The Twilight of the West and China's global expansion
We are at the beginning of the end of the West. The societies of highly developed countries, especially in Europe, do not yet have the public awareness that this process has already begun. However, the fresh US administration has full realised this reality, which is reflected in the statements of both the president and his closest colleagues. For example, Marco Rubio, Secretary of State, in a series of controversial statements stated that the planet no longer functions in unipolar order, with the US as an undisputed hegemon, but in a multipolar, mosaic-like. This represents an almost Copernican coup in American geostrategic thought and evokes associations with the alleged Gorbachev minute (it was accepted to call it the period during which the USSR recognized the necessity of "strategic lifting of the empire" against the inability to bear its burden). Like the russian leader who in the 1980s initiated the perestroika and the accelerated disintegration of the satellite block, modern American elites seem to choose retrenchment – tactical retreat from areas that cannot be defended and strengthening those bastions that can inactive be maintained.
The effectiveness of specified actions remains the subject of debate. The russian transformation brought large benefits to the West, but to Russia and its allies, specified as the GDR, meant a political and economical disaster. Gorbachev, responding to allegations of treason by the leaders of the GDR, replied: “History punishes those who do not follow the spirit of time.” 3 decades later, the United States found itself in a akin "return moment", being forced to redefin its role. Resigning the function of “global policeman” to defend his own “hemispher” explains initiatives specified as expanding control of the Panama Canal or the desire to take over Greenland – these are measures to safe geopolitical reductions in the face of multipolar reality and increasing competition. The metaphor of the "repeating wave of empire" is reflected here: like the USSR, the US withdraws from the periphery to focus resources on protecting the nucleus of its power. This process, although in rational theory, resembles shipping through stormy waters – each maneuver carries a hazard of losing influence or destabilizing. Unfortunately, neither past nor economical sciences offer a navigational map that would indicate the safest way to rolling the empire.
The president of the United States, guided by the mentality of a corporate strategist, balances national spending in economical terms and sees the United States wasting resources on many fronts, generating a chronic deficit in global trade. It is the turbulence in this “global accounting” that explains the current, somewhat chaotic, customs policy of the current administration, which aims to halt the “bloodiness” of the economy. The position of the U.S. (unquestioned hegemon) has allowed strategical generosity towards allies – insignificant trade concessions were seen as a coin in the game of influence, not threatening America's global dominance.
The United States resigns as a “global policeman” to defend its “hemisphery”. The focus of resources on protecting the nucleus of its power, although in rational theory, resembles shipping through stormy waters – each maneuver carries a hazard of losing influence or destabilizing. Unfortunately, neither past nor economical sciences offer a navigational map that would indicate the safest way to rolling the empire.
The second motive for spending cuts and uncovering a way to multiply profits is the expanding national debt of the United States, which reached 124% of GDP. The yearly cost of its service is 890 billion dollars – the equivalent of the Pentagon's yearly budget. As long as the dollar serves as a global reserve currency, the United States can mitigate this problem by printing money. However, in the face of the ongoing de-dollarisation – seen in BRICS initiatives, the expanding usage of Chinese yuan in the trade in natural materials and the increase in the importance of digital state currencies – request for the dollar is steadily decreasing. Increasingly less investors are besides inclined to get American bonds, which reveals the fragile foundations of this financial model. For decades economists have warned that specified a level of debt is simply a balloon that has to crack sometime. This minute seems to be coming: China's falling assurance in the dollar and China's competition puts the US ahead of the possible of a spiral of debt costs, which cannot be stopped solely by currency. In this context, Donald Trump's rhetoric, focused on "economic realism", becomes not so much a choice as a necessity.
The current US administration is making a return in geopolitical optics. America does not intend to proceed to act as a “world knight”. He wants to defend the interests of his country which is in a critical position and for which Russia is no longer the biggest challenge, but the Asian dragon and elephant – China and India.
