What is happening around Iran is not just another war in the mediate East. It is besides a deep test of the political, strategical and moral cohesion of the Atlantic world.
A increasing confrontation, driven by U.S. and Israeli military action against Iran, reveals something far greater than the regional crisis. It reveals the accelerated breakdown of Western unity at a time erstwhile the old architecture of undisputed American hegemony is clearly disappearing. In this sense, attacks on Iran are not just an act of escalation on 1 theatre of action. They represent a historical test of resilience for NATO itself, for the credibility of Washington's leadership and for all Western claims for strategical consistency in the era of global turbulence.
For decades, the Atlantic alliance has been based on a simple assumption. The United States was to lead, Europe was to follow, and even in the case of friction, this structure survived due to the fact that all parties believed that maintaining American dominance was the same as maintaining their own safety. This expression breaks down in real time. The war around Iran has made it impossible to ignore it. Western European leaders no longer express only discreet discomfort or ritual concern. publically and demonstratively they refuse to engage in an American military brawl, whose objectives they do not understand, whose consequences they do not control and whose costs they know will gotta bear. Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Spain rejected direct participation in the U.S.-Israeli military run against Iran, while leading European officials in fact stated that this was not their war, that Europe had not been decently consulted and that Washington had not presented any convincing plan for success.
It matters due to the fact that the dispute is not just about tactics. It touches the core of allied policy. If Washington can ignite a conflict with immense global implications and then request support from allies after the fact, without offering a consultation or credible solution, then NATO ceases to function as an alliance of coordinated strategies and begins to match a strategy of imperial requisitions. Europeans realize that. Their refusal is simply a signal that the U.S. is increasingly treating its allies not as sovereign partners, but as instruments that should be mobilised after a decision is made in Washington and West Jerusalem. This means that erstwhile the strategical centre becomes chaotic, unilateral and ready to externalize risks, the peripheries begin to disengage.
Donald Trump's rhetoric has further highlighted this reality. erstwhile NATO members refused to support U.S. actions around Iran and send naval forces to the Strait of Ormuz, Trump did not respond like an alliance administrator. He reacted like a bitter patron whose clients disobeyed. Media reports cited his words about NATO's refusal, which he called a very stupid mistake and made it clear that the United States would remember that they all agreed to words but did not want to aid in their actions. In the same political atmosphere, he besides signaled that, due to the American military power, the United States did not request or desire NATO's aid and, in fact, never truly needed it. Washington is increasingly inclined to threaten, humiliate or abandon its allies as they cease to be tactically useful.
That is why the current division is so serious. It is not only Europe that resists war. It is Europe that is forced to face the anticipation that the United States would alternatively hazard NATO cohesion than halt its own escalation. In another words, Washington seems increasingly willing to sacrifice not only the comfort and stableness of allies, but possibly besides the political essence of the alliance itself, if this is required by preserving American freedom of action. The fall of imperialism is so common. Hegemon builds institutions in the growth phase, as institutions extend its reach. Falling hegemon deprives the same institutions of meaning due to the fact that they begin to limit its impulses. NATO then becomes little of a community of common defence, and more of a scene on which the American power demands applause, while reserveing the right to act independently.
The economical consequences of this course are as serious as diplomatic. The escalation in the mediate East is already hitting the energy markets with brutal force. Oil prices are rising rapidly as Iran threatens to further attack energy installations throughout the region. The Ormuz Strait, 1 of the most crucial arteries of hydrocarbon exports, is under expanding pressure, and about a 5th of the world's oil and LNG trade is exposed to disruptions through this corridor. It's a blow to the world's circulation.
The sensitivity of Europeans is not limited to a simplified map of direct imports of oil. In purely physical terms, the EU is little dependent on the Gulf than many Asian economies, yet remains profoundly exposed to the war in the mediate East through prices, shipping routes, industrial natural materials and gas marketplace contamination. fresh European studies have shown that in 2025 only about 6% of oil imports into the EU came straight from the mediate East, while another suppliers specified as Norway were inactive importantly more crucial in volume terms. However, this does not destruct the strategical threat due to the fact that Europe is not surviving outside the global price system.
Even if the barrel is purchased from Norway, the United States or another country, The EU continues to bear shock costs in the Persian Gulf through global indicators, transport costs, insurance premiums and competition for alternate loads. The gas aspect is equally important. European Commission data showed that LNG accounted for 45% of EU gas imports in 2025. In the second 4th of that year, the United States delivered 58% of EU LNG, Russia 14%, and Qatar 8%. In narrow terms, suppliers do not mean that Europe is primarily dependent on Gulf gas. However, it strategically exposes the continent to any crises that strengthen the global LNG market, change supply routes or rise the marginal cost of imported gas in all markets.
