Russia calmly accepts Trump's ultimatum on the war with Ukraine

14 July at a press conference with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte president of the United States Donald Trump announced a fresh support mechanics for Ukraine. Within its framework, European allies most likely: 1) could buy weapons and military equipment (UiSW) for Ukraine in the US arms industry, excluding the current order queue, 2) would hand over her own UiSW and rapidly buy this equipment in American armory, 3) They would pass on their own UiSW to Kiev, while the US would rapidly replenish Europe's shortcomings from their own resources, and then Europeans would finance the addition of U.S. stock. This applies primarily to Patriot systems, but besides to missiles and ammunition. Trump besides expressed his discontent with the negotiations with Vladimir Putin. He announced that if, within 50 days (until 2 September), a peace agreement with Ukraine was not reached, he would impose on Russia a double work of 100%, hitting the countries buying natural resources from it. The U.S. media quoted a later message by an anonymous White home typical suggesting that the US would impose 100% duties on trade with Russia and secondary duties of a more unspecified amount on its partners. In addition, Trump was affirmative about the chances of voting the legislature sanction law against the Russian Federation (FR), while pointing out that its ultimatum is independent of it and that the bill itself is not essential from its perspective.

A day later, on July 15, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Pieskov called the U.S. President's declarations serious and stated that Moscow was analyzing them. Similarly, the head of Russian diplomacy Sergey Lavrow, who ironically recalled that Trump had already pointed out different deadlines for ending the war. He besides stated that the U.S. leader is under a huge, "indecent" force from the EU and NATO to extend the conflict in Ukraine. In turn Deputy abroad Minister Aleksandr Gruszko expressed surprise that Trump's declarations were not addressed to Kiev, and felt that the West was not curious in supporting the peace agreement. Previously, Dmitri Medvedev, Deputy Head of the FR safety Council, called Trump's ultimatum "decorative", pointed to the disappointment of the European Union and stated that Russia had not noticed it. Russian parliamentarians and experts and propaganda media spoke in a akin way. Criticism about Trump (for continuing Joe Biden's policy and deficiency of force on Kiev) combined with the belief that his ultimatum would not affect Moscow's attitude, and Trump might change his head again.

Although Washington's decisions are unfavourable to Russia, due to their limited nature and doubts about implementation they will not change its aggressive attitude. The Kremlin is clearly dominated by the belief that, after 50 days, the deficiency of agreement and the continuation of aggression will not prompt Trump to take major action against the FR.

Comment

• Trump is increasingly skeptical of the success of the negotiations with Russia and of helping Ukraine more favourably, but 1 cannot talk about a breakthrough. The president of the United States is inactive acting conservatively – both with respect to Kiev's support and with respect to Moscow. Declared aid to Ukraine will not be financed by the Americans, even though more than $2 billion of appropriations made available to the President (PDA) as part of an aid package for this country, adopted in 2024. The implementation of the customs duties imposed in Russia and its trading partners has been postponed in turn in time and it is doubtful that the threat of their introduction would have led Putin to an agreement. Scala and tempo UiSW supply under the fresh mechanism – if utilized – they will affect Kiev's military potential. Currently You can see gradual failure of efficiency defence effort Ukraine, in peculiar in the area air defense. Stopping and Reversal of this trend will only be possible after reaching a akin supply scale as in the 1920s–2023.
• Trump's declarations are accepted with relief in Russia as they diverge from erstwhile media leaks suggesting much sharper US steps. In particular, the announcements of the President's support for the bill discussed in legislature giving the anticipation of imposing on states supporting the FR secondary duties of 500 % or possible deliveries to Ukraine of JASSM or Tomahawk rockets that could harm targets in Russia. This is evidenced by the increase in capitalization of the Moscow Stock Exchange (by 2.5%), observed immediately after the statements of the American President.
• Trump's decisions are problematic for Moscow as they possibly prolong Ukraine's opposition and distance the possible of normalising relations with the United States. The Kremlin clearly hoped to gradually halt supplies of U.S. arms to Kiev, convince the president of the United States that it was the Ukrainian capital that was liable for the failure of the peace talks, and make the process of normalizing political and economical relations independent of the regulation of the armed conflict. However, Moscow was not prepared for any concessions that would increase the likelihood of specified an attitude for Washington.
• The U.S. President's declarations confirm Moscow's belief that, despite harsh rhetoric, it has no political will to fundamentally revise its existing attitude. The Kremlin sees it as withdrawing the US from engagement on the side of Kiev in the war in Ukraine and striving to normalize relations with Russia and even return to economical cooperation with it. Moscow so focuses on the commercial transportation of U.S. arms (paid by European states which, in the Kremlin's assessment, do not have a political will to supply long-term support for Ukraine) and do not include the most lethal weapon to meet targets in the country. The Russians besides noted a public disincentive by the U.S. president of the Legislative legislature to seriously hit the sources of FR budget revenue. In particular, the postponement of the introduction of duties for 50 days is interpreted as a signal of Trump's reluctance to intensify the force on Moscow and the actual consent to proceed Russian offensive activities in Ukraine.
• The consequences of Trump's threats to Russia depend on how they are implemented. The impact on trade with FR will not be crucial as its trade turnover from the US decreased to $3.5 billion in 2024 (which represents little than 0.5% of the full Russian trade). On the another hand, it could be affected by the introduction of advanced (secondary) duties on another countries trading with it (especially those importing Russian hydrocarbons), specified as China, India or Turkey. However, Moscow does not seem to believe this possibility, as this would torpedo Washington's efforts to scope a trade agreement with Beijing and make a comprehensive partnership with fresh Delhi and Ankara. It is so expected that Russia will not limit its offensive actions in Ukraine or mitigate its maximumist conditions for ending the conflict.