The reindustrialisation of America, a strategical pillar of its economical policy, remains a key motive for president Trump's actions. Globalisation, which for decades moved the US industrial base to the Far East (offshoring) left the national economy in a state of structural dependence. This challenge is not only limited to rebuilding production infrastructure, but requires the creation of conditions that will encourage both home and abroad companies to relocate production facilities to the United States. Trump uses tariffs and duties for this intent – not as an ad hoc retaliation in commercial disputes, but as a tool of systemic pressure. This is about changing the economical calculation: production in the US is expected to become more profitable than outsourcing and offshoring, and abroad corporations, in order to keep access to a lucrative US market, must include local production in their supply chains.
If this plan were to be implemented, the United States could regain control of key industries, reduce vulnerability to global shocks, while creating millions of stable, well-paid jobs – the foundation of the promise Make America large Again (MAGA). However, this process will not be risk-free. In the transitional phase, disruptions in supply chains and increases in inflation, driven by higher production costs and the protection of the interior market, are to be seen. The possible benefits – greater productivity, technological modernisation and considerable economical independency – could only be seen in a fewer years, at the earliest at the end of Trump's current term. At this stage, it is hard to measure whether reindustrialisation will be a sustainable solution to structural problems or only a short-term intervention of limited scope. planet markets and economists are observing this experimentation with fear and, at best, with cautious optimism, realizing that its effects will go far beyond US borders. Success or failure will find not only the future of the American economy, but besides the form of a global trade order in the coming years.
Tectonic cracks in American geopolitical optics radically changed old assumptions. While in Europe (including Poland and Ukraine) there is inactive religion in the indestructible armor of the American power, Washington sees the planet through the prism of the profit and failure account. president Volodymyr Zelenski, representing in best religion the frog position of Ukraine facing a Russian threat, appealed to the White home for solidarity towards his country, arguing that Putin could not be trusted, and the US could feel safe behind the ocean cover. Donald Trump replied with anger: “You do not tell us how we should feel”. It was a eloquent ripost through which the fresh doctrine of the present administration prevails: the US government should no longer play the function of a "world knight" but defend the interests of its country, which is in a critical position and for which the biggest challenge is no longer Russia, but the Asian dragon and elephant – China and India. Faced with these challenges, Ukraine – a comparatively tiny and distant country, active in conflict with strong military Russia, is not a priority. It is simply a problem that the current administration wants to solve rapidly to focus on key (from its perspective) global games.
This phrase has a deeper historical context. In 1992, the United States and Western Europe controlled half of global production, present their share shrinks to 35%, and is expected to drop to 25% by 2050. Forecasts foretell that by 2100 the share will decrease to 15% – the "Twilight of Western Hegemony" becomes inevitable. On the horizon, there is simply a "slight of the power of Asia", the dominance of which is only a substance of time. What will be the form of the future order? Will it take the form of a Chinese monolith or a tango of 2 soloists – China and India?
Forecasts foretell that by 2100 the share of global production of the US and Europe will fall to 15% – the "Twilight of Western Hegemony" will so become inevitable. On the horizon, there is simply a "slight of the power of Asia", the dominance of which is only a substance of time. What will be the form of the future order? Will it take the form of a Chinese monolith or a tango of 2 soloists – China and India?
In this context it is worth noting the clear contrast between the demographic trajectory of China and India. The Central State, presently with 1.41 billion inhabitants, faces a sharp decline in the population - by 2050 the population is expected to decrease to 1.31 billion and fall to just 770 million by the end of the 21st century. An ageing society and a low fertility rate act as a brake for long-term growth. Meanwhile, India, which is already the world's most populous country, is expected to increase its population to 1.67 billion by the mediate of the century before it gradually shrinks, reaching 1.1 billion at its end. This means that by 2100 the Indian population will be 40-45% higher than China, giving them a unique chance to outrun their rival economically and geopolitically.
Inexorable demographic and geopolitical trends make the clock of past ticking louder. There is no longer any space for a policy based on strategical phantoms of the past: lofty slogans and slogans that present service as crystal coffins for the national interests of smaller states. Donald Trump, like the accountant of the empire, rejects these narratives as outages which he believes have already earned a place in the dumpster of past history. The lofty slogans, even those carefully selected, should service to carry out national interests – alternatively than become an end in itself to which politics is subject. Meanwhile, in Europe, including Poland, they are inactive considered irrefutable dogmas, with which it is hard to part.
