The conflict of Warsaw took place from 13 to 16 August. Piłsudski did not participate in this battle, which I will compose about later. It requires a stigma of Piłsudski's taking the credit for this triumph and supporting its simplification by a propaganda apparatus serving him. The military created the image of Piłsudski – a leader who learned perfectly the difficulties of surviving in trenches and murderous marches, so he could get into the situation of an average soldier. Moreover, he could not be the victorious chief, as Joseph Piłsudski was not a professional soldier, he did not postgraduate from any military college, he was self-taught. For understandable reasons, specified self-education had to be limited, only at low tactical levels. Piłsudski did not know the essence of the work of the General Staff, and so – the content and methods of drafting war plans, especially operational plans, mobilisation plans, transport plans, etc. These problems were in fact abroad to him, contrary to his mentality of improvisation and ad hoc preparation.
On the night of the 5th to 6th August, Generals Rozwadowski and Sosnkowski arrived at the Chief Leader to submit an operational plan to him for approval. After a long lively discussion, the Chief Leader approved General Rozwadowski's plan in the morning of August 6th, thus assuming full responsibility. The order of 8 August (this date is crossed out in ink and replaced by the date of 6 August), bearing number 8388/III, is signed by General Rozwadowski, as chief of staff. It is written on a device and was sent to respective recipients.
On the another hand, the Marshal, most likely surviving in an alternate planet or simply making up his mind, claimed that he had made the fundamental decisions himself, as he wrote, on the night of 5th to 6th August in a lonely area in Belvedere; he consciously referred to the date of "sixth August", as the anniversary of the 1914 march from Kraków's shooting staff company, to the beginning of his war career:
‘In... the fearsome torment I could not manage the most with the nonsense of the presumption for battle, the nonsense of passiveness for the "gross" of my forces gathered in Warsaw (over which)... hangs the evil of the sage, powerlessness and reasoning of cowards. The clear evidence of this was a delegation, begging for peace...
I remembered well, with most of my forces gathered in Warsaw, they came to the capital after... long and constant failures... I could not gain neither assurance in the moral forces of the army and the people of the capital, nor in the assurance of the commanders... The south was in a happier position than the north, and the hard work of combat... The commanders gave a greater warrant of the moral strength of the troops taken from there... However, erstwhile I tried to check, I always and constantly realized that I was incapable to weaken my strength in the south in any larger size.... Everything looked black to me and hopelessly... That is why I stopped in advance to think that the counterattack group... or stronger or weaker, I will command myself.”
However, the Warsaw conflict was not yet fought according to this order. This order was only utilized in the first phase. It was replaced by a fresh order, bearing in the header the date 10 August and the fictional number (to hinder its discovery by enemy intelligence) 10,000 and the date 9 August at the signature of General Rozwadowski. Order No. 10000 was the work of General Rozwadowski and only accepted without change by the Chief Leader for news. It is written entirely – on 12 pages – in ink, by the hand of General Rozwadowski, only in 1 copy and was not prescribed on the device or sent out. It is signed by the General only by the abbreviation “Road”. In addition, it contains 13 signatures under the heading: “They are hereby informed”, in which first place “Chief J. Piłsudski”.
However, a well-known and respected historian, but with sanitational sympathies, Prof. Andrzej Nowak says that “The Chief Leader together with General T. Rozwadowski has developed an order to prepare a decisive anti-Polish attack, which was to come out of the river Wieprz and break the Western Tuchaczewski Front. The main forces of Tuchachevsky were to bind the 5th Army of General W. Sikorski in the north and the 1st Army of General F. Latinik under Warsaw. The strike group was to be led entirely by Piłsudski himself. The Polish strike was scheduled for 16 August".
On 12 August, erstwhile russian troops almost reached Warsaw, Piłsudski had a conversation at the Presidency of the Council of Ministers with Prime Minister Wincenty Witos, with the participation of Deputy Prime Minister Ignacy Daszyński. At this meeting, Piłsudski read the act of his resignation as Chief of State and Chief Commander of the Polish Army, after which he gave it to Prime Minister Witos for announcement at his discretion. Witos was at that time the president of the Council of Ministers and Deputy Chief of State in the State Defence Council established on 1 July 1920. The text of this paper reads as follows:
ACT OF THE FIELD DIMISSION
Belveder 12 VIII 1920.
THE GRAND incorrect PRESIDENT!
Before I went to the front, having considered all the interior and external circumstances, I came to believe that I had a work towards The country is to leave in the hand of the Lord, Mr President, my resignations from the position of the Chief of State and the Chief Commander of the Polish Army.
