Russia prevents Ukrainian attacks on Russian atomic forces

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Thomas Röper anti-spiegel.ru/russland-verhindert-ukrainische-angriffe-auf-die-russischen-nuclearstreitkraefte

Playing with fire

Russia prevents Ukrainian attacks on Russian atomic forces

Ukraine again attempted to attack Russian atomic forces with respective terrorist cells, but Russian intelligence managed to prevent and arrest terrorists. If the attack had worked, the escalation of the atomic conflict could have been inevitable.

Anti-Spiegel 15 July 2026

About a year ago, Western euphoria media reported Ukrainian ‘Operation Spider’, in which Ukrainian terrorists smuggled over 100 drones into Russia and fired them from trucks to 4 airports owned by Russian atomic forces.

Reports differed on the consequences: Ukraine claimed to have damaged or destroyed many aircraft belonging to Russian atomic forces, while Russia claimed that the harm was limited.

Playing with fire

The problem with these attacks was that any Russian atomic forces were damaged, which justifies the atomic power's response. This is besides clearly recorded in the Russian atomic doctrine.

The reason is obvious: atomic forces are the last and final warrant of atomic security. If they are damaged, for example by damaging the essential early informing radars or transmission systems, the atomic power risks not being able to defend itself against atomic attack on equal terms.

The fact that Ukraine attacked Russian atomic forces last summertime – seemingly with approval and even support from the West – was so highly dangerous. How would the United States respond if Iran recruited terrorists in the US, equipped them with state-of-the-art combat drones, and they would then attack American atomic bombers at American airports?

The West seems to confuse Russia's patience with weakness, due to the fact that at the end of June Zelenski – without opposition from the West – promised Russia “40 days of hell”, claiming that Kiev will launch the Ukraine safety Service (SBU) operation. He did not give any details, but experts suspected that he meant terrorist attacks in Russia.

Operation Spider 2.0

Then it turned out to be a kind of "Operation Spider 2.0". There is virtually no information on the net in German, but search in English with the slogan "Spiderweb 2.0" gives any results.

And indeed, that seems to be the point, due to the fact that in fresh days the Russian national safety Service (FSB) has thwarted terrorist attacks by Ukrainian intelligence services on 3 military airports. These were Ukrainians over Amur, Shagol in the Chelabin region and the airport at Rostov nad Don.

The Ukrainian Air Base is simply a Russian long-range airport in the Far East, which was 1 of the objectives of the first Operation "The Spider" in June 2025. However, a truck carrying drones to the airport exploded while driving. After Operation “The Web” there were strategical bombers Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3 and Tu-160.

According to the FSB press office, thanks to early intelligence, the planned attacks were prevented and the full network of operations' brains was neutralized.

As part of the operation, Ukrainian safety services transported FPV drones equipped with warheads and mobile ground stations to the Brianian circuit. The transport took place in containers towed by drones and trap balloons. The combat drones were then masked as household equipment and transported further inland by cars with two-walled trailers. After reaching the site, drones were mounted in rented garages and prepared for combat use. However, the group was already under FSB observation, and everything was observed and recorded with hidden cameras.

During the operation, the perpetrators and their associates were detained and 24 FPV drones were secured. These drones were equipped with control modules based on neural networks originating in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Sweden and were resistant to electronic combat. Each warhead contained over a kilo of explosives. 2 mobile ground control stations were besides occupied. These stations could operate via satellites, mobile networks, Wi-Fi and radio, and were equipped with self-destruct devices, each containing 250 grams of explosives.

Both terrorist attacks were planned in parallel, but the perpetrators did not know each another and acted independently, receiving instructions from their commanders in Ukraine. Thanks to fast intervention by the safety forces, dozens were rescued, if not hundreds, soldiers and civilians, and the functioning of strategical objects was maintained.

Ukraine planned at least another terrorist attack on the Russian military airport because, as mentioned earlier, on 10 July the attack on Rostov-Central Airport was thwarted utilizing 13 drones powered by artificial intelligence. The Russian, whose Ukrainian safety services they intended to recruit, reported an effort to recruit for the FSB, and the operation was continued under the supervision of the FSB to gather more information about the people behind the attack.

"Recruited" Russian received an advance of over $3,500 for the planned attack. He was besides given the coordinates of the hiding place where he was to find the essential equipment and further instructions. The hideout was investigated by the FSB.

With respect to the plans that have now come to light, Russian experts say that the usage of high-tech weapons, transported into the country through the brian region, is peculiarly noteworthy, which suggests a well-organised logistics network, as transporting containers with explosive loads across the border utilizing drones and trap balloons, and then loading them into waiting trailers with double bottom for further transport, is no longer an improvised operation.

The drones were equipped with AI control modules that enabled them to find targets even if they lost contact with the operator. Moreover, the methods utilized in all operations were identical: trucks were to be utilized for the start of drones, and drones were in all cases mounted in rented garages or warehouses, and participants utilized instruction films.

Planned attacks on Ukraine's military airports and Shagol were besides detected by the FSB on time, even before the participants left the brian region with delicate cargo. They were so under constant supervision. According to experts, Ukrainian safety services spent $2 to 2.5 million on equipment and logistics.

In parallel, another terrorist attacks by Ukrainian safety services occurred. On July 9, safety forces reported a thwarted assassination of a high-ranking officer in Moscow Oblast, which resulted in the arrest of a Russian female born in 2001 and was charged with terrorism and treason.

These attacks were carried out in parallel. If "Operation Spider 2.0" were successful, German media would surely study it with the same enthusiasm as last year. However, since the operation seemingly failed, there are no reports of it in the German media.

After all, German public does not request to know everything...