ISW: The silent conquest of Belarus by Russia

The Institute for the survey of War (ISW) is an American think tank non-profit, specializing in analysis of armed conflicts and military strategies.

The ISW offers detailed investigation on global military threats, including conflicts in the mediate East, east Europe and Asia. The organisation uses modern analytical methods, combining investigation with geo-information technologies to supply reliable information to decision makers, the military and the public. Founded in 2007, the ISW focuses on promoting a deeper knowing of contemporary conflicts and their impact on planet order.

This essay is based on an analysis presented this week by George Barros in the study “Russia’s Quiet Conquest: Belarus”, which details the objectives, achievements and further plans of the Kremlin in the integration process of both countries. The aim is not only to summarise the main conclusions of the study but besides to present possible implications for regional and global security. Russian action against Belarus is simply a model for future integration campaigns against another post-Soviet states. The discussion of this issue is so crucial to knowing the Kremlin's long-term objectives and the Western response.

Russia has consistently pursued a strategy of subordination of Belarus for decades, which covers military, political and economical aspects. These measures, although carried out gradually and without besides much publicity, can lead to a de facto annexation of the country, which would pose a serious challenge for NATO, Ukraine and an global order based on the sovereignty of states.

I. Objectives for Russia's integration into Belarus

1. Military integration

Russia seeks to make a “unified defence space” with Belarus, which goes beyond standard cooperation within global organisations, specified as the Organization of the Collective safety Agreement (ODKB, from Russian: Организация Договора Коллективной Безопасности, ОДКБ) that is simply a regional global organization that focuses post-missile states and focuses on common defence, military cooperation and safety in the Eurasia region. The ODB was established on the basis of the Collective safety Agreement, signed in 1992 by the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (IDP). The current members of the ODB (as of 2025) are:

1. Russia
2. Armenia
3. Belarus
4. Kazakhstan
5. Kyrgyzstan
6. Tajikistan

The organisation is based on collective defence: the attack on 1 associate State is treated as an attack on all the associated countries. This is akin to NATO, although the scope and political function of the ODB are much smaller. The beginnings of the ODB date back to May 15, 1992, erstwhile six states – Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – signed the Tashkent Collective safety Agreement (the alleged Tashkent Pact). In subsequent years Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia joined the agreement. The nonsubjective of the agreement was to keep stableness in the region after the dissolution of the russian Union and to address external and interior threats. The agreement was initially loose and did not presume the creation of permanent military or political structures. It was seen primarily as a tool enabling Russia to keep influence in the post-missive region. In 1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan resigned to renew their membership in the Collective safety Agreement. In consequence to these changes, the remaining states decided to strengthen cooperation. In 2002, the Agreement was formally converted into a Collective safety Agreement. At the Moscow summit held in May 2002, the decision to establish ODF organisational structures was adopted. In December of the same year, the organization gained observer position at the UN General Assembly.

In subsequent years, the ODB gradually expanded its military and political structures. In 2003, Joint fast consequence Forces were formed to respond to crisis situations specified as armed conflicts, terrorism or natural disasters. The organisation besides introduced mechanisms for coordinating the abroad policy of its members.

In 2007, a joint military staff was established to plan military operations and exercises. The organisation began to organise regular military maneuvers, specified as ‘Cooperation’ or ‘Unbreakable Brotherhood’, which aimed at improving the combat capabilities and integration of associate States' troops.

ODB challenges and crises (2010–currently)

The organisation of the Collective safety Agreement has faced a number of challenges in fresh years that undermine its effectiveness and coherence.

1. Crisis in Armenia and relations with Azerbaijan – The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, peculiarly the increase in combat in 2020 and 2022, highlighted the limited function of the ODKB in ensuring safety for its members. Armenia has repeatedly criticised the organisation for not supporting Azerbaijan's actions, which has led to tensions within the ODB.
2. Withdrawal of Uzbekistan – In 2012, Uzbekistan again left the ranks of the organization, which weakened its position in Central Asia.
3. The function of Russia – Russia, as the largest and most powerful associate of the ODF, is simply a key pillar of the organization. However, its dominant function has frequently been criticised by another associate States, which were afraid of subjecting their political and military interests to Moscow.
4. Lack of effectiveness in addressing crises – The organization was criticized for its inability to respond effectively to interior crises specified as the Kazakhstan riot in 2022 or problems with extremism in Tajikistan.

Organisational structure

The ODB has respective main decision-making bodies:

1. Collective safety Council – the most crucial body of the organisation, composed of the heads of the associate States. The Council shall take decisions on strategical and operational matters.
2. ODB Secretariat – liable for coordinating the activities of the organisation and implementing decisions taken by the Council.
3. Military Staff – he plans and implements military operations, as well as the organisation of joint manoeuvres.
4. Joint fast consequence Forces – military units designated by associate States to respond to threats.

