NATIONAL ARMY – FENOMEN FOR THE WORLD
You can hear a lot about the uniqueness of the Home Army. What was her phenomenon? What is the biggest success of this organization? What is his place in the collective awareness of Poles?
Reflections on these issues are taken by Dr Tomasz Łabuszewski, Head of the Branch Office of Historical investigation of the Institute of National Memory in Warsaw.
Museum of Polish History, Natalia Protection: It is coming on 14 February, the eightyth anniversary of the conversion of the Armed Forces to the National Army, considered symbolically the anniversary of the creation of this organization.
Was it truly the “founding moment” of the organization?
Tomasz Łabuszewski: surely not, The beginnings of the Home Army must be seen in the establishment of the Polish triumph Service, which occurred before the surrender of Warsaw – 27 September 1939,
Shortly thereafter, on 13 November of the same year, this formation was renamed the Armed Forces Union, from which it straight originates the National Army, on 14 February 1942.
The AK was so not created from scratch – it was a simple continuation of organizations conducting the fight against both occupiers since the beginning of planet War II.
MHP: Why do we request to replace the Armed Forces Union with the National Army? Did this step change?
Tomasz Łabuszewski: The main aim was to merge all movements and conspiratorial organizations operating in the country into 1 formation.
It was about to become the National Army. In the establishment of Polish authorities on emigration it was to absorb all structures of military conspiracy existing in occupied Poland.
Therefore, on September 1, 1942, the president of the Republic of Poland in exile Władysław Raczkiewicz issued a decree whereby the commander of the National Army became the typical of the Chief Leader in the country and all participants of the independency conspiracy were to comply with his orders.
Two days later, the Prime Minister of the Polish Government in exile – General Władysław Sikorski – sent to the then commander of the National Army, General Stefan Rowecki ps, “Grot” a telegram in which he reported that he was becoming the commander of the Polish armed forces in the country.
MHP: In 1 of the instructions, General Władysław Sikorski besides stressed that the National Army should be "general, supra-party and superstate, focusing in its ranks, regardless of differences of political and social beliefs, all Poles wishing to fight the occupiers in terms of conspiracy work", Is this how the National Army was formed?
Tomasz Łabuszewski: Indeed, General Władys the Sikorski jury in this way imagined himself the National Army, It should be remembered, however, that the unitary action of the Polish armed forces started so much earlier – as already in 1939, during the period of operation of the Polish triumph Service and later the Armed Forces Union.
It is estimated that by 1940, around 20 conspiracy organisations were included in the latter's ranks, with respective twelve regular negotiations being held.
From the point of view of Polish interests, this process was necessary. If 1 wanted to keep control of the opposition of the full Polish society, there was no another way than to combine the various conspiracy movements into 1 organization and subject it to 1 command.
MHP: It wasn't an easy task, was it? Conspiracy movements operating in occupied Poland came from various, frequently opposition circles and political groups. The combination of specified causes many difficulties in peaceful conditions, let alone talk about the reality of war...
Tomasz Łabuszewski: Indeed. This is best seen in the example of 2 organizations – the National Military Organization and the Peasants Battalions (B.CH.). Both came from political groups – the first was the armed arm of the National Party, the second was created by the people.
While negotiations on the merger with the National Army were successful in August 1942 in the case of the National Military Organization, the merger of the Peasants Battalions did not take place until March 1943 – and this was limited.
There were areas where the people transferred only 20 percent of BCh's individual states to the AK. The situation with the National Military Organization was not so straightforward.
The decision to merge with the AK led to a break-up in its ranks – any activists reluctant to merge set up a life together with the Lizard Union – National Armed Forces.
These in turn decided to merge with the National Army only on 7 March 1944 – and not entirely.
It is estimated that only a twelve percent of NSZ soldiers entered the Polish Armed Forces in the country.
MHP: What resulted from the reluctance of the National Armed Forces and Peasants Battalions to join forces with the National Army?
Tomasz Łabuszewski: Political considerations were mainly involved. Both the National Army and its predecessors – the Polish triumph Service and the Armed Forces Union – were founded by professional active service officers. Thus, they were perceived as “sanctionary” organizations, and a large part of the political opposition activists were liable for the defeat of Poland.
in 1939 – hence distrust towards the Home Army.
There were besides ambitious considerations and political aspirations of the commanders of these formations. All of this made them, having the ability to operate independently and frequently besides to finance themselves, approach the thought of subjecting themselves to orders another than their own – uniform command.
In the end, however, most of the conspiracy organizations were in the ranks of the Home Army and prevailed over the concept of the common good.
