Polish policy describes the word "clincher" in the shortest and most appropriate way. The 2 main political camps – the current coalition of democrats and the erstwhile clerical power – are in a common embrace that importantly limits anyone's field of programming. Especially since there is simply a common awareness of the colossal rate at which this fight is fought. It is not the direction of several, even crucial sectoral policies, but the state itself, the future of civilian rights, and yet even geopolitical fates, defining national safety prospects in an increasingly hard external environment. In a word, everything is at stake.
Under specified conditions, no campaign, no group of possible voters can be abandoned, and taking the hazard of innovative changes in the political offer must not inspire the enthusiasm of the leaders. Like any man, they like to usage tried methods, to follow alternatively conventional paths, and to minimize the dangers that inevitably, at least temporarily, grow along with any fresh dynamics.
Both parties may lose their chances of raising their political possible in the average and long term. Let us look at 2 specified situations, 1 for each of the clink protagonists. However, let's start with this side, which is presently "on the music", i.e. having lost the key parliamentary elections in the fall of 2023, is now at the level of support that does not give a possible of regaining power, and in any studies it even loses its position as the leader of the polls and falls into the vicinity of results so low for it that it has most likely not been noted for more than a decade. It is due to the fact that it faces an urgent request to invent itself again, redefining any of the goals and re-establishing the narrative. “More of the same” is no longer an option for her, as the strategies of the last fewer months have led her to marginalisation. It's evidently a camp of erstwhile power, a right wing.
Social Democratic Right
PiS erstwhile in its past has performed a spectacular reconstruction of its program offer, which had the dimension of worldview change. This occurred gradually, during the period of 8 years of opposition, i.e. between 2007 and 2015. While Jarosław Kaczyński's organization in the short word of its first governments (2005-07) as Minister of Finance appointed a bright economical liberal and supporter of both low taxes and belt tightening by the state budget, Zyta Gilowska, specified a akin choice of staff and policy would be absolutely unthinkable after 2015. Being a organization to the populist right, the Polish Law and Justice has thus entered the trend seen in the conduct of politicians of this current in many European countries.
Both the French National Front in the Age of Old Le Pen and the Austrian “freedom” of Haider's time and the Dutch utmost right in the Age of Pima Fortuna and early Geert Wilders were groups with free marketplace preferences in economical and taxation policy, utterly unwilling to support generous social policies. In terms of American naming, they were alternatively libertarian than national-social. Polish Law and Justice in its rhetoric until 2005 remained an economically average and alternatively vague party, focusing on another issue. Its leaders assumed that the economy would be in the hands of free marketers from PO in the coalition, which during the period 2001-05 was clearly planned and declared by both parties. erstwhile it did not happen, the Law and Justice Service directed itself towards free marketplace alternatively than social.
After the social transformations generated first by the crisis in the global financial markets (2008-10), then the debt crisis in the euro area (2011-14), followed by the social aspects of exile crises (since 2015 with full force), the parties of the European utmost or populist right saw the "political gold" not only in a stronger emphasis on chauvinist and xenophobic content (they were inactive strong in their narratives long before), but besides in a leaning over the material position of indigenous Europeans. While it has previously been stressed that immigrants and refugees are "demosians" who number on carefree lives at the social cost of the state (at the same time akin criticisms apply to indigenous citizens, but preferring to live on benefits from labor), now have been reached for a communicative depicting them as "wreckers" of the mediocre groups of indigenous people, who, by the influx of immigrants, further loses their sense of social security. To classically right-wing communicative based on dislike to the cultural, racial or religiously Other, classically left-wing concern about the location of the poorest members of the community was added, with communities already defined right-wingly, due to the fact that based on cultural criteria. This transformation has opened fresh fields of influence to the far right, and it is usually the main origin of growth in support of the groups of this current in the last fewer years.
