Author: Veronika Barankovych crucial support: Prof. Mirosław Sułek, Ernest Szymala
Introduction
Powerometric analysis is simply a quantitative approach to examining the power of states in global relations. This word combines the terms ‘power’ and ‘measurement’. To put it simply, powerometrics powermetrics) is active in measuring the possible of states and modeling and forecasting the global strength system. We will focus on the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and their power position after the Cold War. The main nonsubjective is to measure how the comparative power of ASEAN members has changed and shaped from the 1990s to the present, taking into account the key dimensions of power: political, economical and military. specified an assessment will let us to realize whether ASEAN countries (both individually and possibly as a whole) have become crucial actors in the global strategy after the Cold War.
The powerometric method itself requires explanation first. According to Mirosław Sulek, 1 of the pioneers of powerometry in Poland, powerometry is simply a “quantitative extension of poweronomy – sciences about the power of political units”, translating qualitative findings into models and numerical indicators[1]. This makes it possible to specify the power profile of countries more precisely and simulate changes in the arrangement of forces in different scenarios[2]. In this power-metric analysis, we will apply this position to ASEAN countries, which means that we will look at the measurable manifestations of their power (such as the size of the economy, military spending, population resources) but besides take into account the political factors affecting the usage of this potential.
It is crucial to emphasise that the power analysis aspires to objectivity and comparability; alternatively of impressional assessments, it is based on hard data and indicators, which is part of the formal nature of state power research.
ASEAN is simply a regional organization established in Bangkok on 8 August 1967 by 5 founding states: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand[3]. In the following years the ASEAN lineup grew – Brunei Darussalam joined on 7 January 1984, Vietnam 28 July 1995, Laos and Myanmar 23 July 1997, and Cambodia 30 April 1999. As of 1999, ASEAN has thus formed 10 Southeast Asian countries, covering the area from Burma (Myanma) to the west to the Philippines to the east. For the full picture, it should be added that in 2022 the acceptance of East Timor was mostly agreed as the 11th ASEAN member, that country was then granted observer position and became a full associate of the organization on 26 October 2025. Therefore, it was not taken into account during the period considered.
Methodology
The methodology presented is rooted in the achievements of the explanation of global relations and geopolitics, with the support of cybernetics and praxeology.
Model Piece[4] allows to calculate, inter alia, the 2 key types of power of the state applicable for this study:
Economic power is simply a synthetic expression of the collective capacity of a given population in a given time and space. Its value is determined in relation to the global strategy of forces, which makes it comparatively "free". This is due to the fact that economical power reflects the balance of power, shaped in a long historical process, which gives it a feature of advanced inertia. As a result, it is not possible to make a extremist change in the short word (except for the global earthquakes specified as war). For this reason, economical power is 1 of the most nonsubjective indicators that de facto politicians have limited influence over the short term. Thanks to this stableness it is possible to forecast comparatively reliable changes in the global power strategy even in the long run.
Economic power is operated through management results measured by gross home product (GDP), supplemented by demographic (population) and spatial (area).
The military power, which is the second key expression of the power of the state, is closely linked to the economical power which can be considered as its foundation. In another words, military power is simply a militarized form of economical power. It has a dual dimension of militarisation: economic, resulting from the decoupling of military spending from GDP, and demographic, linked to the allocation of part of the population to military service. The military burden may be significant, during peacetime military spending usually amounts to 1% to 10% of GDP, and the participation of military personnel in the population from 0.1% to 1.5%. During times of threat of war, and especially during wartime, these indicators are expanding significantly.
Military power is more subjective than economical power due to the fact that it is straight dependent on political decisions. These decisions, although not arbitrary, are subject to various restrictions, specified as public opinion, alliance commitments or available production capacity.
Because military power is part of economical power, it should be much little than economical power. It is indeed. However, in the analysis we adopted a convention according to which both types of power mention to the world, i.e. that both the world's general power and the world's military power equals 1,000.
