United States relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries – fresh beginning and its effects

In May of that year, the planet media wrote much about the United States president Donald Trump's journey to the Arabian Peninsula and the contracts signed by the American leader and ruler of the Persian Gulf monarchy. However, most observers ignored the wider context of this trip. This article examines the evolution of the US relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries over the last decade and the reasons for decisions taken during president Trump's first abroad visit in the second term. Today, after a 4th since the visit, we can talk about its first long-term effects.

Background

Since the United States yet broke off isolationism after planet War II, it has drawn its attention to the Arabian Peninsula, which is simply a key region in the modern rivalry of large powers due to its tremendous resources and strategical location. During this period, Washington made an alliance with Saudi Arabia and then with the monarchial neighbours of Saudi Arabia (after these states gained independence). arabian monarchs of the Gulf region were key allies of the United States during the Cold War, their policies in the 1980s. (maintaining low oil prices and financing Afghan partisans) was an crucial origin that importantly contributed to the dissolution of the USSR. The importance of this group of states (since 1981 concentrated in the Gulf Cooperation Council) in American abroad policy has gradually grown, and the key events that led to this were the muslim Revolution in Iran in 1979, the Gulf War in 1990-1991, and the attacks on the planet Trade Center in 2001. Cooperation between the United States and the Gulf Council members was based on 3 main pillars:

• cooperation in the field of military and security,
• import of oil to America,
• providing advanced American technologies to Gulf States.

The parties carry out completely different socio-political models – the United States is simply a secular democratic republic and members of the Gulf Council are muslim monarchs with strong, mostly absolute power of rulers. With specified differences, it is impossible to find a common ground for agreement on values, and the only way to establish cooperation is through a pragmatic approach. The thought of human rights plays a function in the relations of the United States and the Persian Gulf monarchy, but most of the time its importance was minimal and limited to intervention on the most fundamental issues (e.g. erstwhile president Kennedy put force on Saudi Arabia to bring slavery to an end there). There were moments erstwhile conflicting political interests led to serious problems in relations between the United States and the Gulf monarchs (e.g. during the 1973 oil crisis caused by the arabian embargo imposed on the States supporting Israel), but Washington's benefits from close relations with members of the Gulf Council, especially with Saudi Arabia, the leader of Sunni Muslims and the leading OPEC group figure, offset the controversy and disadvantages associated with these relations.

The second decade of the 21st century led to a change in the American public debate on alliances with the monarchs of the Gulf region, peculiarly with Saudi Arabia, which led to increasing criticism of cooperation with countries that were contrary to democratic ideals. 1 origin of criticism of these alliances was the support provided by the Sunni Gulf states to jihadist militants throughout the muslim world. This policy was most characteristic of Saudi Arabia supporting many fundamentalist organizations, besides known for financing the construction of Salafite mosques in Europe. These actions appeared to conflict with Western efforts to fight terrorism. In home politics Saudi Arabia was guided by fluctuatingism, the harshest sect of Islam, inspiring militants of various jihadist forces.

These circumstances may have led to expectations that the coming to power of Prince Mohammed bin Salman would lead to improved relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States. The fresh Crown Prince liquidated Saudi aid to extremist muslim organizations and introduced any liberal reforms, including allowing women to drive and abolish the work to cover women's hair. These changes caused Saudi Arabia to leave Wahhabism in practice. The fresh ruler besides implements the economical improvement plan and makes the country independent of oil exports, the majority of which is included in the state's 2030 imagination strategy. This ambitious plan cannot win without abroad investors and it is simply a large chance for American companies.

However, changes in Saudi Arabia have not led to improved relations between the Kingdom and the American republic. 1 of the chief aims of the Prince's reforms is to empower the ruler by limiting the function of religion in politics, but without undermining the spiritual legitimacy of the ruling dynasty. The authoritarian character of Saudi reforms combined with Riyadh's criticism for the bloody war in Yemen and the assassination of writer Jamal Chaszukji resulted in Joe Biden's electoral promise that "he would treat Saudi Arabia like a pariah". This approach influenced American policy towards Saudi Arabia and the full Gulf region at the beginning of Biden's presidency. Biden was the first American president to put human rights issues among the priorities of his policy towards Saudi Arabia and the full Gulf region. This was part of Biden's idealistic imagination to spread liberal values and democracy as much as possible in the world.

