Authors:
Krzysztof Karwowski is simply a PhD student of politics and administration at Warsaw School of Economics. It examines the economical and social dependence of technological progress, innovation policy and space strategies in the Southeast Asia area. Master of Oriental Studies, he held an yearly Belt and way scholarship at the South China method University of Canton.
Piotr Pietrzak, Ph.D., is simply a investigator of political philosophy, conflict resolution strategies, global theories and geopolitics. He teaches at the Faculty of doctrine of the University of Sofia, St. Clement Ochridzki in Bulgaria. His investigation interests include global relations, safety studies and humanitarian interventions, among others. He is the author of respective articles and chapters of books published in peer reviewed technological and collective journals, including On the thought of humanitarian intervention: a fresh knowing of IR themes of 2021. Piotr Pietrzak besides publishes articles in Modern Diplomacy.
Analysis in Brief
This analysis addresses the problem of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh of September 2023 and its global aspects from the position of the Trimorese. This subject is related to the global influence of the Tri-Sea Initiative and their attitude towards the patron of Karabach – Armenia, in the face of the withdrawal from Russia's active activities. It is besides crucial for the future perception of the task Trimorz in the Caucasus.
Causes and course of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh
In the second half of September 2023, there was another unprecedented emergence in the geopolitical situation in Nagorno-Karabakh – an escalation of the conflict that will become past as the 3rd Mountain War of Karabach. This geopolitical slur, known in literature as the Self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, is located in the heart of the Caucasus, between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This region is 1 of the most interesting points of inflammation in the modern world. Stepanakert, the capital of the region, frequently fell prey to rivals who competed for control of this strategical area.
However, the origins of this conflict must be sought in the long and rich past of the region inhabited by the cultural and spiritual crucible of Christian cultures (Ormians, Georgians) and Muslim cultures (Azers, Turkish and Persian influences), but the top direct influence was the regulation of Russia and later USSR. It was during the times of the imperial and Soviet, Armenian Karabach became part of the Azerbaijani SRR (socialist russian republic) as a component of the empire. Despite attempts to merge Karabach circuit with Armenian SRR in 1988, this solution was not implemented. Additionally, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 did not bring an end to these attempts to unite, but only worsened the tense situation between the 2 nations [[1]]. In 1991, both Azerbaijan and Armenia declared independency from the USSR.
That same year, also, Mountain Karabach announced independency with the capital in Stepanakert. Independence, despite not being recognised by any state (including Armenia), was confirmed in a referendum. These actions led to a war between 1992 and 1993 which deprived Azerbaijan of 10% of the territory, the creation of communication corridors from Karabach to Armenia, and ended with a protocol signed at the Russian mediation in Bishkek in 1994. Despite further attempts to regulate (the Minsk Group of 1992 under the auspices of Russia, the Madrid pricypnia, the Azerbaijani-Armenian gathering in Moscow in 2008 or the OSCE participation), the dispute continued to increase under periods of greater and little strength with Azerbaijani-Karabian fire exchanges inclusive [[2]♪[[3]].
The next installment of the defrosted conflict took place in the spring of 2016 (the alleged April War), erstwhile for 5 days Azerbaijan implemented the planned operation to take strategical hills in east Karabach. Armed actions returned in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, erstwhile during a 1.5-month clash the Azerbaijani army winged the territory of Karabach, almost cutting it off from Armenia (only the narrow Laczyński Corridor occupied 2 years later was retained). Azerbaijan's aggression besides caused turmoil in Armenia itself, triggering a political crisis that forced Yerevans to talk [[4]]. The war showed overwhelming method advantage for the Azera especially in the field of drones and modern artillery. Armenia failed to usage the last 3 years to make up for losses, and its armed forces did not usage costly modifications to aviation (buyed in Russia in 2019 Su-30 fighters) to defend the integrity of the rebellious Mountain Karabach.
Photo 1. Mural in Stepanakert with motifs of the Caribbean national identity (photo: K. Karwowski)The final decision on the future of this area took place during a short, multi-hour skirmish, which took place on 19-20 September 2023. Although these events led to a humanitarian disaster [[5]In the form of a ten-mile long line of Armenian refugees fleeing the Laczyński Corridor to Armenia, no concrete aid came from another countries. In particular, Russia did not offer real support. As a consequence of the transfer of attention to Ukraine, Russia remained passive, which created an unprecedented geopolitical vacuum in the Caucasus, which Azerbaijan and Turkey are presently very keen to manage.
