The last year showed that the European Union has set itself on expanding independency and distance in relations with the People's Republic of China. Throughout the year, we could see events that were of a kind inflamed in bilateral relations. Nevertheless, the core of the escalation of tensions was the passing and final adoption of countervailing duties on Chinese electrical vehicles. electric vehicle, EV). It was around this issue that the full play was played, whose phase was the European automotive market, and the main actors – Brussels and Beijing. However, this does not mean that no another disputed issues specified as Russia's notorious support by the PRC in its harassing war against Ukraine, spy scandals in Europe or anti-subsidy investigations against goods from the PRC occurred over 2024. All these events could be read monthly in the "EU-China Events Review" of the fresh Europe Institute.
Evolution of the EU's perception of China
The fact is that the European Union has not developed its relations with the People's Republic of China since yesterday, and it is understandable that the European bloc approach to the Asian power has gradually evolved with the passing years. A common opinion among researchers and commentators is that at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries the European Union treated China as a "opportunity" in the sense of primarily economic. This active your accession to the planet Trade Organisation (WTO) structure on 11 December 2001[1]. The EU thus saw China's accession to the WTO as an chance to "extend the global trading strategy while liberalising trade and investment", as Alicia García-Herrero notes[2]. Already 2 years later, on 30 October 2003, EU-China relations moved to the level of the strategical partnership that could have taken place, as both sides had convergent objectives and priorities at the time (satellite technology, space cooperation, trade improvement and euro-dollar empowerment). Thus, EU decision-makers were convinced that by expanding economical cooperation and dependence, Europe would be able to influence China politically, which means that it will steer Beijing towards the western model of political and economical and social development. As it turned out, these were false hopes, and even fresh events in China show that this country is moving towards deeper authoritarianism than it was in the beginning of this century.[3]. Beijing, on the another hand, was expected to have a better and strategical relation with the EU in the future to be the basis for combating the dominant position of the United States in global global governance, in line with the thought of multilateralism, which China mentions on many occasions[4].
In subsequent years, the Union has published strategy papers relating to stricte to a relation with China. These papers include the 2007 Cooperation strategy with China. At the time, the paper stated that "The European Union has an economical and political interest in supporting China's sustainable development", marking China's increasing power in the world[5]. The next example is the strategical Agenda for EU-China 2020 cooperation from 2013. In this document, the European Union points out that both it and China are crucial actors in a multipolar world, and that they "share work for promoting peace, prosperity and sustainable improvement for the benefit of all". They so agree on the continuation and strengthening of the strategical partnership in common benefit, stressing that this cooperation is to be based on "the principles of equality, respect and trust"[6].
A fewer years later, in 2016, the European Commission, together with the European Parliament, issued a joint communication entitled "Elements for a fresh EU strategy towards China". The most crucial recommendations of this Communication include, for example, statements that EU-China relations are based on common political and economical benefits, or that EU interest in contacts with the PRC should be based on practicality and pragmatism and should not conflict with its interests. What is more interesting, at the time, the Union expected China to "accept work in line with the benefits it derives from the principles of global order", and that Brussels policy should have close relations with another European Union partners – this is primarily the United States.[7]. It follows from this paper that China's perception was beginning to change and that the Union was increasingly little and little looking at the mediate State as an "opportunity", which was mainly linked to China's tremendous improvement and the increase in its importance in the global global system.
In this way you can easy decision to the current – yet – strategy. The word "yet" came here for a reason, but about it in a moment. In 2019, the last strategy paper on EU policy towards China was released. EU-China: A strategical perspective, due to the fact that that is what it is called, brings its kind novum in the Brussels perception of Beijing. Namely, due to the increasing awareness of the expanding power of the PRC, and thus its parallel increasing ambition on a global scale, the Union has set itself on a three-dimensional perception of China.
For the EU, China is at 3 levels: tier 1 – China is simply a "negotiating partner" with which to find a "balance of interest"; tier 2 – China is simply a "economic competitor" with the nonsubjective of technological dominance; tier 3 – China as a "system rival" which presents alternate to the Western "management models".
As can be seen in this strategy, this situation requires a "flexible and pragmatic EU-wide approach to defend fundamental interests and values"[8].
