HOW THE NATIONAL ARMY WAS DEFINED
Author Dr Leszek Pietrzak
Soviet dictator Józef Stalin planned to enslave Poland. He considered the Polish Underground Army – the National Army as the biggest obstacle in this operation. Without any scruples, he proceeded to liquidate the largest anti-German conspiracy organization in the German-occupied Europe.
"If I look at your work like this, if there was no Red Army, they'd have fired you like partridges for a week“ – he taunted Stalin on 3 October 1944 during a gathering with his agents from the Polish National Liberation Committee. Stalin, disciplining the PKWN delegation for political softness and non-application of "Revolutionary Techniques" meant just to break up the Home Army. Installed in July 1944 in Poland, PKWN was a highly illusory government, and safety offices – its armed arm – were inactive incapable to act independently. In turn in the increasing folk army (formed in Lublin II Army of the Polish Army) "There are besides many AKs - sheep and another counter-revolutionary elements". The communist power was so based on russian forces stationed in Poland. So it was clear to Stalin that if it wasn't for them, PKWN wouldn't have had a chance. This is why he stopped the front for almost six months and strengthened the NKVD forces stationed in Poland. There were almost 2 million russian soldiers between Vistula and Bug at the turn of 1944 and 1945. Statistically, 35 russian soldiers were stationed on 1 square kilometre of PKWN. With a population density of about 70 people per square kilometre, this was huge.
THE NATURAL CHARGE
Polish Kresy were the experimental polygon of Soviets in fighting the National Army. In January 1944, the Red Army entered Volyn, where the National Army troops there joined the implementation of the “Bury”, an armed action against the retreating German forces. In November 1943, General Tadeusz Komorowski “Bór” issued the order to start “Burzy”. Komorowski recommended the Home Army to talk as host to the entering Red Army. The AK commander believed that specified action would force the Soviets to recognise the power of the Polish government in London, the sovereignty of Poland and the inviolability of its borders.
When the 27th Volyn Infantry Division of the AK began fighting with the overwhelming German forces in January 1944, the Soviets' unfriendly attitude to the Home Army was immediately apparent. They disarmed the Home Army troops and arrested her soldiers. This was especially the case erstwhile the Volynian Home Army troops were forced to cross the front line due to the immense advantage of the German forces with which they fought. In April 1944, the Soviets refused to retreat all troops of the 27th AK Infantry Division into the russian zone. In specified a situation, the division commander of Colonel Jan Kiwerski ‘Oliwa’ decided to enter the rear of the German troops, which entailed a immense risk. Finally, after many dense battles in the lap in June 1944, troops of 27 DP AK were in Lublin and took part in Lublin's “Burza”.
Similar experiences were experienced by the 11th and 12th AK Infantry Divisions, which in March 1944 joined the implementation of the “Burza” on Podol. However, the real test of the Soviets' relation with the Home Army was Wilenszczyzna and Nowogrodówka, where the command over the forces of the Home Army in June 1944 was taken by Colonel Aleksander Krzyżanowski "Wilk". The storm in these areas began with the capture of Vilnius (Operation "The Sharp Gate") by Vilnius troops of the Home Army, which then withdrew from the town in the Rudnicka Forest area. Colonel Krzyżanowski hoped that his subordinate forces of the AK after the Soviets had been armed would be able to engage in further fighting with German forces. erstwhile on 18 July 1944 he went with a delegation to the staff of the commander of the 3rd Belarusian Front General Ivan Chernichowski to enter into an agreement on this matter, he was insidiously arrested. Another group of Vilnius National Army officers, discussing with russian officers in the town of Bogusze details of division equipment, was besides arrested and imprisoned in Vilnius prison. A government delegate was besides detained for Vilnius territory and delegation staff. Participating in the “Burza” action, the Vilnius AK forces were shelled by russian assault aviation, bearing further losses. any of them were scattered and any decided to enter Grodna and Białystok. The Soviets have set up a real hunt for them. In total, about 8,000 soldiers of the National Army were arrested in Vilnius during the “Burza” campaign. The russian officers brought to the camp in Riazana, the enlisted officers and the privates, while they placed in the NKVD camp in the Royal Miedniki (Wileński district), where any of them managed to escape. Part of detainees
The Home Army was to be forced into 1 of the Red Army reserve regiments. However, erstwhile they refused to take their oath, they were taken to the camp in Kałudu, where they could not return until the turn of 1946 and 1947.