China has evolved into an economical giant of global reach. The Central State is the only modern industrial superpower, accounting for 33% of planet production of material goods. Its competitive advantage – based on lower energy costs, a more efficient workforce and aggressive innovation – is like a roller that crushes European and sometimes even American attempts to compete.
This attachment reveals a deeper phenomenon of dependent identity – collective psychology, in which the nation's self-consciousness does not grow out of its own roots, but is simply a mirror reflection of the relation with the guardian. In the case of Poland, this identity has developed for decades around the belief that we are an eternally underestimated Western pet whose safety, economy and culture be exclusively within the framework of the umbrella of NATO and the European Union. Just as the improvement of the stem plant depends on the support, so Poland has internalized the communicative of itself as the “late link” of the West, treating the alliance with the US as a fetish of stability. However, erstwhile a guardian is removed into the shadows, voidness is revealed and the question arises: who are we erstwhile no 1 defines our role?
This circumstantial identity crisis – the teardrop between intellectual dependence on external mention points and the deficiency of autonomous self-image – leads to a collective sense of abandonment and disappointment. Dependent identity involves constructing your own image based on external factors, alternatively of on internal, autonomous self-awareness. erstwhile the mirror in which the nation was viewed breaks, there is only a fog of confusion: are we part of the West, or is it its cultural prosthesis? Is our past a continuity or a set or a conflicting set of responses to others' priorities? The metaphor of a dependent identity acts here as a lens: it shows how nations, which for decades have seen themselves through the prism of a geopolitical sponsor, face the necessity to compose their own communicative again. According to the philosopher, Zbigniew Stavrowski, “the dependent identity is not necessarily a mistake, but a phase – but a phase that must be crossed before time ceases to be an ally.”
In Europe, thus far protected by the geopolitical umbrella of the United States, the atmosphere of collective complacency, moral superiority and illusion of self-sufficiency remains. A dominant part of the public, shaped by mainstream media, would accept the thesis of Europe's descent into geopolitical periphery with amazement, treating it as a manifestation of disaster. Even if he admits that a fall is theoretically possible, the proposition that this process is already ongoing will reject as an apocalyptic exaggeration.
Meanwhile, reality systematically dismantles the optimistic narratives of Western media. It is undeniable that China has evolved into an economical giant of global reach. The Central State is the only modern industrial superpower, accounting for 33% of planet production of material goods. Its competitive advantage – based on lower energy costs, a more efficient workforce and aggressive innovation – resembles a roller that crushes European attempts to compete. Moreover, in key technologies of the future China has already surpassed Europe – even the United States has deposed in selected sectors, and in another areas it reduces the distance at a rate which the West utilized to call "unheard".
It seems that the mediate State is besides close to taking the lead in the improvement of artificial intelligence (SI) – the key fuel driving the machinery of future economies based on the most advanced technologies. The release of the Chinese DeepSeek model in January 2025 was a spark starting a fresh technological race. It produced a crucial resonance in the United States, prompting even the president of the United States to react. In the opinion of DeepSeek users, it even surpassed the ChatGPT 3.0 capabilities in many respects. The first reports besides indicated that it was developed utilizing costs representing only 1 100 OpenAI investments to make the GPT model1. All points to the fact that the difference is not that devastating. The owners of the Chinese company made public only the declared training costs of the DeepSeek model, which does not reflect the full cost of creating the model. Many analysts besides emphasize the advanced probability of hiding direct government financial assistance in Beijing. David Sacks, an entrepreneur who, at the hands of Donald Trump, was appointed to the administration as president of the Council of Advisors of the president for discipline and Technology, submitted (a fewer days after the Chinese model premiere) that there was "significant evidence" that DeepSeek utilized the OpenAI models' output data to support the improvement of its own technology and reduce costs.
Notwithstanding the above controversy, it can be noted that competition in this field is becoming at least equal. The increasing strength of China confirms the introduction in March this year, by another native company, the Manus AI system. It is the first specified tool to coordinate synergies between heterogeneous, independent SI systems, transforming them into a self-control ship capable not only of responding but besides of creating autonomous strategical operational initiatives. The Chinese Manus AI strategy may be the first tangible manifestation of AGI.
