Poland is neither an empire nor a peripheral state that can afford strategical inactivity. Geographical location, historical experience and the current global context place us in a peculiar category: medium-sized front-end countries.
The front-end state functions under the conditions of abbreviated consequence horizon and an increased rate of variation of conditions. strategical errors are revealed faster and their costs are higher than those in countries distant from tension zones.
The mid-size countries, as Mark Carney pointed out erstwhile he spoke in Davos, are present peculiarly susceptible to the erosion of the existing global governance model. In a situation where the large powers are again beginning to usage their military, technological, economical and political advantages unparalleledly, smaller players are seeking a fresh way of ensuring effective strategical autonomy.
What does this mean for Poland? In our situation, sovereignty is not a normative or symbolic concept. It is simply a functional category closely related to our further existence. So we should not look at sovereignty as abstract "independence", but alternatively see it as a applicable ability to keep continuity in a planet of diverse and simultaneously overlapping pressures and distortions: political, military, energy and technology.
New essence of sovereignty and variable geometry alliances
Each state present functions in a multi-level network of dependency and any stories of "self-sufficiency" are unrealistic even for the top powers. We besides request to realize this in Poland – the sovereignty of states does not find whether they are dependent on others, but how to are dependent. The key is the ability to choice and management of dependency. If in any area they are imposed on us and irreparable, in this respect we have or have lost our sovereignty. And if we have the ability to configure dependencies in a way that strengthens safety and improvement while maintaining the real anticipation of correcting the course, we build the actual sovereignty.
For the mediate and front states, sovereignty is not a declaration of self-sufficiency, but a declaration of ability to act efficiently under force and uncertainty. The power of sovereignty is decided present not by the deficiency of dependence on global partners, but by the ability to manage these dependencies. If we can configure the dependencies in a way that strengthens safety and improvement and at the same time keep the anticipation of correcting the course, we build the actual sovereignty.
A sovereign state, well recognized in its strengths and weaknesses, is not afraid or isolated, is not offended by reality. A strong state strives to multiply and manage multilateral dependence intelligently – being able to separate what is crucial for its endurance and improvement and what is not.
At the same time, we besides request to realize in Poland that the period of unchangeable global institutions and alliances guaranteeing collective security, peaceful settlement of disputes or unchangeable financial strategy is over. There is no longer a “end of history”, conflicts are and will be, and the game is about survival. The cross-cutting nature of the challenges facing us (security, access to natural materials and energy, technological revolution, climate crisis, etc.) makes it impossible to have a single, permanent strategy of alliances to join in order to warrant our interests in all areas. State sovereignty present means the ability to build effective coalitions making it pragmatically possible to accomplish the objectives set – an area across the area.
Partnerships and coalitions that effectively increase our country's resilience on individual levels should be built according to logic variable geometry. In another group we will build existential security, we request another kinds of alliances to guarantee economical sovereignty, and in yet another partnership we can think about technological, digital or energy sovereignty.
Of course, this does not mean abandoning so far key alliances for Poland specified as NATO or the EU. However, account must be taken of the impact of the already visible "tectonic movements", specified as the gradual "latinisation" of the U.S. population (the impact of demography and immigration from South America) resulting in the intellectual disengagement of the United States' society and political elites from Europe. It is so worth actively searching for non-obvious alliances, whether with individual countries that are members of NATO and the EU or countries outside these alliances. possibly for the implementation of more detailed interests of Poland, these fresh partnerships will be more effective. New, strengthened relationships are besides worth considering as an alternate in the event of destabilizing our existing alliances. So it is worth looking at alliances over time trying to foretell their "terms of usefulness".
Sovereignty as a capacity system
For the front-end state, sovereignty mostly boils down to the question of whether and how long we are able to act under conditions of uncertainty, pressure, disruption and hybrid aggression. It so includes not only the military sphere, but besides energy, communication, logistics, finance, digital infrastructure, law and organization efficiency. And in a peculiar way besides the communication and social sphere (cognitive independence). It is useful to separate 4 layers of sovereignty, which together should make a coherent architecture.
The first of these (primary) is existential layer – the ability of the State to keep continuity of operations in crisis situations. It includes defence, energy security, communication, basic logistics, financial stableness and the ability of the administration to make and enforce decisions in a chaotic environment. Mistakes made at this level are not translated into a decline in reputation or political quotations, but into real territorial security, social trust and the future of the state. This is an area where political or ideological delusions are peculiarly costly.
