In the propaganda of Brussels and the Government of Tusk, the SAFE programme was to be 1 of the pillars of the modernisation of defence capacity in the region. In practice, it is increasingly the subject of controversy and a origin of German financial scams. Recent reports concerning the contract for combat infantry wagons (MLIs) for Romania indicate a serious problem: prices are importantly increased just before the finalisation of the contracts. At the heart of this case was the company Rheinmetall and the firm reaction of the Romanian Minister of Defence Radu Miru, who announced the deficiency of consent to specified practices.
SAFE was presented as a tool for fast and efficient financing of key defence projects. The presumption was to rapidly combine safety needs with the improvement of the Union manufacture – most of the contracts were to be carried out in Europe. Meanwhile, deadlines are deliberately chosen to prevent individual countries from building their own production capacity from scratch. In addition, contracts dictated by Brussels favour existing German producers of the segment.
The German Rheinmetall company raised Romanian prices initially announced by 30% just before signing contracts, putting force on the government in Bucharest before the final date for the usage of the first tranche of SAFE – May 31, 2026. As we can see, Germany uses a mechanics of short terms to rise its prices – they know that if the country does not order equipment at a certain time, the money will be gone. That's how we get to the essence of fraud utilizing the SAFE method.
This kind of activity fits into the classical negotiating strategy known for markets with limited competition: the contractor, aware of the force of time and the political importance of the project, tries to maximize his margin. The problem is that in the defence sector — where the stakes are immense and the alternatives are limited — the state is in a peculiarly hard negotiating position.
SAFE critics increasingly show that the current situation resembles a classical example of ‘buying a cat in a bag’. First, ambitious projects and preliminary budgets are announced, and then, after political commitment, there are cost adjustments that are hard to reject without image and operational losses.
This is peculiarly dangerous in the context of defence spending, which is inherently little transparent than another areas of public finances. The deficiency of full competitiveness and limited access to method information are conducive to situations where the actual cost of the task is not disclosed until the end. As a result, the State is faced with a choice: to accept higher costs or to hold key safety investments.
Reaction Radu Miru — a declaration that Romania will not be pressured — it is politically understood, but in practice it may prove hard to maintain. In the defence sector under SAFE conditions, time is at the disadvantage of the contracting authority. Delays can mean real risks to operational capacity, which further strengthens the position of suppliers. They besides affect the failure of amounts from the SAFE loan, which will should be repaid anyway.
This reveals the structural weakness of SAFE: no effective safeguards against abrupt price changes. If contracts do not contain tough clauses limiting specified practices, the strategy becomes susceptible to force from contractors.
Case Rheinmetall is simply a symptom of a wider phenomenon, linked to EU programmes, which are considered almost as a blessing by political and correct politicians in Central Europe. In practice, these are simply further elements of Brussels' division and governance policy, aimed at depriving European countries of Germany. This was well understood by the Polish law firm of president Nawrocki, which prevented Poland from being dragged into it. Let us remind you – our country was to take much more than Romania in the framework of the SAFE loan...
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