In 2000, Kenneth Pomeranz published an award-winning book The large Divergence (so-called Great Divergence)[and]. He described the expansion of the Western and the remainder of the world. The mark of the present era is "great convergence" due to the fact that the remainder of the planet is gradually catching up with the West in terms of technology and management methods[ii]. Against this background, the expansion of the improvement paths of the EU and Russia seems to be an anomaly. However, this may be the announcement of a further fragmentation of globalisation.
War and its political consequences
Eighteen adopted EU sanctions packages on Russia show the scale of the collapse of European-Russian relations[iii]. Especially if we want to look at them from a perspective.
In the 18th century Russia became a crucial player in Europe. This position inactive increased in the 19th century erstwhile the carat was referred to as “the gendarme of Europe”. He celebrated his apogee in the days of Stalin and Khrushchev in the mid-20th century. Moscow defeated Nazi Germany and over the next fewer decades controlled the policies of almost half of the countries in Europe. Moreover, Kremlin's interests included a crucial part of Africa and Asia. The collapse of the USSR deprived Russia of 5 million square kilometres, half the population and a crucial part of industry. In December 2021 Vladimir Putin called the collapse of the USSR a disaster and complained that in the 1990s he had to moonlight as a taxi driver[iv]. The only comparatively influential industries remaining in the Russian Federation were military and energy. Today, however, they are besides in a crisis.
The hope of increasing powers of the global South is that young populations will be able to consume and benefit from the innovations developed by others. Russia is not so lucky. Disadvantaged demographic forecasts have plagued Russia for decades[v]. In July 2025, Rosstat stopped publishing monthly birth and death data, indicating a worsening demographic crisis that could be the deepest since the 18th century[vi].
All these processes were reinforced by the Kremlin's instigation of a large war in the erstwhile USSR. The invasion of Ukraine meant the failure of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, and the effective defence of Ukraine's statehood and crucial Western aid to Kiev showed Russia's inability to dominate the erstwhile Tsar state territory. Moreover, Russia has only been incapable to counter hostile action against friendly states specified as Syria, Armenia, Iran or any African countries over the last decade. besides increasing political and economical dependence of Moscow on respective times larger (!) China's economy[vii]. However, in relations with Europe, Russia has been somewhat Belarusian. The Kremlin authorities are isolated. Vladimir Putin became a petent in relations with China and pariah in key political and economical salons of the West. most likely not the kind of function he dreamed of.
Invasion on Ukraine, ongoing de facto Since 2014, she has stripped Russia of allies in Europe. In consequence to violations of UN standards and subsequent escalation of the war in 2022, the West decided to cut Russia off from its decision-making and financial structures[viii]. Many companies have withdrawn from the Russian marketplace and European countries have consistently cut Russian companies out of subsequent value chains. Russian weapons and energy have lost crucial outlets. According to SIPRI, Moscow has lost its position as second arms exporter in the planet and Russian energy natural materials are sold under much worse conditions in Asian markets (e.g. the average price of natural gas in China is about 35% lower than in the EU).[ix]). Inspired by the past of Alexander Newski "the return to Asia", made by the Kremlin respective years ago, it does not seem to be a profitable investment so far.[x]. In particular, as many Asian and African countries are developing faster than Russia, the chances of sustainable trade will decline all decade.
Energy
In April 2025, the Russian government accepted a fresh Russian energy strategy by 2050[xi]. A period later, the European Union decided to strengthen the sanctioning government and the REPowerEU programme[xii]. In 2021, the EU imported around 27% oil, 40% gas and 46% coal from Russia[xiii]. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, the EU generated around 10% of Russia's GDP, while imports from Russia accounted for only 0.7% of GDP in the EU[xiv]. As a consequence of the sanctions and the REPowerEU plan, Russia lost access to the largest marketplace for its products. In 2024, imports of Russian gas, oil and uranium into the EU were 4 times lower than in 2021.[xv].
At the same time, the EU is designing its own energy strategies, specified as the "European Green Deal" (2019)[xvi] and “Ready for 55” (2021)[xvii]. By 2024 fossil fuels were already liable for only 23% of the European energy market. The share of RES in the electricity basket thus increased to evidence 54%[xviii]. Without referring to the controversy surrounding this process, it should be assumed that Russia has been cut off from most European-oriented revenues. Its place on the European hydrocarbon marketplace was mainly the USA, Norway and Algeria. By the end of 2027, the EU wants to complete its import completely and declare "technology integrity" in the energy field[xx]. This process seems inevitable, although it may be delayed by deficiency of unanimity and subsequent crises in the mediate East.
Russia's consequence to sanctions was to prepare its own strategy. Russian policy makers say that oil (36.9%), gas (26.1%) and coal (30%) inactive play a major function in the world's energy manufacture and optimistically presume that in 2050 it will be similar[xxx]. Russia is inactive the world's second maker of oil and gas, and in uranium and coal production it is sixth. Compared to the Russian strategy's baseline, 2023 global oil request by 2050 is expected to increase by 12% and gas by up to 24%. The Russian fuel and energy complex plans to grow into the global confederate market. Infrastructure projects specified as the Pacific Railway, the Grand Eurasian Partnership and the construction of the port network are intended for this purpose. Like the EU, Russia is besides striving for "technological integrity" in the field of energy. However, Europe and Russia have chosen completely different strategies for action in the global energy market. Russia seeks to intensify its influence (technological leadership) and Europe seeks to diversify and manage dependency.