American-Chinese rivalry in the Arabian Peninsula

The American force on Gulf leaders to adopt more Western standards of governance and civilian liberties cannot be besides effective at the turn of the second and 3rd decades of the 21st century. The growth of non-Western powers, specified as China, India and Russia, has led to a situation where countries in conflict with the West can find alternate economical and political partners. Additionally, the West is forced to compete with fresh powers in different geographical regions, and interference in the interior affairs of states makes them unattractive partners for the Global South countries, frequently having systems another than democracy.

Deeper contacts between the People's Republic of China and the arabian Persian Gulf monarchies date back to 1993 erstwhile China ceased to be self-sufficient in oil extraction and began searching for fresh importers of this natural material. The relations between the parties evolved, members of the GCC, like most countries in the world, became importers of inexpensive Chinese products, which were then gradually replaced by more advanced ones. present China is simply a key supplier of modern technologies to the Gulf monarchy, China exports technologies specified as the 5G network and "smart cities". In fresh years China has replaced the US and the EU as the main suppliers of industrial technologies to Saudi Arabia. Between 2022 and 2023 Beijing doubled its exports to Saudi Arabia compared to the pre-pandemic period reaching exports worth $45 billion, while US exports declined from $19 billion in 2015 to $11.5 billion. At the same time, EU exports decreased from $45 billion to $33 billion, which means that in 2023 Chinese exports to Saudi Arabia were larger than EU exports connected to the US. akin trends are observed in the trade relations of another Gulf Council countries.

For them, president Xi Jinping focuses primarily on investments, especially large infrastructure projects specified as port construction. These projects are not isolated, they form part of the Belt and way Initiative. The United States opposes this initiative, as in another regions where Beijing is trying to build a fresh Silk Road. American concerns about the link between China's economical and political presence in the mediate East were reinforced after the United arabian Emirates joined the BRICS Group in 2024 with Egypt and Iran. During this time Saudi Arabia considered a akin move. Strengthening economical cooperation is not the only way to build China's political position in the region. Beijing is already active in various diplomatic initiatives concerning the mediate East – for example, the Chinese mediation has completed as crucial a process as normalising relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Chinese have a reasonably long tradition of military cooperation with the Pakistanis and Persians, in fresh years they have besides become an exporter of arms to Tehran's rivals, e.g. the Saudis, although limited capabilities of the Chinese military manufacture make Beijing's replacement of Washington's main weapon supplier for regional powers unlikely. China's ability to become a major military ally of the mediate East states besides limits China's strategy of not engaging in alliances. Its activity in this field is limited to a network of strategical partnerships already signed with key players in the mediate East, including the Emirates and Saudis.

Russia is in the other position. She built her position in the mediate East mainly by selling arms and military intervention in Syria. After a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the collapse of the Assad dictatorship, these forms of spreading Russian influences are not applied, but Moscow remains a key partner of the GCC states through the OPEC+ group. Baylords are trying to benefit from the chaos caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war. They aid Russia bypass Western sanctions by selling Russian products and energy natural materials as its own (with profit for itself). Dubai became a safe space for pro-Cremlian oligarchs moving from the West after sanctions were imposed against them. However, the U.S.'s top frustration was caused by the decision of the KAS to reduce oil extraction alternatively of expanding it in order to lower prices and reduce Russian income. This was possibly Biden's biggest abroad policy failure. Following Russian aggression against Ukraine, the erstwhile U.S. president decided to change abroad policy to a more realistic 1 and lead to agreements against Russia with the authoritarian regimes he had previously criticised, but his offer to reconstruct the old close cooperation of the KAS and the US was rejected. Most likely this was due to Mohammed bin Salman's deficiency of assurance in Joe Biden. This situation is simply a lesson for all Western leaders – they cannot be besides critical of authoritarian leaders (especially long-term allies) due to the fact that they may request their aid in the future.