As a result, the governments in Yerevan and Stepanokert were practically forced to halt defending this territory as they had no chance of resisting Baku's crucial military advantage. This happened despite erstwhile warnings from the pro-European government of Nikola Pashinyan that Armenia no longer feels protected by Russia [[6]], and that gives the Armenians of Karabach a false sense of security, despite his fresh attempts at rapprochement with the West [[7]]. The war was played in conditions of unprecedented withdrawal of Russia from 1 of its conventional spheres of influence and the deficiency of the West's will to bear the cost of dragging Armenia to its side. Eventually, president of Samwel Sahramanyan's self-appointed republic declared the dissolution of state institutions by January 1, 2024 to prevent the deepening of the humanitarian disaster [[8]].
Photo 2. Monument of the Heroes of the First War of the Mountain Karabach and the flag of the Self-appointed Republic on the streets of Stepanakert (photo: K. Karwowski)Economic imbalances in the region
While there is simply a immense supply of conventional energy in the Caucasus, specified as oil and natural gas, their distribution speaks in Azerbaijan's favor. According to global macroeconomic models, according to Trading Economics analysts, GDP in Azerbaijan will scope $79.98 billion by the end of 2023 [[9]]. After the departure of countries dependent on imports of conventional energy sources from purchases from the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan became 1 of the largest exporters of this fuel in Eurasia. In addition, the government in Baku can trust on strong assistance from Turkey, which, despite the presence of its troops in Cyprus and Syria, has not become active in any devastating regional conflict that would limit its strategical choices. Additionally, the Baku government reinforced this alliance with its participation in NATO peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan and joint exercises with Turkey [[10][[11]]. Therefore, despite erstwhile assurances, Azerbaijan did not intend to respect the provisions of the 2020 peace plan. Russia besides did not pay to become on only 1 side, especially as the list of arms purchases from Azerbaijan was much longer than from Armenia. Therefore, immediately after the events of 2020, the Azerbaijanes became more assertive, adopted evident confrontational positions and began a long-term, devastating economical blockade of the conflicted territories that they lost between 1991 and 1994. Despite the agreement to open the road from Aghdam to Stepanakert, Azerbaijan actively blocked the Laczyński Corridor for more than 2 years, which importantly limited access to basic food products. The usage of specified a maneuver resulted in the intended results, even though this was at the expense of the civilian population.
At the same time, Armenia's economical circumstances were exceptionally unfavourable. Firstly, according to planet Bank data, Armenia's economy suffered importantly from the second conflict with Azerbaijan and the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2022, Armenia's GDP was only $1950 billion, representing just over 0.01 percent of the planet economy [[12]]. This situation was so unfavourable that, unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia could not trust on strong natural resources that would aid it rapidly build military potential. Secondly, the government of Armenia understood besides late that its earlier geostrategic elections and partnership with Russia benefited mainly the Kremlin. In 2020, Nikol Paszynian asked the Russian president to rapidly discuss possible safety assistance for Armenia. However, the Kremlin did not supply the expected armed assistance [[13]], focusing only on diplomatic mediation between the disputed parties. At the time of the real threat of the Self-proclaimed Republic in 2023, Armenia did not even request aid from Russia. This was understandable due to the fact that she realized that despite the statutory provisions suggesting that "aggression against any of the States of the Agreement would be treated as an attack on the full organisation" [[14]The organisation of the Collective safety Agreement (OUBZ), the core of which is Russia, was incapable to launch this mechanics for Armenia in the current geopolitical situation.
In the assessment of fresh events in the Caucasus, it is worth noting that the dissolution of the state institutions of Nagorno-Karabakh is surely beneficial primarily for Turkey and Azerbaijan and is very problematic for Armenia as well as the West.
