What links “radically centred” French president Emmanuel Macron and the right-wing Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni to 28 Polish scientists, entrepreneurs and activists, including the author of this comment, who jointly developed a late published book Let's go to Poland1? In a fewer words: believing in the possible of decentralisation in solving key dilemmas of modern democracy.
The first suggestions that Macron may persuade his compatriots to at least partial departure from the French tradition of centralization already appeared in his first term. However, these suggestions seem to have taken more concrete forms recently. Last autumn in public consultations initiated by the French President, within the framework of the alleged National Council for Reconstruction (Conseil National de la Refondation – CNR), decentralization ideas played an crucial role. Macron mentioned this in a May 11 interview with “L’Opinion”2. Since the beginning of the consultation, the president of France has pointed specifically to the possible of expanding the function of local government and greater financial autonomy of local authorities.3.
The proposals of the Melona government presented in February this year are even more advanced than the French plans. Its aim is to implement the asymmetric autonomy of the regions as permitted by Article 116 of the Italian Constitution, i.e. to transfer certain competences to the willing regions through agreements concluded with the central government4.
Let's go to Poland – The book, which was published precisely on the day of president Macron's interview, fits into this European stream. Although the Italian imagination of regional autonomy, this book powerfully criticises (with prof. Antoni Dudek and Prof. Anna Wojciuk we compose that asymmetric decentralization should be decentralised as well as an electrical chair to the chair5), it is undeniably the fact that I want to focus on in this comment that the democratic planet is on the verge of a fresh wave of interest in decentralisation.
Decentralisation has considerable possible to solve the key dilemmas of modern democracy.
Two Policies
A clear advantage of English is the fundamental discrimination between 2 aspects of the concept of ‘policy’: policys, that is, interaction and power between actors and forces on the democratic political scene; and Policy, that is the art of creating public policies creating functional and effective solutions to collective problems6. Policy is by definition technocratic and, to any extent, idealistic, due to the fact that it assumes that the reason why good solutions are put into practice is that they are good. Politics is, on the another hand, ultra realistic. In this vision, solutions are being implemented due to the fact that their existence is in the interests of politicians and their elected groups.
There is an crucial discrimination in English: policys, i.e. interaction and power between actors and forces on the democratic political scene; Policy, that is, the art of creating public policies creating functional and effective solutions to collective problems.
So far, Polish self-government reforms and a wider discussion on the function of regions in state and European Union governance focus more on the idealistic and technocratic policy position – Policy. Its perfect representation is the celebrated rule of subsidiarity, according to which elder authorities should engage in public tasks only if the downstream communities are incapable to effectively execute the task. In the case of this principle, it is assumed automatically that both local authorities and ‘helpful’ authorities agree on the objectives of the action.7. In another words, all levels of power share 1 concept of common good, a concrete belief in the importance of a given public task. The question to be resolved is only who best performs this task.
So far, Polish self-government reforms and a wider discussion on the function of regions in state and European Union governance focus more on the idealistic and technocratic policy position – Policy.
During the first and second self-government reforms in 1990 and 1997, this presumption could be considered realistic. After the fall of the communist dictatorship, Poland became the leader of countries with ambitions to rapidly join the democratic states of the West. To the West experiencing, as it seemed, a period of liberal consensus that Francis Fukuyama called “the end of history”8. This celebrated phrase, of course, was not meant to mark the end of historical events, but the end of fundamental disputes over the model of a good state. Liberal democracy lost, as was then claimed, the last ideological competitor in its past – the dictatorship of the proletariat.
End of “end of history”
Today we know that both in Poland and in the West, this optimistic imagination ignored clearly visible beginnings of the fresh ideological dispute. The place of democracy's conflict with communism took place step by step. On the 1 hand, we have a progressive imagination of liberal democracy as a strategy of increasingly ambitious improvement of the state-protected freedom of the individual, as well as guaranteeing equality to the law regardless of individual life choices. On the another hand, there is increasing opposition from voters about conservative views who are not willing to join the accelerating train of social and civilizational change.