A key component of the plan to take over Belarus is the Regional Military Group (RGV), a flexible command structure that allows Russia to control the armed forces of Belarus operationally. According to the fresh doctrine of the State of the Union of 2021, The RRV can be activated not only during war but besides during the “direct threat of aggression”. specified an approach gives Kremlin a wide field of usage for Belarusian forces in military operations without formal declaration of war.

Since 2020, an intensification of Russian-Belarusian military exercises has been observed to enhance the interoperability of both armies. For example, mixed battalions and tactical companies were first created in maneuvers organized between 2021 and 2020, allowing full integration of Belarusian units into the Russian command structure. Furthermore, Russia uses Belarus' military infrastructure to increase its military presence at NATO and Ukraine borders.

2. Political integration

In the political sphere, Russia strives to dominate the State of the Union by creating common governing institutions specified as the joint council of ministers, parliament or ultimate court. Although formally Belarus retains sovereignty, in practice the Kremlin gradually takes control of key aspects of the functioning of the state. This process includes harmonisation of law, the introduction of common educational standards and the reorientation of Belarus' abroad policy in favour of Russia.

Russia besides uses propaganda tools and historical manipulation to weaken the Belarusian national identity. The introduction of a common past manual aims to advance the communicative of the Kremlin, according to which Belarus, Ukraine and Russia constitute 1 historical community.

3. economical integration

The Kremlin besides intensifys integration processes in the area of the economy, aiming at creating a single marketplace and monetary union. The introduction of common customs and taxation regulations and the improvement of transport infrastructure serves to increase Belarus' economical dependence on Russia. In addition, Russia uses Belarus as logistical facilities and a tool to circumvent global sanctions.

In conclusion, the objectives of Russia's integration with Belarus go far beyond standard cooperation between countries. They aim to systematically restrict Belarus' sovereignty and transform it into a de facto extension of the Russian state apparatus.

II. Russia's achievements so far

1. Military successes

Russia has importantly deepened its military presence in the territory of Belarus, moving towards its permanent submission. Since 2021, Moscow has gained unprecedented access to Belarusian military infrastructure, which allows the deployment of armed forces close to the borders of NATO and Ukraine. The introduction of Russian air defence systems and permanent military presence increase Kremlin's operational capabilities in the region.

Russia uses military maneuvers specified as “Zapad” and “Union Tarcza”, to integrate its tactical forces with Belarus. It is peculiarly crucial to establish mixed units that may operate under Russian command in the event of a conflict. Furthermore, Moscow controls the Belarusian airspace under the common defence system.

2. Political progress

The Kremlin effectively restricted the political autonomy of Belarus, forcing the Lukashenko government to respect Russian interests as priorities. In 2021, 28 integration programmes were signed, which include harmonisation of law, common economical regulations and the dependence of Minsk's abroad policy on Moscow. Key aspects of these programmes include:

a. Harmonisation of economical policies

• Closer regulation in sectors specified as customs, taxes, economical activity and transport.
• Unification of interior marketplace rules specified as trade and industry.

b. Integration of taxation systems

• Developing a akin taxation collection system, including harmonisation of VAT and excise duties.
• Creating a common taxation area to reduce administrative barriers.

c. Single energy market

• Integrating energy systems, including gas, oil and electricity.
• Potential single gas and oil prices across both countries.

d. Transport and infrastructure

• Development of common rules on rail, road and air transport.
• Strengthen cooperation in the area of logistics.

e. Financial policy

• Cooperation in monetary and financial policy.
• In the position of possible unification of currencies, although no single currency has yet been decided.

f. Common industrial policy

• Coordination of programmes in key industrial sectors, e.g. agriculture, machinery and arms industries.

g. Digitalisation and computerisation

• Developing common standards for the digitisation of public administration.
• Construction of common information systems and databases.

h. Labour marketplace and social benefits

• Harmonisation of provisions on employment and workers' rights.
• Mutual designation of social safety and coordination of pensions and benefits.

and. Security and defence

• Although they are not straight part of 28 programmes, military and safety cooperation is an crucial background, which strengthens coordination in another areas.

j. Scientific and educational policy

Joint investigation programmes, university cooperation and approximation of education systems.

3. Economics under Kremlin control

Russia has successfully integrated the Belarusian economy into its sphere of influence. Belarus has become an crucial partner in circumventing sanctions imposed on Russia, especially through trade in restricted goods. Furthermore, Russia controls key industrial sectors of Belarus, including energy and transport.

In conclusion, Russia's achievements in the integration process with Belarus show the effectiveness of the Kremlin's long-term strategy. Belarus' military, political and economical dependence on Russia makes it a de facto subordinate entity within the Russian sphere of influence.