2019 strategy collapse
This three-dimensional perception of China began to decline with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022. Russia's oppressive war has disrupted not only European safety architecture, but besides relations between Brussels and Beijing. Reason? Chinese pro-Russian ‘neutrality’. China did not openly side with Russia in this conflict, choosing the way of neutrality, as many countries, which did not fall within the widely understood West and its allies. But neutrality in the Chinese edition is simply a pastiche of this kind of approach, as Beijing and Moscow have their asymmetrical alliance[9] They proceed to deepen, which has been peculiarly visible since 2022, as president Xi Jinping said about the sustainability of the Chinese-Russian friendship, which he said at the BRICS summit of 2024: “The planet has now been undergoing changes not seen for a 100 years, the global situation is intertwined with chaos [...] But I firmly believe that the relationship between China and Russia will last for generations, and the work of large countries towards their citizens will not change.”[10].
Therefore, it should not be abused to say that the minute of the outbreak of the war in Ukraine from the position of the EU-PRC relation can be placed on the timeline as a turning point in the current strategical thinking, since the aforementioned pro-Russian neutrality of China has become the basis for the erosion of bilateral relations. Moreover, this situation shows that between the Union and China there is an ever-increasing and thicker wall of conflict of interest, which politicians and 1 organization are trying to mark with words contrary to reality. And the conflict of interest in this case is manifested in Europe's (most) and Russia's (unofficial) side of Ukraine. This leads to deepening blockage in the global system: the democratic and liberal West and the autocratic and anti-Western East. Paradoxically, Beijing is opposed to specified a distribution of force on the global stage, constantly raising the request to decision distant from the cold war and block mentality[11].
In addition to geopolitical disparities between the EU and China, there are besides differences at economical level. The European Union seeks to become independent of external sources as it has already erstwhile fallen into a trap of energy dependence on Russia, which has triggered an energy crisis in European countries[12], and does not want a akin situation to happen in another sector. The European Union has so taken steps to halt the crisis in the economical and/or technological area before it occurs. We're talking strategy here. deriskingto reduce the hazard of dependence. This concept can be understood in many ways, especially since the exact definition of this concept has not yet been coined. Andrea Brinza, Una Aleksandra Berzin-Cerenkova, Philippe Le Corre, John Seaman, Richard Turcsanyi and Stefan Vladisavljev attempted to make specified a definition. They stated that the word refers to "diversification of the EU's economical links and the pursuit of strategical autonomy by building Europe's possible and capacity to act as a geopolitical entity"[13]. Thus, according to the authors in direct mention to the People's Republic of China, this is “the management of risks arising from economical and technological cooperation with China”[14]. Moreover, it should be added that this is simply a milder form decoupling, which means the full economical cut-off of 1 country from another. This approach is notable in any areas in American-Chinese relations, although the US administration determines decoubling negative phenomenon[15].
Policy, concept or strategy (as naming is not consistent in this case too) can be defined not without reason as the “child” of the European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen. It was in March 2023 that the Mercator Institute for China Studies and the European Policy Centre Von der Leyen presented this concept. It considered that "detaching from China is neither feasible nor in the interests of Europe" and that Brussels's relations with Beijing itself "are neither black nor white", suggesting the complexity of bilateral relations[16]. And for this reason, implementation derisking to be more sensible and more beneficial to the European Union.
In June of the same year, the European Commission stated in 1 of its recommendations to China: "The European Union will proceed to reduce critical dependence and vulnerability, including in its supply chains, and will reduce risks and diversify where essential and appropriate"[17].
Strength derisking best illustrates the EU- PRC trade review for the years 2013-2023[18]. It can be read that the year 2022 for the last decade became a highest year, but at the same time a minute of fast decline in 2023. From 2013 to 2022 the value of trade has gradually increased, with more imports from China than exports to China, and the trade balance has thus grown to the detriment of the EU. The decline in the value of Chinese imports into the EU from EUR 627.3 to EUR 514.4 billion in 2023 can be interpreted as an expression of deteriorating relations due to the divergence in the knowing of the war in Ukraine and the general departure of interests from a geopolitical perspective. Moreover, it can show this (because there are many more variables in this case) policy effectiveness derisking: the decrease in the value of Chinese imports and thus the trade balance allows little dependence in the EU economy afraid and opens up opportunities for trade with another countries, i.e. diversification of sources.
Thus, it can be predicted that the trend of 2023 will be maintained in the current year in a more or little akin form. But on the another hand, China reports that in 2024, despite wide economical tensions, trade between the 2 parties increased by 1.6% (increase in Chinese exports and decrease in EU imports)[19]. Therefore, an appropriate amendment must be adopted to both the above trend and the effectiveness itself. derisking in the following years.