In terms of military power, 3 groups of countries can be distinguished. The first are countries with akin economical and military powers. The second is countries that have clearly greater economical power than military power. The 3rd group are countries with much higher military power than economical power – they are heavy militarised countries
Military power includes military-economic factors (military spending as part of GDP), demographic-military (number of active service soldiers) and spatial (area of territory).
Indications:
Pe – economical power; Pm – military power; GDP – gross home product;
L – population; a – territory; WW – military expenditure; S – number of soldiers in active service.
This model is easy to realize and apply, besides for non-specialists. It is based on a essential and adequate number of constant factors in past inherent in the existence and functioning of human groups, including political units. As such, the model's author considered: people operating in a peculiar space and at a certain time, representing certain organizational and production skills or the ability to collective action, i.e. the social processing of matter, energy and information. due to the fact that people act, they have certain results. From the political unit's point of view, GDP (Gross National Product) can be considered a good synthetic result. another possible measures, specified as GNP (Gross National Product), may be considered, but this is not applicable at this phase of consideration. It cannot be excluded that in the future there will be a better indicator, more adapted to measurement the effects of humans. So the variables that we will consider are people, space, time and the results of collective actions. The statistic utilized in the study come from respective sources, the number of which has been tried to be kept to the minimum necessary. Data on population, GDP by currency exchange rate and area of territory of the countries come first from the planet Bank (WB) database. Data on the number of soldiers in active service and military spending in US dollars were taken from the "The Military Balance" yearbooks published by the London global Institute for strategical Studies (IISS). The missing data from these sources were supplemented by data from the following sources according to the hierarchy: the global Monetary Fund (IMF), the Stockholm global Institute for Peace investigation (SIPRI) and the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
The evolution of ASEAN after the Cold War
At the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN functioned as an organization with nearly 20 years of history, but originally rather a narrow mandate. It was created in 1967 in the mediate of the Cold War, inter alia to strengthen the cooperation of anti-communist countries of the region against threats of infiltration by communist movements supported by China or the USSR[5]. Unlike the CENTO pact or another military alliances of that era, ASEAN was deliberately not designed as a military bloc, but alternatively as a forum for consultation and confidence-building between neighbours. It was founded on the rule of non-interference and common respect for sovereignty, which was expected to prevent intra-region conflicts and hinder the external exploitation of divisions between Southeast Asian states.
The end of the Cold War (1989-1991) brought a breakthrough in ASEAN evolution. The organization had to redefine its role: the immediate threat to the expansion of communism in the region disappeared, and at the same time an chance arose to extend ASEAN to erstwhile adversaries. In the 1990s, there was a wave of ASEAN enlargements: first, socialist Vietnam was adopted (1995), then neighbouring Laos and Burma/Myanma (1997), and finally, post-socialist Cambodia (1999), thus ending the process of integrating the full of Southeast Asia under the auspices of ASEAN. This meant that ASEAN has evolved "from an anti-communist organization to a common forum for regional cooperation" and has since brought together all the countries of the region, regardless of their system. This expansion had not only a symbolic dimension (the reconciliation of erstwhile enemies), but besides practical: ASEAN engaged, among others, in the peace process in Cambodia in the early 1990s, supporting the stabilisation of this country after years of civilian war.
ASEAN's reinvention took place in a two-track way: firstly, it was set to deepen economical cooperation in the region in order to benefit jointly from the economical boom. Secondly, ASEAN began to play a greater function in regional safety as the initiator of dialog and cooperation in a broader format. As early as 1994, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a safety forum covering not only ASEAN countries, but besides the main powers of Asia and the Pacific (including the USA, China, Japan, Russia, India, Australia) was established.[6]. The ARF became the first always platform for multilateral political and safety consultations in the Asia-Pacific region, which meant expanding ASEAN's function from purely intra-regional to a "architect" of a wider agreement. Similarly, in the next decade, ASEAN launched East Asia Summit EAS since 2005, which is gathering ASEAN leaders with leaders of 8 key partners (including China, India, Japan, USA, Russia)[7].
