The Ukrainians are giving Russia painful blows today. It's naive to believe that this is happening without American cognition and support

Nothing fresh – 1 could comment by remembering many akin situations erstwhile Moscow was saying "immeasurable red lines". I would like this time to be ignored – and for America to actually hand over to the Ukrainians of Tomahawk. But I gotta admit, I don't believe that much. In my opinion, Washington is bluffing (the question is whether Kiev is besides open, or whether Ukrainians are counting on rockets). erstwhile releasing controlled leaks about talks about handing over the Tomahawks, the US wants to force Russia to return to the negotiating table. The message is simple: “or you will start talking to Ukraine, or your situation will become drastically worse.” What will the White home do erstwhile the Kremlin says “I check!”? I don't know, but I already see a major change in the way Americans approach the Russians.

Before I make this idea, let us look at the effects of the Ukrainian air campaign, aimed at the Russian petrochemical infrastructure. erstwhile I compose these words (on the afternoon of 6 October) there are inactive fuel terminal tanks burning in occupied Theodosia in Crimea. This is crucial to the Russian army operating on the mainland Ukraine's warehouse was already under attack – the impact at night from 5 to 6 October was a "depressive". Generally, the peninsula faces fuel deficits of up to 56% of demand, which forced provincial authorities to ration gasoline (20 l per person). And Crimea is no exception – shortcomings are felt in Russia itself, and everywhere, to the point that it began to import fuel (Russia, a country called a "gas station" ...). Ukrainian drones and rockets "reduced" the production capacity of Russian refineries by 40%.

Mass production capacity of engines

This effectiveness of Ukrainians (including attacks on another elements of weapons and critical infrastructure) may lead to a mistaken conclusion. That is, the Ukrainians deal with attacks on the Russian rear without the support of the United States (and the wider West). With specified conviction it is easy to say that Kiev does not request Tomahawks and another U.S. long-range weapons, that it will deal with the paralysis of Russian rears with much cheaper, own drones and rockets. He won't. Drones have crucial limitations: burden capacity, range, speed. They are an easy mark for the Russian anti-aircraft defence that knocks most of them down. Russian accounts, according to which during 1 night they shoot down over their own territory after 150–200 Ukrainian unmanneds, are not peculiarly exaggerated. This is the scale of these strokes, resulting in 2 to 3 refineries or another plants being hit.

Rockets would be more effective – they fly faster and carry larger warheads. With a adequate number of them, they would accomplish the presently observed effect of partial paralysis of the key branch of the Russian economy, not in many weeks, but in respective days. However, we must remember that Ukraine has inactive not developed the capacity of mass production of engines. The supply of otherwise large Neptunes is limited, and they – even so-called. Long Neptunes – they have no scope to dispel high-value targets in the depths of the Russian Federation. A fewer weeks ago, the Ukrainians praised the construction of a rocket capable of flying for a distance of 3,000 km, but we are talking about a simple structure, comparatively free, with limited maneuverability, with a fatal radar signature – thus an easy prey for anti-aircraft defense. Another thing is that we inactive have no clarity, as in Ukrainian declarations on the degree of advancement of the task was truth, and how much war propaganda.

The reality of a ‘short covers’

I would stress here that I do not in any way undermine the scale of Ukrainian success, but I would like to point out the existing limitations. It is besides worth noting that even in specified realities as today, the "grilling" of the back of Russia is not solely due to the Ukrainians. The precision with which they endanger Russian infrastructure does not come out of nowhere. Apart from the increasing method excellence of weapons, it is besides the consequence of good reconnaissance – and in this area we go beyond Ukrainian competence strictly. 1 might say, “what problem to find and hit the refinery, after all, Google Maps is enough.” but the location alone is barely the entrance to the attack. The Russians have respective twelve refineries, of varying sizes, and their share of full production is different. Their parameters are not rigid: performance is variable, depends on many factors. The biggest bet can be a insignificant mark if it doesn't make enough. In order to accomplish the right synergy of measures and benefits, you request to know what to hit at a given moment. To find which component of the chain is crucial now – this is the first.

USS Preble, performing an operational launch test for Tomahawk missile, 2010.

Secondly, the Russians operate in the realities of a "short covers" in terms of anti-aircraft defence capabilities. They are incapable to guarantee the protection of all essential elements of their own infrastructure (no state has specified power). any defend better, others worse or not at all, any objects have a rotary shield. Let's put a Russian mess on it and get a situation where the current capabilities of local "OPL parasols" become a variable unknown. Not the art of sending a swarm of drones, the art is that at least any of them are not tracked down and shot down.

Who gives Ukrainians these “eyes and ears”, who builds their situational awareness distant from borders where Ukrainian radars and listening stations do not reach? Ukraine has efficient intelligence services, a good agent in Russia, but many essential information cannot be obtained without satellite recognition. In this respect, Kiev is supported in a limited way by Europe (mainly France), but it is primarily the domain of the Americans.

Technical capabilities of the USA

I know that this message gives emergence to any dissonance, at least in the part of the Readers – Donald Trump has done a lot in fresh months that we uncertainty the good intentions of the United States towards Ukraine and mostly the American allies' credibility. He gave an asumpt to claims that he was a submissive player to Russia, but that he would not even let him harm her. I'm not going to psychologicalize or follow conspiracy theories that explain the U.S. President's behavior. I will halt saying that the policy of the current administration has been and is inactive disappointing to me. I would anticipate more decisive action from Washington towards Moscow, led from a dominant position in this superpower relationship. Russia is not an equal partner for the States, and the perpetuation of Putin's illusion of imperial force and perpetuity is simply a dangerous practice and, to a large extent, "Trump's fault". However, I see the back-school American contribution to a painful run for Russia.

And that's why I find it comic that erstwhile attacking bets in the depths of Russia, Ukraine "plays its nose not only to Putin, but besides to Trump". With all my respect for the fighting country, its army and society, I find it unwise to effort to represent the Ukrainians in this substance as those who are full independent and do not look at the opinions of others. Despite Europe's increasing financial commitment to aid Ukraine, most Western support inactive comes from the US in a purely military dimension. Does anyone truly believe that Kiev would hazard stopping this "living steel" and doing something that at least did not have the silent consent of Washington? Ukrainians have already tried to "grill" Russian petrochemicals before, but the increase in the current run coincided with Trump's failure to make peace. In this case, it is simply a control to a different level of ‘exchange of arguments’. And Tomahawks is simply a signal that the stakes can be raised higher, which includes another message: America has technical, conventional (!) capabilities to cut off the oxygen of the full Russian war device with a series of quick, precise strokes. Bring her back to collapse without having to face her in a short circuit. It's an apparent fact that in the last fewer days – here on the Vistula River – has started to slip away. It is so worth stressing this aspect, especially in the face of the defestist narratives about Russia, which will "drone us in the event of a war". But where will he produce them?