By optimistic imagination that liberal democracy lost the last ideological competitor in its past – the dictatorship of the proletariat – both in Poland and the West, the origins of the fresh ideological dispute were ignored.
In Poland, the first signals of this deepening division were disputes about abortion in the early 1990s. erstwhile it seemed that the imperfect 1993 compromise had solved these disputes, akin problems returned with a doubled force while working on the fresh constitution. In fact, its creators seemed amazed by the scale of conservative opposition around a very average document, containing a number of compromises and concessions to the right side of the Polish political scene. Despite these gestures, the 1997 Constitution was approved in a referendum by a tiny majority, with low attendance and loud opposition from the Catholic Church.
Similar roots of the fresh large ideological dispute were besides seen in the “old” democracies of the West. In the U.S., the collapse of the standards of cross-party cooperation, seen in the 1990s in disputes between the Chief of home of Representatives of Newt Gingrich and president Bill Clinton, followed the spread of the opinion of the Democratic and Republican organization voters on key public matters. In France, in 2002, the country suffered shock after an utmost right-wing candidate of the National Front, Jean-Marie Le Pen, switched to a second circular of presidential elections. In Italy, the right-wing regulation of Silvio Berlusconi in the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s. were to any degree a precursor to a increasing fresh kind of right-wing policy.
The Age of fresh Polarisation
The election victories of Victor Orban in Hungary in 2010, Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland in 2015 and, above all, Donald Trump in the US in 2016 contributed to the designation by a large proportion of politicians and commentators that a short period of liberal consensus had come to an end. Both in Poland and in the West, voters and their political elites are increasingly divided into the previously mentioned broad and internally diverse progressive camp involving parties from the left to the mainstream chade, standing in contrast with the more extremist conservatives protesting the fundamental directions of the evolution of our liberal democracies.
The election victories of Victor Orban in Hungary in 2010, Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland in 2015 and, above all, Donald Trump in the US in 2016 contributed to the designation by a large proportion of politicians and commentators that a short period of liberal consensus had come to an end.
Both sides of this fresh Cold War9 They hope that their ideological adversaries will either vanish or agree to hide their political views “in their pockets”. The expression of this kind of hope is, for example, the conservative anticipation that LGBT+ people will cease to “play” with their identity and, on the another hand, equally naive in its essence, the progressive desire to make religion a "private question" for right-wing representatives. These hopes are burning due to the fact that both sides of the progressive conservative ethical, ideological and civilizational dispute have clearly political goals (in the previously defined sense) policys), i.e. they want their values and interests to be recognised, protected and supported by a State apparatus.
The depth of the authentic differences between the progressive and conservative visions of the state and society is frequently underestimated, brought down to the patronising (against both sides) phrase "worldview issues". Another rhetorical procedure is to characterize the other to the commenting side as a "popularist" – a poorly defined concept suggesting any irrationality or ignorance of opponents.
The depth of the authentic differences between the progressive and conservative visions of the state and society is frequently underestimated, brought down to the patronising (against both sides) phrase "worldview issues".
In fact, however, differences between the 2 ideological camps concern not only women's rights or non-heteronormatives, but many another key issues for the average person. In the Polish context, these disparities concern the model of education (the influence of parents and religions on school, the function of critical reasoning in the curriculum, the importance of discipline and hierarchy in school), economical policy (including e.g. trade on Sunday and relations with global corporations), wellness protection (abortion, consequence to pandemics, in vitro, conscience clauses), cultural, migration, energy and environmental protection or justice. Basically, and deeper, we are besides different in our approach to key aspects of our history, specified as the 2010 aviation accident in Smolensk, the circular Table or the attitude of Polish society towards the Holocaust. akin disputes about past and identity can besides be seen in many Western European countries, peculiarly in the discussions on the work of France, the UK or the Netherlands for colonialism or in debates on the function of structural racism in the past of the United States.
Regional policy experts – policies in the sense of Policy – it is hard to realize the fundamental meaning of ideological disputes, among others due to the fact that many of them represent moderate, centred views on many issues.