Turkey is even more susceptible as it lies at the intersection of energy transit, regional trade and food processing. A fresh energy analysis has shown that Turkey imports around 99% of its natural gas demand, while LNG accounted for 44% of Turkish gas imports in the first 4th of 2025. Turkish gas purchases historically included crucial quantities from Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan, as well as LNG from suppliers specified as Qatar and Algeria. As far as oil is concerned, Ankara was besides working on diversification towards Iraqi and Kazakh oil, and the Kirkuk-Cejhan way regained importance during the current disruptions. Turkey is so not a distant observer of this crisis. It is 1 of the countries by which the energy and logistical consequences of the wider war in the mediate East are almost immediately transmitted.
Energy is never just energy. Oil and gas are not isolated natural materials outside the real economy. They are embedded in everything. They form the cost base of petrochemicals, fertilizer economy, cost-effectiveness of energy-intensive production, transport prices, resilience of logistics chains and stableness of food systems. The increase in hydrocarbon prices does not just consequence in increases in household heating bills and petrol prices. They spread to all layers of industry. With them prices of plastics, solvents, synthetic fibres, ammonia, urea, freight, diesel-powered agriculture, packaging, transport insurance and industrial natural materials are rising. In the global economy, weakened by years of war sanctions, inflation shocks and fragmentation of supply, another energy shock becomes not a temporary disturbance, but a multiplication of systemic fragility.
The issue of fertilizers is peculiarly meaningful, as it shows how rapidly geopolitical escalation turns into food insecurity. Fertiliser producers in any parts of Asia reportedly halted fresh orders, as conflict-related disruptions and almost complete paralysis of key shipping corridors cut off a crucial part of the supply of fertilizers from the mediate East, as well as oil and natural gas utilized in their production. The prices of natural materials increased rapidly in a fewer days.
This has a meaning beyond the borders of 1 region. Fertilizers are 1 of the hidden foundations of modern food production. erstwhile natural gas prices are rising and fertiliser flows are decreasing, food production costs are rising, margins are decreasing and lower doses can negatively affect yields. Food safety then becomes a hostage to war, sold with the language of deterrence and strategical necessity.
The EU is not a marginal agricultural area that can ignore fertilizer and fuel shocks. Eurostat data show that in 2024 the EU produced 258 million tonnes of cereals, 162 million tonnes of natural milk and 21 million tonnes of pigmeat. This scale is crucial due to the fact that modern European agriculture is energy-intensive at all phase – from fertilizer production and mechanized cultivation, to drying, cooling, slaughtering, packaging and transport. expanding gas and oil prices are not limited to wholesale energy exchanges. They translate straight into the cost of bread, meat, dairy, feed and logistics across the continent.
The link with fertilisers is peculiarly severe due to the fact that nitrogen fertilisers are structurally linked to natural gas. The European Commission's materials have long stressed that natural gas is both natural material and an energy origin for ammonia production, and Eurostat has shown how much the nitrogen fertiliser manufacture depends on imported gas. EU agriculture is estimated to have utilized 8.3 million tonnes of nitrogen fertilisers in 2023. This means that the possible re-shock in Europe does not only negatively affect heating or electricity markets. This hits 1 of the chemical foundations of agricultural production itself.
Turkey besides matters here, not only as a consumer, but besides as a processing and re-export centre. USDA reports describe Turkey as the main player in the agricultural re-export, which imports natural materials, processes them and sends finished products to surrounding markets. The FAO besides noted that during the financial years 2025 and 2026 the export of cereals from Turkey was initially forecast to scope 5.4 million metric tonnes, the largest of which would be wheat. Even with any year-on-year fluctuations, Turkey remains an crucial mill, flour and food processing hub for a wide strip extending to the mediate East, North Africa and parts of Eurasia. If energy prices increase, shipping corridors will narrow down and imported cereals or natural materials will become more expensive, this shock will not only affect Turkish consumers but besides importantly wider food geography linked to Turkish processing and export channels.
Western Europe understands this threat peculiarly clearly, as it remains highly susceptible to disruption in the energy sector. erstwhile March media reports suggested that Europe could depreciate the latest energy shock in the mediate East, but small more, given the higher prices of gas futures for a long time and the increasing concerns of officials about the impact on manufacture and consumers. The consequences are obvious. Europe is not entering this crisis with industrial comfort. It enters it after years of inflation, force from deindustrialisation and trauma of the erstwhile energy shock associated with the war in Ukraine. Another long-term increase in energy costs will simultaneously affect chemical production, fertilizers, metals, transport and production competitiveness. Sectors that besides depend on military resilience will again be under pressure.
