When Donald Trump, during his first term, referred to national safety considerations, imposing duties on steel and aluminum, 2 contradictory signals were sent into the world. The first was the deficiency of respect for US allies, who were not only included in the duties, but besides threatened to impose duties on the automotive sector. The second is that free trade has its safety boundaries. This thought has not been denied in its essence. Article XXI of the GATT Agreement (WTO predecessor) provides for the anticipation of recourse to a national safety clause to take discriminatory protectionist action.
Trump's link of trade and safety was so nothing new. Subsequent US administrations have utilized trade policy for years as an component of abroad policy, although in a completely other way than president Trump. By creating political and economical alliances, Washington had partners. Interdependencies were to safeguard the interests of the US by creating possible economical losses in the partner's situation of a US-friendly policy. A small forgotten "back to Asia" for Barack Obama's presidency was intended to make a counterweight against China's economical dominance in the region. The Transpacific Agreement (TPP), from which Donald Trump withdrew the US in 2017, was intended to limit the dependence of 11 Pacific countries on China. It is besides the Obama administration, together with the EU, that imposed sanctions on Iran to force its authorities to negociate a atomic programme.
Security is an immanent part of global trade. The events of fresh years – from Russia's aggression against Ukraine to the pandemic – have shown that the era of belief in free trade as a guarantor of peace has come to an end.
However, trade interdependencies did not defend Ukraine – neither in 2014 erstwhile the annexation of Crimea and the war occurred in its east circuits, nor in 2022 erstwhile Russia began a full-scale invasion. These events ended the era of religion in free trade as a guarantor of peace. Russia besides decided to block the supply of gas to Europe as part of an economical effort to put force on the EU. In 2020, the disruption of supply chains during the pandemic and the deficiency of access to medical equipment, as well as medicines, made it clear to everyone that safety must besides trust on adequate diversification of import sources or the ability to rapidly make its own production in crisis situations.
Security is an immanent part of global trade. After the collapse of the russian Union, Francis Fukuyama wrote about the “end of history”. From an economical perspective, we can besides call this time a period of alleged peace dividend. Europe could afford to quit its investment in safety in part and focus on building its own prosperity. Trade did not have strong limits for safety reasons either in the US. This era is definitely over.
Are trade ties broken, then?
The adoption of safety issues in global trade should not lead to a call for full autarkia. The complete independency of the United States from China, for example, is not only unrealistic, but besides unfavorable. Many goods are produced present within complex supply chains – for microprocessors, up to 12 production stages can be distinguished, with national boundaries exceeding 70 times1.
The Ricardon imagination of the economy deploys the production of goods, as well as the provision of services in a way that maximises the comparative advantages of each region. Globalisation, at least in theory, leads to greater business efficiency and besides gives a chance to reduce poverty, which could be seen at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries in Asia, primarily in China.
Limiting global exchange will so not have a affirmative impact on individual economies, as it will deprive us of the efficiency of the location. Socio-economic improvement is linked to the increase in the importance of services in the economy and the decline in the share of manufacture – this is simply a natural process, so trying to reverse it will bring real costs.
In this context, the key question becomes: how to specify conditions that guarantee greater safety in global trade? It is not about complete independency from each partner, but about the ability to separate between import types, its scale, its importance for the economy and its function throughout the production process.
From this point of view, Poland should look at its import as part of a larger EU puzzle. Reproduction of production in all 27 associate States for safety reasons would lead to inefficient usage of resources, even more so, to waste. The optimal solution would be to enter into an even broader arrangement – at least transatlantic, and possibly including another countries specified as Japan and South Korea. At the same time, however, hazard scenarios should be developed, linked to the possible supply interruption from selected locations – and these links should be adequately secured.
The key is diversification.
A large example of the deficiency of the request to guarantee full autarkia is the situation of Poland in the area of natural gas supply. The construction of the Świnoujście LNG terminal, followed by the Baltic tube pipeline, made us independent of 1 supplier. However, we have not become full independent – we do not have adequate gas deposits in Poland to satisfy consumption. The LNG terminal gives you the option to choose a supplier and Baltic tube connects us with a reliable and predictable Solitary partner. Further strengthening energy safety should consist of diversification, both of sources of supply and of sources of production.
It is not adequate to look at the sources of supply of gas, uranium or photovoltaic cells alone. Dependencies in the production chain of equipment needed to produce individual energy sources should besides be investigated.
Full economical independency is neither possible nor cost-effective – the key to trade safety is diversification and informed hazard management. Poland, as a associate of the EU, should build resilience not by autaryka, but by entering wider economical systems and preparing for possible disruptions.
Here we contact on the crucial issue of dependence, among others, in the aspect of critical natural materials. It is not China's secret dominance in this respect. Energy transformation may lead to independent suppliers of fossil fuels, but besides much dependence on the supply chain should inactive be avoided in the context of the equipment itself and its components. They can yet be folded in a different place, but if the full production process depends only on 1 partner, he will besides be able to usage this dependence someday. Therefore, the key word in terms of import is not independency or autarka, but diversification.
Figure 1.Critical import dependency of Poland from non-European countries in 2023 (participation in full imports of Poland in percent and number of product categories where imports are critical and the country dominates)
Source: pastry own development
The European Commission has prepared an external sensitivity indicator (External Vulnerability Index – EXVI), which identifies excessive dependence on imports2. The indicator takes into account not only the scale of imports, but besides the concentration in 1 supplier and the anticipation of replacing these products with an alternate – both within and outside the Union. economical risks arise erstwhile the EU is incapable to find alternate sources (own or external). The EC survey indicated that the EU has more critical trade dependency in imports than China, but somewhat little than the US. At the same time, we are more delicate than the US to supply semiconductors.
