Methodical decommissioning. Dismantling the local government strategy in Russia

For more than 2 decades the Putinowski government gradually deprived local governments of their autonomy on the wave of consistent centralization of the state. The actual dismantling of the self-government strategy is now coming to an end through the improvement implemented on the pretext of improving its functioning. Changes, which hit the interests of both the population and local and regional elites, have provoked grassroots resistance. Despite this, the Kremlin will most likely not change its course to further consolidate power. The abolition of self-government gives the national centre considerable control over the local level, where so far limited political pluralism has persisted. At the same time, however, it raises a number of challenges for the Putin strategy that may prove dangerous in the future.

Gradual abolition of self-government

For a decade after the collapse of the USSR (where local government did not be almost to the end – its substitute was local councils, devoid of ownership and in practice dependent on the communist party) the local governments in Russia developed on the way of experiments, taking various forms, frequently resulting from regional specificities. In the context of the economical crisis and the weakness of the national centre, local authorities in the Municipalites (territorial local units) – constitutionally separated from those state (federal and regional) – enjoyed large political autonomy and did not experience strong force from Moscow (more dependent on regional authorities, besides having far-reaching independency from the centre at the time).

The process of depriving self-governments of autonomy began shortly after Vladimir Putin's taking over the state's controls in 2000 and went parallel to Kremlin's fresh centralization policy^[1]. Initiated under the pretext of demarcation of jurisdiction and competence between the state authority and the local improvement of 2003 with the violation of the FR Constitution, the organisational structure of the self-government was unified. In place of a variety of higher and lower-level musicals (the second were part of the former), urban districts and municipal areas emerged, including agrarian and urban settlements.

In order to weaken the position of the head of the unit, it was prevented (except for little than a 1000 residents) from combining the function of head of the local administration and head of the typical body. As a pretext, the desire to limit the dominance of the local executive power over the legislature, allegedly creating a wide area for corruption was given.^[2].

As a result, the institution of the alleged city manager, the contract admin of the local administration selected by the competition, was established, alternate to the position of the chief elected in the general vote. The appointment of specified an official, who did not have a social mandate, not only meant a conflict of interest (the head of the Municipalitet, elected from among the local deputies had to hand over the majority of his rights to an employed administrator), but besides blurred the work of the residents and limited their impact on local politics.

By 2014, the city managers managed 58 regional capitals, and the number of administrative centres where the mera was straight elected decreased from 75 to 19 (in 83). In 2015, regulations were introduced to give them the appearance of election – after the competition procedure, local deputies vote over each candidacy. Today, direct electoral ordination has remained only in Jakuck (Republic of Sacha), Chabarovsk (Kraj Chabarowski), Anadyr (Czukocki Autonomous District) and Abakana (Chakasia).

Figure 1. Number of regional capitals with direct mera elections

Source: own development.

With structural changes, the local government in Russia, although formally separated from the state authorities, in fact passed under their control. Regional authorities – de facto local typical offices of the Kremlin^[3] – they have the right to find the mode of selection of local authorities in their territory, as well as to fill half of the seats in the competition committees appointing managers. In 2024, the governors were given the chance to give the heads of the unit and the heads of the local administration reproofs and reprimands, and to appeal or request the local legislative bodies to remove them.

Constitution revision in 2020, cementing super-presidential strategy and centralization of power in Russia^[4], was an impulse for the final dismantling of local self-government autonomy. This strategy was submitted in December 2021. Due to the intrapolitical context (invasion to Ukraine, 2024 presidential elections and bottom-up resistance) Putin did not sign this act until March 2025.^[5]

One of the main objectives of the improvement was to abolish the two-stagemunicipal strategy by integrating the downstream units into larger ones. For example, there were 472 units in the Krasnoyarski Region before the changes – 17 urban districts and 12 municipal districts, 32 municipal areas, 389 agrarian settlements and 22 urban settlements. Then there will be only 39 – six urban districts and 33 municipal districts.