In conclusion, after the end of the Cold War, ASEAN underwent a crucial transformation: from a club of 5 anti-communist states it became an inclusive regional organization covering the full of Southeast Asia and an active moderator of wider cooperation. The literature emphasizes that this gave ASEAN the possible to influence disproportionately to the strength of its individual members, becoming a key component of regionalism in East Asia and a desirable partner for large powers.
The economical power of ASEAN countries
ASEAN countries have experienced exceptionally dynamic economical growth since the late 1980s, which in literature is frequently referred to as "the economical wonder of Southeast Asia". Like the Asian tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore), ASEAN's main economies have besides recorded an average GDP growth rate frequently exceeding 7–8% per year in the pre-crisis period 1997[8]. The 1990s is, as can be seen in the illustration below, a golden period for countries specified as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines that benefited from abroad investment flows, export improvement (especially electronics, textiles, natural materials) and free marketplace reforms. Singapore had already, since the 1970s, grown into a highly developed financial center, being the leader of modernization in ASEAN (it is frequently said to be the first economical miracle of the region). Vietnam has joined this group since improvement doi mine (since 1986)[9] it gradually moved from a centrally planned economy to the marketplace and in the 1990s it began to accomplish awesome results (a GDP increase of 7-8 % per year). Even smaller economies like Laos and Cambodia, starting from a very low level after decades of conflict, saw fast improvement in the 2000s, although they stay in the group of least developed countries.
As shown in Figure 1, this process was not homogeneous: the individual ASEAN economies developed at different rates, with Indonesia acting as the main ‘engine’ of the region's growth while Vietnam and the Philippines gradually reduced the distance to the more developed countries of the group.
Figure 1. The economical power of ASEAN countries from 1992 to 2024.
Source: own development.
(East Timor was not included in the analysis due to the full membership of ASEAN only on 26 October 2025).
However, we must note the braking factors and crises that have interrupted this growth. The most crucial of these was the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis. It started in Southeast Asia. The fall of the Thai baht caused a cascade of collapse of currencies and financial sectors in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and indirectly besides affected Singapore and another economies[10]. The crisis revealed structural weaknesses (credit overheating, fragile banking systems) and caused a short period of deep recession (e.g. Indonesia's GDP fell by over 13% in 1998)[11]. ASEAN, as an organization, failed to prevent the crisis or to resolve it jointly, and the IMF's assistance and national reforms proved to be a rescue. However, by the turn of the century, most ASEAN countries were back on the way of growth, though, for example, the Philippines and Thailand needed a fewer years to make their losses.
One of the key drivers of ASEAN's economical growth was the influx of abroad direct investment (FDI) and the gradual economical integration of the region. After the end of the Cold War, many ASEAN countries, especially those with a cheaper workforce and reforming the economy, specified as Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, have become attractive locations for global capital seeking fresh markets and production bases. abroad investments flowed into manufacturing sectors (electronics, household appliances, textile plants), mining (oil, gas, mining), infrastructure, and more late digital sectors (data centres, e-commerce). According to UNCTAD reports, ASEAN's participation in the global FDI inflow has steadily increased and in any years has taken on more investment than China.[12]. In 2022, the ASEAN region attracted around USD 224 billion of FDI, accounting for about 17% of all FDI to developing countries[13].
The military power of ASEAN states
Political and economical change after the end of the Cold War was reflected in the defence policies of ASEAN states. The overall trend in the region since the 1990s has been a gradual increase in military spending, linked to both the improvement of the budgetary position (due to economical growth) and the emergence of fresh safety challenges (South China Sea conflicts, terrorism, modernisation of neighbouring armed forces).
Figure 2. The military power of ASEAN states from 1992 to 2024.
Source: own development.
(East Timor was not included in the analysis due to the full membership of ASEAN only on 26 October 2025).