In another industries, Western countries are not doing better. According to any calculations, China produces more than 9 major economies combined. They dominate photovoltaics (they satisfy 2.5 times the current global demand) or the production of electrical vehicles (they produce 50 million cars per year, which is twice the request on their own market). They are a monopolist in fierce competition for uncommon earth elements. The transition to green energy (which is so crucial to EU countries) can only be achieved through affordable and advanced quality production of Chinese solar modules, wind turbines and electrical vehicles. Looking at supply chains reveals the crushing dominance of China in these key areas (a percent share in the global market):
- solar modules: 85%;
- solar panels: 90%;
- Polysilicon for solar panels: 85%;
- battery cells: 90%;
- battery cathodes: 90%;
- Battery anodes: 95%;
- wind turbines: 63%;
- hydrogen electrolysers: 70%.
It is estimated that without your participation, the green transition in the EU would cost at least an additional $6 trillion. This difference in costs would be borne primarily by taxpayers in associate States, including Poland. China's energy advantage is further reinforced by the usage of inexpensive energy supplies from Russia, which the EU has mostly given up in consequence to the war in Ukraine.
Moreover, the mediate State is developing rapidly in East Asia, Latin America and Africa. He is Mexico's largest trading partner, ahead of a powerful neighbour – the USA. The Chinese build industrial centers there for solar panels, lighting, electronics, automotive parts and mechanical equipment. abroad direct investment from China increased from 0.2 billion dollars in 2012 to 2.5 billion dollars in 2022. In 2023 20% of all car sales in Mexico went to China.
According to any calculations, China produces more than 9 major economies combined. Moreover, the mediate State is simply a monopolist in fierce competition for uncommon earths. The transition to green energy (which is so crucial to EU countries) can only be achieved through affordable and advanced quality production of Chinese solar modules, wind turbines and electrical vehicles.
A comparison between the BRICS block and the G7 countries is besides instructive. In 2012, the economical production of the BRICS and G7 countries remained at $30 trillion. By 2023 production of G7 dropped to US$29 trillion, while BRICS (excluding fresh members) increased to $34 trillion. In addition, the BRICS Group increased importantly in 2024, including Turkey, which, after bitter EU experience, applied for an alternate alliance in June 2024. Although the summit in Kazan in October 2024 did not bring any key settlements, a clear signal was sent from the countries forming this group that they wanted to break the dominance of the US dollar in global economical accounts and even replace it with their own currency.
Industrial policy: protectionism, tariffs and subsidies
In the world, peculiarly in the United States and Europe, there has been a immense shift towards an industrial policy characterised by protectionism, tariffs and subsidies. any examples of a departure from the free marketplace rules and the non-interference of the state in economical matters are worth mentioning.
In the United States – under the law CHIPS and discipline Act – Intel received $8.5 billion to build fresh factories in 4 states (Arizona, fresh Mexico, Ohio, Oregon), while GlobalFoundries gained $1.5 billion from state funds. The aim is to increase American production of advanced chips from 12% to 20% of global production by 2035. Micron Technology and Samsung are expected to receive a full of over $11 billion in subsidies in the US. Intel's erstwhile CEO, Pat Gelsinger, predicted that in the next 5 years, even over $100 billion of U.S. public funds would go to Intel and Micron, with Intel himself to rise at least $50 billion in state subsidies. Gelsinger's position was taken over by Lip-Bu Tan, and Intel seeks to regain marketplace share, lost to competition. This challenge becomes even bigger in the face of rumors that the division of production of integrated circuits of the company – so-called. foundry – is unsavable and can be taken over by Taiwanese giant – TSMC. Rebuilding Intel's position will not be an easy task. Over the years, the company has failed to effectively be in 2 key areas that dominated the improvement of the technology industry: smartphones and artificial intelligence.
In the world, peculiarly in the United States and Europe, there has been a immense shift towards an industrial policy characterised by protectionism, tariffs and subsidies. In the EU, Germany is an appalling example of breaking all the "free Marktwirtschaft" principles and promoting the trend towards the rebirth of protectionist industrial policy.