Technology
The liquidation or sale of many subsidiaries of Western companies in Russia did not contribute to the increase in the technological independency of the Kremlin. Without Western co-operators, Moscow will be hard to recover pre-war levels of innovation and production capacity[xxi]. In place of Western companies their Chinese counterparts entered.
Only in the second 10 in the planet do Russia spends on R & D. It's not much for a country seeking superpower status. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, the Russian device manufacture imported at least 5 times more from the West than it itself exported. Now imports from the West have been lost. Although inactive in December 2024 W. Putin claimed that the cut-off from the West accelerated the digitization of the country, but a much greater failure seems to be the departure of respective 100 1000 Russian IT specialists[xxii]. It is hard to anticipate the improvement of business in a country that is cut off from markets, human resources and capital. The maintenance of all these spheres must take on the state, which did not work in either the Tsar strategy or the russian system. The improvement of the defence manufacture at the expense of civilian sectors is besides not a sign of economical growth. The increase in money supply in the marketplace by 77% over the last 3 years has caused inflation[xxiii]. The Russians are poor. The average Russian wage is presently at the level of earnings in Bolivia[xxiv]. Looks like Moscow most likely doesn't have a plan B.
According to Rosstat, Russia's GDP in the first 4th of 2025 increased year-on-year by 1.4%, almost 4 times little than in the first 4th of 2024 (5.4%)[xxx]. The Kremlin reported that it intends to reduce military spending, which seems to be a good look for a bad game[xxx]. At the same time, the Gajdar Institute calculated that war and sanctions contributed to the failure of about 14% of Russian GDP[xxvii]. Meanwhile, in early July 2025, the EU announced plans for a further €100 billion support fund for Ukraine[xxxiii].
In the last 20 years China's share of Russian trade has increased from below 10% to 36%, and let us remind you that no trading partner in Russia has always been liable for more than 16%[xxx]. At the same time, Russia accounts for little than 3% of China's trade[xxx]. Disparity is gross. The June 2025 CAPA study confirms Russia's increasing dependence on China in terms of currencies, investments and fresh technologies[xxxi]. The number of companies registered in Russia by the Chinese is increasing[xxxii]. Meanwhile, the Kremlin's offer inactive mainly remains oil and gas, which account for as much as 75% of exports to China (more than that, this rate increases!)[xxxiii]. China has much more to lose in its relations with the EU.
Summary
The title of this survey identifies 3 crucial areas of global competition: safety policy, energy and technology. In all these areas, Russia is becoming more peripheral, which translates into the country's position and its ability to wage war. In each area of global relations Russia is losing. Indeed, Moscow will proceed to hold atomic weapons, peculiar services and stay an crucial exporter of energy resources. Russia is inactive able to make chaos, support diversion and advance populism. However, the demographic, military and economical losses suffered by the invasion of Ukraine will have long-term negative consequences for Russia's power position. Russian Casus is besides an example of what happens if an influential state is cut off from the global technology market.
The possible Europeanisation of Ukraine (and Belarus?) from the position of the mid-21st century could be interpreted as a long-term failure of the Russian power model, the final consequence of which is the observed failure of Kremlin influence in Europe. This does not immediately mean that the European model has worked, but in the current race for "technology integrity", Europe's strategy is definitely winning. Today, it is hard to imagine not only the normalisation of political relations between EU countries and Russia, but besides the restoration of pre-war energy, economical or social ties. This situation besides means a gradual increase in Poland's function in east Europe, which deserves a separate development.
[and] The president The large Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern planet EconomyPrinceton University Press, Princeton 2000.
[ii] The president Great convergence. Asia, the West and the logic of 1 world, PWN technological Publishing, Warsaw 2020.
[iii]EU sanctions against Russia – calendar, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policy/sanctions-against-russia/timeline-sanctions-against-russia/
[iv] ‘The collapse of the USSR is the fall of historical Russia." Putin: I had to moonlight as a taxi driver, 13 December 2021, html
[v] Tadeusz Kisielewski wrote about this in Poland, Russia's decline, Rebis Publishing House, Poznań 2007.
[vi] B. Cole, Russia hides the number of war victims. And a powerful demographic crisis, Newsweek, July 7, 2025, https://www.newsweek.pl/world/Russian-demography-in-ruinie-kreml-hide-not-only-libbe-victim-war/gcswemv
[vii] Lt. M. Lubin, A bear in dragon embraces. How Russia became China's younger brother, Szczelin Publishing House, Kraków 2022.
[viii] In 2025 the number of sanctions (called "one-sided restrictive measures" in Russia was estimated to be around 20 000 in total).