Figure 2 reveals a much greater variation in military power than economical power, which confirms that it is more susceptible to political decisions. Among the ASEAN countries, however, there are crucial differences in the rate and scale of the increase in defence spending. The fastest increase in possible has been recorded by Vietnam, which has been intensively modernising the armed forces since the early 21st century due to China's perceived threat in the South China Sea. Between 2003 and 2018, Vietnam's military spending increased by around 700%, from around USD 840 million to about USD 5.5 billion[14].
This is an unprecedented jump on the regional scale, although it should be remembered that they were launched from a very low base (the army of Vietnam in the 1990s was poorly funded). Vietnam invested in peculiar in the Navy and Coast defender (purchase of modern Kilo submarines)[15], frigate chepard[16] from Russia, rocket systems), as well as in aviation (Su-27/30)[17]. specified a sharp increase in spending made Vietnam 1 of the largest arms importers in Southeast Asia.
Indonesia, the largest country in the region, besides increases expenditures, although the starting point and the strategical environment are different. After the fall of Suharto (1998) the defence budget of Indonesia was for a time limited to civilian spending, it fell even to ~0.8% GDP[18]. However, as democracy and economical growth stabilised, Indonesia started an ambitious modernisation plan called Minimum Essential Force[19]. The defence budget grew in 2010. 2 figures per year, reaching around US$ 10.6 billion in 2025 (1.5% of GDP, although these are estimates)[20].
The structure of the ASEAN armed forces varies and reflects both their geographical circumstances and historical safety priorities. Overall, it can be said that traditionally most of the countries of the region maintained extended land forces, resulting from the request to deal with interior threats (communist partisans, separatists, cultural conflicts) and classical border conflicts on land (e.g. between Thailand and Vietnam/Cambodia). However, in fresh decades, with a change in the nature of the threats, we have seen an expanding emphasis on the improvement of maritime and air capabilities, especially for countries with a long coastline and disputed aquenas (Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia) maritime safety issues have become priorities.
The ability to task ASEAN forces is mostly limited, i.e. outside their own borders, military capabilities are limited. No ASEAN country has, for example, intercontinental systems, no atomic weapons, and the region is simply a non-atomic region (1995 Bangkok Treaty). Even in the conventional sphere, the region's armed forces are adapted to defend the territory and possible short expedition operations in the region (e.g. Indonesia)[21] and Malaysia[22] send quotas to UN missions or humanitarian aid in the neighbourhood). Thus, the safety of your own territory remains the main task.
Land forces proceed to account for the largest part of the army in all ASEAN countries. The largest armies (numbers) have Vietnam (approximately 480,000 active soldiers, plus immense paramilitary reserves[23]), Indonesia (~300 thousand.[24]), Thailand (~250 thousand.[25]). Singapore's land forces, Malaysia, Philippines are smaller (40-100 thousand), corresponding to the population. Historically, they were infantry armies, supported by a limited number of armoured units and artillery.
A peculiar challenge is the protection of maritime borders and the fight against irregular threats (piracy, smuggling, terrorism). Additional formations have been created to this end like the Coast defender (not all countries have it) or e.g. Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia are expanding civilian patrol agencies. ASEAN launched joint patrol initiatives specified as Trilateral Maritime Patrols in 2017 (Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines against pirates and Islamists in Sulu)[26]), or Joint Malakka Patrols[27] (with Singapore and Thailand).
In summary, ASEAN's military structure is evolving towards a more balanced armed force, in which the function of fleet and aviation is growing, but the land armies are inactive the most developed. The military capacity between countries varies widely: Singapore has technologies (Planned F-35) not available to others, while large countries specified as Indonesia and Vietnam have an asset of mass (many staff and reserves). A common feature is the defensive attitude, i.e. preparing to defend your own territory and exclusive economical zones.
Summary
After more than 3 decades since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN as a full has grown into a crucial centre of economical power, but its political-military power is fragmented and remains mostly the sum of the capacities of individual associate States alternatively than a single bloc.
First, ASEAN became a prominent economical actor. Its common economy (of US$3.8 billion GDP) makes it the world's 5th largest economical power.
