Since the earliest times of war, they have served as a tool to change the existing position quo. It was uncommon for them to return to pre-war state (status quo ante bellum).
Even erstwhile the form of borders was restored in a formal sense, for example, the material and even intellectual changes among the population were so profound that it was hard for years to get free of the effects of the fire and war trauma. frequently wars resulted not only in territorial changes and population displacements, but besides in systemic transformations and membership of fresh forces.
State bombings (coup d’etat) whether the taking of another people's lands is usually considered acceptable under applicable law. All the more reason for annexing the war. Russian intervention in Crimea in 2014 and the Incorporation of the Peninsula in the Russian Federation and the open armed aggression in February 2022 on Ukraine again place the public view on the function of facts made (faits accomplis) and their legal effects. The facts are made erstwhile the opponent or rival is incapable to respond effectively to or argue the situation. They usually service to revise the existing position quo.
Facts made...
may be decisive, surprise and one-off, but may besides be stretched over time (in creeping mode). They are then called "salami tactics" (Thomas Schelling). They may take the form of armed or persuasion action. In their logic lies an effective transformation of the situation that allows to accomplish the nonsubjective of the initiator and avoid the hazard of undesirable escalation. The point is not to give the opponent a chance and time to counter threat. For these reasons, a blitzkrieg strategy is preferred. The another side is in a position of coercion – it must accept the fresh position quo, or go to war with all its consequences. It was calculated that from the end of planet War I to the Russian annexation of Crimea in the planet there were more than a 100 different “facts made” related to the seizure of territories, but only in the case of respective occupations was effective.
An example of decisions is cited in the past of global relations Gamal Abdel Nasser of 1956 on the Nationalization of the Suez Canal, which sparked the armed repost of large Britain, France and Israel, but it was yet Egypt who won, not the interveners. Another example concerns North Korea, which tests the credibility and resilience of the American-South Korean and American-Japanese alliance with its attack and atomic provocations. Crossing the “red line” may 1 day encounter a retaliatory reaction. So far, the provoked have kept “cold blood”.
Strategy faits accomplis She's unscrupulous. It's always meant to push individual out of assurance and balance, which is fundamentally utilized to intimidate the weaker one. It means striving to stand on your own, without having to get along or deal with any resistance. This happens erstwhile the parties lose their assurance in each other. In a situation of breach of common obligations (e.g. a treaty on safety guarantees) no moral or legal code matters. From a moral point of view and the law of Russian aggression on Ukraine, nothing is specifically different from American aggression on Iraq in 2003 under the false pretext of imprisonment Saddam Hussein access to weapons of mass destruction. The elimination of global law by circumventing and applying "double standards" is fundamentally an immanent feature of global relations.
Facts made carry changes that are hard to reverse. They besides origin asymmetry of roles. The 1 who made them gain initiative and leverage in possible crisis negotiations. It can impose the conditions of conflict resolution, it can besides escalate the usage of force. The paradox of the war in Ukraine is not only the inequality of the potentials of the parties, but besides the dependence of Ukraine's success on the adherence to Western restraint (US and NATO) in actions to the detriment of Russia. For it hangs over this war like Damocles' sword the threat of activating Russian atomic potential.
International lawyers agree that the annexation of the territory always takes the form of a unilateral act. It means the incarnation of abroad state territory (in part or in whole), which transforms conquest into winding-up. In the League of Nations Pact, which constituted the first part of the Treaty of Versailles, ending planet War I, “the League members have undertaken to respect and keep against all external assault the territorial full and political independency of all League members” (Article 10). However, during the interwar period, the policy of non-recognition of conquest was inconsistently implemented. The annexation of Abissinia by Italy in 1936, Anschluss of Austria by Hitler and the provisions of the 1938 Munich Agreement with respect to Czechoslovakia were not condemned. akin inconsistency was the actions concerning the annexation of the Baltic States in 1940 by Stalin.
