Ukrainian forces attacked the Russian naval base in Noworosyjsk on 9 September. The General Staff of Ukraine reported the hit of 3 ships and oil tanks a day later. If the scale of the harm is confirmed, Russia will lose part of the Black Sea Fleet's potential, which is utilized for military force on Ukraine and the full region.
Three units on the hit list
According to the announcement of the General Staff of Ukraine, the aim of the impact carried out on 9 September was the facilities of the Russian naval base in Noworosyjsk. The Ukrainian side reported that at least 3 units were hit: a tiny trawler Żelesniakow, a frigate Admiral Essen and a large landing ship of task 11711 Piotr Morgunov. The attack was besides intended to cover oil-fuel tanks.
This is the balance sheet presented by Kiev for now. No independent, complete method assessment of the harm to all 3 ships has been published. This caution is essential due to the fact that in war conditions, information is part of the fight. This does not change the fact that the choice of targets itself shows a consistent effort to weaken the Russian maritime base.
New Russian under expanding pressure
New Russian is 1 of the key points of Russian military presence on the Black Sea. The impact on ships, port infrastructure and fuel supplies makes sense of operation: it restricts the opponent's ability to operate, forces him to costlyly defend the back and deprives him of his freedom in a place to be a safe base.
This is not an isolated episode. In August, the attack in Novorossyjsk was aimed, among others, at the frigate Admiral Makarov.. The repeatability of specified operations is more crucial to Moscow than a single explosion. Each alarm engages defence, complicates logistics, and undermines the belief that the Russian fleet can operate with impunity from its own bases.
Admiral Essen and the Black Sea rate
The most crucial of these units is the frigate Admiral Essen. The ship is simply a carrier of Calibr maneuvering missiles, which Russia uses in the war against Ukraine. The hit of specified a unit is so straight military, even if the actual degree of harm inactive needs confirmation. Earlier attacks on Russian frigates showed how crucial the fight for their protection became.
Piotr Morgunov has another function as a large landing ship, and Żelezniakow is liable for antimine tasks. The impact on individuals with different roles indicates an effort to violate respective elements of the Russian maritime strategy simultaneously. The final balance can only be assessed erstwhile reliable data on the scale of repairs and the time erstwhile ships are disengaged.
Poland needs a cool realism
For Poland, the safety of the full east flank of NATO is at stake. It is in our interest to weaken the Russian ability to conduct rocket strikes and naval operations, due to the fact that Russia remains a country conducting an aggressive war just beyond the Polish border. This does not mean agreeing to a non-reflexive policy or giving up their own interests towards Kiev. It means a sober designation of the main threat.
Poland should observe the effectiveness of fresh ways of fighting, make its own defence of ports and critical infrastructure and strengthen exploratory capabilities. War in the Black Sea proves that costly ships and heavy protected bases are not beyond the scope of precise strikes. Sovereignty present requires its own strength, resilient infrastructure, and an army capable of learning from others' experiences.
Source: Polsat News
Source: Polsat News