Since Obama's presidency, the United States has been implementing a strategy of "return to Asia". However, American-Chinese rivalry is carried out worldwide, so a hypothetical drastic simplification of American presence in regions specified as the mediate East would lead to a strengthening of position China there and all over the world. In the current realms of rivalry, Persian Gulf monarchs adopt a pragmatic approach – they choose a power that offers them better technologies and better conditions of cooperation, not allowing themselves to dominate 1 power unless necessary.

Trump's May visit and its effects

According to earlier parts of the article, president Trump did not have an easy task trying to reconstruct friendly relations with Gulf partners. The erstwhile cooperation between the 2 parties weakened Biden's unrealistic policy, the Gulf states had many alternate options in abroad policy, and the Iranian-Saudi standardisation distanced them any of the threats. In order to reconstruct closer cooperation with the Gulf monarchs, Trump had to offer them a truly favourable terms of cooperation. Going to that region for the first abroad tour was a good idea, due to the fact that if previously it was besides Trump's first visit in his first term, he had to go there again on the first tour to show that the importance of these countries for him was not diminishing. The Gulf expedition was a success of the American president. The main effects of the visit were:

• a commitment from Saudi Arabia to invest $600 billion in the United States, worth $243.5 billion in Qatar's investment plans and a $200 billion investment plan;
• sales of 18,000 AI chips to Humain;
• the construction of the largest U.S.-wide AI campus in the UAE;
• selling US weapons to Saudi Arabia worth $122 billion;
• an agreement with Qatar to strengthen military cooperation and sale to that country advanced American weapons, i.e. MQ-9B Reaper drones;
• the announcement of the abolition of US sanctions against Syria.

W Riyadh Trump gave a controversial speech, criticising the erstwhile American administrations for interventionist politics, in fact he even stated that the mediate East countries do not request democracy due to the fact that they better address their problems in a different way. It was rather an unprecedented declaration by the American leader, but needed to compete with China, 1 of the main promoted rules being non-interference in the interior affairs of another states. Trump utilized existing opportunities to strengthen relations with Gulf monarchs, including the request for modern technologies by Council members to upgrade the army and implement ambitious improvement plans. The agreements may lead to the return of the US to the position of the first economical partner of the arabian Gulf monarchy, although Trump's customs policy may complicate the intensification of trade.

Many decisions taken during the meetings of the US delegation with the Gulf States were just announcements and it is besides early to find to what degree they were implemented. For now, we can conclude that Gulf leaders have not taken action contrary to the spirit of the agreements, while maintaining existing ties with rivals of the United States. With the fresh generation of ambitious Persian Gulf rulers, there is no return to the past in the relations between the US and the Persian Gulf, erstwhile America had a considerable monopoly on cooperation with the countries of the region and was a dominant force there. Later developments in the mediate East have besides shown shortcomings in cooperation with the United States - they could aid defend against Iran, but besides against their will to drag oil monarchs into the war with Iran. However, common cooperation has endured many difficulties in common relations and is likely to last in the future.

Summary

Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United arabian Emirates are long-standing allies of the United States. The nature of these alliances has evolved over the years, present the US is simply a key but not the only crucial partner of the Gulf Cooperation Council states among the large powers. The cooperation lasted so long due to the strategical location of the Arabian Peninsula, the immense oil resources and the request of local states for defence cooperation. Due to the importance of these countries, most of the time Washington did small to improve democratic standards in the Gulf Council states. This changed during Biden's presidency and led to a crisis in common relations. president Trump is presently pursuing a completely different, strictly realistic policy towards Gulf Cooperation Council members. This change strengthened cooperation, but it is inactive besides early to feature in item the fresh phase of America's relation with the Gulf.

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