We all know what happened to the first September of the year 1939. Here the second independent Polish state in past was subjected to the final, top test that could not survive. For many decades, generations of Poles have bowed with awe over these events, trying to draw conclusions for the future. However, looking at the state of defence in today's Poland, 1 can get the impression that all this effort was futile.
The September run lost by Poland can, of course, be viewed from different sides, and so it happened. First, from always, until today, we rightly remember that day's expansive balance of harm. However, due to the fact that the bills of incorrect inevitably end at a dead end, in the evidence that Poland will most likely never be able to enforce their compensation – we were more likely to turn to the evaluation of the Second Republic, rightly seeing in this war a kind of balance of achievements of that country. And although many positives can be indicated, many examples of heroism, however, the failure prompted us to first of all search out the causes of defeat.
RP II mistake account
So for years, historians have been analyzing and scoring errors, mistakes of the run itself, but besides everything that preceded the campaign. They point to the tragic behaviour of many Polish commanders with the chief commander at the head, to the deplorable fact that the military suffered from shortages not only in modern equipment, but even in ammunition. We looked at the industrial ambitions of the Second Republic of Poland, and we knocked on the head – how much wishful thinking! What illusions! What nonsense, planning industrial improvement and production of military equipment for the war in 1942, erstwhile almost all day after 1936, it signaled that the war would come much faster.
For example, General Rayski, who was liable for Polish aviation – why did he persist in home production, where it was hard to keep up technically at the level of projects, and at the level of equipment implemented... not at all? Why did he not buy newer, better fighters abroad, why did he let Polish plants to build fighters exclusively for export erstwhile there was specified a hunger for fresh machines in our ranks?
The most important, however, and consequently the most intensive, were the land troops. Shortsightedness was criticised, which ordered Polish decision-makers to stick to cavalry. The criticism was subjected to plans to defend the full line of borders, but it was besides noted that the Polish military, after years of alleged negligence, was inactive doomed to failure, and the blame was on whether it was Marshal Śmigły-Rydz or Józef Piłsudski, and the full state apparatus which they built or mowed after the 1926 infamous May bombing.
All this criticism that has fallen on the Second Polish Republic is actually right, and these are only selected examples that could be multiplied endlessly. It is impossible to indicate a branch of the army, any part of the state apparatus, which best fulfilled its duties of preparing us for a war that had to come. All true, right, right criticism! And I look at our country today, and I ask a bitter question: since historians and researchers have discussed, discussed, overtook all the mistakes of the 1920-1939 period, present we are most likely better prepared as a country for war than then. I guess it's obvious, you learn from your mistakes. Right...?
Where the II of the Polish Republic started...
Before returning to this day, let us consider the circumstances in which the Second Republic of Poland built its military power, in contrast to our situation after 1989. This will make it easier for us to see what conclusions we actually managed to draw from that September defeat – not on paper, not in the book, but in practice.
The Second Republic began its life in disastrous circumstances. This is simply a combination of 3 parts of the erstwhile invaders, 1 of whom – Germany – even in a situation of collapse inactive had the strength to effort to control events in Warsaw, and, above all, to block the return to Poland of parts of its western rung, the most industrially developed, most valuable economically. Everything was to be built again, in a situation of country devastation, utmost poorness and poverty. The state apparatus was built on people who were educated and collected experience under 3 different systems. Nevertheless, the state administration was able to build and Poland rapidly ceased to be a theoretical state, but actually functioning, even with many difficulties. Being, however, frequently manifested an excess of ambition, which sometimes led to confusion, has contributed to any serious mistakes – but these ambitions, figuratively speaking, have made it possible to measurement towards the unattainable stars to emergence much higher than if little ambitious goals were set. Building Gdynia and the Central Industrial territory can be accused of many, but not without momentum. How to compare their situation and achievements to the III Polish Republic, which at the beginning may have inherited and inefficient, possibly besides corrupt and ideologically poisoned state structure of the Polish People's Republic of Poland – but nevertheless a comprehensive and coherent structure? After all, the bankruptcy mass after the PRL gave a base on which many could be built. Society, Poles, actually built a lot as individuals, as entrepreneurs – but can the same be said about government?
If the II of Poland had a dense start, the worse it was with her army, forced to fight even before it was created. Our troops were fugitives from 3 different armies, reinforced by the 4th built in France, trying to learn to work together. Apart from the French contingent, the equipment consisted of what could be obtained from the stocks of erstwhile invaders. Despite this, in just 2 years, II of the Republic of Poland managed to build a coherent military that yet defeated the Bolshevik storm. Then the Army was maintained in comparable numbers until 1939, training further drafts and officers. It has not been decently developed, and the existing structures, specified as this cavalry, were hard to transform into the needs of the modern battlefield. After all, in Poland at the end of the 1930s it was inactive easier to buy a horse than a car, about armored cars or tanks.
