Overview of events in the mediate East – December 2025

Israel-Lebanon relations: December 2025

Beirut, December 1-31

Since October 2024, a ceasefire has been in force between Israel and Lebanon. 1 of the key conditions for his maintenance is the government's commitment in Beirut to disarm Hezbollah by 31 December 2025. Despite many incidents violating the agreement, there was a marked decline in the strength of Israeli operations in Lebanon in December. The number of fatalities has fallen to thirteen people – this is the lowest monthly consequence since the entry into force of the ceasefire.

The hope of deescalation is brought by direct talks between Israel and Lebanon, the first in over 4 decades. The meetings discussed not only safety issues but besides possible areas of economical cooperation. However, the Lebanese side remains conservative, pointing out that dialog with Israeli representatives does not mean an effort to normalise relations between countries.

In early January, the Lebanese Army command announced taking work for safety in the area to the Litani River and the completion of the first phase of the demolition process. Israel has identified these measures as insufficient. According to the Israeli authorities, Hezbollah continues to assemble, and Lebanon's core ceasefire obligations have not been full fulfilled. This means that the hazard of re-escalating the conflict remains real.

Perspectives of extending demilitarisation to areas reaching the river Awali are unclear, mainly due to the expanding opposition of Hezbollah. This organisation clearly opposes the complete laying down of arms in the remainder of Lebanon, arguing that attempts to impose specified a solution would lead to state destabilisation and violent interior clashes.

Attack on American soldiers in Syria

Palmira, 13 December

December 13, 2025 In the Palmira region of central Syria, there was an assassination of a patrol of American and Syrian forces, carrying out anti-terrorist actions against the alleged muslim State (ISIS). 2 U.S. soldiers and a civilian translator were killed as a consequence of the attack and respective another patrol members were injured. The attacker was immediately neutralized by Syrian safety forces.

According to information from the Syrian Ministry of Interior, the perpetrator of the attack was an officer of the local safety services. He was previously identified as a individual with extremist views, and the decision to release or dismiss him from service was to be made on December 14, 2025. This incidental leads to a worrying conclusion: the muslim State is inactive capable of infiltration of Syrian state structures. This underlines the seriousness of the interior risks that can be posed by persons formally associated with the State safety apparatus.

In consequence to the attacks, the Pentagon announced decisive military action. The United States has announced the launch of a code name retaliatory operation. ‘Operation Hawkeye Strike’, aimed at the remains of ISIS structures in Syria. The raids included training facilities, weapons warehouses and command posts. The intent of the operation was to weaken the terrorist organization and prevent further strikes.

The Palmira incidental shows that the conflict in Syria is inactive ongoing and the threat from terrorist organisations has not been completely eliminated. The event besides reveals the risks associated with the presence of abroad troops and the destabilising impact of radicalisation within state structures.

Operation Hawkeye Strike: U.S. Air Force soldiers charging weapons to F-15E aircraft (DoD, 2026).

Anti-terrorism operation in Turkey: neutralisation of ISIS cells

Istanbul, December 25

On Thursday, December 25, Turkish safety services conducted a large-scale anti-terrorist operation aimed at persons suspected of being linked to the alleged muslim State (IS). The action was the consequence of respective weeks of operational work and resulted in over 130 arrests, of which 115 suspects were arrested on suspicion of direct terrorist activity. The detention took place simultaneously in respective provinces of the country, including primarily Istanbul, which has been 1 of the main targets of extremist groups for years.

As reported by the Chief Prosecutor's Office in Istanbul, they are suspected of planning a series of attacks during Christmas and the upcoming fresh Year. According to investigators, attacks were to be directed against public places, specified as buying malls, spiritual objects and areas with advanced tourist traffic.

The threat from the muslim State (IS) to Turkey is best illustrated by the dramatic attacks that have shaken the country in the last decade:

• October 10, 2015: Suicide bombers associated with the IS attacked a peaceful rally in front of the main railway station in Ankara. At least 102 people died and more than 400 were injured. It was the bloodiest terrorist attack in Turkey's history.
• January 1, 2017: In the heart of Istanbul, an armed attacker attacked Reina's nightclub during fresh Year's Eve celebrations, killing 39 people.

