The “Orka” program, i.e. the plan to acquisition fresh submarines for the Polish Navy, was to be a flagship task of modernization of the Armed Forces. Repeatedly announced, revived, silenced and restored – present it is in a state of deep collapse.
According to the diary Republic ofThe government has no real chance of signing an agreement to acquisition submarines by the end of this year. This is another spectacular failure in a long series of unfulfilled promises in the sphere of national security.
Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz assured last autumn that 2025 would be the year of the breakthrough for the "Orka" programme. circumstantial announcements have been made: political decisions, the selection of the tenderer, the beginning of negotiations and the conclusion of the contract. no of these announcements were implemented. Today, in the mediate of the year, there is not only a selected producer, but there is not even a coherent concept, according to which the acquisition process would proceed. As a consequence – as he writes Republic of “There is no chance that the contract will be signed by the end of the year. The Ministry of National Defence has not confirmed any circumstantial discussions with possible partners, and all communication around the task is limited to general assurances about "permanent analyses".
Meanwhile, the situation of the Navy – especially its underwater component – is dramatic. Poland present has only 1 active submarine: ORP Orzel, a russian construction from the late 1980s task unit 877E (Kilo type). The unit has undergone a series of repairs, but its combat and method capabilities stay subject to serious doubt. Worse still, ORP Eagle has been requiring modernisation for years and its emergency is high. The another 3 submarines, the Kobben kind from Norway, have already been withdrawn from service. The last of them, the ORP Vulture, left the fleet ranks in 2021. The Polish Navy practically ceased to be as a submarine, which in the context of the Baltic – despite its specificity – is simply a serious military problem.
In April this year, erstwhile officers and sailors sent an open letter to Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Minister Kosiniak-Kamysz. In sharp words, they called the situation "a disgrace to the state" and "a symbol of defence omission". They pointed out that Poland not only does not make submarine capabilities, but does not even keep them in the basic state of readiness. The reaction of the Ministry of Defence was, to put it mildly, conservative. The consequence was that "consultations are ongoing", "operational needs will be analysed" and that "it is not a fast decision but a right decision". It's a language well known from erstwhile years, utilized by successive government teams to mask the deficiency of decisions.
The failure of the Orka programme is not the first case where state modernisation ambitions break into the walls of bureaucracy, deficiency of political courage and incompetence in arms purchases. Since 2013, there has been talk of the request to replace obsolete submarines. The PO-PSL government then initiated work on the Orka programme but did not complete it. After being taken over by the Law and Justice in 2015, the program was frozen to then, under NATO force and its own declarations, return to the mouth of politicians in each election year. A decade of fake actions without any decision. The current team, although referring to the request to repair the state and rebuild the institution, duplicated precisely the same scheme.
The Orca programme is not only symbolic but besides strategic. Contrary to the frequent opinion that submarines are not needed in the Baltic, many experts item their key role. The Baltic is simply a shallow basin, but intensively penetrated by water units and aviation. Under specified conditions, a modern submarine can service as a reconnaissance, deterrent and offensive platform. For example, Germany and Sweden – both countries are investing in their submarines with a view to taking action in this circumstantial operating environment. Poland, despite its geographical location and declared commitment to NATO structures, is de facto withdrawing from this area of defence.
The costs of omissions will be felt for years. Even if present the government woke up from lethargy and began buying fresh units, their delivery, testing, integration and training of staff would take at least 5-7 years. This means that, at the earliest between 2030 and 2030, Poland could have a full-fledged submarine again – provided that decisions are taken immediately and the contractors are able to do so without delay. This is an optimistic scenario, and experience shows that in Polish armed realities, it seldom meets.
That is why it concerns the passiveness of the current government. alternatively of a transparent tender, communication with the public and unequivocal declarations, we are faced with vague messages and a deficiency of clear responsibility. Neither the Prime Minister nor the Defence Minister presented Plan B. It is not known whether Poland intends to abandon the underwater component for e.g. the improvement of sea drones, or simply postpones the decision for political reasons. There is besides a deficiency of a wider parliamentary debate – the Sejm does not deal with the state of the Navy, and the public does not really know the current maritime strategy of the state.
All this shows that modernisation of the Polish armed forces remains mostly a declarative matter. The Orka programme is the best example of this: an ambitious, promising, needed task – which one more time ends in nothing. And this can no longer be blamed either on the pandemic or on the war in Ukraine or on the "difficult geopolitical situation". This is only a consequence of deficiency of decision, competence and determination. And these are things for which circumstantial power is responsible—not history.