The top-down order was to accelerate the already practised transformations – until the law was passed under force from the Kremlin it was implemented by 20 regions (including the territories occupied in Ukraine – alleged Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republic, and since 2022 – the Kherson and Zaporosian circuits), which was reflected in the regularly falling number of muscipal units.

Figure 2. Number of firearms in Russia

Source: own development.

As a consequence of the liquidation of the lower levels of the unit, up to 99% of all elected positions in the country may disappear. The fresh government has sparked opposition from regional and local elites (see below), in which the Kremlin has made any concessions to their benefit. The anticipation for regional authorities to decide on the local government structure was allowed – only a partial improvement was announced in 24 national entities and the following 17 decided to preserve the old model. However, it is not known whether to keep a two-level organisation after 2035, erstwhile the 10-year transitional period ends^[6]. It cannot be excluded that Moscow will force the regions to implement the changes even more quickly.

The improvement interfered not only with the structure of self-government, but besides with the basic principles of its interior organisation. After its introduction, the head of the village, where direct elections do not take place, emerges in the way of a competition not from the number of applicants who have undergone prior selection but from the list presented by the governor. This strategy is forced to introduce all regional capitals, which means that the last 4 administrative centres will shortly cease to straight elect their bosses.

Candidates may be submitted by political parties and regional typical bodies, but besides by national level bodies, specified as Members of the State Duma, the Social Chamber of the FR or the All-Russian Association for Local Government improvement (contributing local associations). This creates a hazard of filling local posts with non-local officials. This practice has so far been primarily applied at regional level^[7].

The Kremlin is already preparing fresh staffs. In 2023, the alleged specified school was launched (by analogy to the alleged governor's school in existence since 2017) – a program implemented by the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration at the president of FR and coordinated by Sergei Kirijenko, the influential first Deputy Head of the President's Administration. The 4 editions of the training completed 321 people, previously holding advanced local and regional positions. The rotation of specified "professional managers" between individual musicals will let Moscow to avoid a situation in which the heads of local governments will emergence besides much with local business and authoritative elites.

Absolute control

The improvement of the self-government strategy is officially explained by the request to increase its efficiency^[8] and improving his finances. In fact, however, it serves the success of the Kremlin's policy of consolidating power. The legal submission of local authorities to these regional authorities, equivalent to the strict supervision of Moscow, fits into the centralization logic of the Putin regime.

The actual demolition of local government enables the effective demobilization of the municipal electorate, which is simply a conventional base of opposition movements, and importantly weakens the possible of bottom-up protest and reduces the hazard of its support by the local elites. Parallel solutions, specified as the digitisation of administration and the dissemination of electronic voting, increase the Kremlin's impact on the field electoral process and reduce the dependence of the national centre on local officials^[9].

Strengthening control of the local level is rewarded by the Putin organization 1 Russia, and at the same time limits the influence of the licensed political opposition, which has so far been able to effectively argue the authorities (especially the Communist organization of the Russian Federation – KPFR)^[10], and independent activists. The consequence of the integration of local units is, among others, a benefit in the form of balancing dissident moods in cities with the voices of residents of smaller towns, more loyal to Moscow.

Thanks to the dominance of 1 Russia in the Kreml municipalities, it will be able to manipulate the gubernatorial elections even more effectively with alleged "municipal filters".^[11] and usage the alleged administrative resources (e.g. the voices of officials, budget staff and large enterprises) to accomplish the desired results in voting for regional parliaments, State Duma or presidential elections.

In fresh years Moscow has stressed the request to increase the financial autonomy of local governments^[12]. However, changes seem to be going in the other direction^[13]. Municipalites are heavy dependent on inter-budget transfers (regional and federal) – subsidies (supporting circumstantial tasks delegated by elder entities) and budget subsidies and subsidies – without which they would not even be able to cover their current expenditure.

Figure 3. Share of inter-budget transfers in the income of public funds

Source: Ministry of Finance FR.

The improvement does not, in principle, introduce solutions to strengthen the financial base of the coal-fired budgets. At the same time, the share of government loans in the structure of local government debt increases (January 2024 – 61%, January 2025 – 63%) at the expense of commercial loans^[14]. This translates into an expanding dependence of local authorities on the centre.

