer months today's calculations may not be worth much. Looking at this from our European perspective, we should not give in to the illusion that the fresh year will be safer than the old one. due to the fact that until the war in Ukraine ends on terms that are beneficial to this country, there will be no peace in Europe. And it could cost us a lot to be alert. There is specified an idiom in English – “to sit on the edge of a chair”. It means waiting. If we were to shift its importance to the ground of global policy, this “seat on the edge” could be interpreted as an increased anticipation of certain events, while being cautious and constantly ready to act. This is what European politicians and societies should do. Sit on the edge of a chair. To know that our situation is difficult. And that it could get worse at any time. We should be prepared for specified a anticipation now.

Dr Wojciech Michnik– political scientist, assistant prof. at the Department of global Relations and abroad Policy of the Jagiellonian University and editor of the fresh east Europe journal.