MHP: There is frequently talk about the uniqueness of the AK at European or even global level, What is her phenomenon?
What distinguished her from another conspiracy organizations operating in Europe at the time?
Tomasz Łabuszewski: The basic discrimination of the AK among another military conspiracy organizations was that it was 1 of the elements of a wider conspiracy-political project.
It was not an average underground diversionary or guerrilla organization established to fight the occupier, but an armed arm of the Polish Underground State – a well organized structure, covering the full territory of the Second Republic and conducting developed administrative, political and military activities.
It was simply part of a broader pro-state presumption – hence its wide impact on society. It should be remembered that in the case of the National Army we are talking about a kind of common decision – it was primarily a volunteer army, bringing together young people as well as people over the age of 50 or even sixty.
They were people from very different backgrounds, with different skills, baggage of experience, emotional maturity.
Most volunteers besides had to be trained, found a suitable place for them in the structures of the Home Army, which was undoubtedly a major challenge. But it worked.
Estimates show that at the end of the war between 250 and 380,000 soldiers were included in the ranks of this organization. It is besides crucial to pay attention to the quality of specialized pawns – for example, an interview, which is very high.
Since April 1940, there has besides been a dedicated to the ongoing armed conflict – a combat pawn – first as the “Retaliation Union”, later as the “Wachlarz”, “Osa”, and yet as January 1943, as “Kedyw”.
It is the work of the soldiers of these formations that are the actions: ‘Cleaning’, ‘Topiel’, ‘head’, ‘Kośba’, or diversion operations on railway lines: ‘Wieniec’, ‘Railout’, ‘Jula’.
It's a full of tens of thousands of armed acts. Finally, it must be remembered that the National Army, despite all the soldiers and commanders in force of the same orders and regulations, was not a uniform formation.
Her image marked the outside conditions in which she came to work.
She was otherwise able to operate in areas straight incorporated into the 3rd German Reich, otherwise in the General Governorate, even differently in Ostland, or the Ukrainian Commission.
In addition, we must remember that it was frequently the territory commanders who gave the organization that they commanded the final outline, For example, in the Nowogródsk District, for example, 7500 members served in battalions 77 and 78 pp, and 27 BC, in the Vilnius territory in 16 brigades – 8,000 of the 12,000 sworn in, while in the Białystok territory only 2000 served in guerrilla troops,
So, while we were able to fight the east Borders of the Second Republic of Poland in real guerrilla battles – it was in the Tucholski Bora or in Wielkopolska – the individual military actions were already increasing to the rank of a symbol of resistance.
MHP: From the office in Warsaw, through the level of districts, districts, municipalities – how did the structure of the army manage so well in terms of occupying reality?
Tomasz Łabuszewski: This required first of all learning to operate under conspiracy conditions, which was not easy. Within respective years of the occupation, hundreds of instructions were issued, which fundamentally standardized all spheres of operation of this organization.
From the way of secretive – “conspiracy” movement in the city, drawing up associate records, acting in the event of arrest, by the art of writing reports – political, situational, intelligence, combative.
'It required gigantic work. Watro realize what organizational scale we're talking about here. The vertical structure of the Home Army included as many as 8 degrees – from the facility, through areas, circuits, inspectorates, districts, subdistricts, areas, to the Main Command.
Each of these levels was assigned circumstantial competences, casts, and specialised verticals, requiring appropriate people and equipment, functioned at each level.
Although in stories about the National Army frequently do not see it, a gigantic logistics work was done.
Organizing specified efficient structures in the occupied country deserves real admiration.
MHP: And not only in the country – the National Army has developed structures operating besides outside Poland, specified as in Berlin or Hungary.
Tomasz Łabuszewski: Yes, it is worth noting that the operation of the Home Army was not limited to pre-war Poland.
It was part of the Polish Armed Forces in the West, part of the Allied coalition, Although the final normation of her position in this coalition took place only during the Warsaw Uprising, she served with the Allied forces throughout her existence.
One of her most crucial actions was intelligence activity – soldiers of the National Army provided information about the full occupied Europe with various channels.
They were highly effective. 1 of the representatives of MI6 (Secret Intelligence Service) admitted after the war that nearly half of the intelligence information about the occupied Europe that the Allies had came from Poles.
MHP: However, this is much little than military activity. The bombing of trains, the attack on Kutschera, the Action under Arsenal – mainly specified shares we associate with the National Army.
Why? Are they more media?
Tomasz Łabuszewski: Sensational paintings always attract more attention, they fit into the established in our past ethos of combat, armed uprisings against occupiers.