Inflation simplification Act (Inflation simplification ActWith a budget of $430 billion, it is the largest climate investment in history. It benefits companies specified as BMW, Mercedes, Volkswagen, Linde, Holcim, Tesla, DRAX and Audi, provoking the relocation of production to the US. At the same time, the United States increased its duties on Chinese electrical vehicles to 100% of their value, despite imports of only 3,000 Chinese electrical cars per year. Even America's submissive Europe has protested against these unfair practices of subsidisation. However, US president Donald Trump gives subsidies and tariffs fresh quality: they must be constructed and implemented in a way that will actually contribute to the reindustrialisation of America.
However, has Europe inactive been faithful to the principles of free marketplace and fair competition? Take Germany, the largest dominant economy in the EU. Germany is an appalling example of breaking all the “free Marktwirtschaft” principles and promoting the trend towards the rebirth of protectionist industrial policy. Here are any examples of crucial German investment in the German industry: Wolfspeed in Ensdorf (EUR 0.8 billion), Infineon in Dresden (EUR billion) or TSMC in Dresden (EUR 7 billion). On the another hand, Thyssen Krupp received more than 2 billion euros for the production of "green steel"; Saarstahl and Dillinger Hütte – 2.6 billion euros, Salzgitter – billion euros, and ArcelorMittal – 1.3 billion euros from the national budget. In addition, Germany has already spent EUR 100 billion from the Zeitenwende Fund (although its best feature seems to be its name, indicating indeed a ‘return point’ within the meaning of economical mechanisms).
Germany is keen to criticise China for over-production (overcapacity), even though in the past they have sold 2 thirds of their production of cars outside the country. This bright hypocrisy underlines the current change in industrial dynamics. The slogans of the free marketplace and free trade and the harmfulness of state interference have been mostly abandoned and forgotten. full generations of economists were taught to believe in free marketplace mechanisms and the benefits of specialisation and exchange, but these principles were dropped unceremoniously erstwhile they ceased to service the interests of major economies. The pragmatic Americans already behind Biden's administration were the first to abandon this narrative, noticing its harmful effects.
Consequences of Protectionism
Ultimately, all players want the same thing: that the factories of the future be located in their own countries. This effort revolves around taxes, jobs, economical growth and safety interests. any defend their old industries while others effort to build fresh ones. However, this race threatens to exceed the mark – global request is yet limited. What happens if everyone has their own factory, but no of them will be full exploited? Politically motivated investments that bypass real request can lead to a sharp fall in prices and in the underprofitability of producers and thus possibly harm the economy. This can be seen from both the United States and Germany.
In the United States, chip shortages caused by a sharp increase in request during the pandemic turned into a surplus in 2022, overburdening company revenue. Intel delayed the construction agenda of the mill in Ohio (in which production was initially to start in 2025) due to marketplace challenges (due to "business conditions" and "market dynamics"). Last year, an American chip maker claimed he would request even bigger subsidies due to the fact that he was losing money on his foundry business. The current president of Intel publically announced that the sale of this department is being considered2.
It's disappointing that this legendary American company is so dependent on government support. Although politicians of both parties advertise chip producers as a national champion, it is increasingly seen as a symbol of the dubious quality of government industrial policy. Intel was expected to receive up to $50 billion national grants, which was demanded by the company's erstwhile CEO, Pat Gelsinger. He stated that the American production of integrated circuits "will not be repaired under 1 three- or five-year programme" and suggested the request for the CHIPS 2 programme.
Industrial policy, although frequently "sold" as patriotic nationalism, usually ends with a plea for peculiar treatment. On the another hand, capital is directed for political reasons alternatively than for the most productive usage of it. In 2024 Intel fired 15,000 employees and resigned plans to build a modern chip mill in Magdeburg (notabene besides from the assembly line of circuit boards close Wrocław), despite a German government grant of EUR 10 billion. This decision is another nail in the coffin for Germany's ineffective technological and economical improvement policy. Infineon, the largest German semiconductor company, received in 2023 a billion euros to build a chip mill for the automobile manufacture in Dresden. However, in August 2024, she announced that she would be forced to release 1.4 1000 workers. On the another hand, Volkswagen's electrical car mill in Zwickau, erstwhile praised by Angela Merkel as "the cornerstone of the future of the German automotive industry", reduced production due to low demand. The plant operates at only two-thirds of its production capacity and temporary contract workers are released. erstwhile the deal was announced with Intel, any questioned whether car manufacturers would actually buy more costly “Made in Germany” chips or would inactive choose cheaper counterparts from Asia.