The PiS went in Poland in the same direction. Among the main reasons for the party's electoral success in 2015 was its turn towards a policy of raising and introducing fresh social benefits. household allowances, additional pensions, a fast increase in minimum wage – these are just a fewer of the most crucial moves of this squad with a strict leftist, social democratic character. In Poland, this was in line with the anti-elitarian communicative of the Law and Justice, which has always been crucial in its rhetoric, but has now been supplemented with mistrust besides towards the next "elity" – private entrepreneurs and another "rich" people, "stealing" the country, e.g. by machinations around VAT. In addition, the pro-social transformation of the PiS was a link to the absorption by this organization of the multicenterial electorate of the erstwhile Self-defense, as well as many farmers before 2007 associated with the PSL. The PiS electorate not only increased, but besides changed all its sociological indicators with a profile of the level of education, a place of residence on the axis of the village-great city and the structure of the age at the head. Simplifyingly, the PiS – until at least 2007 a organization of large-town voters close to the Church and anti-communist – turned into a organization of undereducated provinces and pensioners, frequently with a teardrop in the eye of mentioning the PRL.
During the last fewer years, the thought of a "package" of the Law and Justice included the following main pillars: 1) nationalism/cultural xenophobia, 2) systemic authoritarianism with support of the thought of a "strong hand government", 3) isolationism expressed as skepticism towards the West and the EU, 4) antiliberal moral conservatism of the old type, 5) political Catholicism with clerical features, and 6) socialism/etatism in concepts of economic, social and derived policies. This package was the origin of the success of the Law and Justice in the mediate of the erstwhile decade, but it began to lose its power in Poland from the early 1920s. Since then, support for the Law and Justice has slow fallen and this process will not be stopped if it does not redefin akin to that of the period after 2007.
Liberalism in Antiliberals
In European countries, support for the far right is increasing and Poland is falling. And yet our country is affected by the same crises. Why is that? The answer to this question should be sought by combining the thought of a "PiS package" with "packages" of parties of the same current in another countries that are now doing better from the Law and Justice. What differences can be observed here?
It is not hard to see that the PiS from akin parties in most European countries differs in point 5 and to any degree in point 4 of its "ideo package". Undoubtedly, the main groups of the populist rightist European right do not effort to affect the Catholic Church (or, more so, Protestant Churches) in the current politics, they do not mention to church authorities and obtain, nor seek, the support of the hierarchs in the political struggle. Clericism is simply a completely abroad party, and this phenomenon goes back rather far, even before the demolition of the image of the Catholic Church due to pedophile scandals.
One can rightly see that this has been understood: yet in France, the Netherlands, Austria and even Italy, laicization processes are far advanced and recourse to church authority, even in the performance of the right hand, would be either a suicide goal, or would stay without any translation into the level of support that parties do. It is indeed. The point is that in Poland there is simply a fast laicisation process of the young generation, including age groups, which will scope the level of 35 years at the time of the next elections to the Sejm. Of course, spiritual zeal remains a characteristic determinant of the PiS electorate (deep Catholic religion is at the minute the strongest indicator identifying the possible electorate of this party). However, this electorate grows old and shrinks. If the aim of the Law and Justice Agency is to have any chance of fighting for power in 2027 (or even later), it must take into account the laicised face of those electorate groups that must attract to it. Even young people supporting the Confederation – the first specified group on the shore – are very frequently non-religious. Clericism was the natural attitude of the right in politics for 35 years of the existence of free Poland – it made sociological sense. But that's what ends. Clericism has become a recipe for building a right-wing niche or an open-air museum, which will satisfy with a consequence around 20% (and then most likely less) and zero coalition capacity.
The PiS is facing a hard task. The transition to social positions discouraged comparatively fewer voters from the early part of 2001-07. The departure from intimacy with the wilting Church must be more careful if the organization wants to preserve its current electorate. The introduction of the Church-State separation organization to the agenda should go hand in hand with respect for religion and tradition, but besides with the emphasis on freedom of religion. In order to stay an crucial player, the PiS must build the figure of the “conservative non-believer” as a possible organization supporter for which it has its offer. PiS needs to send a signal that in its environment there is area for people who – being conservatives or nationalists – will not want to assist in any service or prayers. Whoever goes to the PiS demonstration must be able not to participate in the rosary.