Inflammatory points
But by observing stricte The last year, it is easy to separate the points of inflammation that heated tensions between the European Union and the People's Republic of China. Without looking into the details, a fewer of the most crucial ones should be presented, which are more broadly characterised by the monthly "Review of EU-China Events".
- China electrical cars
A dispute around Chinese electrical cars should be considered the most crucial of specified points. On October 4, 2023, the European Commission's investigation began, which accused Beijing of subsidizing its electrical vehicles, thereby distorting equal competition on the European market[20]. The investigation resulted in the imposition of provisional duties on Chinese electrical vehicles in early July 2024[21]. On 4 October 2024, the European Union's countries accept the final proposal of the level of tariffs for EV from China.
The final value of the countervailing duties as shortly as they enter into force is as follows. 3 Chinese companies were isolated and countervailing duties were imposed on them, according to the European Commission: BYD – 17%, Geely – 18.8% and SAIC – 35.3%. another companies that have expressed their willingness to cooperate with the Commission will be subject to a tariff of 20.7%. In turn, those that did not cooperate in this way gotta number for duties that amount to 35.3%, as with SAIC. In addition, the US Tesla brand will be charged a 7.8% work following an individual examination supported by a reasoned request[22].
At this time, on all occasion, the Chinese side reacted retaliatoryly, threatening and actually starting an investigation and imposing duties on goods from the European Union (brands[23], pork[24], dairy[25]), however, which are successively contested by the EU (for example with respect to Chinese tariffs on European brandy[26]). erstwhile assessing the European Commission's actions, it is impossible to disagree with Justyna Szczudlik from the Polish Institute of global Affairs. Firstly, it notes that this has been done “against lobbying and pressure”. Secondly, it was a breakthrough decision due to the fact that ‘the decision on Chinese electricians is offensive due to the fact that it hits production and exports in China’ and thus the Union is able to defend the indigenous manufacture of emission-free vehicles, which has not been achieved more than a decade ago in the photovoltaic panels industry.[27].
- New EU investigations and tightening up
Other investigations and tightenings implemented by the European Union in relation to China are besides linked to the issue of duties on Chinese EV. From January to December 2024, fresh cases could frequently be heard in different areas. any of them are worth mentioning here:
- Investigation of Chinese PV in Romania[28];
- Investigation of Chinese wind turbine suppliers[29];
- investigation into trade in Chinese steel sheet[30];
- tightening the provisions on hydrogen subsidies following Chinese concerns[31];
- calling on this guy to comply with EU consumer protection rules[32].
Subsequent investigations by the European Union are an effort to defend its own marketplace and home businesses from China's state-supported companies, which thereby undermine equal opportunities and fair competition in the European market. The industries in this case, as you can see, are of small importance, but it is crucial to be aware that to a large degree they concern above all advanced technology, which at present is the key to winning the technological race between the top powers. Therefore, the Union cannot afford to lag behind, and despite the fact that anti-subsidy investigations may sometimes appear to be a purely political movement, the economical interests of the EU frequently support them.
- First Chinese companies sanctioned for helping Russia in the war
The European Union, on 21 February 2024, implemented the 13th package of sanctions against Russia and entities that aid the Russian Federation circumvent these sanctions. This package prohibits nearly 200 entities and persons charged with assisting Moscow in the acquisition of weapons or participation in kidnapping of Ukrainian children. For the first time, restrictions were imposed on Chinese companies, which was expected to constitute a precedent on this issue. Thus, 3 companies from mainland China – Guangzhou Ausay Technology Co Limited, Shenzhen Biguang Trading Co Limited and Yilufa Electronics Limited – and 1 from Hong Kong – RG Solutions Limited – were covered by this package of sanctions[33].
On 16 December last year, the Council of the European Union officially announced the adoption of another package of sanctions against entities and persons who have been proven to support Russia in its harassing war in Ukraine. erstwhile again, these measures have affected China. In a more than 40-page EU Council Decision, published in the authoritative diary of the European Union, 7 items can be found that mention to representatives of the People's Republic of China, i.e. six companies (Shijiazhuang Hanqiang Technology Co., Juhang Aviation Technology Shenzhen Co. Limited, Redlepus TSK Vector Industrial (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd., Xiamen Limbach Aviation Engine Co., Ltd., Asia Pacific Links Ltd., ARCLM global Trading Co., Ltd.) and 1 private individual (Li Xiaocui)[34].
