Practitions under the code name “Zapad” play an crucial function in preparing the Russian army for action in the western direction. erstwhile again, these manoeuvres will pay attention and make possible risks for the region of Central and east Europe. Although there is no chance of a spectacular show of force in the performance of the FR Armed Forces – and this is usually the sense of akin projects from Russia's position – this does not mean that these maneuvers can be ignored or overlooked.
Introduction to War
The Russian Federation cyclically conducts large military exercises on peculiar major directions of its political and military engagement. 1 of the most crucial are the manoeuvres under the codename “Zapad” (West) which are carried out in the territory of Belarus and in the European part of the Russian Federation all 4 years. erstwhile exercises in this series took place in 2017 and 2021, inactive within the West Military territory of the FR Armed Forces: according to decisions that were taken in 2024, the Western Military territory was liquidated, and in its place arose – and in fact were restored – 2 military districts, i.e. the Moscow OW and Leningrad OW. At the same time, the position of a separate OW lost the Russian North Fleet, which was operationally subordinate to the command of Leningrad Military District, which importantly affected its possible to carry out offensive actions.
The changes in the military structures of the Russian Federation began much earlier, and the reconstruction of the 2 military districts mentioned should be considered as their crowning. Shortly after the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in Ukraine, at the turn of 2014 and 2015, he accelerated the process of moving distant from the brigade structure in the Russian army: right at the western border of the FR, the process of forming fresh mechanized divisions (3, 144 and 150) as well as the playback of the 1st defender armored Army began. The basic presumption of forming these formations was to increase the possible of the offensive Russian army in this direction.
What is very crucial is that traditionally military units permanently stationed in the European part of the Russian Federation take part in the "Zapad" exercises, but besides those subject to the 2 largest military districts – Central and Eastern. The preparation process so involves a crucial number of soldiers and equipment from Asia to the European part of the Russian Federation. This was the case in 2017 and then in 2021, although in both cases they were rather different. It is actual that the ‘fall of ‘17’, despite a possibly aggressive script towards NATO (as will be referred to further), was a test of the capabilities and component of the first preparations for the attack on Ukraine, but the ‘fall of ‘21’ was not so much a drill as 1 of the last elements of the Russian Federation's preparations for armed aggression against Ukraine: it was actually a concentration of troops before the planned attack operation. The preparations carried out by Russia from March 2021 (exercises, combat preparedness checks, deployment of forces close Ukraine's borders, accumulation of supplies of combat resources and logistics, etc.) indicated clearly the intention to carry out more than just “ordinary” exercises, which materialized in February 2022 in the form of a alleged peculiar military operation, or full-scale war in Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022.
"Fault 25": Nothing to hide?
Just as it was hard for the Russian Federation to effectively hide preparations for war activities in 2021, so in 2025 it will besides be impossible to hide the actual state of the Russian army. Moreover, in view of the burden created by the ongoing 3rd year of full-scale war for the Russian army, there is no chance of a spectacular show of force in the performance of the SZ FR – and usually this is the sense of akin projects from the Russian perspective. This does not mean, however, that these manoeuvres can be ignored or that they do not recognise the dangers they pose.
Illustration image – Belarusian and Russian soldiers during the “Zapad ‘17” exercise. Fig. Sergei Grits/AP/EAST NEWS
The vast majority of Russian military units, both from the European and Asian parts of Russia, are active in 1 way or another in the war against Ukraine. Personnel shortages in the Russian army are a fact and are getting more serious each day due to expanding individual losses – which forced Russian command to engage North Korean soldiers in 2024 (a) which in no way translated into changing the situation on the front in favour of Russia). The situation with respect to equipment is no different – besides in this case the Russian reserves stay exhausted, as evidenced by the attacks carried out for respective months with the usage of (mainly) not tanks or combat infantry cars, but makeshift for armored civilian cars, motorcycles, scooters or just walking. Hardware warehouses in central and east Russia besides shine voids, which makes it improbable that there will be a large relocation of equipment for the next “Fall”.
It can be assumed that the main function in this year's exercises will be played by the Belarusian forces, as a crucial part of the activities active will take place in Belarus. This in itself creates problems from the point of view of Ukraine at war with Russia: as long as the hazard of active armed action by Belarus against Ukraine is minimal (and surely smaller than in 2022), but Minsk is de facto a organization to the conflict (although it lends its territory to the offensive activities of the Russian Federation Armed Forces since the beginning of this war phase) and the possible risks associated with this cannot be disregarded – and the Ukrainian side has now considerable problems in ensuring a adequate number of soldiers and equipment.
A Challenge for NATO
The “Zad” exercises besides stay an crucial challenge for NATO countries, especially for countries bordering Russia and Belarus – i.e. Poland and the Baltic countries, as well as for recently a associate of the Alliance of Finland. The reconstruction of Leningrad Military territory and its subordination of naval forces (North and Baltic Fly) is problematic for all Scandinavian countries and the full Baltic region (i.e. again Poland and the countries mentioned, but besides Sweden, besides late a NATO member). The situation in the Baltic remains tense regardless of the SZ FR military exercise calendar: the full 2024 year passed under the sign incidents related to maritime infrastructureThe harm Russia is accused of.
The ‘Zapad ‘17’, although it was ‘advertised’ as the underlying script of Russia's offensive operations against NATO countries – and so above all against Poland and the Baltic States – was indeed part of preparations for aggression against Ukraine, but planned for the second half of the year ‘Zapad’25, despite all the problems the Russian Federation and its army presently have, requires the same or even greater attention from Western countries. From a military point of view, as well as political and in full any another Belarus remains a de facto part of the Russian Federation – and the level of its dependence on Russia is steadily deepening and is now much higher than it was 8 years ago. From this perspective, the threat that these exercises can make has become more serious. In addition, situation on the border with Belarus, in view of ongoing attempts at illegal influx of migrants, it is besides much more serious than in 2017. While the hazard of the FR taking any major action against NATO countries is negligible, given its engagement in Ukraine, the likelihood of hybrid action, including in the form of border incidents, should be considered very serious.
What is not little crucial – it is crucial to remember that akin exercises take place not only on the ground and include not only the shipment of equipment or shooting, but besides the staff phase, including planning and building scenarios for future activities. These elements will surely have an crucial dimension in the case of the '25 collapse', and the scenarios created and developed there may have a crucial impact in the future on the actions of Russian forces in the phase of carrying out possible actions against Western countries.