The second step for the Law and Justice should be to weaken his antiliberalism on any moral issues. The utmost right in Europe understood that it would not turn the river of cultural change back. In all subsequent countries of the continent, the preaching of homophobic slogans against women's autonomy or even the ban on abortion became unpopular and detrimental to the election chances of parties, and then grotesquely marginal and unthinkable. This will not be a taste for PiS politicians, but besides due to the balance of their governments (to close their eyes to attacks on Parades of Equality, LGBT-free zones, the "tribunal" on abortion) moral liberalism has doubled its influence in Polish society. With each successive year of youth entering adulthood and all year of seniors leaving for the Lord, the rate of public support for liberal responses to these matters inevitably continues. The PiS can, of course, until the end of the planet and longer defend the ban on abortion in almost all situation or deny LGBT people the right to any formalization of the relationship, but there are surely many politicians in this organization who realize that this will mean condemning themselves to eternal opposition. Andrzej Duda's signature under the In vitro Restoration Act is the link of this fresh consciousness.
The utmost right in Europe remanented its postulates and ideas: a) retained and strengthened the popular ones, b) co-opted another people's postulates, which it considered useful, c) threw out into the garbage of past those of her erstwhile postulates that became her ballad. This is why today: a) speaks loudly about the protection of European culture by immigration from muslim states, b) adds concern for social safety of the poorest layers of the hoarded cultural group, but c) does not in any way question the rights of women and LGBT people – on the contrary: it actively attracts fresh supporters among feminists and homosexuals. In France, the majority of Marine Le Pen organization parliamentarians late supported the incorporation of abortion law into the Constitution.
More Liberalism in Liberals
Coalition groups are located on the another side of the Polish political wedge on October 15. There are respective of them, but fundamentally they are grouped together into 4 entities: KO, Lewica and (a joint 3rd Road) PSL and Poland 2050. Of these, Poland 2050 has a short history, but the others have long been participants in the political game. While the 2 smaller of these groups have undergone rather insignificant worldview transformations (this does not mean that there have been any changes – in the Left the worldview dimension besides had a generational change and the final ending of the post-communism era, as well as the influence of the parties Together on the another partners; in PSL we see features of the transition from the pattern of agrarism and the industrial organization representing the interests of 1 group towards the Chadetic organization highlighting a average political offer), these changes in the PO – giving a speech to the KO coalition – were almost as fundamental as the decision of the Law and Social Party.
PO was primarily a multi-division organization for most of its past and remains so. However, it is clear that there are crucial changes in the strategy of forces of these currents within it. Until recently, the party's programme was given a conservative speech (but much little extremist than the PiS). However, the leaders of the POL saw the previously indicated changes in the worldview and made a clear shift towards moral liberalism. It is not as strong in this organization present as in the ranks of the Left, but it is nevertheless very strong and clearly dominant. alternatively of a organization in which an almost lonely associate has been unsuccessfully fighting for a bill introducing the most cautious form of partnerships, present we have a group full declared for their implementation. alternatively of a organization that supports the most restrictive abortion law in Europe (called a fun “compromise”), we have a organization that supports the right to terminate pregnancy by week 12. These are the most bright manifestations of this change, but not only (the approach of the PO to the Church has changed highly strongly). They are naturally both the aftermath of the evolution of social attitudes and the mistakes made by the anti-liberal power of the Law and Justice in 2015-23.
The consequence of the overwhelmingly affirmative perception of the right's social policy during the period of its regulation is the second, even more clear change in the "ideal package" of the PO. However, it is frequently little noticed from the first. This is due to the fact that the transition of the PO from conservatism to moral liberalism occurred rather dynamically in a comparatively short period of moving the organization by Boris Budka, erstwhile emotions around issues of women's rights and hatred towards LGBT people reached zenith. The evolution of the PO from liberalism to economical social democratism has been moving forward very slow and not spectacularly for a long period of time, with its first signs reaching as far as 2008-09. Nevertheless, the ideological differences in economic, taxation or social policy between today's PO and – let us say – the 2004 PO are enormous.
