- On 20 October 2024, the Republic of Moldova will hold its first circular of elections for president of the country. On the same day, with the election of the head of state, Moldova is to vote in a national referendum on Moldova's membership of the European Union.
- 11 candidates apply for the position of president of the State, however, as the polls show, the rivalry for the presidential seat is mainly between 3 of them, namely Maia Sandu, Renato Usatim and Alexandr Stoianoglo.
- The highest chance of winning the election is the current president of Moldova, Maia Sandu, seeking re-election, but her support is insufficient to win the election in the first round.
In the second half of October (20.10.2024) presidential elections will be held in Moldova. The importance of this election is peculiarly crucial for Moldovan society, as a referendum on the membership of the EU will be held on the same day. This means that the result of the October elections will find Moldova's future abroad policy and its relations with Moscow. The referendum is to be the culmination of efforts begun after a full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation to increase integration with the West and independency from Russia.
In this year's election, 11 candidates run for head of state. In fact, however, only 3 of them will compete: Maia Sandu, Renato Usatim and Alexandr Stoianoglo.
The current president of the country of Maia Sandu is simply a favourite of the election, which according to the polls can number on about 27% of the support of her candidacy[1]. The applicant for re-election of Sandu is the founder and erstwhile president of the current organization of Action and Solidarity (PAS). Both the president and her group represent a clearly pro-European wing on the Moldovan political scene. It was during her word that the country importantly accelerated the process of European integration, which has resulted in Moldova becoming a candidate for the EU. Sandu besides has the top political experience of the 3 dominant in candidates' polls. In 2012-15, she served as Minister of Education in the governments of Vlad Filat, Iurie Leanca and Chirila Gaburici. In 2016, she began to service as president of the PAS established by her, and as a typical of the organization in 2019 she took the position of MP to the Moldovan parliament and then for respective months as Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers. On behalf of PAS, she besides competed in the 2020 presidential election, however, after a triumph in the vote she renounced the presidency in the party[2]. In this year's election, Sandu is formally an independent candidate.
In second place in terms of the support of citizens with the consequence of about 13% of the support is placed by the erstwhile mayor of Bielc Renato Usatia. The policy-makers from our organization do not have much experience in Moldovan politics and so far have only successfully performed self-government functions. As of 2014, he held the office of mayor of the town of Bielce (the second largest city in Moldova), and in 2019 he was re-elected for this position. He ran for the head of the state and for the Moldovan Parliament on respective occasions, however, in the 2020 presidential election he finished third, thus not moving to the second circular in which Maia Sandu and Igor Dodon clashed, while in the 2021 parliamentary election, his election block gained only 4% of the vote, which prevented him from joining Parliament at a 7% threshold. Ustati has in Moldova the opinion of a scandalist, anti-establishmentist, populist and man associated with the underworld[3].
He began his political career with controversial statements that he would build a replica of the large Wall of China at the Moldovan border with Romania and that he would "close the US embassy and make a karaoke club in its place"[4].
The 3rd dominant candidate is Gagauzia-based Alexander Stoianoglo, erstwhile lawyer General, dismissed in 2023 due to criminal investigation into passive corruption, false evidence and abuse of power[5]. Stoianoglo in Moldovan politics does not have much experience, only in 2006 he ran for the office of Bashkin (Mayor) Gagauzia as an independent candidate, nevertheless his support was insufficient to decision on to the second round[6][1]. However, the deficiency of candidate experience does not mean that it does not pose any threat to the applicant for re-election of Sandu. Stoianoglo competes with the pro-Russian list and second in terms of popularity in the country of the Socialist organization of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), as well as gaining the authoritative support of Igor Dodon (former president of Moldova and president of the PSRM from 2020-21). According to the Stoianoglo polls can number on about 11% of support in the first circular of elections.
The remaining candidates include: Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova from 2001 to 2008 Vasile Tarlev (6.3%), erstwhile Gagauzia bar Irina Vlah (6.1%) and Prime Minister of Moldova from 2019 to 2020 Iona Chicu (4.1%). The remainder of possible candidates achieved a score not exceeding 2 percent of their support[7].
Among the candidates there was no typical of the "Victory" Electoral Block created in Moscow at the initiative of Ilan Șor. Founded by oligarch, the group was excluded from the run by the Central Election Commission.
The reason why the Moldovan CKW did not let the pro-Russian electoral block to be elected was due to the fact that there were no papers on the numerical composition of the group and the list of persons present at the National Political Council of the organization where the decision to participate in the referendum was taken[8].
What's the game truly about?