These little spectacular episodes are frequently forgotten, and rather wrongly – frequently they had a much greater impact on the course of planet War II. The best example is the interview mentioned earlier.
Although this is an unknown subject for many, it was the specialized AK offensive intelligence cells codenamed "Lombard" that informed the Allies about the existence of a rocket base in Peenemünde Island.
The intelligence besides discovered the German base of the “Blind” placed under Tarnow for investigating V1 and V2 rockets.
Moreover, in 1944, the soldiers of the Home Army from Siedlce Oblast took over the failure of specified a rocket, and the specialists of the KG AK provided the main fragments of its British side as part of Operation Bridge III.
These are immense successes!
MHP: Did the Allies remember them? How was the National Army received in the West?
Tomasz Łabuszewski: We are dealing with a very ambiguous attitude of the Allies. On the 1 hand, they stressed the importance of cooperation with the National Army, treating it as 1 of the main sources of information coming from Europe. On the another hand, the size of the aid granted to the Home Army was small,
It received the least support from all organisations forming the anti-German coalition. If we compare the number of equipment, weapons, or logistical materials provided by the Allied to allies by 1944, the opposition in France has received more than 10 times as many, and the communist partisan in Yugoslavia has received more than seventy times!
The declared appreciation for the National Army did not go hand in hand with tangible help. The Allies helped the functioning of the organization in a very restrained way, and yet went even to betrayal, spending it on the russian Union.
MHP: With this declared designation it was not so easy either – the Allies considered the National Army to be regular armed forces only on August 30, 1944.
Tomasz Łabuszewski: It was a purely symbolic act, limited in practice only to Warsaw Insurgents, Although they, contrary to the Geneva Conventions, were later forced by the Germans as prisoners of war – which was forbidden.
For AK soldiers from another areas, it did not mean any qualitative change, Further, as well as before, they were killed by the Germans on the spot, likewise with the remainder and by the Russians.
MHP: But why did the Allies wait so long to grant the statutes of the regular armed forces of the Home Army?
Information about German crimes committed during the Warsaw Uprising came to them much earlier.
Tomasz Łabuszewski: Yes, but let us remember that this happened after the Tehran conference and for the Allied leaders it was clear that Poland would be in the sphere of influence of russian Russia,
Excessive engagement in Polish matters was increasingly embarrassing and uncomfortable for them, to say the least. announcement how the Allies behaved in 1945 after the “Przeszkowski provocation”, which resulted in Soviets kidnapping and exporting the leaders of the Polish Underground State to Moscow,
In addition to the authoritative question addressed to the russian authorities, they did not take any crucial action to rescue the leaders of the allied state, which in the war gave them large merit,
We are dealing with a classical example of utmost disloyalty, not to say betrayal.
MHP: How did the destiny of the Home Army soldiers unfold after the dissolution of this formation?
Tomasz Łabuszewski: Very different, but in most cases they did not quit the fight. General Leopold Okulicki's order to disband the Home Army was dictated mainly by political and organizational considerations – this decision was intended to deprive the communist side of the anticipation of arguing that the soldiers of the Home Army were acting against the Red Army in agreement with Germany.
Although the presumption was right, unfortunately it proved fatal, The dissolution of the National Army did not in fact bring any political benefits, on the contrary.
As a result, what was the essence of the organization's action, namely the anticipation of influencing society, was lost. In this situation, the collaboration with the Soviets and the Communist government ceased to be treason, and the sentences on traitors began to be referred to as brother-killing. Interesting, but to this day many historians defend this schizophrenic situation – without any uncertainty about the rightness of the sentences of German collaborators.
Most likely General Leopold Okulicki planned to take conspiracy action in another form.
On the same day, on which he decided to disband the Home Army, he issued 2 another orders, in which he instructed territory level commanders to hold the squadron office and keep the communications network. Unfortunately, he did not have time to take further action – he was the victim of the already mentioned “pruszkowski provocation”.
GEN, LEOPOLD OKULICKI
General Leopold Okulicki, pp. ‘Midwiadek’, ‘Biedronka’, ‘Bronka’, ‘Jan’, ‘Jan Mrówka’, ‘Jan Ogór’, ‘Kobra’, ‘Konrad’, ‘Kula’, ‘Miller’, ‘Miller’, ‘Old Bob’, ‘Osa’, ‘Mr Jan’, ‘Sęp’, ‘Termit’
(born 12 November 1898 in Bratucice, born 24 December 1946 in Moscow – Brigadier General of the Polish Army, co-creator of the SZP-ZWZ-AK, last Chief Commandant of the National Army, Chief Commandant of the ‘NIE’ AK, Commandant of the Łódź ZWZ District, Chief Commandant of the ZWZ Area under russian occupation, silent.