AUTHORITY OF THE POLISH LAND
The government delegation to the Country and the command of the Home Army knew about the Soviets' actions against troops that participated in the “Burza” action in the Kresach. Their situation was besides known to the Polish government in London, who informed the British side. However, this 1 did not intend to intervene. The “Burza” in Kresach, performed by the Polish Home Army, was contrary to the provisions of the Tehran Conference, under which Polish east lands were to fall to the Soviets.
The British Minister of Information Brendan Bracken, who imposed preventive censorship on all information about the “Burza” action in the Polish Borderlands, took care of the silence on this betrayal, so no 1 noticed the effort of the Polish National Army in the fight against Germany. An attitude akin to that of the British was besides adopted by the Americans.
The Last Soyose With Hitler
The successes of the Red Army offensive in Belarus and northern Ukraine resulted in its troops crossing the Bug line at the end of July 1944 and occupying the Lublin area. In the area between Bug and Vistula there were immense Red Army forces. These included, among others, 10 armies (including 1 armored army), six separate armoured and artillery corps, as well as 2 aerial armies. These forces had at their disposal immense amounts of equipment and all supplies essential for further combat. General Nicolaus von Vormann, commander of the 9th Army facing them, even assessed in his reports that the Soviets' predominance was so large that it was adequate to have the German front completely broken.
However, the Red Army did not strike due to the fact that Stalin had forbidden it. The russian dictator then began the most crucial phase of his plan to compose Poland. In addition to installing on the Red Army's occupied areas of power, the demolition of the underground Home Army began. The strategy towards the AK in the areas behind the Bugu Stalin line was set out in a directive of 14 July 1944, ordering russian commanders not to enter into any relations and agreements with Polish troops. As he pointed out "without hold after disclosure of the individual composition of these branches, disarm and put them on specially organized points and, in the event of opposition from Polish troops, apply armed forces". In order to guarantee better conditions for these objectives, on 26 July 1944 he signed with PKWN (before his arrival in Poland), an agreement "On relations between russian leadership and Polish administration in liberated areas of Poland". This agreement subjected russian jurisdiction to any crimes that could have been committed by the civilian population “in the war region in Poland”, which was deliberately not specified. Stalin, however, decided to first deal with the National Army utilizing the Germans.
Knowing about the preparations for the Warsaw Uprising (it was to be part of the “Burzy”), he did his best to accelerate its explosion. Among another things, at his command on 29 July 1944, Moscow radio broadcast an appeal in Polish to the Warsawians, urging them to fight Germany as rapidly as possible. A day later, on 30 July 1944, the “Kościuszko” station, headed by the widow of Felix Dzierżyński, besides made a akin appeal. The message she gave said that the Red Army already occupied Warsaw's Prague and called on the population of the capital to attack the Germans.
When fighting broke out in Warsaw on 1 August 1944, Stalin stopped the front and decided to wait for the uprising to fall. He knew perfectly well that the unassisted National Army would be crushed by the Germans. Therefore, he refused to let the Western Allies to let their aircraft with weapons and food for insurgents to land at russian airports. He besides did not let troops of the Home Army from areas occupied by the Red Army to arrive with the assistance of insurgents fighting in the capital (this was ordered by the commandant of the Home Army General Tadeusz Komorowski "Bora" of 14 August 1944).
The defeat of the uprising was occupied with the death of thousands of insurgents from the Home Army and the physical demolition of the city. Thus Stalin destroyed the flower of the Home Army, which was located in the Polish capital by the hands of the Germans. At the time of the outbreak, the number of AK units in Warsaw was estimated at around 50,000 sworn soldiers. The russian dictator did so to save his NKVD's work, which was to systematically address the problem of combating the "fascist" National Army.