This year's presidential election is held on the same day as the referendum on accession to the European Union. Many Moldovan politicians believe that the distribution of elections to the head of state and the vote on Moldova's membership in the EU is solely a political game by Mai Sandu and PAS, who, thanks to specified procedures, hope to increase the chances of re-election of the current president. specified accusations towards Sandu were directed, among others, at second place in terms of support for the presidential candidate Renato Usatia[9, as well as exhibiting its candidate in these PSRM elections[10].
There is no uncertainty that out of all eleven candidates, Sandu is the biggest advocate of European integration. Since the beginning of 2024, it has organised a series of information and education meetings and consultations aimed at convincing various Moldovan social groups to participate in the referendum. It is besides the only candidate for the office of head of state who is genuinely seeking Moldova's membership of the Union. Although 2 of Sandu's main counter-candidates declare that they are not against the inclusion of the state in the membership of the United Europe, but simply against the usage of the accession referendum in order to guarantee the re-election of the political game, they are not the real guarantors of the affirmative result of the referendum.
In his statements, he stressed many times that he intended to prosecute a affirmative relation with both the European Union and the Russian Federation[11), which, in the face of the ongoing war in Ukraine, does not necessarily indicate circumstantial action on European integration. Similarly, the candidacy of Alexander Stoianoglo behind which the PSRM stands is presented. Socialists on the Moldovan political scene clearly present the prokremlian position and future membership of the EU structures would not be in their favor. The fact that the boycott's intention was announced in July this year clearly shows the group's attitude towards the thought of European integration[12].
The position on Moldova's membership of the European Union is now besides presented by Ilan Șor, whose election block triumph has been excluded from the upcoming elections. Hunted by an oligarch's BOLO, he takes circumstantial action to influence RM citizens to vote against integration. To this end, as the Balkan Insight portal reports, Șor set up a peculiar channel on the Telegram where he offers people money (between €25 and €250) for convincing as many citizens as possible to opt for no in the upcoming referendum[13].
In addition to the evasive oligarch, the Russian Federation is besides accused of “anti-reference” actions. According to Moldovan police chief Viorel Cernăuțeanu, Russia bribed at least 130 000 Moldovan citizens to vote against the inclusion of Moldova in the EU[14].
Both the actions of the Polish Government and the Russian Federation may have any implications for the forthcoming referendum. According to an iData survey, only 46% of citizens expressed their desire to vote in favour of joining the European Union, 39% of respondents are against, 13% are undecided and 2% would not vote at all[15].
Conclusions:
The upcoming presidential elections, together with the referendum on joining the EU, are of vital importance to the Republic of Moldova. On 20 October, however, an accession referendum will play a much more crucial function than the election of the head of state, which will find the direction in which the post-election Moldova will move.
The result of the referendum can undoubtedly give Moldova a chance to importantly reduce the inactive heavy present Russian influences in the country, which would be powerfully detrimental to the Kremlin, peculiarly after the simplification of the state's dependence on Moscow and the increased assertiveness of Chisinau towards Transnistrian after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It is not for no reason that action can be observed in the country to influence the decision of possible voters. This applies to both the purely corrupt plays of Moscow and Ilan Șor, but besides the re-election of Mai Sandu. The distribution of the national general vote on the day of the presidential election undoubtedly aimed at expanding the support of the head of state in office, which, at the same time, calls for participation in the referendum. However, based on the polls, it can be assumed that a second will be needed to elect a fresh country president. However, it is not certain who outside of Sandu will pass on this second tour. Although polls place Renato Usati in second place, it is likely that the Moldovans will decide to support a candidate of socialists, whose group is the second (after PAS) most popular organization among voters.
However, this does not change the fact that the second circular of the presidential election will be a rivalry between a pro-European candidate and a more Moscow-oriented activist. On the another hand, the result of the forthcoming referendum will be a clear voice of Moldovan society as to the direction in which they would like their country to follow. Based on the survey published by iData, it would be hard to foretell the actual result of the presidential election and the accession referendum, however, the diaspora was completely omitted in the study. It is so likely that the support for Mai Sandu and for Moldova's integration into the European Union will be higher than expected by the polls on 20 October. In the erstwhile 2020 presidential election, erstwhile pro-European Sand and clearly pro-Russian Igor Dodon competed in the second round, the vast majority of voters abroad (93%) supported the candidate of the Action organization and Solidarity[16]. An additional origin influencing the importance of diaspora in this year's elections is the decision by the Moldovan authorities to increase the number of polling stations abroad, which is expected to scope more than 200, and to let abroad citizens to vote by correspondence[17]. Of the more than 2 100 active polling venues abroad, only 2 of them will be open in Russia, which will importantly impede the selection of pro-Russian voters there[18].