It is worth noting that the Council of the European Union "for the first time imposes full sanctions (travel ban, asset freeze, ban on economical resources) on various Chinese actors supplying drone components and microelectronic components for the Russian aggression war against Ukraine"[35] – specified words can be read from the EU communication. It is right in this case to fishy that in the future, further packages of sanctions will again affect Chinese actors and people.
- Taiwan
Taiwan is simply a delicate point for the People's Republic of China, which carefully ensures that no of the countries having authoritative diplomatic relations with China deepen their relations with Taiwan or, all the more so, would legitimize its sovereignty internationally, as Beijing believes that the island is simply a "rebellied province" which they believe will return to its parent sooner or later.
Lithuania and the Czech Republic are the countries of the EU which have come to the top degree to question this position. Vilnius' relation with Beijing began to decline from 2021 erstwhile Lithuania announced its exit from the 17+1 format[36] and the desire to establish a trade representation in Taiwan[37]. Since then, tensions between the 2 parties have gradually increased, resulting, inter alia, in China's lower bilateral relations[38].
However, returning to last year, a noteworthy event between Lithuania and China was the expulsion of 3 Chinese embassy workers in Lithuania and their designation as personae non gratae[39]. China considered this decision to be a ‘senseless and provocative situation’[40]. However, the statements of the fresh Lithuanian authorities propose to find a solution to this ongoing deadlock in Vilnius-Pekin relations, but – as you can realize from the statements of the fresh Lithuanian Prime Minister Gintautas Paluckas – while there is no “demeanor, kneeling and begging for anything”[41].
As far as the Czech Republic is concerned, there was an increase in tension with the change of the Czech President. Selected in 2023, Petr Pavel held a telephone conversation with the then ruling Taiwanese Tsai Ing-wen, becoming the first European leader to make specified a move[42]. And, of course, this decision did not escape Beijing's attention, which powerfully condemned it, citing the rule of "one China"[43].
In October 2024, Tsai made her journey across Europe, during which she visited the Czech capital. She was a associate of the 28th global Conference of the Forum 2000, where she gave her speech on the threats to modern democracy from authoritarian regimes. However, there was no authoritative exchange between her and the incumbent Czech President. According to the media, Pavel only welcomed her erstwhile she arrived at the conference[44].
Another figure from Taiwan who went on a European tour was Hsiao Bi-khim last March. Hsiao, the current vice president of Taiwan, stopped in the Czech Republic[45], Lithuania[46]and besides in Poland[47] and the European Parliament[48], where she spoke to various national officials and then vice-president of the European Parliament, Othmar Karas.
The issue of Taiwan was besides addressed by the European Union itself and by the president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. On 13 January 2024, the European Union issued a message in which, as stated above, it "welcomed the elections" in Taiwan and congratulated Taiwanese voters in peculiar on democratic success, not mentioning in this short note on the website of the European economical and Trade Office in Taiwan not erstwhile of the nature of Taiwanese elections, nor the names of the winners[49].
In July last year, however, he was re-elected Von der Leyen in his 30-page manifesto entitled ‘Choice of Europe’. Europe’s Choice) raised the flagship issues for the European Union, which besides mentioned China. The references to Beijing were first to policies derisking and further decoupling the European economy from China and, secondly, Taiwan. Von der Leyen announced that the European Union and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region must take joint steps to "stop China from unilateral change status quo by military means, in peculiar Taiwan’[50]. This approach clearly indicates that its second word will proceed to keep an assertive and conflicting course in relations with China.
- Spy affairs
The last point of inflammation worth mentioning is spy scandals, which erupted in 2024. The largest number of them took place in Germany. The loudest spy scandal of April 23 afraid the assistant politician German alternate for Germany and the newly-baked Euro MP for this organization – Maximilian Krah. Jian G. was detained by the German services on charges of providing information on discussions in EU legislative structures to Chinese intelligence[51].
On the another hand, 3 German nationals had been arrested a day earlier due to suspicions of spying on the People's Republic of China. The detainees were to supply Chinese secret services with information on state-of-the-art engine parts utilized in marine vessels.[52].
Last November, the German national prosecutors reported another case of espionage to the PRC. This time a United States citizen Martin D was accused of doing so. The suspect was to offer his "services" to the Chinese secret services, which were to supply delicate military information relating to the United States[53].
In December, a Chinese citizen was detained, who was to take unauthorized photographs at the naval base. An investigation of suspected presentation of military facilities has been initiated against the detained Chinese in a way that threatens safety and is to be in custody until now[54].