III. Russia's next steps in integration

1. Further strengthening of military presence

The Kremlin plans to proceed to grow its military presence in Belarus. These actions include the creation of fresh training centres and military bases, which will let even greater operational integration of both armies. Russia can besides strive for the permanent deployment of its armored and rocket units in Belarus, which will further increase force on NATO and Ukraine.

The next step will be to increase the number of joint manoeuvres, with an emphasis on offensive scenarios. Russian military instructors can take full control of the training of Belarusian soldiers, which will in practice limit the independency of Belarus' armed forces.

2. Strengthening political control

In the political sphere, Russia will search even more centralisation within the Union State. It is possible to establish a common parliament or to accelerate work on the Constitution of the State of the Union, which formally sanctions the domination of the Kremlin over Belarus. Russia may besides push for a common electoral strategy to influence decision-making processes in Minsk.

The Kremlin will besides usage propaganda tools to further weaken Belarusian national identity. A single past manual will become a tool for legitimising integration and minimising social resistance.

3. Full economical integration

Russia will proceed its efforts to accomplish full economical integration, including the introduction of a single currency. Belarus' dependence on Russian energy resources and loans will be further deepened. The Kremlin will push for harmonisation of taxation systems and customs regulations, which will virtually prevent Minsk from pursuing an independent economical policy.

Russia can besides grow cooperation in technology, especially in strategical sectors specified as the arms and IT industries. This approach will let Kremlin to take control of key branches of the Belarusian economy.

4. usage of global institutions

The Kremlin will search to legitimise its actions towards Belarus internationally. utilizing organisations specified as the Organisation of the Collective safety Agreement (CSTO) or the Eurasian economical Union (EAEU), Russia may present the integration process as compatible with global law and beneficial to both parties.

In conclusion, Russia's next steps in the process of integration with Belarus are moving towards full subordination of this country. These actions cover military, political, economical and propaganda aspects, making them part of the Kremlin's long-term strategy to reconstruct influence in the post-Soviet space.

IV. Implications for NATO, Ukraine and Belarus

1. NATO implications

Russia's increasing presence in Belarus poses a direct threat to NATO's east flank. The deployment of rocket systems, specified as Iskander, and the improvement of military infrastructure enable Moscow to conduct military operations in the Baltic and east Europe. NATO must increase its defence capabilities in the region, including the deployment of additional units in Poland and the Baltic States.

Military integration of Russia and Belarus can besides lead to escalation of tensions in the region. Military maneuvers specified as Zapad, simulating offensive actions, can be seen as provocation, forcing NATO to respond, which increases the hazard of accidental clashes.

2. Effects on Ukraine

Belarus, subordinated to Russia, becomes a strategical base for Russian military operations against Ukraine. From the territory of Belarus Russia may lead rocket attacks and land offensives, threatening the northern regions of Ukraine, including Kiev. Additionally, Belarus can be utilized to circumvent global sanctions and support the Russian military industry.

Ukraine needs to increase its defence capacity on the northern border, which further burdens its limited resources. Intelligence cooperation with NATO and the Baltic States is becoming crucial for monitoring Russian activities in Belarus.

3. Implications for Belarus

The integration process with Russia means further failure of Belarus' sovereignty. The political and economical dependence on Moscow limits Minsk's ability to conduct independent interior and abroad policies. Belarusian society, though divided, may feel increasing discontent with Russia's increasing influence, which may lead to interior tensions.

Belarus besides becomes more susceptible to global sanctions. Cooperation with Russia in the celebration of restrictions may consequence in additional penalties imposed by the West, which will make the country's economical situation worse.

In summary, the implications for NATO, Ukraine and Belarus resulting from Russia's actions are multidimensional. NATO must increase its defence capabilities, Ukraine faces fresh threats to the north, and Belarus faces the possible of a full submission to Moscow.

Completion

The analysis of Russia's actions towards Belarus shows a multidimensional process of systematic subordination of the country. Military, political and economical integration, conducted in a methodical and long-term manner, makes Belarus a tool for carrying out Kremlin's interests. From a global and regional perspective, this poses a serious threat to the stableness of east Europe, as well as to NATO and Ukraine.

Russia uses Belarus as an operational base, logistics facilities and a means of circumventing global sanctions. This process is simply a model example of the Russian strategy of “hybrid submission”, which can be replicated against another post-Soviet states. Therefore, knowing and countering these actions are crucial to halt the further expansion of Moscow's influence.

For NATO, this means strengthening the east flank, developing fast consequence capabilities and strengthening cooperation with the Baltic and Polish countries. Ukraine faces the challenge of defending its northern border and countering Russian attacks from Belarus. On the another hand, Belarus is struggling with an always deeper dependence on Moscow, which may lead to interior opposition to the regulation of Lukashenko and Russian influence.

In summary, Russia's actions towards Belarus are not only a local problem, but an component of a broader strategy for destabilisation and subordination of the region. The global consequence must be adequate, firm and long-term in order to effectively counter Russian hegemonic ambitions.