In 2015–2017, the IS besides carried out bombings at Atatürka Airport in Istanbul and in the cities of Suruç and Diyarbakır. Although the muslim State has lost its territorial control in Syria and Iraq, this did not mean an end to the threat. The structures of the organization have been dispersed, but its “sleepy cells” are inactive functioning, planning attacks both in the mediate East and outside the region.

A wave of anti-government protests in Iran

Tehran, 28 December 2025.

28 December 2025 "In Iran, a wave of anti-government protests began, another outbreak of social unrest in the country in fresh years. Demonstrations were initiated by deteriorating economical conditions: the Iranian rial recorded the lowest level in 2025 against the dollar, and planned by president Masoud Pezeshkian 62% of taxation increases in combination with over 40% inflation have led to a fast deterioration in the material situation of citizens. The value of riala has decreased importantly over the year, which according to ISW reports (2025) represents an crucial challenge to the stableness of the muslim Republic.

* Oh, yeah *Value of Iranian Rial over the year (ISW, 2025)

Initially, the protests were economic, local and peaceful, focusing on Tehran. However, in just 3 days the movement took place at least 9 provinces, including strategical urban and academic centres in Alborz, Isfahan and Kermanshah. In the following days, the protests escalated in terms of both the number of participants and geographical coverage. In many cities demonstrators raised not only economical issues, but besides expressed their discontent with the current power: anti-regime slogans appeared, including "Death to the dictator" and open support for the Pahlavi dynasty. The radicalisation of slogans undermines the authoritative communicative of the authorities who have attempted to present protests solely as a reaction to the hard economical situation. Information is inactive coming in on injured and fatal victims whose numbers are hard to verify for the time being. Demonstrations in key cities and provinces, including Tehran, Isfahan, Alborz, Kermanshah, and Fasa, proceed despite an expanding spiral of violence, indicating a increasing crisis of legitimacy and deep social discontent.

Gulf crisis: UAE retreat forces from Yemen after escalation of tensions with Saudi Arabia

Abu Dhabi, 30 December 2025.

The United arabian Emirates (UAE) announced the withdrawal of their remaining anti-terrorism units from Yemen (after the de facto end of UAE military presence in 2019). This decision is simply a consequence of the expanding crisis in relations with Saudi Arabia and came after Riyadh supported Rashad al-Alimi's request, the head of the Saudi-backed Yemeni Presidential Council, who gave the UAE's armed forces 24 hours to leave the country.The direct origin of the violent deterioration of relations was an air attack by the coalition under the leadership of Saudi Arabia on Mukalla port in confederate Yemen. The mark of the attack was transport, which, according to Saudi sources, contained weapons and ammunition intended for separatists from the South Interim Council (STC).

The coalition reported that the impact occurred upon arrival at the port of 2 ships from the Emirati port of Fujairah, which did not have the required authorisation. The Saudi information agency published a recording of the Greenland unit which allegedly carried arms for the STC. The conflict reveals a deep divided within the coalition, which has been carrying out armed actions against the Huti movement since 2015. While Saudi Arabia supports the internationally recognized Yemeni government, the UAE gives political and military support to STC separatists. Rashad al-Alimi-Presidential Leadership Council, publically accused the UAE of exerting force on the STC and directing its actions to undermine the authority of the state through military escalation. In turn, STC leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, rejected Alimi's orders, claiming that they were not agreed by consensus, and stressed that the UAE remained a key partner in the fight. In consequence to the incidental in the port of Mukalla Al-Alimi announced the introduction of a no-fly region and a sea and land blockade of all border crossings for a period of 72 hours.

Tensions between the 2 largest Persian Gulf powers have consequences beyond Yemen's borders: Both states are key players in the OPEC+ agreement. Analysts inform that a deepening conflict may make it hard to scope consensus on levels of oil extraction. Information on the crisis has already contributed to the decline of major stock indices in the Gulf region. Although voluntary withdrawal of forces by the UAE may temporarily alleviate tensions, the future of the cooperation of both monarchies in Yemen – as well as further support of Abu Dhabi for confederate separatists – remains uncertain.