Regional policy experts – policies in the sense of Policy – it is hard to realize the fundamental meaning of these disputes, inter alia, due to the fact that many of them represent moderate, centred views on many of the above-mentioned issues. Perhaps, if not for thousands of rockets aimed at each another by hostile superpowers during the erstwhile Cold War, average social democrats, e.g. in Scandinavian countries, might not have noticed the fierceness of the dispute between communism and capitalism. The mistake of reasoning "rational centrists" here is based on a misunderstanding of the political economy of a deep ideological dispute. In order for it to proceed and deepen, we do not request all citizens and citizens to have decisively progressive or conservative views. The only condition is that politicians representing a conservative or progressive camp are incapable to win without the support of their "hard electorate" – a base of voters representing uncompromising views.
In order for the ideological dispute to proceed and deepen, we do not request complete polarization. It is adequate that politicians representing a conservative or progressive camp will not be able to win without the support of their "hard electorate" – a database of voters representing uncompromising views.
From this perspective, the dispute over the function of the state in the economy from the second half of the 20th century can be recognised from a technocratic point of view Policy, in fact, to be easier to solve than the current gap between progressives and conservatives. "Money is easy divided and state intervention in the economy can be graduated"10. crucial values, symbols, memory and identity, for which the increasingly hostile ideological camps are fighting today, are much little susceptible to “a compromise in half the way”. A painful example of this is the failure of both the alleged abortion compromise and the strong rejection by the Polish rightist of the compromise preamble to the 1997 Constitution, by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who refers to citizens "both believers in God (...) and who do not share this faith".
The globalisation trends only deepen the gap between progressive and conservative citizens and citizens in the democratic system. In fact, globalisation is simply a combination of technological, environmental and economical changes which, on the 1 hand, increase the function of states and governments in regulating crucial areas of socio-economic life and, on the another hand, force key decisions in many areas of public policy (Policy) on always higher levels. It is impossible to avoid climate disaster, to fight pandemics effectively, to solve mass migration problems, or to avoid a repeat of the 2008 financial crisis without coordinating public authorities at global or European level. The impact of decisions at global consensus level is politically asymmetric, as most global interventions in these areas represent a progressive, alternatively than conservative, mindset. If we add to this, in the European context, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU and the European Court of Human Rights, which besides represents a decisively progressive trend, it is easy for us to see that conservative voters have reason to feel in any sense cornered by organization "imposibilism" preventing them from gathering their own political objectives.
The globalisation trends only deepen the gap between progressive and conservative citizens and citizens in the democratic system.
Strategic decentralisation as an answer
Pointed, well-designed decentralisation can be 1 of the fewer available systemic responses to the challenges described above conservatively progressive dispute. However, it must be a decentralization of the "strategic", i.e. delimiting areas to be transferred to the level of voivodships or cities on the laws of voivodships according to a very consciously adopted key. And it can no longer be the only functionality to which regional policy experts have become so accustomed. It loses its meaning as a decision-making criterion erstwhile we disagree on the objectives of public authorities.
Pointed, well-designed decentralisation can be 1 of the fewer systemic responses available to the challenges of a conservative and progressive dispute.
The criterion of fresh strategical decentralisation must be to look not so much for areas of peculiar self-government efficiency as alternatively accessible areas of primarily democratic causality – fields where political competition can inactive function in the era of globalisation and current European law and continental human rights standards (policys). In another words, strategical decentralisation deliberately balances or even "contrasts", expanding technological, ecological, economical and civilizational centralization trends to reduce the negative impact of these nonsubjective trends on our democracies. To put it another way, the aim is to at least partially prevent the "exploitation of democracy" hollowing out democracy) and to, although in any areas, give both progressive and conservative voters the chance to accomplish their political objectives, regardless of how much we may dislike these objectives.