The reasons and causes that led me to this step are as follows:
1. At 1 of the R.O.P. meetings, I had the honour to say 1 of the most crucial reasons. The situation in which Poland finds itself requires a sense of responsibility, and the average opinion rightly must ask, and it will increasingly ask, that this work is not just a platitude, but a completely real thing. I think I am liable for both the fame and strength of Poland in the erstwhile day and for the powerlessness and humiliation of the present. At least I always feel that work and so the natural consequence for me is to resign. And although R.O.P., erstwhile I raised this matter, expressed full assurance in me and thus authorized me to stay in power, I cannot hide that they stay in me and operate with great, strength the moral motives I expounded before R.O.P. a fewer weeks ago.
2.I was and am a supporter of the war "a outrance" with the Bolsheviks due to the fact that I do not see the absolute warrant that these or another agreements or treaties will be kept by them. So I stand with myself now in constant contradiction, due to the fact that I am forced to make constant concessions in this area, leading, in my opinion, to frequent humiliations for both Poland and especially for me personally.
3. After the likely break of peace negotiations in Minsk, we inactive have an asset in the reserve – the asset of Ententa. The conditions left by her are directed against a state function which I have been fulfilling for almost 2 years. Me and R.O.P. the government or the seym, everyone would have a choice either to leave me in 1 function or to remove me completely. As for me, I choose a second possibility. It is more consistent with dignity, individual and more practical. Leaving me at 1 of the offices reduces my authority and so powerfully undermined and it necessarily leads to the slow demolition of this moral force, which it inactive represents for the fight and for the country. I then take into account my very independent nature and my habit of acting according to my own opinion, which the conditions left by the entent disagree with. Finally, it contradicts the strategy that I have served in Poland since the beginning of my political and social work, which has always been based on the possible independent work on rebuilding the Homeland, due to the fact that it seemed to me only valuable and lasting. Therefore, I am afraid that erstwhile left with frontal functions, and with my character and habits, there may be little and greater friction to the detriment of the country, which is not pleasant to either side, all the same thing would gotta end with my removal.
Finally, the last. He understands [sic! ed.] well that this value which I represent in Poland does not belong to me, but to the Homeland of the whole. Until now, I've managed it as I could myself.
At the minute of writing this letter, I believe that this must cease and that my disposition must pass to the government, which I successfully composed from representatives of all Poland.
That is why I leave you, Mr President, to settle pending the publication of my resignation. I besides leave to the Lord, along with his fellow Members of the Government, the way in which I am to implement my resignation, and I will yet anticipate an order. A government to usage my power in 1 occupation or another. As for the last one, delight do not be embarrassed by the advanced charge I hold or the advanced position I own. I do not want to multiply my individual a large number of people, who do not fall into any system, whether due to whims and individual ambition, or due to the weakness of the Polish character, inclined to make the most unnecessary functions will give individual reasons.
Please accept the President's assurance of advanced respect and respect with which he remains."
In order not to confuse and disturb the hope among the soldiers at this dramatic moment, Witos kept Piłsudski's handwriting a secret. That's how Witos remembered this dramatic conversation:
‘The Chief Chief was very focused and serious, and as I thought, depressed, uncertain, hesitant and very upset... In the conversation, he was highly careful, and erstwhile he touched the current issues he put alternatively sad horoscopes. He claimed to be betting on the last card, having no certainty of winning.”
The Prime Minister himself claimed that Piłsudski was so depressed that he wanted to shoot himself. So in the key days of the conflict of Warsaw Piłsudski was only the commander of 1 of the fronts. The state was liable for the Prime Minister and president of the State Defence Council – Wincenty Witos, and for the course of the war the Chief of General Staff Tadeusz Jordan Rozwadowski. Ziuk left Warsaw late in the evening on 12 August 1920 at 21 p.m. He left Warsaw by car, but not to Puławy on the river Wieprz, to the gathering troops there – only to Małopolska, to Aleksandra Szczerbińska. In addition, General Weygand, recalling a conversation with Pitsudski before his departure to the front, was most likely convinced that he was going to his quarters in Puławy.
Behind Jędrzejewicz:
‘Piłsudski, driving along with Prystor at night to Puławy, put on quite a few road to visit Mrs. Ola and daughters, located at the time under Krakow".
In Bobowa, 147 km away. The full way was about 650 km, and at that time the fastest cars rode on average 31 km/h. He reached Bobowa on 14 August, and reportedly arrived at the front in Puławy the next day, where he did not fight, but came for the baptism of the boy of the Minkiewiczs, as a godfather. Alexander's lover mentioned:
‘When he said goodbye to us before leaving for Puławy, he was tired and gloomy. The burden of large work for the destiny of the country, overwhelming it and tormenting it. At that time I was in the vicinity of Krakow, where I was evacuated with Wanda and Jagoda, who had come to the planet a fewer months earlier. My husband came with Alexander Prystor, said goodbye to the children and to me, as if he were going to die. He was impatient with my absolute certainty that the conflict would end in our victory, and he would be fine. I don't know what to call it: possibly a hunch, possibly an instinct, possibly an intuition, but it was. [...]
