The Russian-Ukrainian War, like almost all military conflict in history, "lives" the word and image. It besides shows at the same time what is best, as well as the worst in man, and demitologies and demons the enemy, and makes heroes or heroes of its own.
It sets out a clear division into “We” – good, defending only the right origin and “They” – bad usurpers, followers and soldiers of “false cause”. Modern militaristic propaganda was born – from the “need of the moment” – in the context of the large War. It was then that after the spontaneous for all parties to the conflict on the Western Front in the end of December 1914, the "Christmas truce" effort was made to "information", which launched a run of depreciation and dehumanization of the opponent "on the another side of the barricade", which, in the opinion of decision makers, ceased to be human, and became simply a "wild beast in the human body".
In general, specified information stratification has been accompanied by the presumption that the overarching nonsubjective is to maximise the "proneness" of soldiers to fight and to mobilise full societies for increased war effort, for "victory". Essentially, these elements apply to this day, and the full-scale Ukrainian-Russian war is no exception.
The basic imperatives and grounds of war propaganda were formulated by Sir Arthur Ponsonby in classical work: Lies of war times. Propaganda during planet War I (Polish edition: „Vectors”, Wrocław 2022), first published in 1928 and successfully utilized by the Allies during planet War II. Then on the basis of this work Anne Mettewie-Morelli developed principles: Principes élémentaires de propagande de guerre (utilisables en cas de guerre froide, chaude ou tiede...) (edit. ‘Labour’, Bruxelles 2001), in which she drew up an analytical and medical framework to verify the nature of armed conflicts in a temporal and comparative perspective. This canon so boils down to 10 assumptions – a kind of “decalogue” of manipulation techniques in the field of war propaganda – which the author will examine in the context of the Ukrainian-Russian War held after 24 February 2022:
- We don't want a war. We want a fight. – this message shows citizens of a peculiar country that they are fighting to defend their “holy” in the hope of a better and safer future. Well, from Ukraine's perspective, after the triumph of the EuroRevolutionary (Revolution of Dignity) in 2014, Russia committed a breach of the provisions of the Budapest Memorandum and began an aggression which after February 24, 2022 turned into a full-scale invasion. Its aim is fundamentally to detach Russian-speaking provinces and to establish a "subsidiary state" like Belarus. On the another hand, the another side sees EuroMajdan as a coup d'état which, with the aid of the US and any EU countries, has led to the removal from power of the legitimate president, the persecution of the Russian people, and therefore, in line with Vladimir Putin's 2008 doctrine, it has begun this military intervention. The aftermath of the clash between Ukrainian nationalism and Russian neo-imperialism is so the annexation of Crimea and the fantasy of Novorosia (2014-2015);
- The work for the outbreak of war lies solely with the enemy. – no state, nor its leader, is willing to admit publically that simple human weaknesses, speechlessness, prejudice or animosity, certain geopolitical aspirations, global positioning, conflict for dominance or spheres of influence, access to certain resources may be behind lofty slogans. That is why these motivations are "dressed" in the narratives of "peace struggle", "justice fight". Motivating his attack after February 24, 2022, The Kremlin referred not only to the right to self-determination of the national Donbass, but pointed out that after 2015, the Ukrainian side committed many “war crimes”, methodically shelling the area of “People's Republics” and planning an attack on them. The Russian propaganda so presents the current conflict as a preemptive action, almost "a peace-making operation". Of course, the another organization denies specified accusations, pointing out that it is actually about the territorial disintegration of the country in the face of actual geostrategic reorientation and the reconstruction of the sphere of influence under the pretext of defending the Russian World;
- 3. The leader of our enemy is inherently evil "The demonization mentioned is not amazing from a historical perspective, erstwhile the said decision-makers were presented explicitly as "the spawns of Satan", which mention to hatred, cruelty, panic and aggression. In the propaganda (pro)Ukrainian president Vladimir Putin is combined in 1 line with Adolf Hitler or Josif Stalin. Its usage was besides coined by the neo-totaliztic neo-totaliztic neo-totaliztic neo-totaliztic tendencies. The problem is that the another side does not stay in debt and does not dress itself in invections: the president Volodymyr Zelenski is defined by epithets specified as: drug addict or Nazi, although paradoxically he himself is of judaic origin. As a consequence of this “fight of narrative” – if taken virtually – it turns out that during the war analysed Russian “fascists” are fighting Ukrainian “Nazis”. It is indeed hard for Klio to be more ironic!