AK-BOOKING
The death of the uprising was Stalin's first step towards the demolition of the Home Army. The latter, despite her defeat, inactive seemed a dangerous opponent. PKWN remained an illusory government which had no support among Poles and could be only thanks to the support of the Soviets. The power in “Lubel” Poland was exercised by the Soviets, treating it entirely as a front region where they can do anything. The most crucial of these actions was to fight the National Army. The Soviets have had real hunting since the first days of their presence. Many underground soldiers were detained in the second half of August 1944. The arrests of AK soldiers were intensified in October and November 1944. They went to transitional camps, which the NKVD created in Lublin Poland tens. Camps on Lublin Majdanek, in Skrobów close Lubartów, Krzesimów close Łęczna, Kąkolewnica close Radzynia Podlaski, Podwarszawskie Remberts are only any of them. The AK - the sheep were besides exported to the russian Union. Only in August and September 1944, there were 400 officers and functionaries in the structures of the Home Army in 8 transports that left Lublin. Almost at the same time, in 4 transports from Białystok, 3,700 AK - sheep were exported, and in 2 transports from Przemyśl there were almost 1,300 of them. Transports of deportees in October and November 1944
The AKs were even more numerous. They usually went to labour camps in Stalinogorsk, Kharkov, Borowicz, Riazań, Tula and dozens of another places in the russian Union. Only after respective years of murderous work could they return to the country, but a large part of them remained forever on inhuman soil. Historians estimation that between September 1944 and May 1945 more than 50,000 Polish citizens were deported from Lublin Poland to the russian Union, mostly soldiers of the AK.
DEFINITE LICVIATION
In the spring of 1945 the russian NKVD had to face the branches of the AK - the underground which began to revive. So the Soviets brought respective NKVD divisions to Poland. In total, in January 1945, the NKVD forces stationed in Poland had already had 35 1000 people to scope the state by the end of the summertime of 1945. Their strategy has besides changed. erstwhile the front moved west in January 1945, the component units of the individual NKVD divisions were assigned to a circumstantial area of action for which they were entirely responsible. Only 1 of these units was assigned a somewhat different task. It was the 2nd NKVD Border Regiment, which was part of the 64th NKVD Division, which received the task of protecting the Polish Government (The Provisional Government was created on 31 December 1944 on the basis of PKWN).
When underground troops activated their activities in the spring of 1945, NKVD units took on the main burden of fighting them. They were pursuing underground troops. They locked them in laps and destroyed them. They besides arrested the civilian population, which provided assistance to the guerrillas. These actions frequently had the dimension of major pacification and repressive operations. The most celebrated of this kind of maneuver was Oława Augustowska – an operation conducted from 10 to 25 July 1945 by the 385th firearm Regiment 62. The NKVD Division and its supporting Red Army troops from the 3rd Belarusian Front and separate LWP and UB troops. Its goal was to break up underground troops that operated in the Suwałk and Augustów area. During this process, the Augustowska Forest area was pacified and more than 7,000 people were detained who were imprisoned in specially created filter camps and tortured. About 600 arrested were taken in an unknown direction and most likely murdered.
The structures of the Poak subterranean were besides comprehensively developed, eliminating subsequent organizational links. Among another things, on 21 March 1945, in 1 of the apartments in Warsaw Prague, the full staff of the AK – DSZ territory Command in Lublin was arrested, which held an organizational meeting. A real blow to the underground was the arrest on 27 and 28 March 1945 of the leaders of the Polish Underground State, who were transported to Moscow, where they were tried in June 1945 (the alleged trial of sixteen). This operation was personally supervised by the head of the NKVD in Poland by General Ivan Aleksandrowicz Sierow, who appeared in this operation as General Ivanov.
The NKVD forces left Poland only in spring 1947. By then, however, the underground was already badly broken. The work of his final annihilation has already been carried out by local safety authorities (UBs) trained for this task by NKVD specialists.
Dr Leszek Pietrzak
