Why OPEC+ Is Supporting A Potentially Disastrous Rise In Oil Production

By Simon Watkins of OilPrice.com

Oil prices have fallen fast since the 3 March announcement from OPEC+ that it will go ahead with a planned rise in its collective oil production. The prospect of increased supply from the group has added to the bearish tone created by rising supply from other key producers and from uncertain demand projections from the world’s biggest importer of oil, China. Lower oil and gas prices is precisely what Donald Trump wants to see in his second term as U.S. president, but with budget breakeven oil prices much higher than even current levels, many may wonder why OPEC+ members are supporting such a potentially financially disastrous production rise.

So economically vital is it to most OPEC+ members that oil prices are kept at the higher end of recent historical levels that the organization has not increased production since 2022. In fact, at that point it had begun a series of collective oil production cuts to support oil prices, totaling around 5.85 million barrels per day (bpd), or around 5.7% of global supply. As recently as December, the cartel extended its previous round of 2.2 million bpd in output reductions to the end of this quarter. Industry estimates are that the first phase of the removal of these production cuts will total about 138,000 bpd in April, with much more to come. “Part of this move [OPEC+ oil production increases] results from repeated overproduction from some of its members, most recently from Kazakhstan [following the Tengiz expansion project], Iraq, and Russia, although Moscow has been doing a lot of it as dark inventory [unofficial output] to sidestep sanctions,” a senior source in the European Union’s (E.U.) energy security complex exclusively told OilPrice.com last week. “Another part comes from the group wanting to protect its market share, given the major shift in the supply-demand balance that’s unfolding,” he added. “And the final part of it is the fact that OPEC+ doesn’t think it can win an oil price war against the U.S. with Trump in his second presidency, given how badly it did in the last two [oil price wars],” he concluded.

Indeed, over the course of the 2014-2016 Oil Price War, de facto OPEC leader Saudi Arabia spend over 34% of its precious US$737 billion foreign exchange reserves and swung from a budget surplus to a then-record high deficit of US$98 billion, as analyzed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. So bad was Saudi Arabia’s economic and political situation back towards the end of the Second Oil Price War in 2016 (the first being the 1973-1974 Oil Crisis) that the country’s deputy economic minister, Mohamed Al Tuwaijri, stated in an unprecedentedly unequivocal way for a senior Saudi in October 2016 that: “If we [Saudi Arabia] don’t take any reform measures, and if the global economy stays the same, then we’re doomed to bankruptcy in three to four years.”

Although the 2014-2016 Oil Price War had been launched by Saudi Arabia with the intention of destroying or significantly disabling the U.S.’s then-nascent shale oil industry, it only succeeded in destroying the finances of OPEC’s members and undermining the reputation of the group – and Saudi Arabia — in the global oil market. Aside from the damage to its own economy, Saudi Arabia had cost the OPEC member states collectively at least US$450 billion in revenues during the 2014-2016 Oil Price War, according to International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates.

So badly had OPEC and its effective leader Saudi Arabia been hit by their own actions that Donald Trump was able to exploit this weakness to maintain a tight oil price range during his first term as president through the occasional incentive but many more threats. The lower part of the ‘Trum Oil Price Range’ is US$40-45 per barrel of the Brent benchmark, which is the price at which the bulk of U.S. shale oil producers can breakeven and make a good profit on top. The upper part of it is US$75-80 per barrel, which ties into historical data showing that a gasoline price of under US$2 per gallon has been most advantageous for U.S. economic growth. This US$2 per gallon level has historically equated to a West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil price of around US$70 per barrel. And as WTI has also historically traded at a discount of between US$5-10 per barrel to the Brent oil benchmark, this US$70 per barrel of WTI price equates to around US$75-80 per barrel of Brent. Judging from Trump’s comments on the campaign trail and in his ‘Agenda47’ blueprint for a second term, his view that oil prices should continue to be heavily influenced by the U.S. in such a way has not changed. He will also be aware of the dramatic political consequences for U.S. presidents of oil prices rising beyond the top of the Range, as also fully detailed in my latest book on the new global oil market order. Specifically, since 1896 the sitting U.S. president has won re-election 11 times out of 11 if the economy was not in recession within two years of an upcoming election. However, sitting U.S. presidents who went into a re-election campaign with the economy in recession won only one time out of seven.

Adding to their troubles in this regard, the Saudis know that Trump has much greater power in this term than he did in his first, with Republican majorities in the Senate and the House of Representatives, and his nominees dominating the Supreme Court. They also know his attitude to OPEC and the Russia-enhanced OPEC+ groups, which was marked early in his first term. More specifically, when Saudi Arabia was still trying desperately to repair the appalling damage its 2014-2016 Oil Price War had done to its own finances and to those of its OPEC brothers, it embarked on coordinated production cuts (with Russia as the new-found member of the expanded ‘OPEC+’ cartel) to push the oil price higher. Trump’s reaction was quick and unequivocal: “OPEC and OPEC nations are, as usual, ripping off the rest of the world, and I don’t like it. Nobody should like it,” he said. He added: “We defend many of these nations for nothing, and then they take advantage of us by giving us high oil prices. Not good. We want them to stop raising prices. We want them to start lowering prices and they must contribute substantially to military protection from now on.” Following Trump’s clear warnings to Saudi Arabia’s Royal Family in the third quarter of 2018 of the catastrophic consequences if the Kingdom continued to keep oil prices higher than the US$80 per barrel Brent price ceiling – analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order — Saudi Arabia was instrumental in keeping oil prices lower by orchestrating coordinated OPEC production increases. That brief period was the only part of Trump’s presidency that saw his Oil Price Trading Range breached to the upside.

This no-nonsense approach from Trump was a function of a broader shift in U.S. policy towards Saudi Arabia following its 2014-2016 Oil Price War that continues to this day and of which the Saudis are fully aware. Before that War, the foundation relationship agreement between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. was the deal that had been struck on 14 February 1945 between the then-U.S. President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the then-Saudi King, Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud. This deal was simply that the U.S. would receive all the oil supplies it needed for as long as Saudi Arabia had oil in place and, in return for this, that the U.S. would guarantee the security both of Saudi Arabia and its ruling House of Saud. The implication of this – and clearly delineated at the time of the 1945 agreement by the U.S. side – was that the oil Saudi Arabia supplied to the U.S. would be at a reasonable price based on previous historical levels.

However, after the end of the Oil Price War in 2016, a hugely significant change occurred in the U.S.-Saudi Arabia agreement. It effectively changed to one in which the U.S. would receive all the oil supplies it needed for as long as Saudi Arabia has oil in place and in return would guarantee the security of Saudi Arabia and the ruling House of Saud, but it included the proviso that Saudi Arabia did not jeopardise the economic well-being of the U.S. Or to put it more simply as one senior White House official commented off-the-record to OilPrice.com at the end of 2016: “We’re not going to put up with any more crap from the Saudis.”