[ix] J. C. K. Daly, Russia’s Fiscal Dependence on China Grows, The Jamestown Foundation, November 14, 2024, https://jamestown.substack.com/p/russias-fiscal-dependence-on-china
[x] K. Pacek, And the Chinese Tributary? The Consequences of Moscow’s Increased Dependence on Beijing, Clingendael, June 2024, https://www.clingendael.org/publication/consequences-moscows-increased-dependence-beijing
[xi] I wrote about it in: T. Pavluszko, Russian Energy strategy by 2050. In search of technological sovereignty, Commentary Łukasiewicz – ITECH, Nr 8/2025/DBT, 13 June 2025, https://doi.org/10.36735/AHEI9869 ; the strategy itself available: Энергетическая стратегия Федерации на период период 2050 года, https://minenergo.gov.ru/ministery/energy-strategy and its approval and justification can be read here: http://government.ru/news/54754/
[xii]REPowerEU: Energy policy in national recovery and resilience plans, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policy/repowereu/ ; a detailed plan available for: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0230
[xiii]Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European economical and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. REPowerEU: Joint European actions towards safe and sustainable energy at an affordable price, 8 March 2022, COM(2022) 108 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0108
[xiv]The EU's independency from natural materials from Russia is possible, Polish economical Institute, 22 March 2022, https://pie.net.pl/undependency-sie-ue-from-raw-from-Russia-is-possible/
[xv] S. Majewski, The Union is moving distant from gas from Russia. What about the US import? “This is little evil”, 12 May 2025, https://businessinsider.com.pl/economy/Commission-European-about-departure-from-import-wegla-gas-i-oil/zkgnnc
[xvi]The European Green Deal. Striving to be the first climate-neutral constant, the European Commission, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en
[xvii]Fit for 55the European Council, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policy/fit-for-55/
[xviii] The president Europe moves distant from fossil fuels. First specified period ever, 20 May 2024, https://smoglab.pl/ue-fuel-mine-record/
[xx]Commission proposes grandial phase-out of Russian gas and oil imports into the EU, European Commission, Jun 17, 2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorn/detail/en/ip_25_1504
[xxx] T. Pavluszko, Russian Energy strategy by 2050. In search of technological sovereignty, Commentary Łukasiewicz – ITECH, Nr 8/2025/DBT, 13 June 2025, https://doi.org/10.36735/AHEI9869
[xxi] Sanctions have redirected investment flows in the EAEU, Gaidar Institute for economical Policy, 04.07.2025, https://www.iep.ru/en/sanctions-have-redirected-investment-flows-in-the-eaeu.html
[xxii]The Russians are fleeing Putin. It hasn't been that bad in 100 years, The Moscow Times, August 24, 2023, https://news.onet.pl/world/putin-lost-with-own-nation-Russia-experi-large-fali-immigration/bf75ecp
[xxiii]Russia flooded with cash. Economists inform against the crisis, Money.pl, 21 February 2025, https://www.money.pl/economy/Russia-washed-money-economicists-warning-pre-crisis-7127540176358208a.html
[xxiv] Cf. Sanctions have directed investment flows in the EAEU, Gaidar Institute for economical Policy, 04.07.2025, https://www.iep.ru/en/sanctions-have-redirected-investment-flows-in-the-eaeu.html
[xxx] I. Trusewicz, You can't hide it anymore. In Russia, the economy is rapidly slowing down, Republic, 17 May 2025, https://www.rp.pl/economy/Article42308591-longer-no-da-sie-the-hire-in-Russia-givally-release-economy
[xxx]Putin is promising to cut defence spending. Russia ‘paid with inflation’, 28 June 2025, https://news.wp.pl/putin-pronouncement-expenditure-on-defence-Russia-paying-inflation-7172359015033728a
[xxvii]Monitoring of Russia’s economical Outlook, Gaidar Institute for economical Policy, https://www.iep.ru/en/monitoring/
[xxxiii] I. Trusewicz, The Union wants to defeat Russia in Ukraine. Here's how, the Republic of Poland, 9 July 2025, https://www.rp.pl/economy/art42677211-unia-chce-pogonac-rosje-in-Ukraine-to-in-how
[xxx] The president Russia’s Dependence On China Is Deep And Wide — It May besides Be Irreversible, planet Crunch, 28 September 2023, https://worldcrunch.com/focus/russia-ukraine-war/russia-china-economic-dependency/
[xxx] The president Russia’s quasi-colonial independency on China, The Loop – ECPR’s Political discipline Blog, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/russias-quasi-colonial-dependence-on-china/
[xxxi] The president Going Steady: China and Russia’s economical Ties are Deeper Than Washington Thoughts, CEPA, June 16, 2025, https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/going-steady-china-and-russias-economic-ties-are-deep-than-washington-thinks/
[xxxii] Lt. J. C. K. Daly, Russia’s Fiscal Dependence on China Grows, The Jamestown Foundation, November 14, 2024, https://jamestown.substack.com/p/russias-fiscal-dependence-on-china
[xxxiii]China-Russia Dashboard: a peculiar relation in facts and figures, MERICS — Mercator Institute for China Studies, https://merics.org/en/china-russia-dashboard-facts-and-figures-special-relationship