Firstly, the ambivalent attitude of Russia and Europe on the safety of Armenians is mobilising Turkey to take their political place in the region. Secondly, this power vacuum affects destabilization and the possibly adverse shift of the balance of power towards Ankara, which will not easy give these influences to Western states in the future. Thirdly, as a consequence of the changes described, Russia is losing not so much as Europe, as it escapes the chance to support 1 of the fewer pro-Western governments that was elected in the democratic process alternatively than installed artificially without legitimacy.
Western consequence to the 3rd War in Mountain Karabach: Analysis of Challenges and Perspectives
The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh after the war is dynamic, but there is simply a deficiency of long-term imagination from both the European Union and the limited ambition of the recently enlarged thirteen of the Trimorese Initiative [[15]]. Both doctrinally and practically, the Trimorian Initiative grew out of the assumptions of Brzeziński and Kennan, which establish multidimensional efforts of the Transatlantic Block to halt the neo-imperial policy of the Russian Federation, especially after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. These efforts were even more coordinated and deepened after the outbreak of a full-scale invasion against Ukraine in February 2022. Thanks to NATO and the European Union, Ukraine received adequate support that allowed it to last the first months of Russian aggression [[16]]. The continuation of this assistance from the West and the east flank of NATO, both in the form of material, diplomatic, technological and humanitarian support, helps Ukraine to organize counteroffensives on the confederate and east fronts. As global relations researchers have repeatedly stressed, focus on aid Ukraine builds a strong, affirmative intellectual stimulus that aims to deter possible aggressors in the future.
To accomplish this goal, it is worth applying the same logic to Turkey's actions, reminding it in a friendly way that NATO membership is not just about benefits and playing on 2 fronts is only conducive to Kremlin. Although Turkey is not a typical land empire, its abroad policy is subject to akin norms as in Russia. The administration of Erdogan continues to be clearly influenced by Doctrine Davutoğlu known as the concept of strategical depth [[17]]. This doctrine presupposes the implementation of a abroad policy that highlights Turkey's historical and cultural ties with the Ottoman Empire, aimed at expanding Turkey's influence in neighbouring regions.
In addition, the nonsubjective is to establish good relations and cooperation with neighbouring countries, or to force them to do so, in line with the presumption of "zero problems with neighbours". These objectives were to be achieved through active economical activities and multilateral cooperation. In practice, however, this imagination has been introduced on very Turkish conditions, as is well seen in the example of Cypriots, Greeks, Syrians, Iraqis, Kurds and most likely in the future Bulgarians.
In this situation, it is worth noting that Zbigniew Brzeziński, always paying attention to knowing political geography and utilizing unique historical opportunities, explained that the Russian Federation, as a typical land empire, will always be curious in expansion to the west and south. The expansion is for Moscow a origin internally integrating the full state structure. Brzeziński suggested that Vladimir Putin is not a single ruler of Russia, which emphasizes the request to conquer neighbouring countries with an external threat – his possible successor will besides take these actions [[18]♪[[19]], despite unprecedented training and equipment-in command of the Russian army's blamage in Ukraine. The Kremlin turned into a more conservative geopolitical player only in the short term. Russia did not say the last conviction due to the fact that her interests have always been, are and will be in the Caucasus.
Brzeziński hinted that it was only a substance of time before Russia resumed its hybrid-diplomatic activities in this region according to Doctrine Primakow (in the vital interest of the Kremlin it is to preserve and reject NATO influences in the Russian sphere of influence: erstwhile russian republics and neighbouring countries of so-called, close foreign). Therefore, the Kremlin should be ready to strengthen its economic, political and military influences in the region, due to the fact that they are the political facilities of Moscow, for future territorial expansion, which will be multipolar [[20]]. Therefore, it is worth considering the fact that the failure to exploit Russia's current weakness decently can be a geostrategic error, which the countries of the Trimorese Initiative should not forgive themselves. That is why we request a more balanced approach to the matter, which aims to deprive Russia of its sphere of influence in the Balkans and the Caucasus.
