Why Russia Ukraine? After more than 2 years of bloody war, this question can be asked again

polska-zbrojna.pl 1 year ago

The reasons behind Russia's attack on Ukraine are known from propaganda narratives, including speeches by Kremlin representatives. We know that Moscow wanted to "denify" Ukraine, under the cloak of this idea, covering the intentions of deukrainization and de-Europeanization of the neighbouring nation. The final consequence of both processes was the secondary rusification of Ukrainians. Although that's evidently not the only reason for intervention.

Aggression besides had circumstantial territorial objectives. From the analysis of the possible and movements of Russian troops in February 2022 it can be concluded that the Kremlin did not presume a more serious defensive action, especially in the Russian-speaking East. There is no indication that Moscow planned to enter western Ukraine. The Russians intended to make the annexation of Zadnieprz and the south. In the central and western parts of the country, they wanted to establish puppet governments, in which the will to submit to local administration to fresh authorities in Kiev, alternatively than the physical presence of Russian troops, would play a decisive role. In another words, Putin expected to surrender and vassalize the full country, from which he would cut for himself at least 8 circuits, representing 2 thirds of Ukraine's surface.

As it was said, it was not the land itself. Ivan Krastew, an excellent Bulgarian political scientist, gave an interview to Polish “Newsweek” in July 2022. erstwhile asked what Putin wanted, he replied: “[...] he is not curious in the territory, but the population. He has a demographic obsession. He has been saying for any time that if it had not been for the revolution and the Second planet War, Russia would have 500 million inhabitants today. [...] He is convinced that Russia needs Ukrainian men and women to last in the fresh world. due to the fact that to him, Ukrainians are Russian. The unification of historical Russia with Ukraine and Belarus is his obsession number one." The obsession not only with Putin, the absorption of Ukraine and the regeneration of the local population are for many Russian decision-makers and elite representatives, besides intellectual, the last hotel of the rescue. Otherwise Russia is threatened with a cultural revolution, linked to the decline in ethnically Russian and Orthodox populations for Muslims from the Caucasus and Central Asia.

This is besides why this war began in a full-scale dimension. 2014 was the year that the Russians decided to scope out to the attractive Ukrainian and Slavic population reserve again. After the annexation of Crimea, the population of Russia grew by 2 million people, most of whom had ‘cultural characteristics’. Russian-speaking Ukrainians from east circuits and cultural proximity provided hope for another equally seamless injection of vitality.

RECLAMA

Let's keep moving. In August 2022, Canada's survey firm SecDev calculated that Russia occupied Ukrainian territories where there were natural riches worth at least $12.4 trillion. The Federation took over, among others, 63% of Ukrainian coal deposits, 11% of oil deposits, 20% of gas deposits, 42% of metallic deposits and 33% of uncommon earth deposits and another crucial mineral deposits, including lithium. Under business there was besides 20–25% of land suitable for cultivation. Most of the areas listed in the SecDev study were intercepted by Russia in 2014. And it was already clear that Russian aggression was besides motivated by economical factors. Calling a thing by name – it was a robbery.

But besides to reduce anxiety. "NATO could usage Ukrainian territory to deploy missiles capable of reaching Moscow within 5 minutes", he repeatedly announced sinister Putin. He was rambling, speaking of allied plans towards the Russian capital, which does not change the fact that the concept of Ukraine as a soft underbelly of the Federation is an crucial component of Russian strategical culture. 500–600 km dividers of Kharkiv, Suma or Szostka from Moscow are not adequate to let Ukrainians to full self-power. Russian elites and a large part of society think so. This is besides based on the interior legitimacy of Kremlin's actions towards Kiev. They are supported by the unchanging, despite the collapse of the USSR, by convincing the Russians that NATO is the enemy of their homeland. And it is the Ukrainian “romans” with the West that makes unacceptable.

What is the level of accomplishment of these objectives, we know well. The Russians were stuck in a terrible war, having occupied only 18% of Ukraine's surface area (together with the 2014 conquests). Their economy hangs on a Chinese drip, and a war crime fishy leader is prosecuted by the global Criminal Court. NATO has drawn even closer to Russia's borders, and the savagery of the Russian army has made Ukrainians in the crushing majority see their neighbours as hated enemies.

And yes, Putin and fellow workers consistently reiterate that Russia will search to “opposise the Kiev regime”. However, I do not think that the generals of the Federation – who know the real capabilities of its armed forces, which do not let Ukraine to be defeated in the conventional conflict – will measurement further than maintaining territorial gains until they become the subject of peace talks. That's what this war is about now.

To end it is impossible for another reason. The origin of Putin's legitimacy and company is convincing citizens of the brutal effectiveness of power; if a war squad loses (or at least does not win), it is not effective, so it has no right to rule. Historically, specified a reflection in Russian citizens usually ended in the death of the ruling. The continuation of the war in this respect is simply a conflict for the endurance of the Putin regime. The crucial thing is to keep balance – to channel the conflict into a socially acceptable dimension, so that the Russians do not feel that it is overloaded.

But it's not just about keeping the government going. It's inactive crucial to play on time. It is simply a conscious strategy of the Kremlin that assumes in a long-term plan a more serious success – due to the fact that the West will get bored of helping Ukraine, and it will yet break itself. It's as logical as a desperate assumption...

Marcin Ogdowski , war correspondent, author of the blog unkamuflazu.pl
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