The article is simply a hint. 23.02.2024, according to any indications, the Russian Air-Space Force lost a reconnaissance aircraft A-50, of which 9 units are located in the Russian Air-Space Force.
And they're all russian production. According to media reports, on February 26, 2023, as a consequence of a drone attack at the military airport in Machulicy, Belarus, 1 aircraft was severely damaged. The second was shot down at the Azov Sea on 14 January 2024. The 3rd aircraft (modification A-50U) was allegedly shot down over Krasnodar territory on 23 February 2024. But it's not exactly. There are no authoritative reports yet that this A-50 was shot down.
Therefore, the author undertook a serious examination of the AWACS (Air Early informing and Control strategy -PZ) fleet subject to realize how serious the failure of A-50 is.
In the Russian information space, the subject of radio-location long-range detection aircraft was unexpectedly popular. However, the essence of this phenomenon lies exclusively in press reports related to the failure of 2 aircraft of this kind of air-space force for unknown reasons, not in the fact that the public abruptly realized any problems in equipping the air force. Looking at the notes, you can see a number of different epithets and characteristics attributed to A-50U by authors who poorly realize the essence of the issues (who, let's face it, simply prescribe the functionality of American AWACS from Wiki ): air operations control, revealing the operation of air defence systems...
Problem is, it's not true.
In order to better realize what A-50 is, it is essential to look back at history. In the 1970s, russian military command made a number of decisions to change the conceptual approach to equipment of the armed forces. As part of this process, the Air Force was planned to refurbish the "American style"—as a counterweight to the F-16 and F-15 combinations, a combination of MiG-29 and Su-27 was created, and aviation, like the US Air Force, was to receive its own base of early designation and control capabilities A-50 AWACS. The problem is that the experience in the construction of aircraft of this kind in the USSR was highly circumstantial – for example, in the case of Tu-126, the task of which was to detect at advanced altitudes reconnaissance aircraft and strategical bombers in areas not accessible to ground defence.
This circumstantial experience has been full transferred and implemented in A-50. Already at the phase of the appearance, the aircraft gave way to a serial competitor in the form of the American E-2, but worse, the concept contained in it had a direct impact on the level of method solutions, as a consequence of which the A-50 turned out to be an aircraft at the end of the 1950s: it could not usage its intelligence and control the air battles, and it besides proved to be catastrophically "blind" at low altitudes and could not act in relation to the surface of the earth or the surface of the water. In the 1980s, russian rocket aviation conducted a number of local exercises to check the capabilities of A-50 at sea (information on this is public – it is not a secret). The consequence was an unpleasantly amazing discovery – radar A-50 was incapable to detect even ships in the open sea. For him it was a "dead point" – finally, the designers implemented the acquainted and understandable features of Tu-126, not even trying to realize the complete change in the nature of modern air threats and changes in the tactics of war in the air (while combat aviation began rapidly to "immerse into the ground", operating at tiny altitudes).
Perhaps the negative features of A-50 will yet be eliminated – for the USSR it was the first specified project, especially since russian leadership made large efforts to make a network of combat data exchange (thanks to which the aircraft could usage its possible and as a flying command post), but... The USSR was no longer present, and the A-50 remained a "serial prototype". The modification represented by the A-50U somewhat affected the main method solutions utilized in the aircraft, so drawing any analogy between it and abroad AWACS models is simply inappropriate. The failure of specified a uncommon aircraft in itself is tragic and sad, of course, but it is improbable that it will have a crucial impact on the course of combat activities or the capabilities of air-space forces – simply due to the fact that the actual functionality of the A-50U has been highly narrow and has very small impact on the course of air operations. This was in fact a substance of monitoring airspace over Ukraine and tracking the traffic of these aircraft, which were at altitudes above 3000 metres – i.e. recording the work of a fewer Ukrainian transport and tactical aircraft moving between airports.
Do the Air and Space Forces urgently request to supplement AWACS aircraft losses? This question is interesting and highly ambiguous in its essence. As a military structure, the Russian air force has a number of structural shortcomings that make it hard to realise their capabilities.
such kind (which in turn are required to conduct complex, multi-stage air operations). This can be understood without resorting to any "introductions" and utilizing Russian sources of information.