It is disappointing that Intel – a legendary American company – is so dependent on government support. Although politicians of both parties advertise the chip maker as a national champion, it is increasingly seen as a symbol of the dubious quality of government industrial policy, which, although frequently "sold" as patriotic nationalism, usually ends with a plea for peculiar treatment. On the another hand, capital is directed for political reasons alternatively than for the most productive usage of it.
Mercedes sold at least 170 000 fresh electrical cars in 2023 little than planned, and in the first 4th of 2024 their supplies decreased by another 9%. Volkswagen announced in the second half of 2024 that he was forced to close 3 German factories, release 15,000 workers and reduce the Christmas bonuses and social benefits for the remaining staff. The CEO of the company stressed that in the current structure the company is incapable to compete with Chinese producers. This situation in the key German automotive manufacture is unprecedented in the post-war past of the country. In March 2025, Audi besides joined this alarming trend, announcing: the dismissal of 7.5 1000 workers, the abandonment of the improvement of electrical cars and the return to a strategy based on combustion vehicles – contrary to the Green Deal guidelines of the European Union.
Forced decoubling
In the West, concepts specified as globalisation, the free marketplace or free trade have almost completely disappeared from public discourse. Paradoxically, present China has become the loudest advocate of these ideas. Until recently, the West has instrumentally utilized globalisation as a tool for expansion, but present its function has been marginalized. The reason lies in the nature of economics itself: unlike physics, where universal laws (such as gravity) govern, in the economy circumstances dictate the rules of the game, and states and corporations must adapt to them. In this context, 2 dominant trends emerge: voluntary separation (voluntary decoubling) and forced chapter (forced decoubling). The key word became decoubling – strategical separation of the American economy, and in the wider position of the full West, from China. This concept is the core of modern deglobalization processes. The United States is exerting large force on its allies to limit trade with China. Under US influence, the German chemical giant BASF closed the mill and refinery in Xinxiang Province. The alleged reason was Chinese persecution of the Uighurs. The tradesblatt paper suggested that Volkswagen could besides be forced to close the mill in Xinxiang. If that happens, it will affect, among another things, well-paid Uighur workers.
The West utilized globalisation as a tool for development, but now its usefulness has passed. Economics are not governed by universal laws, specified as the law of gravity in physics. In economics, circumstances dictate actions, and companies adapt to them. There are 2 emerging trends: voluntary separation and forced separation.
In addition, Australia, at the request of the Americans, ordered Chinese conglomerate Yuxieo to divest ownership of Northern Minerals – an Australian company dealing with the extraction of uncommon earth elements essential for modern electronics. Furthermore, the Dutch company ASML, which produces critical equipment for printing the smallest nanometer structures on silicon substrates, was forced to halt sending equipment to China. As a result, ASML, after the failure of a lucrative Chinese market, is now undergoing a major crisis. There are many more examples of this. These are not isolated cases, but a broad-scale policy.
Geopolitical implications for Europe
Germany is struggling with its dependence on China. Although Ursula von der Leyen told Chinese president Xi Jinping at a gathering in Paris that Europe had to engage in “reducing risks” (derisking), Germany remains mostly related to Chinese trade and investment. This dependency creates a dilemma, leading to indecision and delays in strategical planning. Production to the US and China carries large corporations, including BASF and Volkswagen. Only these 2 companies invested $12 billion in the Central State. For example, the Volkswagen ID.3 costs EUR 15,200 in China and EUR 39,900 in Germany, although both are mainly assembled from parts manufactured in China. This price discrepancy is due to lower labour costs, cheaper energy, lower social benefits and closer supply chains. Production strategy just-in-time, inactive effective in the Central State, in the West was replaced by systems just-in-case, thus reflecting the change in industrial dynamics. In addition, Germany faces a serious shortage of specialists, which forces companies specified as Herrenknecht to decision production to Spain. The bureaucratic process and the advanced social costs, which represent 50% of the budget, make the situation even more difficult.