Principles and practice
After planet War II, annexation became an illegal act, as was armed aggression. But again, these rules deny practice. For example, in 1974 Turkey annexed Northern Cyprus and in 1980 Israel incorporated east Jerusalem. Currently, fewer people remember these acts as contrary to global law. The same was actual of many acts of aggression, which were treated as interventions, missions, operations, although they were a manifest violation of global law. The Secession of Kosovo, i.e. its separation from Serbia and its declaration of independency in 2008, had many signs of the facts accomplished. It is now a protectorate administered by the UN with the aid of NATO, which in itself shows the curiosity of this phenomenon.
After Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the opposition to the global opinion, including the West, was moderate. In time, what was considered unacceptable began to be tolerated and even treated as part of a fresh arrangement of relations. On the 1 hand, Russia, as the recipient of negative assessments, proved to be resistant to criticism, sanctions and pressures, and on the another hand, part of the West preferred to step down alternatively than put their interests at risk, especially in the field of natural materials supply.
Moreover, what is not said loudly, regardless of the various excuses and silences, it was realized that the overthrow of governments Viktor Yanukovych was not lawful, was an extra-constitutional coup d'état, carried out with the support of Western states. It all consisted of a climate of silent acceptance of the facts made.
For territorial changes – especially erstwhile they are the consequence of annexation and business – there is no formal authorisation in either global law or politics. However, given the facts, local circumstances must nevertheless be seen. The business of Crimea by Russia was a tragedy in terms of Ukrainian state thinking. However, if you look at the problem with the position of the Crimean people, even if there was a plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations, the consequence of the vote could scope a qualified majority and find the decision to join Russia. Unfortunately, no 1 wants to check this out, and the results of the March 2014 referendum are barely credible (96.77% of the voters voted in favour of joining Russia). It must besides be made clear that Crimea was never Ukrainian in an cultural and linguistic sense. In the late 18th century the Crimean-Tatar component prevailed there, and from the second half of the 19th century the Russian element. It can besides be noted that many Ukrainians seeking national-state consolidation did not regret that the region considered to be promoskiewski had fallen away. Similarly, Donbas is treated, whose affiliation to any conflicting organization brings more problem than benefits.
The facts achieved so request to be looked at from the position of geopolitical dynamics and changing power systems, not just by the prism of absolute protection of position quo. In the global system, various changes take place constantly. any of them are voluntary, for example integration processes, others are the consequence of aggravating force centres by a fresh division of resources and roles. They are accompanied by force and violations of global law standards. Nothing can aid the lamentation of defenders of democratic ideals and human rights. This is due to the fact that the selfish and ruthless interests of rival powers for dominance, primacy and leadership are behind these actions.
The facts made are not risk-free. An example of Russian aggression against Ukraine shows that what was to be a short and victorious military operation ends in blamage and defeat. Russia failed to outsmart the victim and her allies, nor to revise Ukraine's territorial and systemic position without resorting to an open and bloody war. The tenacity of Russia and Ukraine's defensive determination led to a powerful war party. Its essence boils down to Russia's unforeseeable mobilisation of Ukraine's forces and massive Western aid. What could have been rational and cost-effective in Russia's strategical calculations has taken on an highly costly nature and has erratic consequences. This example shows that the effectiveness of the strategy faits accomplis depends mostly on the circumstances. The deficiency of good discernment and misjudgement of their strategical advantage led to underestimation of the risks and so the drama of the protracted war.
The motives for Russian decision-makers' behaviour are easier to realize erstwhile a broader geostrategic context is taken into account, especially the United States' entry into the large Game, which takes place in the Euro-Asian mass. It's a game of business in which Russia tries to keep its claims of power and hold its remaining influence and powerful responsibility. Despite Russian escalations of threats to Ukraine, the American president has repeatedly declared that the US and NATO do not intend to intervene militarily in Ukraine. In this situation, the Russian decision-makers could have received these declarations as a kind of encouragement to make facts.
Consequence
The longer the war goes on, the more questions arise about its consequences as facts accomplished. Above all, between Russia and Ukraine, both countries but besides societies have been dug a deep gap for decades, and even for centuries, which no reconcilation efforts will be able to remove. Collective memory of the sufferings and humiliations will not only be the basis of Ukrainian identity, but besides a constitutional component of the global strategy for many years.