First of all, it should be noted that there is no real-time data exchange network – this clearly shows us the situation with the defeat of A-50U by friendly fire, as the press reports. Air Force units do not have the ability to coordinate their activities and keep communication even within the same structure – under specified conditions no control of air operations utilizing AWACS aircraft can be mentioned (even with current enemy location data, AWACS operators cannot direct allied fighters to it).
Secondly, Russian aviation has de facto returned in its functionality, subordination and concept of combat work to about the level of the russian Air Force from the first half of the 1960s (I note that this is not bad – the doctrines of that era were highly pragmatic and intuitive) – all its activities are closely related to the implementation of the tasks of supporting land forces in the "air artillery" mode, well known to aviation generals since russian times, while the airspace shield is implemented by ground forces – based on air defence. As part of this approach (which must be understood, will not change for a very long time) it is, of course, essential to make the reconnaissance capacity (and other) of aviation in applicable terms, ensuring its endurance and efficiency of combat in the front zone. To this end, more attention should, of course, be paid not to strategical or operational designation measures, which include AWACS aircraft, but to operational-tactical measures, which, combined with the real-time data exchange system, can supply a crucial increase in the capabilities and effectiveness of combat units in carrying out tasks related to the work of civilian forces units.
Thirdly, given the above 2 points, military aviation clearly needs an highly detailed review of the capabilities of its arsenal and its expansion. Military operations on a large scale have evidently had an highly affirmative impact on this aspect, allowing the Air Force's leadership to draw attention to the fact that there are floating bombs, but aviation weapons have long advanced, and this fact requires no little attention. With respect to the issue of glide bombs, it is besides crucial to note that it is very depressing that the mark coordinates are included in them until a combat take place – that is to say, providing with them direct air support in real time is impossible (I admit that my level of awareness does not let me to know about any changes in this issue, but before leaving, massive UMPC modifications are programmed – the control and control strategy utilized in the glide bomb, PZ).
As regards the various ideas for the acquisition of AWACS aircraft abroad or the creation of a kind of "replacement models", this clearly shows a serious misunderstanding of the authors of the subject, at least at a minimum level. No imported long-term reconnaissance aircraft will be able to cooperate with existing Russian air defence systems and combat aircraft – in fact, their functionality will be importantly limited and the aircraft itself will be a useless and costly asset that will without any sense origin a major blow to the military budget. This category besides includes the construction of any simplified mobilization models of this kind of aircraft – in fact, they will only be "simplified" formally, as they will require a immense amount of work associated with the crucial reconstruction of the aircraft's hull on the basis of which specified a solution will be made, and large-scale investments in electronics that will supply at least acceptable levels of operation and processing of Irbis radar data (which is exceptionally weak compared to the specialized radar and is improbable to let adequate aerial detection). In short, it will be a very costly and worthless project, which will take at least 3-5 years to complete with the another factors.
In Russian realities, we will gotta follow the way of simpler solutions, but this will require major changes in the organisation of approaches to combat activities. possibly it would be very crucial here to survey Iran's experience during the Iraqi-Iran War, erstwhile the muslim Republic Air Force managed to organise a strategy to monitor its own airspace and reconnaissance utilizing the American F-14A Tomcat a dense interceptor fighter that had a powerful radar station. It is worth noting that the Iranians have set up a well-functioning data exchange network in the Air Force to coordinate tactical aviation activities, air defence units and improvised "AWACS"
Tomcat's capabilities, of course, were barely suited to the needs, but the competent organization combined with a competent interaction allowed to uncover the functionality of this fighter from a completely unexpected side – and all this took place under harsh air conditions a war against the overwhelming forces of a cunning and professional enemy who attempted to gain an advantage in the air and proceed to carry out strategical bombings, which the Iranian air force could not let – and in fact did not allow.
It is hard to measure how much the capabilities of the Su-35S radar are comparable to the F-14A, but of course the essence of the problem is not primarily in the method parameters of the radar, but above all in organisational matters, which, in turn, will be able to exploit the inherent capabilities of the equipment and overcome its disadvantages (it should be noted that the capability to monitor airspace in this variant will be limited, but nevertheless it will be carried out – and the process will be carried out without implementation of "shock" projects for the military budget and useless).
for: https://stalingrad.life/articles/lyegkaya-missen/
(PL)
