On the Volyn massacre

There are 2 aspects to the Volyn massacre: moral and political. Memory of the victims, their worthy burial, opposition to the worship of the oppressors – these are moral obligations, and there are no political reasons that would require us to quit the completion or attempts to complete these obligations. On the another hand, we should not let ourselves be deceived that, by completing them, we are pursuing any abroad policy interests.

Politics is simply a deliberate activity, and the goal in abroad policy can only be what improves the state's position in global relations of forces.

A typical Polish illusion is the belief that visions of past are of large importance to the position of countries in the global strategy

and that the inferior position of Poland is due to the fact that we are losing the "battle for memory", and if only we could impose another way of persuasion (because we cannot force anyone to impose anything) the correct imagination of history, then the importance of Poland would increase enormously.

Hard and without anesthesia

– this is how we have been operating since 2020. Journalism that is not indifferent. The civilian Affairs Weekly announces abuse, educates and gives tools for a real, civic change.

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We usage this method without effect against Germans (the reeducation of Germans had completely different causes, was just imposed on them by force and not by us), we tried it with effect, seems to be the other of intended against Russians and now we would like to apply it to Ukraine. The fact that this is actually the only goal that Polish elites have for Ukraine shows the immaturity of these elites and their inability to conduct real abroad policy.

→ Volyn – victims of genocide cry for truth, apology and burial •Rafał Górski, Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski

→ Appeal of the Families of Victims of Genocide to the Episcopals of Poland and Ukraine

In another words: Polish elites are incapable to formulate any sensible political goals for Ukraine, so they give us a symbolic goal and convince us that something crucial is going to come out of this.

I repeat, if the Ukrainians could be persuaded to quit the worship of UPA (which now seems very unlikely), it would undoubtedly be a moral success, but what would consequence from it in politics? Would the relation of forces between Poland and Ukraine change in our favour? Would Polish influence in Ukraine increase? Would we have any origin of force on the Ukrainians to be more yielding in areas where current interests may conflict? Would we negociate better conditions for economical agreements?

If there were to be serious Polish-Ukrainian conflicts, it was not due to the dividing past of both nations, but due to differences in current political or economical interests

It is in these material spheres that Poland should defend itself against possible unpleasantness in the future, not in the sphere of symbols.

In politics, the memory of Volyn matters only in so far as it does not end at celebrations, but motivates to work, work and work again on interior strengthening of the state. The cult of people liable for the genocide of Poles is simply a fact in Ukraine and we cannot change that now, but only learn from it. The basic conclusion is to guarantee that conditions for specified extermination of Poles are never repeated.