In the face of the fresh US tariff and customs policy and interior tensions in the EU, the Old Continent faces the spectrum of geopolitical chaos, whose scale and direction stay hard to foretell today.
Our western neighbour is facing an impending budget disaster, exacerbated by increased force on military spending from the US. At the same time, the United States is pushing Germany to limit trade with China, which further complicates the situation. In 2023 German exports to the US amounted to €158 billion and to China – €100 billion. president Donald Trump, who announced the imposition of import duties of 10-20% on goods from the European Union before the elections, is now implementing this promise with unprecedented determination. This protectionist policy, combined with negative trends in the German economy – from the declining competitiveness of manufacture to the shrinking exports – seems to have the darkest script for Germany.
The situation is further deepened by the interior paradoxes of German politics. On 18 March 2025, a coalition of the Bundestag party, which is inactive operating under the end of its parliamentary term, under the leadership of Friedrich Merz, presently the fresh chancellor, carried out a controversial revision of the Constitution. This change, voted in an atmosphere of haste and political bribery, raised the acceptable level of sovereign debt of an unprecedented amount of EUR 500 billion, breaking Merz's earlier declarations of fiscal discipline. This decision not only increased German debt to evidence 80% of GDP, but besides weakened investor confidence. If the short-sighted wave of investments financed by this debt, like straw fire, expires without a lasting strengthening of the economy, the full German European integration task can collapse under its own weight. In the face of the fresh US tariff and customs policy and interior tensions in the EU, the Old Continent faces the spectrum of geopolitical chaos, whose scale and direction stay hard to foretell today.
Consequences for Poland
Poland, like a boat drifting in the shadow of German industrial colossus, remains heavy dependent on its western neighbour. Unlike the US or Western Europe, we cannot afford billion-dollar subsidies to industry, which puts it at a disadvantage in the technological race. However, in this apparent power deficit there is an unexpected opportunity: the future of the country can be forged not so much by imitation, but by an innovative revolution consecutive from the periphery.
The key to growth is niche technologies, in which Poland is already successful globally. Our companies, inscribed in a dense network of global value chains, match pearls in the crown of global industry. Take the example of a smartphone: its Taiwanese processor is created utilizing the Dutch ASML device – the only 1 in the planet capable of precise photolitography. And in the heart of this technological alchemy are pulsed infrared detectors from Ożarow Mazowiecki (VIGO Photonics) and lenses resistant to utmost UV radiation from Józefowa (Solaris Optics) – components without competition on the market.
These are not the only examples. In Łomianki, Smarttech manufactures 3D scanners whose models beat the competition with precision and colour fidelity. In Poznań, Airoptic provides gas analyzers that defender the clean energy manufacture from China to Texas. In Zablack FIBRAIN built the fiber-optic mill himself, and in Walcz Eagle creates the world's fastest laser metallic cutters. These companies are black horses of globalisation: without publicity, but with a technological mastery they conquer markets from Asia to America.
Poland does not should be a passenger on another ship forever. Its chance lies in investment in future infrastructure: artificial intelligence, advanced materials, photonic technologies. It is precisely those areas in which companies from peripheral areas transform local genius into global advantages that can become the driving wheel of the economy. As examples show, we already have everything we need: talent, know-how and determination. There's only 1 thing missing: a bold imagination to take your own course alternatively of drifting.
Poland inactive resembles an archipelago without bridges – we deficiency "integrators" that would combine dispersed islands of innovation into a coherent continent of modern technologies. We urgently need, like the Gdańsk Institute for investigation on marketplace Economy, "cooperators": networks of companies, universities and investigation institutes, which, like shipping lines, would guarantee the flow of cognition and resources between "islands" of Polish potential. Although many of our companies, thanks to the proverbial Polish "improvisation", conquered abroad markets alone, it is advanced time to realize that individualism is not enough. The state must become a catalyst for change by identifying diamond industries (those that already shine on the global map) and building around them ecosystems: from laboratories to training; from backing to global marketing.
