"The mud general"

"Blood General", untrained crews and pogrom of Ukrainian artillery by drones "Lancet", that is why the Ukrainian spring offensive does not move.

"Over 230 tanks and over 1.5 1000 armored vehicles have been sent by the contact group in Ukraine over the last fewer months, including 9 Ukrainian armored brigades late announced US Secretary of defence Lloyd Austin in Ramstein. I would add that they sent more of them, and thousands of tons of ammunition, missiles, mines, bombs and hundreds of cannons, artillery rocket launchers and mortars.

Since March, a large spring-year-old Ukrainian counteroffensive has been announced, to reject Russian troops from Ukraine's land captured by them after 24 February 2022, and even to let the authorities in Kiev to regain Crimea. Why, even though it's actually April, nothing is happening?

Abstaining from the widely distributed opinions of dilettants recently, these have always the most to say, the opinions of professional propagandists including trolls on Fb (faceless profiles etc.) – specified work and those who are “polluted” with visions of unilateral “information bubbles” to which they belong and with which dialog is pointless, it is worth considering this issue.

Firstly, what I find one more time is the analogy, in a large part of events, with 1943 and preparations of the German Army for the offensive operation “Zitatedele” which resulted in the large groundbreaking start of planet War II – the conflict of the Kursk Arch. The weight of success or not of Ukrainian counteroffensive on the destiny of the unfortunate Russian-Ukrainian war is akin to the clash between the Wehrmacht and the russian Army in the summertime of 1943.

1. The transportation origin for fresh equipment and problems with the control of its operation and operation by circumstantial services.

The United States, along with NATO allies, supplied 1,500 armored vehicles, and 230 tanks whose service must be mastered by Ukrainian crews. The Leopard-2 tank, or M2 Bradley's combat infantry car, requires at least six months of training. 4-5 weeks which are given to Ukrainian tankers is not enough, hence problems and accidents like with Leopards on the Polish camp in Świętszów. It is not an art to bring vehicles to the barracks of a given unit, and the art is to master its handling and exploit their combat capabilities by trained crews. Finally, there's a squad of subdivisions. This takes time and this period is clearly delayed against optimistic assumptions.

2. method factor.

Delivered by the USA, Australia, Canada, Italy, Denmark, France or Poland, vehicles are proverbially “From Sasa to Lasa”, their service requires effort and training of logistics soldiers. Most of them are wheeled vehicles with a alternatively delicate plan for the charms of the “Eastern Front”, its road and weather conditions. dense wheeled vehicles are simply incapable to decision under the conditions of the "muddy sea", or spring and autumn razputica. As in 1943, the Earth must dry and harden so that Ukrainian troops like the Wehrmacht on the Kursk Luka can take maneuvering action.

3. Weather factor.

Winter and Spring 2023 is on the southeast Ukraine is anomaly rainy and wet. The roads and the side of the paved roads are “mud sea”, not seen there for 2 decades. It was the mud in which the military equipment sank that paralyzed the war activities during planet War II on the east front. Although the road arrived, the tank then weighed about 25 t, and present about 60 t, etc. The terrain through which the front line presently runs is not suitable for fighting.

4. The origin for the effective usage by Russians of ‘Kamikaze’ drones or ammunition circulating ‘Lancet-3M’ in the fight against Ukrainian artillery.

Russian drones eliminated (destroyed or damaged) a crucial number of guns, peculiarly towed American Haubic M777 by which they eliminated many Ukrainian fire agents. Indirectly, they forced the simplification of the function of NATO artillery supplied by NATO countries, which had its far reaching and precise fire to replace the weakness of impact aviation in the large spring-year counteroffensive. Effective against the Russians, Ukrainian tactics, with the winning autumn run of 2022 must change.

5. Finally, the command factor.

On the Russian side, many high-ranking inept commanders, various ointments of “favorites” of power, protege “favorites of power” as “bloody butcher” General Muradow protegated Kadyrov (both of Kakukazu) who facilitated the success of the Ukrainian army under Kiev Balakeja or Izjum.
The command was taken over by General Walery Gierasimov Chief of the General Staff of the FR and generals who were respected in the military, about the different résumé and talents, specified as General Tieplinski, General Kim, Gen Modrewiczew or yet Gen Kuzowlew. Russian army supplemented by trained reserves (mobilization was in October 2022), supplemented by equipment (Russian military manufacture entered the war production tracks) , reasonably commanded is simply a hard opponent for Ukrainian army. The advanced hazard of defeat in a large conflict to find the destiny of the war is not a origin allowing Ukrainian commanders to unthinkable actions.

To sum up, I do not anticipate a large Ukrainian confro offensive earlier as in June, and it is likely to happen as in 1943 to the conflict of the Kursk Arch in July. It will not be a single start, but a number of operations caught in different operating directions, including landing operations by Dniepr, but it is most likely interesting to consider for a separate and equally long article.

KP

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