The changes can even exacerbate their financial difficulties. 18 exclusive competences of local governments have been identified, but the second so much can be delegated from a regional level without the compulsory allocation of funds. The politician is allowed to dismiss the heads of the musicals who neglect to execute their tasks, which is another instrument of supervision and pressure.

Extending self-government control means, at the same time, a much stronger engagement of the Kremlin in manual local management. This involves respective possible challenges.

By eliminating the lower levels of penicillin, the centre deprives itself of the authorities that operated closest to the population. In this way, the regime's ability to announcement social tensions and respond rapidly to outbreaks of discontent may weaken. Local government structures besides served as a screen for Moscow's increasingly authoritarian policy, giving citizens an illusion of local performance. Moreover, the ruling authorities were willing to shed work for the local action of the live-based protest on lower-level officials and acted as an arbitrator. Organisational changes will make it hard to apply this mechanics in the future.

With the systematic dismantling of the local government system, its prestige and attractiveness decreased. This is peculiarly about the function of the mayors of large cities, which erstwhile enjoyed extended powers and access to financial resources. The activity in local legislative bodies is usually free of charge (the salaries are paid only to their president and alternates and to the heads of committees) and the benefits and influences of the mandate of the associate have been reduced over the years.

Facing the office may even pose a threat. Throughout Russia, there are regular arrests of erstwhile and active corrupt self-governments (the merits of the charges cannot be verified), mostly defenseless against the authorities. Not even crucial figures are safe, as evidenced by the arrest of Mr. Krasnojarska Władysław Loginów (actor of the 1 Russia and erstwhile associate of the Council of the State of France) in June 2025.

As a result, there are less and less candidates in local elections and experienced managers are little and little likely to apply for a occupation in a unit-palitet^[15]. Symptomatic (and inseparable) is simply a case of 100 000 inhabitants of Novokuybyszewska (Samar region) who remained without a chief for over a year^[16].

In the long term, this situation can lead to a serious staff crisis, which can only be partially mitigated, utilizing graduates of the alleged specified school. In April 2025 Putin called for a wider engagement of veterans of the invasion of Ukraine in local government work – authorities are trying to systematically co-opt them^[17].

Lower opposition

The abolition of the lower level of themunicipal eliminates almost all elected positions in the country. People associated with regional elites frequently occupied more exposed ones. The changes so affected the interests of the local authoritative apparatus and its protectors.

The peculiar dissatisfaction of the improvement has sparked in national republics, where, despite the centralization of the Kremlin's policies, the phenomenon of clanality (community of authorities with authoritative apparatus and economical elites) has been preserved to the top extent. She was publically opposed by Tatarstan leaders Rustam Minnichanov and Bashkortostan Radij Chabirov. The president of the State Duma Viacheslaw Wołodin advocated the compromise amendments to the bill.

The bottom-up opposition of the elite proved comparatively effective – the legal act was greatly delayed, while Moscow, having met with criticism, softened the first provisions of the bill and allowed any concessions – a transitional period until 2035 and the anticipation of maintaining a two-level self-government model in the regions. However, the maintenance of the concession is subject to a large question. The current dynamics of Putin's centralist policy suggests that the centre will exert force on the national entities remaining in the old strategy to implement fresh solutions.

Map.Models of local government organisation in entities of the Russian Federation

ZSource: own development.

The public's aversion besides encountered changes. What is noteworthy, opposition actions were initiated not by the inhabitants of large cities, but by the population of peripheral areas, which the dismantling of the self-government strategy will most likely affect. She was sometimes supported by local officials and deputies (especially for the KPFR).

The background for opposition is the fast progressive degradation of smaller urban centres (also those located in developed regions). There are presently 1120 cities in Russia, of which 70% are average and small. In the close term, 129 of them, inhabited by nearly 3.5 million people, may actually disappear. Over the last decade, their population has shrunk by over 300,000.^[18] The causes of the collapse include: concentration around non-perspective industries (e.g. coal), outflow of young people to large agglomerations, ageing municipal infrastructure^[19], underdeveloped transport network, mediocre local education and wellness care^[20] and no adequate investments.