The problem of facts made concerns not only the massive demolition of Ukraine, but besides the transfer of the population. Many Ukrainians may never return to their country of residence before the war. This phenomenon besides applies to countries where the fresh Ukrainian diaspora has found refuge from conflict. After all, millions of refugees and displaced persons have been spontaneously accepted through facts that have been made, giving them a number of rights that own their own citizens have. No 1 knows the answer to the question whether, after the end of the war, these rights and privileges will be taken from them, or whether it is the beginning of a profound transformation of the social structure of the host state, through the integration of visitors into a multinational society.
Many problems associated with this phenomenon seem to vanish from sight due to the challenges and threats of the ongoing war. However, this may have a negative impact on circumstantial legal solutions, as it is precisely the facts made, inter alia, by sittings, that will have conclusive power. Settlement of Ukrainians in Poland will permanently consequence in the growth of Ukrainian national minority. global law and interior law do not separate the position of settlement from belonging to a national minority. This means that residents or displaced persons will over time appeal for number rights, citing the right to self-determination.
Polish case
Polish citizens have the right to information about the intentions of the Polish government to settle Ukrainians in Poland permanently. Rather, global law advocates restoration status quo ante, which means repatriation of visitors to the country of origin. In many cases there will be apparent deviations from this rule, for example due to mixed marriages and natural acquisition of the right to get Polish citizenship. The Polish labour marketplace absorbs countless human masses, but it happens in a mechanical way, without taking into account the position of integration or assimilation. What happens, for example, in the event of a deep economical crisis, will the Ukrainian number not become a proverbial “scapegoat”, or will its political activation not affect the greater conflict of Poles themselves? So far it seems that immigration policy towards Ukrainians is based on emotions, especially hard-to-understand altruism, separated from awareness and historical knowledge. The phenomenon of irrationalism, which accompanies naive belief that it will someway be, is frightening. Meanwhile, many spontaneous actions of the Polish State can bring more harm than good in the long term.
Poland's migration policy must deal with the inconsistency and dissonance of the open and unconditional reception of refugees from Ukraine and the disgraceful anti-immigrant practices on the Polish-Belarusian border. The instrumental approach to the problem of refugees is contrary primarily to global law, not to mention the principles of humanitarianism and solidarity with all those in need, resulting from conscience and conviction. The right to movement, the change of place of residence is simply a fundamental human right, is simply a condition for the implementation of freedom. So why in Poland did we let specified manipulation of politics and mass media that there was a national unity and a suprapolitical consensus about generosity towards Ukrainians, with simultaneous contempt for the lives of people pushing barbed meshes on the border with Belarus?
The political phenomenon of Poland is the admiration for the “exceptional unanimity of the Polish political class” towards the war in Ukraine. The bidding of Polish politicians, who is more pro-Ukrainian and who is more anti-Russian is of the character of tragic grotesque. It shows how small the actual defence of what is made up of the Polish national interest presently means. No 1 asks how they view extremist national decomposition, the creation of a 2 - nation state. The decision-makers shall make decisions whose effects will be far-reaching and irreversible. 1 of the facts of the war in Ukraine is the constant disregard of society in the settlement of vital matters of systemic importance.
Due to the engagement in the war on the Ukrainian side, Poland yet broke all relations with Russia. Thanks to the United States, she adopted a competitive strategy that made Russia the biggest geopolitical enemy for years. In the sphere of facts, we are so faced with the broadly supported militarisation of the Polish state, the maximisation of expenditure on reinforcements, and the expanding influences of abroad agents, especially at the level of inspiration for rusophobic behaviours.. The military mobilisation of resources and deployment of abroad armed forces in the country lead to Poland's engagement in planet War III to preserve the global leadership of America. Against this background, what is most harmful as a consequence of the engagement in the war in Ukraine, is the habitation of Polish society, that Poland can one more time in past become a field of disastrous battle, having no existential interest in it.
Prof. Stanisław Bielen
Think Poland, No. 45-46 (6-13.11.2022)