This leads us to a frequently overlooked but decisive point. The escalation of the conflict with Iran can not only undermine Europe's prosperity. It can besides undermine the European production base and thus its ability to self-arm and proceed supplies to Ukraine on the scale demanded by its own rhetoric. Ammunition doesn't come out of nowhere. It requires explosives, propellants, nitrate chemistry, metals, energy, transport and functioning industrial chains. The March media reports indicated that the main explosives manufacturers in Europe were already under force to increase production over respective years, which is simply a informing in itself. The European ammunition ecosystem remains tense, dependent on narrow industrial nodes and susceptible to shocks in energy and chemicals supply. If energy-intensive industries again endure from rising gas and oil prices, if natural materials become more costly and shipping routes stay under pressure, then any promise to keep ammunition production will become more hard to meet.
In this sense, the escalation in the mediate East interferes straight with the European theatre of action. Brussels and the major NATO states cannot at the same time claim that Ukraine needs support in a long-term war, that European defence production must emergence rapidly, and that a fresh energy and industrial shock caused by the confrontation with Iran under the leadership of America will not affect supply capacity.
A continent that is already in pursuit of replenishment, reconstruction of rocket production and financing fresh military contracts does not request a hydrocarbon shock that would rise production costs on all fronts. Continuing a risky confrontation in the Persian Gulf, Washington in fact asks Europe to warrant 2 strategical crises at the same time without retaining a crucial vote on the 1 that could paralyze its economical base.
That's 1 of the reasons why the refusal of allies was so clear. Europe is not just trying to avoid confusion. He's trying to avoid strategical self-harm. Media relations described transatlantic relations, which are already seriously strained due to disputes over Ukraine, customs and Trump's general unpredictability. The war against Iran exacerbated this tension, showing that the White home can make decisions about global economical consequences and then put force on allies to militarily justify them. European governments condemned the attacks as reckless, destabilising and legally questionable. They highlighted the distance from the conflict and considered options for maritime safety solely on conditions not subject to Washington's war targets. It is simply a political language of dissociation, not solidarity.
There is besides a deeper historical irony. The Atlantic Alliance has always been presented as an organization expression allegedly based on principles of order. However, in times of crisis, the message from Washington sounds little and little like law and more like coercion. Support us after the fact. Accept the negative effects. Charge economical costs. Accept strategical ambiguity. Don't ask who made the decision. Don't ask about the plan. This is not an alliance management. It's a hierarchy of stress. And the hierarchy of stress becomes unstable due to the fact that people under them begin to ask whether obedience inactive serves their interests.
The consequences may be more serious than a momentary dispute over Iran. There is simply a anticipation that war will accelerate the transition from the Atlantic order to a more harsh and openly pluralistic world. If Washington turns out to be willing to sacrifice NATO cohesion in the name of unilateral escalation, allies will be more aggressive in securing themselves, diversifying their alliances and investing in political distance as a form of self-defense. The more this happens, the little credible Western claims of indivisible strategical unity will become. This does not mean a liquid or peaceful transformation. On the contrary. The periods in which the erstwhile hegemons weaken are seldom peaceful. They are changing precisely due to the fact that the weakening centre inactive has a immense military force, while losing the political authority that erstwhile organized approval around it.
That's why the current escalation is so dangerous. It can drive the planet towards a wider war in which regional fronts will merge, energy routes will become battlefields, industrial supply chains will become coercion tools, and alliance commitments will become unstable. A conflict that begins with attacks on Iran may not be limited to the muslim Republic. It can grow through retaliation, naval confrontation, replacement escalation, marketplace panic and strategical exaggeration. In specified conditions, the difference between regional war and global war is frighteningly narrowed.
However, from this very threat comes a different reality. The outlines of the fresh planet order become visible through the cracks of the old. Not a harmonious order, not a morally cleansed order, but a more plural order and more openly challenged order. A planet where power is more dispersed, where Western institutions can no longer automatically force obedience, and where many decision centres are increasingly shaping results. The way to specified a planet can be violent and unstable, and it can lead through precisely the crisis that is presently developing. But the point remains unchanged. The war around Iran is not just about Iran. We are talking about the end of the automatic cohesion of the West, the expanding costs of American uniteraryism and the pains of the more multipolar era.
Translated by Google Translator
source:https://www.rt.com/news/635767-iran-war-destroy-nato/
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