The book mentioned above Let's go to Poland The co-operation with Prof. Anna Wojciuk is complete by a multi-year investigation task aimed at identifying these areas in Polish conditions. Although any commentators describe the political imagination outlined in this book as radical, in fact the effect is simply a alternatively slight shift of public tasks in relation to those that the self-government already performs today. Taking into account the more crucial issues, we propose to transfer to the local voivodships, not related to energy and defence of state-owned companies, state forests, public universities and technological institutions, specified as IPN or PAN, and inactive under the control of the centre, cultural institutions. After implementing the "maximum option" of our proposal, inactive more than 55% of public spending would stay the work of the central administration. This clearly shows these modern restrictions on bringing power closer to citizens – the number of public policies (Policy) where this can be done is already very limited.
Strategic decentralisation wants to give both progressive and conservative voters the chance to accomplish their political objectives.
Similarly to president Macron's vision, in decentralised areas, local governments would gain not only the right to execute public tasks, but much broader than today's legislative powers, i.e. the ability to regulate independently the way these tasks are performed, as well as much greater financial autonomy. These 2 fresh dimensions of decentralisation we would like to implement, strengthening the regional government. The voivodships, as well as a number of the largest cities on the laws of the voivodships, would become the main legislators on local issues. Cities and regions would have large freedom to regulate curricula, the structure of general education (e.g. the existence of advanced schools), the regulation of cultural policy, the strategy of higher education, as well as many issues related to economical and agricultural policy. These tasks would be supported by a much larger percent of the alleged own gross generated by the conversion of PIT and CIT taxes into regional taxes, analogous to existing local taxes.
Coming out of a democratic trap
Of course, even in these decentralised areas, the freedom of self-government to prosecute political visions and objectives would be very limited. Local governments in our proposal stay part of a unitary state with a common justice strategy safeguarding the compatibility of local law with the constitution, laws and regulations and global law, including EU law, and the European Convention on Human Rights. In addition, our proposal assumes the establishment of a fresh coordinating institution – the Provincial College – in which representatives of all voivodships and cities on the laws of voivodships would set nationwide standards in decentralised areas.
Local governments are to stay part of a single state with a common justice strategy that protects the conformity of local law with the constitution, laws and regulations and global law, including EU law, and with the European Convention on Human Rights.
The reality of political economics would most likely be even more important. On decentralised issues, all voivodships would start in our imagination from the same starting point – that is, from the current legal state, which the proposed improvement by law would make local law standards in all region or city. Any change in this state of law would should be accepted not only by reinforced provincial seymikas, but by the recently appointed representation of the municipalities: the provincial legislature made up of all the mayors, mayors and presidents of the cities in the region, having a weighted voice of the population represented. In specified a system, any deviation from the nationwide model will gotta have strong regional public support.
As a result, our proposal can guarantee a healthy balance between the request to give citizens (where it is inactive possible) a real democratic political origin (policys) with an crucial functional aim to avoid excessive interregional disparities in public policies (Policy). The systemic incentives to coordinate local policies will be omitted only in matters of peculiar political importance to regional communities.
Like in your comment to Let's go to Poland writes Prof. Kalypso Nicolaidis of the European University Institute in Florence, this solution can make “a densely intertwined polycentric Poland”11. specified Poland is possibly the best way to solve hard dilemmas of the increasing ideological gap between conservatives and progressives. alternatively of playing for everything at the central level, and the recurring political cycles of revolutions and counter-revolution, decentralisation will lead to a little black-and-white, more subtle mosaic of ways to deal with issues politically between us. As illustrated in the second part of the book, the feature chapters on "dreaming voivodships", in the fresh social agreement we propose, the differences between the voivodships may concern not only "hard" public policies, but besides crucial to citizens and citizens the symbolic issues adopted by public authorities of authoritative narrative, the way in which accents and priorities are distributed.
Instead of playing for everything at the central level, and the recurring political cycles of revolutions and contro-revolution, decentralisation will make a little black and white, more subtle mosaic of ways to deal with issues politically between us.