With respect to another cases of espionage in the countries of the Union, the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands announced in early February 2024 that China had led cyber spy actions against Dutch military structures, during which Chinese hackers, supported by the state, gained access to the Netherlands military network[55]. In early April, the Swedish authorities issued an order for Chinese journalists to be expelled from the country, which would constitute a “serious safety threat”[56]. On the another hand, Czech intelligence in September warned that Chinese services recruit lecturers and academics from Europe to spy on Beijing through the social networking network LinkedIn[57].
Pilgrimage and tour
The year 2024 besides abounded in diplomatic travel by representatives of the European Union to China and the another way around. However, the difference in the frequency of visits by Europeans to Beijing and Chinese in European capitals cannot be overlooked. First of all, we are talking about the disparity of the Head of State to Europe, due to the fact that last year he had only 1 tour of the Old Continent, visiting France, Serbia (which is not an EU country) and Hungary in May. As Zoltan Feher rightly points out, "the Xi mission was to sow divisions in Europe and mobilise countries that could aid reverse the continent's fresh quest to reduce risks to China"[58]. Did he succeed? In a sense, both both neither and not due to the fact that the division in the European Union actually highlighted the associate States' vote on the introduction of definitive duties on Chinese electrical cars, but not so much so as not to introduce them[59].
Other representatives of the Chinese establishment in Europe have frequently been heard. For example, the Prime Minister of the PRC Li Qianga, who visited Ireland in January 2024[60], China's peculiar Envoy for Eurasia Li Hui, who held his second expedition to Europe in March (stopped in Moscow, Brussels, Warsaw, Kiev, Berlin and Paris)[61], Chinese abroad Minister Wang Yi, who participated in the Munich safety Conference in February[62], or Chinese Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao, who visited Europe respective times (e.g. in September), mainly in order to ease tensions over the introduction of duties on Chinese electricity[63].
European leaders (as well as another ministers and delegates specified as Annalena Baebock[64] Or Stephane Sejourne[65]), in turn, they chose Beijing much more frequently as a destination, comparing them with president Xi.
The reasons for these "pilgrimages" to China were primarily the issue of influencing China in connection with the war in Ukraine and bilateral matters, mainly economical ones.
All the individual visits of the leaders of the European countries to China have been more broadly characterised by the "Review of the EU-China Events", although any of them are worth marking here.
The visit of erstwhile Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte in March is 1 specified example. The main subject of talks between the leaders was the problematic issue of advanced microchip technology and the Dutch company ASML[66]. Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited Beijing in April with a considerable entourage in the German business class. The discussion took place primarily around the then planned European tariffs on Chinese EV and the position of German automotive brands on the Chinese market[67]. The July journey of Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban to Beijing besides echoed (on the way he stopped in Kiev and Moscow)[68]. alleged "peace Mission" Orbana was straight criticized by European partners as a pro-Russian prank[69]. In the same month, the Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni besides held her pilgrimage to Beijing, who in 2024 sought a kind of “reset” in relations with the Chinese[70]. The journey of Italian president Sergio Mattarelli last November was besides linked to this.[71]. Going back a small bit, in September the capital of China was visited by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, whose country was placed on a Chinese mark as part of retaliatory duties on European pork, and Sanchez himself was trying to alleviate the expanding tensions[72].
Having noted this trend, it can be concluded that the result of these trips has not been beneficial to the European Union, and that the Chinese leader himself has gained more. The reason for this message is prosaic: Xi Jinping's political position has been reinforced due to the fact that he was not the 1 who came halfway across the planet to Europe, but Europe to him. Like an emperor, he received messengers, and he was not accepted. This showed that the European countries have a greater interest in signing to the Chinese than China itself has in Europeans. This, of course, argues with the policy of the European Union, which is trying to make itself independent, but it must be remembered that the EU is simply a block of sovereign states, each with its own objectives and interests, sometimes not necessarily coincident with the EU line.
Perspectives for further improvement of relations
Considering the prospects of further relations between Brussels and Beijing, darker than brighter clouds are painted. The last year showed that the Union is determined to prosecute and defend its own interests and, despite organization difficulties, does not intend to step out of the way. Especially as the new/old European Commission under the leadership of Ursula von der Leyen seems to be even more geared towards the collision course than has been the case in fresh years.
Speaking of the fresh European Commission, it is crucial to note that president Von der Leyen has selected at least 4 personalities to it, which express a more militant attitude in relations with China. In 1 place, he collected this for the Central European Institute of Asian Studies Unai Gómez-Hernández, listing Kaja Kallas, Maroš Šefčovič, Teresa Ribera and Henna Virkkunen, who stressed the importance of developing an appropriate EU strategy for the People's Republic of China during their hearings in the European Commission.[73].