At least any of these problems relate to the specified minimum self-reliance of local government and to the focus of economical and political life in regional capitals. As part of the alleged optimizations, public utility facilities (rentals, schools, post offices, etc.) are closed in the localities considered to be "non-perspective", which further exacerbates the socio-economic exclusion of the local population.

The biggest opposition actions took place in the geographically distant part of the capital of the Republic of Altaj and the Krasnojarski Country. At the end of June 2025 respective 1000 people attended the protest rally in Gornoałtajsk. The resignation sent by the Kremlin to politician Andrei Turczak (former Secretary of the General Council of the 1 Russia) was demanded. The residents besides blocked the roads and the decision of the authorities was challenged to the Republican ultimate Court (the application was rejected). little many demonstrations in the Krasnoyarski Country in May 2025 were attended by local officials and veterans of the invasion of Ukraine.

The local context of these speeches must not be forgotten. The Republic of Altaj (where only 210 000 people live, of which around 70% in the countryside) is faced with the expansion of a large business outside the region (including the largest bank in Russia – Sbierbank), whose changes will facilitate land purchase. The opposition is besides raised all fewer years by plans to merge the republic with the neighbouring Altaean Country.

In the case of the Krasnojarski Country, the geographical origin proved decisive^[21] – region over 2.3 million km2 It is inhabited by little than 3 million people. The distances between the towns are considerable and the communication between them is limited. Local identity besides plays an crucial role. Discontent among the Jenisesian population, called "the father of Siberian cities" (he rose in 1619), sparked a imagination of incorporation into the urban territory with the centre in Lessibirsku, formed in the 1970s.

The answer of the rulers to the demonstrations was to accelerate the work on self-government improvement (and to vote on changes in secrecy from the population) and to apply point repression. Transformations in the opposing regions were adopted in their first form, with the exception of occasional insignificant concessions^[22]. Social protests, unlike the opposition of the elite, have thus proved unsuccessful.

The Future Without Self-government

Resistance to the improvement points to the unpopularity of the Kremlin's centralisation policy – both among local and regional elites and among citizens – and the attachment of Russians to self-government, even 1 with much limited competence.

Moscow will most likely search to destruct a two-step self-government organisation in all regions. Cases of opposition on the part of the elite already after the adoption of the bill make it appear that the objections to this issue will be ineffective. For example, KPFR politician Valentin Konowalov vetoed a part of government implementing a one-level model in Chakasia, but has a regional parliament dominated by 1 Russia against each other. On the another hand, the court in Krasnoyarsk rejected the proposal of legislative representatives of 1 of the areas demanding that the improvement be abandoned. It is improbable that the refusal to amend the statutes by the half-divisions of the Republic of Altaj will halt the transformation either.

The demands for a return to the direct elections of mayors in regional capitals are besides doomed. However, it is simply a subject so popular in large cities that licensed opposition parties can usage it in campaigns – under specified slogans in the race for the politician of the Irkutsk territory competed KPFR candidate Sergei Lewchenko^[23].

The possible of protest at local level inactive exists, and the Russians are willing to show in matters straight affecting them^[24]. However, in the absence of appropriate coordination and limited support for individual speeches by opposition parties, discontent does not pose a serious political threat to the Kremlin. The deteriorating situation of the population, while the deficiency of a safety valve in the form of self-governments, can worsen the attitude of the population to central authorities, which will increasingly be considered straight liable for local-level problems.

Dismantling the lower level of the municipal is most likely the eventual blow to the outermost regions. The self-government strategy will become even more centralised and thus little responsive to the problems of smaller cities and villages. They will be affected by the outflow of firearms (administration, public services, financial resources etc.; only single local officials will stay on site) to local centres, which will translate into a further depopulation of the province. Local political and social activism, so far concentrated in local governments, will virtually cease outside larger centres, and local staff will most likely retreat from public life.