The second layer is scale. Poland will not build sovereignty through individual, its own prestigious projects (e.g. infrastructure) or symbolic gestures. An global scale of our economical and technological activities is needed: a common marketplace and standards, industrial interoperability, capacity to deliver large and repetitive orders, common logistics and compatibility of systems. The scale request not be imperial; can be networked (e.g. at EU or Baltic Sea level). In this sense, the sovereignty of the mediate state frequently involves being Node – a place to integrate flows – not to be an independent maker of all elements of the system. Poland as a “node” will keep its sovereignty and safety due to its usefulness for partners and their participation will let to keep the infrastructure of a larger scale. The more our neighbours and allies' systems are intertwined with ours, the more their sovereignty depends on our survival. So let Poland be essential and necessary.
The sovereignty of the front-end state is not a single decision, not a single sector, but a coherent capacity system. It consists of layers that must strengthen each other. Where excessively prestigious projects lead to inefficient usage of public funds and undermine continuity, sovereignty is eroded regardless of declared ambitions.
The 3rd layer is efficiency. In the long term, the strategical advantage is obtained not by the most expressive states politically, but by the most efficient organisationally and economically (productively). With advanced efficiency, safety costs can be borne without erosion of improvement possible and defence capacity can be developed and maintained without excessive burden on society and the quality of public services. Long debts do not lead to addiction.
The 4th layer is technological innovation. Not as a goal in itself, nor as an component of prestige, but as a tool for strengthening the 3 erstwhile layers. Innovations that do not increase safety, resilience or efficiency stay a luxury. Those that safe the existential layer, let to increase the scale or efficiency of production activities, become part of a real strategical advantage. Innovations are born in the heads of talent around the world, and they are won by those who can make the right incentives and conditions for their accomplishment at home.
The rule should be inter-layer consistency, with the primacy of the basic layer. For example, innovative or inclusive (network) projects that increase dependency in the existential area undermine sovereignty even if they are attractive to the image or short-term viability.
Technologies – Key Dependency Area
The area of modern technologies, where there are presently the most parallel processes that can decide on our sovereignty and development, should peculiarly attract our attention. A country that does not control its digital infrastructure, data, standards and cyber-operational capabilities is exposed to paralysis without the usage of classical military or economical means.
In modern conditions, technology becomes the core of sovereignty, due to the fact that it determines the continuity of the state's operations. Technological sovereignty is not about autarkia, but about controlling key dependencies – data, standards and jurisdiction. Its reality is determined by the ability to change the solution without paralyzing critical systems.
It is crucial to build technological sovereignty with awareness key dependencies: who has our data, cryptographic keys, updates, licenses, who provides service or jurisdiction over critical systems, but besides without foggy autrakia visions or dreams of building all elements of the strategy alone. Technological sovereignty is besides the ability to keep continuity of operations under cyber attacks and external regulatory pressure.
In this sense, technological decisions are political decisions with long-term consequences. Digital transnational projects should be assessed not only for cost and efficiency but besides for reversibility. The ability to exit a given solution in the horizon of respective months (without failure of continuity of operation), becomes 1 of the key tests of technological and digital sovereignty of the front-end state.
Middle country in large game
The mediate country will not win the large game by pretending to be bigger than it is, but it will besides lose erstwhile it starts acting like a tiny state – giving up subjectivity for convenience, short-term benefits (lower costs) and safety illusions. The symbol of the sovereignty of our times should not be either the throne or the wall, but the rudder: the ability to adjust the course in changing conditions and the ability to maneuver in networks of interdependence.
In a planet of expanding rivalry of powers and expanding force on front states, reasoning in terms of the full architecture of sovereignty not excessive sectoral ambitions and empty passwords. Multi-layer, multi-track and flexible architecture. 1 that combines safety with development, alliances with pragmatic awareness of their wobblyness, and technological enthusiasm with cool strategical calculation and avoiding non-alternative choices.
The average state does not keep its subjectivity by trying to be larger than it is, nor by acting like a tiny state. In the fresh large game sovereignty is to keep the ability to consciously adjust the course under changing conditions.
However, for Poland the biggest hazard would be passiveness and the belief that time works in our favour. You gotta build these abilities before they become necessary. The front country has no luxury of strategical nap.