The Polish economical Institute (PIE) study3 The same indicator for Poland has shown that our highest import dependency exists towards EU associate States. This is not amazing due to the closeness and importance of economical relations. These dependencies should not be considered dangerous. Critical dependence on imports should be sought outside the Union. This was the case only for 0.6% of full Polish imports. The largest dependence on China afraid 30 product categories (including screens, distillation and rectification equipment), while in relations with the USA – 7 categories, including nickel and aero-engine starters.
It is so worth examining these dependencies not only at Union level, but besides at associate State level. Only in this way can it be ensured that Europe – and Poland – are not exposed to excessive external economical pressure.
In the case of Poland, the highest import dependency occurs towards EU countries. Critically dependent imports from outside the Union represent only 0.6% of our full imports. In this part, our top dependence is on China and then the US.
Second face of dependence
However, economical dependence has 2 dimensions – not only concerning supply but besides the dependence of individual economies on the request of another countries for their products and services. These, on the another hand, uncover possible pressures on another country or company straight and indirectly. We have late heard the most widely about specified dependence in the case of US action, which, by raising customs between countries, controlled the access of the country to the American market. Donald Trump's administration thus exerted political force on Colombia, Mexico and Canada, among others. erstwhile the European Union, in retaliation for duties on steel and aluminium, intended to rise fees on bourbon imported from the USA, Trump threatened with a barrage rate of 200 % work on French champagne and cognac – symbolic products for France, which was a strong advocate of a tough attitude towards the US.
China has besides utilized economical dependency for years as an instrument of abroad policy. The threat of failure of access to the Chinese marketplace is an effective tool of influence, both towards countries and individual companies. For example, Beijing has put force on EU associate States in connection with EU anti-subsidy duties on electrical cars from China, as well as in relation to plans to restrict Huawei's access to tenders in any countries. Years ago, Beijing banned the broadcast of NBA games due to the league's stated support league manager for Hong Kong protesters in 2019. In order to avoid this kind of pressure, it is highly crucial to examine the dependence on abroad markets – not only at national level, but also, where possible, at the level of individual companies.
In this respect, as an export economy, the European Union is more susceptible to this kind of dependence than the United States. Compared to the USA, the EU is twice as dependent on request from non-OECD countries, including twice as dependent on Chinese demand4. The bad condition of the German automotive manufacture and another industrial products did not come out of nowhere. peculiar importance was the falling exports to the mediate State. In 2024, exports of German products (both final and semi-finished products within supply chains) to Poland exceeded exports to China.
Figure 2.Structure of final request for added value of selected countries with a discrimination between non-EU OECD countries and non-OECD countries, percent (2020)
Source: pastry own improvement based on TiVA OECD data (2021)
Trade dependency is not only a question of supply – it is besides a hazard of failure of demand, which can be utilized as an effective tool of political and economical pressure.
Although Poland has a lower dependency on 3rd country markets than the EU as a whole, through strong links between supply chains, especially with another associate States, it remains more susceptible to specified pressures than the US. Poland besides shows a somewhat higher level of dependence compared to economies specified as France or Italy, but lower than Germany.
Dependency and globalisation – what next?
Changes in existing economical relations are necessary. China has been utilizing unfair competitive practices for years – massively subsidizing its businesses and forcing technology transfers from Western companies. Russia's invasion of Ukraine yet crossed off dreams of commercial interdependence as a warrant of peace. Further irrational political decisions cannot be ruled out in the future. The European Union, including Poland as its member, must so be ready for negative scenarios and consequences of specified decisions. Therefore, dependencies request to be monitored on an ongoing basis and effort to diversify their relationships – backwards, i.e. import and forward, i.e. demand. This should happen at the level of each company as well as the full country, due to the fact that in both cases there are possible negative consequences of besides much concentration. In fresh years, the European Commission has launched a number of measures to reduce the vulnerability of the EU economy: monitoring strategical dependence, introducing mechanisms to defend against external pressures and a more decisive attitude towards dumping or subsidies in 3rd countries.
Diversification of dependency is not a choice today, but a necessity – safety must become part of the economical account, but without giving up on the benefits of global cooperation.
Security must be an integral part of economical calculation, but it should not mean a complete withdrawal from global connections. Above all, relations and investments in their own production capacity and home request should be diversified, in peculiar in the most crucial sectors. It's highly unfortunate what happened in transatlantic relations. alternatively of creating a common allied base, both production and demand, there was an erosion of trust. Despite the suspension of certain duties, imports from the European Union to the United States are inactive subject to a 25% work on steel, aluminium and cars and a 10% work on most another products (with partial exemptions). This is simply a major waste of the possible for cooperation in global economical change. This will besides increase the cost of functioning the economy, especially on the American side.
1I. Cerutti, M. Nardo, Semiconductors in the EUEC JRC [access online].
2W.C. Garcia, V. Ho, External Vulnerability Index (EXVI), Single marketplace Economics Briefs n. 14, [on-line].
3B. Michalski, DependencytradestopauinstrumentcoercionEconomic, WeeklyEconomic pastry No 11, 2025 [access online].
4Ambroziak, L., Arak, P., Baszczak, L., Yuszczak, A., Kopiński, D., Leszczyński, P., Maj, M., Wąsiński, M. (2022), Decade of economical security. From Offshoring to Partial Friendshoring, Polish economical Institute, Warsaw; [on-line access].
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