Undoubtedly in favour of the incumbent president, in addition to the Moldovan diaspora, who will most likely support her, is the deficiency of a single candidate being put forward by the pro-Russian opposition as announced in May this year. The deficiency of consensus on 1 opposition candidate will origin the vote sympathetic to Moscow voters to be more fragmented and only the second circular of presidential elections may someway jeopardise Sandu's re-election.
However, it should not be forgotten that the consequence of the referendum alone will not prejudge future state membership in the structures of the European Union. The process of European integration for Moldova can take many years, all depends on who wins this year's presidential seat competition, as well as the parliamentary elections to be held in 2025.
Bibliography:
[1] Poll: president Maia Sandu leads among presidential candidates, 26.8% of respondents are ready to vote for herInfotag, https://www.infotag.md/politics-en/319057, accessed: 08.10.2024.
[2] Gridina M., Maia Sandu – Candidate Portrait, Moldovalive, https://moldovalive.md/maia-sandu-candidate-portrait/, accessed: 08.10.2024.
[3] Gridina M., Renato Usatii – Candidate Portrait, Molovalive, https://moldovalive.md/renato-usatii-candidate-profile/, accessed: 08.10.2024.
[4] #Renato Usatîi, Ziarul De Garda, https://www.zdg.md/tag/renato-usati/, accessed: 08.10.2024.
[5] #Alexandr Stoianoglo, Ziarul De Garda, https://www.zdg.md/tag/alexandr-stoianoglo/, accessed: 08.10.2024.
[6] Gridina M., Alexandr Stoianoglo – Candidate Portrait, Moldovalive, https://moldovalive.md/alexandr-stoianoglo-candidate-portrait/, accessed: 08.10.2024.
[7] Poll: president Maia Sandu leads among presidential candidates, 26.8% of respondents are ready to vote for herInfotag, https://www.infotag.md/politics-en/319057, accessed: 08.10.2024
[8] Necsutu M., Moldova Bars Fugitive Oligarch Shor’s organization From EU Referendum, Balkan Insight, https://balkaninsight.com/2024/09/24/moldova-bars-fugitive-oligarch-shors-party-from-eu-referencenum/, accessed: 08.10.2024.
[9] Leader of “Our Party” Renato Usatii: The referendum of October 20 is simply a referendum for the second mandate of Maia Sandu as President, Partidul Nostru, https://pn.md/en/post/leader-of-our-party-renato-usatii-the-referencendum-of-october-20-is-a-referencendum-for-the-second-mandate-of-maia-sandu-as-president~666400b364f862d21de69627, accessed: 08.10.2024.
[10] Sandu launches Moldova re-election bid, referendum run on joining EU, Euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/sandu-launches-moldova-re-election-bid-referendum-campaign-on-joining-eu/, accessed: 08.10.2024.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Socialists decided to boycott the referendum on EU integration, Radio Moldova, https://radiomoldova.md/p/37021/socialists-decided-to-boycott-the-referenceendum-on-eu-integration, accessed: 08.10.2024.
[13] Necsutu M., Moldovan Oligarch Offer Money for Votes Against EU Integration, Balkan Insight, https://balkaninsight.com/2024/09/30/moldovan-oligarch-offers-money-for-votes-against-eu-integration/, accessed: 08.10.2024.
[14] Aventimentul șefului Poliției din R. Moldova assă ce Rusia a plătit 130.000 de Moldoveni să voteze anti-UE la referendum, Digi24, https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/externe/avertismentul-sefului-politiei-din-r-moldova-dupa-ce-rusia-a-platit-moldoveni-sa-vote-anti-ue-la-referendum-2956333, accessed: 08.10.2024.
[15] Străjescu C., Poll: About 46% would vote in the referendum for the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the EU, Moldova1, https://moldova1.md/p/35990/poll-about-46-would-vote-in-the-referencendum-for-the-accession-of-the-republandc-of-moldova-to-the-eu, accessed: 08.10.2024.
[16] Alegerile presidentțiale din 2020 în Republica Moldova, Alegeri.md, https://alegeri.md/w/Alegerile_preziden%C8%9Biale_din_2020_%C3%AEn_Republica_Moldova, accessed: 08.10.2024.
[17] SURVEY Voting outside Moldova in 2024: more polling stations and vote by correspondenceMoldpres, https://www.moldpres.md/en/news/2024/09/12/24007206, accessed: 08.10.2024.
Photo: Canva