And now I had no uncertainty that everything would be okay.
‘The consequence of all war – my husband said to me before the breakup – is uncertain until the end of the war. Everything is in God’s hand.”
Now let's go to the conflict itself. On 12-18 August 1920, the full command of the actions of the Polish army at the decisive minute of the Warsaw conflict remains in the hands of General Tadeusz Rozwadowski. Unfortunately, with this opinion, among current professional historians, only Prof. Lech Wyszczelski agrees. Chief of Staff, Gen. Tadeusz Rozwadowski, not Józef Piłsudski, released on 14 August. I'll call the soldiers for the start of the conflict of Warsaw. He had a strong alternative:
‘Either we break down the Bolshevik chaotic and thwart the russian assassination on the independency of the Homeland and the existence of the Nation, or the fresh yoke and severe misery awaits us all without exception. Mention the knightly traditions of Poland, present all peasants, workers and all the intelligence to fight this to death.
He will mention the eternal slogan “God and Homeland”, and in these days of the close future, we will intensify all our strength to crush the first enemy, which will command our destruction. He has sworn to the demolition of Poland, and he is eager to conquer and rob Warsaw. But we will not give the capital, we will free Poland from them and we will prepare this red horde a organization so that there is nothing left of it.”
General Rozwadowski spent all the time in the conflict over Wisła he was constantly driving around individual sections of the front; among the hail of the bullets he issued arrangements, moved the detachments, managed the attacks of his system: "from the saddle", not from the green table, far behind the front. Green table, that's the staff job, he's been saving it for the night. He maintains contact with Piłsudski (since 14 August), informs about actions on the front, retains courtesies and respect, but proves himself. The decision to issue an order to strike the 5th Army is taken during a gathering with General Joseph Haller and General Maxime Weygand on 13 August 1920. He besides urges Piłsudski to accelerate the impact from the Pig by 1 day, from August 17 to August 16, due to the fact that otherwise Piłsudski might not have taken part in the fight at all. According to the Marshal in his memoirs, on August 16, he started an attack on whom only? Then the Bolsheviks were gone. Clearly, he was completely unaware of what was going on at the front and fought against the proverbial “windmills”. Moreover, Piłsudski delayed the impact from Puławy. At the crucial minute of the clash “Ziuka” was not on the front... erstwhile Piłsudski arrives with his troops at Siedlce on 18 August 1920, the conflict is already settled and the Bolshevik retreat continues. Marshal Piłsudski on his return to Warsaw set fresh operational targets before his armies on the afternoon of 18 August, as if nothing had happened, due to the fact that only fewer knew about his actual participation in the "Warsaw Battle". After the end of the war, Witos sent Piłsudski this, unused for good luck for Poland, to resign. He hid political animosities in his pocket and, among others, is simply a statesman.
Finally, let us give the level to the outstanding General Rozwadowski, who in late April 1926 submitted a letter to General Żeligowski, and here is the most crucial passage:
‘As we all know, at the minute of complete depression and helplessness, in 1920 the Marshal was only decently sustained and supported by me, and that Poland owes me very much to the rescue from the inevitable and everywhere expected defeat. I have been silent for far besides long, while the Marshal has dressed himself up in partially undeserved laurels, but for the sake of maintaining his prestige as head of state I would be most unselfishly and deliberately concealing my decisive function in these final victories, for I wanted and wanted to make to the glory of Homeland the Marshal to become a truly large man to play his part in the past of the State and Nation."
It is simply a key paper – Rozwadowski, as he had never before challenged Piłsudski's function in the conflict and felt that he played the decisive role. In my opinion, this letter most likely contributed decisively to his imprisonment and premature death. Piłsudski, which is obvious, read this letter. He could not let his legend to be destroyed and the hard work of many collaborators to be in vain. During the last gathering of both rivals, just after Rozwadowski was released from prison, Piłsudski, referring to this letter, threw upset: “But the conflict of Warsaw won me”.
Source:
Tomasz Ciołkowski, Józef Piłsudski. Fake Biography”, IInd edition Warsaw 2021
Jędrzej Giertych, “About Piłsudski”, London 1987
Maciej Giertych, “The Piłsudski Myth”, Warsaw 2017
Wacław Jędrzejewicz, The Chronicle of the Life of Józef Piłsudski, London 1977
Andrzej Nowak, “Independent! 1864-1924. How did Poles regain their homeland?”, Kraków 2018
Andrzej Nowak, The Fall of the Evil Empire. 1920”, Kraków 2020
Aleksandra Piłsudska, “Memoirs”, Warsaw 1989
Works., “General Rozwadowski”, Warsaw 2020
Brunon Różycki, “Mite of the Marshal. Legend of J. Piłsudski in the light of the latest research", Częstochowa 2021
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