- 4. We defend the right cause, not the peculiar interests – In this case, we frequently deal with the mythology of war, which exposes the noble goals that we seem to be at war and at the same time hides actual – frequently even individual – motives or inspirations. Both Ukraine and Russia present the view that the current conflict is simply a "shock of values": liberal democracy with its slogans against Russian-Legal civilization. The problem is, however, that each organization to the right of "its cause" as well as the value of the opposing organization interprets in its own right and against it. The demonization of the opponent is so intended to obscure, on the 1 hand, the "war fog" competition for access to certain natural resources or the wealth of the area of the Black Sea, the repositioning of large powers in the context of the twilight of liberal (non-)global governance, on the another hand, concealing their own geopolitical errors or omissions in interior policy. "Recognition of Russia – writes Andrew Bacevich – as [...] the enemy of the civilized planet effectively weakened the urgent request to look at our own values [...]"1. Furthermore, from the context of Poland's commitment to the Ukrainian-Russian war, 1 can rhetorically ask: what "European values" is Ukraine fighting about? Whether these classical ones, unambiguously associated with the acquis of Latin civilization, or those referring to the contemporary EU fatherophobia;
- Aggressor conducts an extermination policy, and we make mistakes without bad intentions – we are willing to attribute to the opponent all kinds of abuses, bad intentions and wickedness, and, on the another hand, to neglect our own negligence, omissions or actions in bad will, as non-objective actions, resulting from mistake or indifference. many news has already been made public about the war crimes committed by the Russians in Buczy or Irpien. Of course, counterpropaganda does not stay indebted in this case and itself accuses Ukrainians of akin actions or forgeries of reality. Whereas, meanwhile, the Independent global Investigation Commission on Ukraine at the UN Human Rights Council in its reports of 15 and 24 March 2023 states that both fighting parties have committed violations of customs and war rights, peculiarly as regards the persecution of prisoners of war, the usage of civilian facilities for military activities, or unjustified attacks on the local population (2);
- An opponent uses illegal weapons and does not respect the rules of war “This indicates that the enemy uses weapons banned by global treaties, has an “unfair” quantitative or qualitative advantage over “our” military, uses prohibited methods of combat, makes citizens aware that “we” are more balanced, humanitarian and more honorable (even in the face of “the act of aggression”).” specified facts are exposed by war propaganda, despite the deficiency of clear evidence, or the existence of serious doubts as to the possible usage of ‘these weapons’ and the circumstances of their use. In this case, it should be noted that 1 of the pretexts of a full-scale invasion was the accusation of creating a network of laboratories in Ukraine – with the aid of and protectorate of the U.S. – which were expected to work on the next generation of chemical and biological weapons. Work on atomic weapons was besides suggested, and peculiarly "a dirty bomb".
On the another hand, we should not forget the Russian doctrine of "deescalation through escalation", which is the script of the usage of tactical atomic weapons. Besides, the ghost of the usage of the second keeps returning like a boomerang in propaganda. Therefore, the "injustice" of the principles of the war under consideration besides means that Russia can completely unpunished and willfully attack and destroy, by means of rocket, drone and aeronautical attacks, Ukrainian critical infrastructure, and, on the another hand, Ukraine, at the express request of allies, must be satisfied with only answers limited to the annexed, small, mainly propaganda trips to the border areas of the Russian Federation and occasional attacks within its territory, in fear of escaping the armed conflict from control. A much smaller "caliber" is, in turn, bilateral accusations of "illegal" usage of landmines and cluster ammunition;
- In defence of our cause, we endure meaningless losses, while the enemy inactive suffers serious failures and aims to self-destruct – a unilateral and overblown media message about the immense disparity of human and material losses suffered by the opponent brings social comfort and strengthens belief in the rightness and intent of further war. In practice, the data presented frequently idealize reality, paint a false image of conflict, and politicians themselves frequently fall into a trap of their own "propaganda of success". As a result, this kind of communicative becomes a "double-edged weapon", which, alternatively of facilitating the political resolution of the war, stimulates it even more.