However, the most interesting figure in this ranking seems to be the erstwhile Prime Minister of Estonia and the candidate for head of NATO Kaja Kallas. Her appointment on the head of EU diplomacy was a clever procedure by Von der Leyen, as she is known for her "jaster-tooth" attitude towards the Kremlin, she will besides be successful – in Von der Leyen's view – as the "sharks" of the fresh European Commission, this time not only directed against Russia but besides China. In her hearing, she said: “Subjects specified as Russia, Iran, North Korea and partially China are seeking to arm the interdependence and exploit the openness of our societies against us. We must be prepared for this." Furthermore, Kallas warned the European Parliament that "Russia, Iran, North Korea and – more discreetly – China wanted to change the principle-based order of the world". It explicitly said that China is becoming little and little a partner and increasingly a competitor and rival, and that European dependence on China in certain sectors is simply a ‘real weakness’[74].
There is besides a request for a fresh EU strategy towards China, as China's three-dimensional perception of China is increasingly different from reality and sense since 2019. In October 2024, Alicia García-Herrero and Abigail Vasselier made a call for the request to update the current strategy, which can be summarised under the heading "coexistence while reducing risks through partnerships"[75]. The above authors list 3 main fields on which to focus erstwhile creating specified a strategy.
Firstly, coherence and coordination in implementing the strategy towards China. The EU needs overall coherence and coordination in its policies, but this is peculiarly crucial in the case of cooperation with the Chinese government, which represents a single front against the 27 divergent national interests of the associate States of the Union. In a akin speech in December, the fresh Minister of Economy and improvement of Lithuania Lukas Savickas spoke. He stated that Lithuania had acted alone over fresh years in the dispute with China, and that a better and more effective policy model is "to act together with the EU and another strategical partners and to keep a common position with them"[76].
Secondly, further focus on economical security. Given that cooperation between the EU and China is increasingly failing and that there is no agreement between the parties, much more needs to be done to make and implement the EU's economical safety strategy, which will defend both the European marketplace and the European companies from being dominated and marginalised. This is reflected in fresh recommendations from the European Commission to the associate States to check the investments of their companies located outside the EU, especially in advanced technology[77].
And thirdly, there is simply a request for greater reliance on partnerships. A united Europe needs partners for many reasons. 1 of these is that fresh and existing partners in the EU can aid to mitigate the costs needed to shift from the hazard of dependence on the Chinese economy. On the another hand, the improvement of partnerships with another countries can be a valuable exchange of experience on how to coexist with China. The United States continues to stay and will stay the most crucial partner and ally for the European Union, but due to the fresh U.S. presidential elections and Donald Trump's victory, uncertainty grows among European leaders and decision-makers (not all) as to whether the U.S. will proceed to be actively involved, as has been the case so far, in relations with the EU. And whether relations with Washington during the new/old Trump period will lose overly affirmative character (the threat of imposing duties on the Union)[78].
The question is besides open erstwhile the fresh strategy will see the light of day. This could be suspected either before the EU-China Summit, which last year did not happen and disrupted the yearly cyclicality, but is in the planning phase for the year now, or after the summit as a consequence of its findings. The Brussels summit was informed by the president of the European Council, Mr Costa, after a telephone conversation with Mr Xi[79]. After the event itself, nothing peculiar or groundbreaking is to be expected. It is very likely that the character of the last summit of 2023 will be maintained, erstwhile it was possible to observe the spectacle of divergence and different perceptions[80].
To conclude, the European Union is fighting for its position in global governance. The collision course of the block and the Von der Leyen Commission can be read in the category of effort to break the EU out of geopolitical deadlock. In order for the Union to be a genuine pole of global governance, it must take steps specified as the fight for its own market. It is clear that the EU is trying to break through the American-Chinese wall of dominance and form a 3rd force in the system, which is much more hard due to the fact that the Union is not a state like the US or China, but a block of sovereign states with their own interests.
Nevertheless, in order for the European Union to become another force of real importance, it needs cohesion and interior solidarity. China has a skillful interior conflict in the EU by making bilateral agreements with individual countries specified as Hungary[81] or Slovakia[82], as well as in a sense Germany, more specifically German automotive business[83]. China will proceed to gnaw at EU cohesion, and the Commission is facing a hard challenge to resist. And all of this yet confirms the thesis that China is already little and little a partner for Brussels and more and more a competitor and a rival.
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