The thought shift within the context of the worldview issues in the PO has already been made, as has been said, by changing the expectations of the electorate, among others, of this party. It should be added that the leaders' reaction was at least late. Although liberal views on women's rights or LGBT people's rights, or the place of the Church in public life have changed intensely in the last 3-5 years, in the group of Poles and Poles supporting the PO (or wider pro-democracy camp) they were mostly liberal much earlier. The platform has frequently been negatively assessed for failing to "keep up" in these cases for its own voters.
The thought shift as part of economical issues in the PO was due to the reflection of a affirmative social perception of the policy of the Law and Justice Government at the level of the full society. However, as investigation shows, supporters of socialism/economic statism present are mainly supporters of the Law and Justice and this evolution of their views is simply a strong support for specified solutions in our country. Social investigation on, among others, 800+, nationalisation of enterprises or ways of combating inflation (https://electoral.pl/7,75968,29935542, social-pis-liberal-opposition-second-sondaz-citizen-pokazal.html) have shown that the GO electorate (as well as another democratic parties, including even the Left) sceptically refers to economical social democratism and longs for the PO programme years ago. It is interesting and amazing that the Platform has long ignored changes in the expectations of its electorate on moral matters and has moved distant only erstwhile they have achieved a global dimension in society, and in the case of expectations of economic/social policy, it has followed the general public, leaving its own voters behind.
The survey quoted above shows that the Coalition on October 15 has the support of its voters to retreat from the expansion of the PiS-style social policy for a more disciplined and cost-effective policy that addresses social benefits more precisely and, above all, the "dropping money from a helicopter" for better public services (the second is besides the motto of the Left). But although it itself is simply a mosaic of many different groups, it does not seem to have a place for this 1 current – a clear economical liberalism.
In the Alliance of Democrats we have Conservatives from PSL and parts of Poland 2050, we have socialists from Together and Social Democrats from fresh Left. We have moral liberals in all these groups (maybe outside the PSL). In this symphony of pluralism of voices and attitudes, united by the request to rebuild democracy after the PiS governments, however, there is simply a deficiency of crucial voice in favour of free marketplace economical solutions, cost-effective treatment of public penny or privatisation. Within the KO there is simply a modern party, which would be predestined to play this function (other smaller PO partners inside the KO have their individual ideas – the Polish Initiative is social democratic, The Greens have their first program and priorities, Agrounia is agrarna), but either avoids this for fear of Donald Tusk's disapproval, or lacks presently staff, respective politicians at the top of the organization with advanced economical strength.
Some voices about liberal economical colour are sometimes heard from Poland 2050. However, there is simply a deficiency of readability of the message (except for the point-to-point raising of problems specified as charging wellness contributions to entrepreneurs), due to the fact that the group as a full is besides multi-divisional and is inactive looking for its worldview identity. The only politician from the “first pages of newspapers” from the coalition ranks on 15 October, who in the parliamentary run clearly reached for free marketplace slogans was Ryszard Petru, who became a Polish MP 2050 as a nonpartisan outsider. His charge was alternatively lonely, but inactive of the importance of gold – he stripped the Confederacy of many free marketplace supporters who voted for democratic parties.
The Confederate aspect of the free marketplace electorate, but besides a possible PiS coalition, should encourage the leaders of KO and Poland 2050 to make a clear communication strategy for this rather large group of voters. Like the Law and Justice, which, in order to 1 day number for power, must at the same time hold the clerical electorate and win unbelievers conservatives, Democrats – in order to hold power – must keep average voters of the measurement falling in love with the social functions of the state, but besides re-incentivize the group opting for the classical school of economics and a limited state. It is in Poland a group so many that its failure (or demobilization) could mean the failure of the majority by the Tusk government. Especially since many young, fresh voters declare themselves opponents of the social state. Entering the arena yearbooks make Polish society both little clerical and little social.
One side of the Polish dispute about the future, both those declared anti-liberals and parties to liberalism looking rather favourably, seem to request present an injection of liberal ideas to increase their political and electoral potential.