In this case, the Ukrainian and Russian data presented are contradictory and overshadowed to the detriment of the opposing party. Meanwhile, the U.S. data speaks of advanced losses in surviving power on both sides: over 120 1000 Ukrainian soldiers eliminated and about 200 1000 on the Russian side. Equally advanced are losses in combat equipment, although this balance is beneficial for Ukraine in a ratio of 1:3 or even 1:4; the problem is that the Russian side is able to supplement these imbalances much faster. delicate nuance is besides the supply of ammunition, although both parties effort to exposure the enemy's shortcomings and to underestimate their own logistical weaknesses [3];
- Powerful people support our cause – it is frequently that various intellectuals, artists, celebrities, journalists, politicians and bloggers, whose voice is seen as an expression of public opinion identify with a peculiar fighting side, uncritically advance its narratives and "play on the emotions" of a grey man, although in fact they have no thought of the reality of war at all. Of course, president Joe Biden is the main advocate of Ukrainian affairs internationally. This politician, acting as vice president in the Barack Obama administration, was just liable for the country's policy, and it should not be besides amazing that he became part of Russia's policy to halt Russia during his word of office. Unfortunately, the individual ties of the president of the United States to Ukraine stay unclear, as his boy Hunter, who was on the Board of Directors of the Ukrainian company Burisma Holdings associated with the Viktor Yanukovych clan, was accused of klepto- or plutacracy [4];
- 9. Our case is only right – the mentioned rule frequently finds embodiment in the slogans calling for increased war effort. According to the authoritative narrative, nations are frequently supported by a higher force, mention to it or even fight on its behalf. So they fight and die in the name of any god, a charismatic leader, a “national destiny” or another higher idea, which makes soldiers present themselves as representatives of the sacrum sphere, fighting for a “holy cause”. Therefore, it is not amazing that Ukraine presents its soldiers as fighting against evil for the future of Europe, and refers to specified slogans as: “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!’ Although the call itself has its origins during the period of Ukrainian national-social revolution from 1917 to 1921, it is clearly associated with the Nationalists of the CNS. Russia refers to the etymology of Saint Ruth or the planet of Russia [5];
- Whoever questions our propaganda, favors the enemy and is simply a traitor – The essence of propaganda is the clarity and uniformity of the information message, which builds on the communicative cohesion (even the apparent one), refers to the desired by the ruling social emotions. This logic is of a zero-one character, and all its intellectual adversaries, opponents and even affirmative about the "right cause" critics experience something that can be described as communicative alienation. In this case, we are dealing not so much with the facts and their interpretations, but with an effort to discredit those who think differently, by escalating negative emotions and media attacks ad personam, alternatively of a substantive polemic ad res. The critical head was in the close past a large value in itself, and now it became part of the Cancel culture. “We have lived through times where wise people are silenced, so that what they say does not offend fools,” said Albert Einstein. In Russia itself, calling a peculiar military operation a war threatens to arrest and exile, and on the another hand, "critical approach" to Ukraine (even right!) means vulnerability to ostracism and exclusion from the information sphere of the "main stream". Therefore, it should not be amazing that there is simply a public and private dichotomia of reasoning among journalists or analysts who are oriented towards information conformism.
The summary concludes that in the "only right" communicative of the media "main stream" in Poland there is simply a circumstantial political consensus based on the unwritten "command": "You can say and compose about Ukraine what you want... just to be good ...". Nevertheless, there are 2 fundamental messages in the information sphere that the summa of the summarum is intrinsically contradictory:
- The Ukrainian-Russian War after February 24, 2022 is “our war”, while the attacked Ukraine is fighting not only for its own state independency and territorial integrity within the limits of 1991, but besides defending Europe and Poland against the temptations of the Russian neoimperium. In the event of its collapse, or a military-political defeat, the next mark of the Kremlin's aggression will so be Poland and the Baltic countries – according to the Tbilisi speech of president Lech Kaczyński in August 2008;
- Poland is safe from Russia's aggression, due to the fact that we are protected by NATO presence and U.S. engagement in the east Flance (East Front) alliance. It will not dare to invade openly, as this would lead to the outbreak of planet War III.