Unfortunately, in this race, we're like a heavy-duty runner. While another countries, thanks to multi-vector finesse, attract Chinese investments, Poland is inactive trapped – it tries to act alone and at the same time avoid any misunderstandings with partners. This imbalance is clearly seen in relations with China: Polish exports to the mediate States are inactive mainly natural echoes of the past (apple, copper, milk powder), but China is flooding our digital economy with tsunami (5G, electronics, electrical cars). As a result, our trade resembles the colonial exchange of inequality – natural materials for technology. In contrast, Hungary, Serbia and even France (Geely-Renault!) build partner bridges benefits. Is Poland to usage Chinese know-how, must he have a leader like Orban? Definitely not, it is adequate to be strategically brave, like France or Spain, of countries that combine loyalty to the EU with pragmatic cooperation with Beijing. The key is not the choice between East and West, but the ability to play in many fields simultaneously. alternatively of just watching the geopolitically changing map, Poland should take the initiative: not as a follower of individual else's steps, but as an architect of its own strategy, which can combine business and not only choose between them.
The key to Poland's improvement is not the choice between East and West. In a multipolar reality, we must learn to dance on many floors simultaneously, without losing our own rhythm. alternatively of just watching a geopolitically changing map, we should take the initiative. The future of our country is not in imitation, but in hybrid wisdom: combining local genius with global alliances before the clock of the technological revolution strikes the final blow.
Cooperation with you in the Middle, although it is geopolitically risky (the threat of the Western safety straitjacket), could be a turbocharge for our technological infrastructure. Does that mean a choice between East and West? No, it's a call for strategical flexibility. In a multipolar reality, we must learn to dance on many floors simultaneously, without losing our own rhythm. The future of Poland lies not in imitation, but in hybrid wisdom: combining the local genius with global alliances before the clock of the technological revolution strikes the final blow.
China invests heavy not only in Hungary but besides in Italy and Serbia. Serbia, without being a associate of the EU or NATO, is more free to invest. She even created a Belt and way investigation Institute at her Academy of Sciences. Hungary, on the another hand, is trying to redirect the Belt and way Initiative, which presently runs through Polish cities specified as Łódź, Kutno and Małaszewicze, into its territory, which can importantly strengthen their strategical and economical position. Unless global tensions undermine these trends, Hungary and Serbia will appear as beneficiaries of the fresh order – countries that have turned the geopolitical vacuum into a strategical asset. Poland, alternatively of drifting in the shadow of erstwhile alliances, should take “Zeitenwende” – a strategical turn towards hybrid independence, diversifying economical and diplomatic links. In pursuit of the West, which itself changes course (or turns around), we hazard becoming a relic of the technological era – the more we pursuit the escaping mirage of modernity, the deeper we are in the past, which is not even ours anymore, but reflects the technological stagnation of the European Union.
In conclusion, in order to break out of the geopolitical leash of Germany and the USA, Poland must become an architect of its own economical sovereignty. Inspired by the multi-vector finesse of Hungary, Spain and France, which transform Chinese investments into technological trampolines, our country can decision from the position of an eternal supplier of natural materials to the creator of global value chains. The key here is simply a strategical symbiosis: drawing on Asian dynamism while not giving up on European identity. Only in this way, combining local genius with global entrepreneurship, Poland has the chance to break distant from the function of the passive viewer and become the manager of the fresh economical reality – the 1 in which innovation is currency and independency is the most valuable capital.
1This information contributed to the sharp decline (by $600 billion) of NVIDIA's stock value – the leader in the production of specialized processors for SI. In the following weeks, the company's shares recovered a crucial proportion of these losses.
2Intel revealed in a message on securities that in 2023 he lost 7 billion dollars on his foundry unit, with $18.9 billion in sales, after about 5 billion in losses in each of the erstwhile 2 years. In addition, Intel revealed that it does not anticipate its foundry activities to scope a profitability threshold by mid-term from now until late 2030.