In this case Doctrine of Brzeziński and Kennan[21] It would propose that Greece's accession to Block 3SI would avoid focusing attention on only 1 section of the front is only seemingly effective and could positively affect the block's perception of a somewhat broader geopolitical position and activating activities throughout the Eurasian area. To halt neo-imperial politics, it takes a wider coalition, a strong starting position and a policy to build geostrategic footholds. Given that, despite fresh events, Pashinyan is inactive in power, it can be assumed that geostrategically there is inactive something to fight for in Armenia. Although his actions so far have not yielded the expected results, due to the fact that he could not affect players specified as the European Union or the US in his plans, the second pro-Western politician in Armenia like Nikol Pashinyan may not be repeated again for long. He was the 1 who convinced the self-appointed president of the Republic of Nagorno Karabach, Samvel Sahramanyan, to announce the dissolution of state institutions to prevent bloodshed. At this point, it is worth to thin over the tactics of the actions of the Tri-Sea or their deficiency in the mountain Karabach. The situation in this region is clearly out of control and is already marked by a major humanitarian disaster. Both Russia's ambivalent consequence to the implementation of the policies of wider influences of Turkey (neoosmanism), Azerbaijan (neopanturkism) and Western apathy have contributed to the deterioration of the situation of the civilian population in the region. The European Union shows virtually no desire to convince the Armenian authorities to rethink the function of “Caucasian Finland” and hazard a long march towards the West.
Recommendations for the 3 Seas
According to Brzeziński's doctrine, weakening neo-imperial aspirations of the Russian Federation is simply a key interest. Supporting the efforts of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan by the Trimorese States can make a crucial contribution to this objective. specified action would aid build a strong anti-imperial alliance on the central axis of Rimland, which would counterbalance Moscow's future actions. Theoretically, the increase in Turkey's assertiveness and its adoption as a regional leader with open ambitions in the russian area could be a stabilising factor. Turkey could accomplish its objectives and geopolitical imperatives, utilizing smart power factors, in line with the liberal explanation of Davutoğlu's doctrine. Unfortunately, the situation is not so favourable due to the fact that Turkey's increased activity in the region is due to the real implementation of the Neo-Osmanian version of Davutoğlu doctrine, which is rather machiavistic. For Turkey there are no eternal friends, there are only eternal interests. Despite NATO membership and fresh developments in Ukraine, Ankara continues to keep a warm relation with Moscow and acts in an unreasonable way in the context of long-term safety of the region.
It is worth noting that the Baltic States, Poland and Hungary are trying to keep a good relation with Turkey, while the countries of the South, specified as Bulgaria and Greece, are looking at Turkish neo-imperialism with a certain degree of suspicion. From their perspective, the 3rd Mountain War of Karabach would not have erupted if Azerbaijan had not received strong support from Turkey. This conflict would have a much more bloody course if Armenia had received greater support from its erstwhile geostrategic partner, the Russian Federation. In the current situation, Turkey does not retreat its support for Azerbaijan due to the fact that it does not want to duplicate Russia's mistakes. As Philip Gamaghelyan emphasizes in his cult Conflict Resolution Beyond the global Relations Paradigm (2017),[[22]The beneficiaries of changes in the position quo in this region are mostly larger players.
Therefore, paradoxically, the cost of winning the war may simply not be profitable to the government in Baku, as it pushes Azerbaijan more into the embrace of Turkey, which does not mean partnership, but surrender.
The 3 seas know well that switching 1 subject to another is seldom a beneficial change from a geopolitical perspective, so they should encourage Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan to their geopolitical imagination and not impose anything on them.
The 3 Sea States should introduce their own imagination of safety in the region, based on actors who share akin values. The problem is that protesters on the streets of Erwania are demanding Pashinyan's departure [[23]], which negatively affects the building of strategies based on "falls" in Armenian politics. The Tri-Sea States are inactive able to fight effectively for their influence in the Caucasus, competing with Russia and Turkey. If this is not the case in Nagorno Karabach, it is inactive possible in Armenia. It is so worth supporting Pashinyan, especially now that the Kremlin is preparing to respond to the Armenian ratification of the founding statute of the global Criminal Court (ICC) and to accept the jurisdiction of the Hague Court. This reorientation of Armenia indicates that Russia is no longer seen as a country in the current political strategy that could be trusted again on strategical issues.
Photo 3. Shusha Cathedral – the largest Armenian Catholic church in Karabach (photo: K. Karwowski)Bibliography:
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Photos – private archive
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