The principles of logic and the analysis of the content of these "media communications" show, however, the sterility and falsity of the quoted message: if the first thesis is correct, then the second presumption is false, due to the fact that its followers do not believe in the "causative power" and the deterrent function of the North Atlantic Pact. The dominant communicative besides warns against the "Russian danger" (which constitutes a note of a kind of essence to justify the modernization and reinforcements of the Polish Army), failing to see another inaccuracies – the same media centres, individual authors notoriously proclaim the following: Russia continues to "diba" on Polish independence, leads a hybrid war with the European Union and threatens to yet aggressively attack the full Old Continent and, on the another hand, the same Russian Federation is simply a military power no. 2, honoris causa, a colossus "on clay legs", threatened by disintegration and decomposition, which yet loses the war to the "incombable" and "unconfused" Ukraine.
From the position of the Kremlin, this propaganda does not stay without an echo of course, as it presents Poland as a satellite state of the United States, which is only waiting for an chance to incorporate Western Ukraine within the limits of September 17, 1939. On the another hand, in his communicative there are inactive historical sentiments – and this besides sounds nonsense – which shows that Russia, in the event of Ukrainian victory, clearly fears the “reanimation” of the Republic of Poland of 4 nations.
"Near a year since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine," he writes Luke Warches – small has changed in the Polish debate. inactive the loudest are those who would like to proceed their deepest commitment, or even – Poland's entry into this conflict. A different position inactive means that we hazard charging ourselves with ‘resonating Russian propaganda’. Above all, there is no discussion of options for ending the war another than the under-specified “winnership of Ukraine”. Journalists, alternatively of inviting guests to talk with different looks and to coolly face viewpoints turned into zealous war propaganda, pushing violently only the right version [...]. Meanwhile, the proximity of the theatre of activities in Ukraine should prompt us to be highly careful and to weigh all word and decision" [6].
This "decalogue" so points to the universality of forms and content of the message of war propaganda, although the rules governing political marketing are more complex and complex. This does not exempt us from critical reasoning about the Ukrainian-Russian war and analyzing it in a much broader socio-political context. It must besides be remembered that propaganda is simply a non-substantial way of arguing, that it is strictly selective in character and refers to certain emotions, that it is designed to form and influence them in the spirit desired by the governing states. It does not should be false, but it is usually associated with the subjective perception of a reality and is simply a form of interpretation. It is simply a tool of war, and there is no indication that this would change in a visible future. On the contrary, modern past shows that the infosphere has become 1 of the major theatres of armed conflict, possibly even more crucial than the “normal reality”; this last message is peculiarly crucial in a situation where a war in the media (wider: political) can be won, simultaneously losing it in the military field and vice versa. Reality can be more complex, multidimensional and ambiguous than is presented by certain narratives or images ("war snapshots") which mention to the assumptions or precepts taken from above.
Dr. Robert Potocki
photo public domain
[1] Andrew Bacevich, Hypocrisy and Defence of Civilization, "Review" 13–19 III 2023, No. 11, p. 40.
[2] study of the Independent global Commission of enquiry on Ukraine, Human Rights Council, Geneva 15 III 2023; study on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (1 VIII 2022 – 31 I 2023), United Nations Human Rights Office of the advanced Commissioner, Geneva 24 III 2023; Treatment of Prisons of War and Persons Hors de Combat in the Contex of the Armed Attack by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, United Nations Human Rights Office of the advanced Commissioner, Geneva 24 III 2023.
[3] Marcin Piotrowski, "Military-technical assistance for Ukraine – assessment of short and medium-term needs", Polish Institute of global Affairs, Warsaw, December 2022.
[4] Robert Walenciak, "What do the Bidens owe Zelenskim?",
[5] Joanna Getka, Jolanta Darczewska, “Mouse kidnapped? Russian War on the Identity of Ukraine”, Warsaw University Publishing House, Warsaw 2022, pp. 100–165.
[6] Łukasz Warzecha, “War Instigators”, “To the Thing”, 16–22 I 2023, No. 3, pp. 44–45.
