Restructuring Getin Noble Bank

Facts

The Polish dispute between the supervisory board of Getin Noble Bank S.A. (hereinafter: Bank) and a large number of natural and legal persons with the Bank warrant Fund (hereinafter: BFG) afraid the decision of BFG, acting as a resolution authority (hereinafter: ORUL), to initiate the resolution procedure against the Bank.

The Bank's supervisory board brought an action against the contested decision to the WSA in Warsaw (referring court). another actors have brought over 7,000 complaints against this decision.

In the context of this dispute, the CSA set out in its preliminary ruling a number of doubts regarding procedural and substantive issues. First, it pointed out that, in conjunction with Article 111(1) of the Law of 30.8.2002. The law on proceedings before administrative courts (Journal of Laws of 2024 item 935; hereinafter: PostAdmU) will be unduly hard and even impossible to issue a judgement within a reasonable time. Secondly, with respect to the decision in question, he sought to find what the requirements concerning the independency of the ORUL were, if he was besides a temporary admin of the Bank, and was besides liable for guaranteeing bank deposits.

TS Position

Reasonable Term

The Court recalled that the request effective judicial protection In particular, the right to an effective remedy must be regarded within the meaning of Article 47 of the NPP, including in peculiar the right to processing the case within a reasonable time.

The Court held that Article 47 of the CPP must be interpreted as precluding the application of a national procedural provision imposing on the court competent to hear complaints against the decision of the ORUL to adopt a crisis management measurement requiring the merger of all complaints brought against that decision if the application of that provision is contrary to the right to consider the case within a reasonable period of time.

Court review

Article 85(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15.5.2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC and Directive 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 2014 No 173, p. 190) supply that all persons affected by the decision to adopt a crisis management measurement should be required to have the right to bring that decision before a court. The Court held that Article 85(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU, in conjunction with Article 47 of the CPP, must be interpreted as meaning that, in cases where more complaints have been brought before the national court against the decision of the ORUL to adopt a crisis management measure, 1 of which has been brought by the authority of the institution under resolution, dismissing only that 1 action as unfounded does not let it to be considered that the right to an effective remedy has been ensured in respect of any another individual afraid by that decision and who besides brought an action against it, raising allegations which have not been taken into account in the judgement given and which, in any event, have not been the subject of a counter-dictory debate allowing that individual to present his case.

BFG

Article 3 of Directive 2014/59/EU lays down in paragraph 2 the rule that resolution functions should be exercised by public administrations or bodies entrusted with public administration powers. Furthermore, paragraph 3 of that Article shows that those authorities may exercise other functionsand ORUL may even be supervisory authority. However, in the event of respective functions, paragraph 3 of that Article provides for appropriate structural arrangements to be put in place to guarantee operational independency and avoidance of conflicts of interest. The Court explained that the application very broad wordings in paragraph 3, it follows that the Union legislature intended establish these requirements for all another functions performed by ORULif only the nature of these functions creates specified objective risk. This is surely the case with temporary admin function within the meaning of Article 29 of Directive 2014/59/EU, or depositor functions within the meaning of that Directive.

The Court ruled that Article 3(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU should be interpreted as meaning that that provision applies where the ORUL besides performs temporary admin functions within the meaning of Article 29 of that Directive or depositor functions within the meaning of Directive 2014/49? it requires the adoption of structural arrangements to guarantee the operational independency of that authority and to avoid conflicts of interest in relation to those functions.

‘Internal provisions’

Article 3(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU indicates that the essential interior rules may be laid down not only by the associate Statebut besides by ORUL. This provision besides requires specified rules to be published.

The Court held that Article 3(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU should be interpreted as meaning that, where The ORUL besides performs ‘supervising functions’ or ‘other functions’ within the meaning of that provision and in the absence of interior written provisions to guarantee the operational independency of that authority and to prevent conflicts of interest between its resolution functions and another functions, however, compliance with those requirements may consequence from the introduction of adequate organisational and another measures to that end. This provision However, it does not mean that decisions relating to the resolution function and those relating to another functions of the resolution authority must be taken by different decision-making bodies, nor that the interior departments of the same authority cannot supply support services to both the employees assigned to the resolution function and the staff assigned to the another functions, without prejudice to the rules on professional secrecy. If they be under that provision interior provisions in writing, deficiency of publication does not automatically invalidate decisions taken by ORUL, but means, where appropriate, in the event of an appeal against the decision of that authority, that it is for that authority to show that those provisions have been complied with, as a result, the decision was taken solely to accomplish 1 or more resolution objectives.

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