Reinforced regional governments and major cities could be integrated into the strategy of division and balance of power in the centre. The way to do this would be to return to the thought of the local government of the Polish legislature considered in 1990, in which – in our concept – the local government of the voivodships and the presidents of cities on the rights of voivodships would sit. The fresh Senate, a decisive majority represented by the Voivods‐Senators of the citizens of Poland and citizens of Poland, should have stronger than the present Senate, the right of veto against laws – in the minimum version, at least those affecting the competences and position of local government units.
Are we ready?
If self-government is indeed the best recipe available for a hard conflict between progressive and conservative models of good life and good society, then the strategical decentralisation of part of government and public finances becomes a very real possible of democratic adaptation in the countries of the European Union. It is so time to start preparing for the fresh function of “democratic guardian angels” that local governments and local authorities will gotta execute in a strategically decentralised unitary country. Entering this function does not should be easy for the self-government community. Technological policy (Policy) is safe and in a sense comfortable for many Polish authorities, as well as a wider environment of experts of Polish regional policy. Are we able to imagine today's marshals of the voivodships as the Provincials of the legislature – after the President, Prime Minister and Ministers, the most crucial public officers in the state?
Are we able to imagine today's marshals of the voivodships as the Provincials of the legislature – after the President, Prime Minister and Ministers, the most crucial public officers in the state?
In my opinion, a combination of a valuable, educated after 1989 ethos of a self-government host with a fresh function of expressor of expectations of Poles and Poles besides in a more hard and risky policy area- PoliticsIt's possible. Examples of politically courageous local government decisions can be found even in the current strategy in Poland. The position of decentralised European countries specified as Austria (where I live permanently) and Germany, where progressive regions and cities coexist with profoundly conservative regions, is besides optimistic. These examples show that in the European legal strategy there is area for strategical decentralisation, and that, as we see from proposals from unitary Italy or France, is not necessarily in the national model. However, the key is to realize that maintaining the religion of the vast majority of citizens and citizens in the chance to implement at least any of their crucial political demands is simply a essential condition for democratic stableness in Poland and in another countries of the European Union. strategical decentralisation, in my opinion, is the most realistic systemic improvement that brings us closer to this stability.
1 See Let's go to Poland, ed. M. Kisilowski, A. Wojciuk, Znak, Kraków 2023.
2 Interview with Emmanuel Macron: https://www.lopinion.fr/dossiers/linerview-exclusive-demmanuel-macron-a-lopinion [accessed: 22.06.2023].
3Emmanuel Macron wants to compose “a fresh chapter of decentralization”: https://www.lagazettedescommunes.com/829942/emmanuel-macron-veut-ecrire-un-nouveau-chapitre-de-la-decentralisation/ [accessed 22.06.2023].
4 Press release of the Council of Ministers: https://www.governo.it/it/articolo/comunicato-stampa-del-consiglio-dei-ministeri-n-19/21687 [accessed: 22.06.2023].
5 A. Dudek, M. Kisilowski, A. Wojciuk, The Republic of Our Dreams in: op. cit., ed. M. Kisilowski, A. Wojciuk, pp. 45–46.
6 See M. Kisilowski, I. Kisilowska, Administration, Studio EMKA, Warsaw 2016, p. 104.
7 This optimism about the anticipation of a complete social agreement, in connection with the definition of the common good, is part of the broader corporate imagination of the state, which has developed the rule of subsidiarity: see M. Kisilowski, Non-governmental Sector Law: Functional Analysis, LexisNexis 2008, pp. 63–64.
8 The president The End of past and the Last Man"The National Interest" No. 16 (1989), pp. 3–18.
9 See M. Kisilowski, Democrats request a strategy for a fresh Cold War, ‘Gazeta Wyborcza’, 29.05.2023, https://eborcza.pl/7,75968,29813218,science-jaka-plynie-z-election-in-Turkey-strategic-democrativ.html [accessed: 23.06.2023].
10 Ibid.
11 The president European Dream of Polish Dreams in: op. cit., ed. M. Kisilowski, A. Wojciuk, p. 392.
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