He was imprisoned in the USSR by the NKVD, among others, in Brygidki (1941), Łubiance (1941 and 1945), Lefortów (1941 and 1945) and Butyrkas (1945–1946).
MHP: The soldiers of the Home Army did not quit the fight – although beyond its structures.
Tomasz Łabuszewski: Indeed, although in a different form, the Successor of General Leopold Okulicki – Colonel Jan Rzepecki – appointed the Armed Forces Delegation for the country sought to destruct the structures of the military conspiracy as shortly as possible, and especially the partisan troops operating.
He did not want and did not realize the motivation of most of his subordinates, for whom the communist government did not mean free Poland.
Instead, he dreamed of an illusion of saving the remnants of democracy and independency in cooperation with the PSL at the first legislative elections. This concept was intended to transform a military organization into a socio-citizen formation.
Thus arose the Freedom and independency Association, In retrospect, we can say that this was a naive assumption, given the stationing in Poland of 500 1000 Red Army soldiers, 30 1000 Home Army soldiers NKVD and the panic that the russian Union started in Polish territories.
According to the most likely estimates, the first communist decade cost Poland about 50,000 killed on the independency side, 250,000 sentenced for political reasons and about 1100 1000 prisoners of detention, prisoners of camps.
To that we gotta add about 200,000 exported to russian camps, For 24 million citizens, the scale of repression was gigantic.
MHP: Communist propaganda explained these repressions with the necessity to fight “bandits” from the National Army, cooperating during the war with the Nazis,
Did specified passwords have the intended effect? How did Polish society mention to the Poakian guerrilla?
Tomasz Łabuszewski: Despite the breakdown of uniformity of attitudes, the independency conspiracy inactive enjoyed large support from Polish society.
This is evidenced by the fact that in the summertime of 1945 – during the period of the top improvement of the anti-communist conspiracy – there were about 200 1000 people in its ranks, in the vast majority from the Home Army.
If there were so many of them, they surely had to find support among respective million Poles who gave them support in various ways.
Of course, over time these proportions have changed – whether due to constant repression or average fatigue of war. No another period in the past of the Polish state over a 1000 years has been likewise dramatic.
According to the 1946 census, Polish society ended the war by 11 million smaller citizens!
However, we have 2 moments in the post-war period that let to measure the moods of the Polish society and its attitude towards the communist government and opposition – a popular referendum of 30 June 1946 and the election to the Legislative Sejm of 19 January 1947.
Both of these votes were totally lost by the communist regime. Only the presence of the Soviets and the falsification of the results on a gigantic scale helped him keep his power.
MHP: And how do Poles see the National Army today?
What is its place in our collective identity?
Tomasz Łabuszewski: Today, post-communist propaganda has no major chance of breaking through, unless in utmost groups,
However, we are faced with another disturbing phenomenon.
The public debate begins to dominate a reasonably simplified image of the Home Army. Many past popularisers present the National Army as part of the Polish armed forces, but acting under normal, peaceful conditions, transforming it into today's standards.
It's an extraction from the business reality, it's a large mistake not to say forgery. The National Army operated in very circumstantial – even exceptional conditions, which should be taken into account – especially erstwhile formulating assessments of its achievements.
It was primarily a volunteer formation, composed of various, frequently opposing political groups and militants, and besides uncompromised, mostly without adequate weapons and training of a large condition of soldiers.
Meanwhile, her opponent was a powerful and undefeated German army, That's what we gotta remember. All this makes the successes of the National Army – not so tiny – just prove its uniqueness and phenomenon.
MHP: What can we consider to be the top success of the Home Army?
Tomasz Łabuszewski: Spectacular diversion or armed actions, taken despite crucial disparity of forces and in highly hard conditions of operation, intelligence successes, large organization – all of this must undoubtedly be considered a large accomplishment of the National Army and an example of awesome mobilisation of Polish society.
However, in my opinion, her top success is that she managed to master the minds of the full Polish society, to impose the majority – frequently silent or passive opposition – a circumstantial pattern of behaviour towards the occupiers, which this society respected.
She managed to unite the nation in a common cause. This we can definitely – and we should learn present from soldiers of the Home Army.
Natalia Protection spoke.
Museum of Polish History
Citadel Warszawska ul. Guardia 1
01-538 Warsaw