The economical growth of the region after the Cold War was dynamic, frequently exceeding the global average, which led to a immense improvement in the level of improvement of many ASEAN members. The macroeconomic indicators (world trade share, abroad exchange reserves, attracting investment) place ASEAN as a full among the main centres of global growth.
Secondly, ASEAN as a full remains a limited centre of force in the political and military dimension. ASEAN is not a military alliance and has no integrated abroad or defence policy. Decisions require consensus, which reduces aggravation (as shown, for example, in the South China Sea area ASEAN has frequently been silent due to deficiency of unanimity).
As a collective diplomatic actor, ASEAN plays an crucial function Regional governance organiser e.g. it hosts multilateral summits and fora (ARF, EAS) and can influence regional discussions. However, it is not a unified strategical force that could balance the top powers.
In purely military terms, ASEAN as a bloc does not have integrated forces: it has no common staff or defence doctrine. If we hypothetically sum up all the military spending and equipment of the ASEAN states, there would be a crucial army (about 1 million soldiers under arms, hundreds of aircraft, respective submarines, etc.), but in practice specified a sum is purely theoretical. The deficiency of political will to give sovereignty in safety matters makes ASEAN's military power developed unevenly (strong in any countries, weak in others) and cannot be utilized together in the event of a threat. In the global ranking of military forces, no ASEAN state is simply a global power (Indonesia or Vietnam are regional powers at most).
Future prospects
Looking forward, respective scenarios and trends can be outlined regarding the power of ASEAN countries and ASEAN itself as an organisation, in the context of changing regional and global dynamics.
One key origin will be the further economical and demographic improvement of the region. Forecasts indicate that ASEAN can keep a comparatively advanced growth rate by the end of the 1920s (average ~5% per year)[28], which will further increase regional participation in the global economy. If these trends come true, ASEAN's economical power will proceed to grow, giving members more resources for modernisation and more ambitious policies. In particular, Vietnam is increasing into a fresh economical engine thanks to fast growth (average >6% per year since 2000[29]) approaches the position of ASEAN's second largest economy in 2030. A stronger economical Vietnam will most likely translate into a greater political and military function (it is already upgrading the fleet and aviation). any analysts indicate that Vietnam can become in ASEAN what Poland has become in the EU after enlargement, i.e. a fresh dynamic player, even aspiring to the function of co-leader (beside Indonesia). This evidently raises questions about interior balance: Indonesia historically hegemonized discourse, but by 2030 Indonesia and Vietnam together could account for over 60% of the ASEAN population and GDP, which will force any duumvirate.
Equally crucial will be the rivalry of the powers (US–China) and its consequences. Southeast Asia is 1 of the main theatres of this rivalry. China is increasingly active in the South China Sea, while the US strengthens alliances with the Philippines and builds fresh systems (e.g. AUKUS featuring Australia, which besides has implications for the region). For ASEAN, this means force to take a position or at least not to be divided. Prospectively, if competition escalates, states can be forced to make harder statements, on 1 side. This may in turn affect ASEAN's unity, for example.It is possible that Cambodia and Laos will become even more connected to China, and the Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore from the USA, forming 2 camps inside. It would be a negative scenario, threatening to paralyze the organization. Another script is that ASEAN will strengthen its centrality e.g. accelerate the creation of the alleged "ASEAN Minus X"[30] decision-making mechanisms to bypass the vetoes (this is discussed, for example, in the context of Myanmar) and will work together to make a code of conduct with the powers.
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[2] Ibid.
[3] ASEAN All. (n.d.). About us. ASEAN All. https://www.aseanall.com/about-us/ (accessed: 12.12.2025)
[4] Salads, M., & Szymala, E. (2024). State Power 2025: Powerometer Rankings. fresh Europe Institute.
[5] Molthof, M. (2012, February 8). ASEAN and the Principles of Non-Interference. E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/02/08/asean-and-the-principle-of-non-interference/ (accessed 14.12.2025)
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[8] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD
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