Meanwhile, the 3rd Republic, inheriting a powerful army from the Polish People's Republic with respective divisions, not only did it not make the same structure, but it lost it. The cuts in the military were not made by any plans for a reasonable, thoughtful restructuring, but by decades of negligence and lies – for, for example, until present on paper, the Polish Army has immense reserves of soldiers to be called during the war, when, in fact, as a consequence of the suspension of the collection, the youngest years of reserveists enter present in the 4th decade of their lives, and many older years are only theoretically capable of serving.
As far as the modernity of the army is concerned, during the 2 decades of the Second Republic, it was not possible to build an arms manufacture that could supply the military with modern tanks, armored vehicles and trucks, fighter jets, reconnaissance aircraft and bombers – even ammunition. In each of these areas, however, much was done – and the aviation was built from scratch. Were any of these actions wrong? Yes, it has been – but frequently what we see as mistakes present was the only real possibility. For example, we can ask, why, by not being able to produce adequate equipment, did Poles not buy it abroad, even on credit?
However, while specified credits are easy to get today's 3rd Polish Republic, II Polish Republic did not have so easily. In addition to loans, the eternal problem was abroad currencies, which were needed for all abroad purchases, and which could be obtained by exporting goods. Thus, the seemingly absurd fact that Polish plants frequently produced military equipment for export, alternatively of saving it for the Polish army – the only way that these plants could further make and carry out Polish orders, was that they would gain on each another by exporting goods abroad, and if they did not, they simply could not produce equipment for home needs. But these factories – full production chains, from the steelworks through the engine factories to the airframe or tank factories – even existed.
Built with large effort on a natural root. Otherwise in the 3rd Poland, which inherited from the Polish People's Republic, and in a sense inactive after the Second Poland, powerful plants capable of producing either aircraft or helicopters or tanks, and which plants were either gradually sold out or expired. A decade ago, it was possible to talk about the fast improvement of the production of not the best, but adequate tanks in Polish plants, tanks whose remains are successfully fighting in Ukraine present – present these production lines. The Polish arms manufacture is factories that either do not exist, or have been sold at a priceless abroad corporation, and have lost their ability to produce independently.
Not about the end of the Second Republic, and about next day let's talk!
How much more details could be added to the short picture! And this is unfortunately a image of misery and despair, the most severe possible condemnation, not for the II of Poland whose fall we symbolically mention on the first September, but for ourselves.
In the end, the decision-makers of the II Republic of Poland, though sometimes inept, did everything they could to prepare for the defence of Poland. It was a hard task. In fact, if Poland had a somewhat better equipment in September 1939, a small more ammunition, or somewhat better commanders and plans – the consequence of the run was presupposed anyway, the German advantage was so great. Yet, it was essential to prepare for war with the Soviets at the same time, which required sharing efforts into 2 diverging assumptions of possible wars. And yet – how much did the II of Poland accomplish to rise our chances at least a little! Is it possible to blame her decision-makers for not having the strength to immediately make an army capable of equal combating Germany, making far-reaching plans, and hoping that the war would not start in a fewer years? They've been busy. Each year without war was someway used.
Today, even in the face of the war in Ukraine, even erstwhile our political class repeatedly repeats the threat of war with Russia, at the same time it seems to hide its heads in the sand, acting as if the threat was only theoretical. You buy equipment – but mostly tanks or airplanes, against which you can photograph yourself, while the military has difficulties even with uniforming. fresh structures for reservists are being organized, ignoring the fact that these volunteers are not there and will not be – but the restoration of the collection would hit the poll poles. Our authorities are even afraid to order real exercises of large units, knowing well how compromising specified exercises would be for the military.
What is the point, imagine today's Polish Army facing a challenge akin to that September? Let's go down. Let us callback how in July 1997, 25 1000 Polish soldiers participated in the rescue operation during the alleged flood of the century. If in the Lord's year 2024 July brought a akin flood, our army, whose troops service rotationally on the border, would gotta choose between flood and border – so profoundly fell the 3rd Republic in defence capabilities. So since we have learned nothing from the mistakes of our ancestors, since as a state we can do nothing better than them, let's halt giving them mistakes – due to the fact that it just doesn't seem right.
Jakub Majewski
