In anticipation of the sentence. Turkish opposition under pressure

On 15 September, the Ankara court decided to postpone proceedings for the Republican People's organization (CHP) general legislature until 24 October. The top opposition force was afraid about the decision to remove Özgür Özel from his post and reconstruct Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. The CHP procedure itself considers a politically motivated effort to influence the phase by judicial measures.

The decision to postpone does not mean the end of the group's troubles. The intent of the Turkish authorities is to make it a licensed opposition – internally divided, inefficient and incapable to take over. Its neutralisation is intended to enable president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and improvement organization (AKP) to keep the state's controls. Therefore, since the beginning of the year CHP has been under constant force from the politicized justice system, and the government camp has been trying to fuel interior tensions in it. The rulers will most likely proceed to search to remove Özel from his post.

The precedent for a possible decision concerning Özel would be another court order of September 2nd of this year to revoke from the post of head of the Istanbul CHP Özgür Çelik structures. The legislature which elected it was declared invalid due to irregularities and introduced the committee board held by Gürsel Tekin, a erstwhile organization policy related to Kılıçdaroğlu. This step was met with opposition from CHP. On Monday, September 8, her members and supporters made it hard for Tekin and the police assisting him to enter the Istanbul office of the group. Following clashes with the order forces, a convention ban was announced in selected districts of Istanbul, and protests were accompanied by a block of access to social media.

From a non-choice organization to a poll leader...

In fresh years, CHP has become a political threat to ACP and Erdoğan. In 2023, power in the organization lost Kılıçdaroğlu. The politician, headed by her since 2010, led the group during 5 parliamentary campaigns, as well as 2 presidential, local, and referendums. CHP did not win any of these votes, and the biggest success was in 2019 erstwhile its candidates won the local elections in Ankara and Istanbul. Earlier, however, Kılıçdaroğlu had succeeded in redefining the identity of the party. As a result, the CHP – so far seen as a extremist laick, so unobtainable for part of a conservative society – opened up to activists with conventional views. The pass in the group and electorate Kılıçdaroğlu lost erstwhile he lost in May 2023 in the presidential election to Erdoğan. His decision to take off was considered controversial – he made it against the polls that showed that another CHP members had the best chance of winning, especially the mayors of Ankara Mansur Yavaş and Istanbul Ekram İmamoğlu.

This failure sparked solstice in the organization – in November 2023 the chairman's seat was taken over by Özel, supported by İmamoğlu. Under his leadership, the group achieved its top success – in the March 2024 local elections it not only held power in large cities, but besides took over fresh provinces and recorded the first country-wide score (see. Turkey: opposition triumph in local elections). The CHP began to appear consistently at the top of the parliamentary polls, and this trend is besides confirmed by fresh studies – according to the August average it inactive ranks first (31.9%) before the ACP (30.6%). In the presidential polls, İmamoğlu won both Erdoğan and another possible candidates of the ruling party.

The opposition notes were favoured by mediocre social sentiments caused by Turkey's chronic economical problems. Since taking the position of president Özel, he has played them effectively. In many speeches he accused the authorities of mediocre economical governance, claiming that it primarily serves the elites involved, not workers and the mediate class. In doing so, he pointed to the expanding cost of living. In addition, the duo Özel–İmamoğlu upgraded the CHP, basing its action on an in-depth analysis of the electorate, building affirmative messages on social media or direct contact with voters. The advanced activity of this tandem seemed to have taken precedence over the ACP in shaping trends in interior policy.

...and from irritation to the request for neutralization

The unrest of the rulings has already sparked the triumph of İmamoğlu in the local elections in March 2019. The ultimate Election Commission decided to repeat them (in June the CHP candidate increased the advantage over the ACP rival). The power in Istanbul was crucial for a government camp due to the fact that it gave access to immense financial resources that enabled a clienteleist network to be maintained. By taking control of these measures, the opposition could make human resources, and İmamoğlu began to gain popularity as mayor as a consequence of the improvement of public transport and urban social programs (e.g. free nursery, subsidised food and student scholarships). Good governance of the largest city in Turkey besides helped him build his position as a presidential candidate and encouraged citizens to believe that CHP politicians could be effective leaders.

The scale of the CHP triumph in 2024 combined with the persistence of the organization at the head of the polls increased the concern of the rulers. This is evidenced by the fact that from this point on, with the support of politicised services and the judiciary, the process of limiting the authority of CHP in local governments at different levels has begun. 15 mayors belonging to this organization were arrested in the current term, of which 10 were arrested in the districts of Istanbul. A extremist exacerbation occurred in March this year with the removal and arrest of İmamoğlu and his colleagues. This has caused the largest manifestations in over a decade (see Turkey: a wave of protests following the arrest of the Mayor of Istanbul). The CHP tried to harness the energy of the protest, organizing solidarity actions from İmamoğl and boycott of consumers associated with the corporate power. A peculiarly active run began by Özel, under which the party's leadership began demanding accelerated parliamentary elections (it has collected 20 million signatures so far under petition) and convened regular meetings in various parts of the country. To this day, there have been over 50 specified events.

The rulers accuse Özel of inciting society for the usage of interior fighting in the group. ACP-friendly media describe the CHP as busy proposing Turkey to prosecute the peculiar interests of its politicians and argue that the state needs an effective opposition – focused on its problems alternatively than on itself. They push the return of Kılıçdaroğlu to the leader's seat, trying to fuel divisions in the party. At the same time, ACP activists deny allegations of political judicial control, arguing that justice is independent.

An Uncertain Future

In June 2025, a court in Ankara on the basis of reports of irregularities and buying votes began proceedings concerning the CHP general legislature of 2023. They were postponed on 15 September, most likely due to the negative reaction of the markets. On the day of the removal of Çelik, the largest Turkish stock exchange index recorded a decrease of 5.5%. The continuing authoritarian tendencies of ACP governments besides negatively affect the moods of abroad investors. Political shocks could be a threat to the recovery plans of the state economy (see Turbulent stabilization: Turkish economy under Şimşeka).

Another origin is social mobilization, which prompted the appointment of a commission board in the Istanbul office of CHP. The organization will effort to usage it and sustain it to rise the cost of actions aimed at its leader. Although this maneuver has brought immediate benefits to her, she may be unstable in the long term. A peculiar challenge for the plans to keep the electorate in mobilization is that the next presidential and parliamentary elections are not to be held until 2028. This is why CHP takes administrative action in parallel. Her leadership planned an extraordinary national convention for 21 September to resolve possible doubts about the elected leader of organization delegates and, in the event of the appointment of a commissioner, regain control of the group as shortly as possible. On 24 September, a local convention was convened in Istanbul to reinstate Çelik as president of local organization structures.