International position quo – how global law and geopolitics keep the government in North Korea

Substantive support: Sandra Krawczyszyn-Trash, Patryk Brush

As reported by Human Rights Watch, the Korean People's Democratic Republic (KRLD)[1] is 1 of the most repressive governments in the world, which is based its power on the ideologies of the beetle and the cult of the individual. Moreover, it is considered 1 of the most closed to the planet – North Korea is not, among another things, NATO or G20. Despite membership of the UN, it is not subject to most of the agendas including the global Monetary Fund, the planet Trade Organisation. The continuation of the totalitarian government is at the heart of an global debate on the effectiveness of global law and economical sanctions. Despite isolationist tendencies, North Korea maintains diplomatic relations with 160 countries (as of 2024)[2], developing atomic weapons, and supporting the Russian Federation militarily in armed action in Ukraine.

The question so arises – how the totalitarian government persists in the communicative of global peace, as well as what factors on the global phase let North Korea to strengthen interior power and consolidate authority. First of all, how sanctions, global law and geopolitical interests of the main powers contribute to the regime's sustainability in the capital – Pjongjang.

In this analysis, peculiar attention will be paid to 3 key aspects: the effectiveness and consequences of global sanctions, the geopolitical power game and the ways North Korea manipulates the global legal strategy to guarantee stability. We will besides ask how the global position of North Korea has developed and what are the predictions of the regime's future in this context.

Impact of sanctions on the functioning of the totalitarian regime

The modern global order is based on the rule of respect for state sovereignty and peaceful conflict resolution. Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter clearly states that ‘The organisation is based on the rule of sovereign equality of all its members’. North Korean membership in the United Nations, approved on 17 September 1991, at the same time as the accession of South Korea, limits the anticipation of direct humanitarian intervention in the DPRK, at least from an global law point of view. However, the Treaties supply for another force mechanisms, specified as sanctions, which, as Norwich University’s analysis emphasises, let for a change in state policy without excessive engagement of the armed forces.[3]

North Korea is presently subject to extended sanctions, both from individual countries specified as the United States and global organisations, including the European Union. However, it should be noted that the frequency and strength of these actions were not full correlated with human rights violations – by 2006 economical pressures and restrictions were mainly unilateral. An example is the sanctions imposed by the United States in the 1980s in consequence to the bombing of a South Korean passenger aircraft (Korean Air Flight 858), including restrictions on abroad aid and technology exports.[4]

The interest in economical activity of the DPRK only increased after the first atomic test in 2006, erstwhile North Korea joined a narrow group of 9 countries with atomic potential. Although the blast force was only 500–800 tonnes of TNT, which made it the smallest atomic test in history, global reactions were violent, peculiarly in the context of an earlier withdrawal of the DPRK from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of atomic Weapons in 2003. The sanctions imposed were intended not only to halt the further improvement of the atomic programme, but besides to send a political signal of opposition to violations of global position quo. [5]

The key consequence to the improvement of weapons of mass demolition by the DPRK was Resolution 1718, issued unanimously by the UN safety Council on 14 October 2006. A wide scope of sanctions took into account the ban on Korea's provision of a scope of dense military weapons and arms exports. It was besides impossible to supply any support, from training to funding, if it could contribute to the improvement of Korean weapons. In addressing a wider group, exports of luxury goods to Korea were besides banned. Another tool was an effort to force the cancellation of a declaration of withdrawal from the atomic Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, this example shows the limits of global law and the advantage of Korea's sovereignty – regardless of the characteristics of its regime. The Treaty law allows voluntary withdrawal from the agreement with a three-month notification period. North Korea, in accordance with its rights, has ceased to be organization to the treaty, and the demands of the safety Council themselves pose a question of their compatibility with the framework of global law. [6]

The presumption of voluntary membership in global organisations is simply a strong tool for North Korea to proceed its isolation policy and make military capacity. For this reason, the UN safety Council is not the only assembly to effort to control Korean activities through economical restrictions. The European Union, as well as individual countries, peculiarly the United States and Japan, are following its footsteps, which keep strong relations with South Korea.

On the part of the European Union, the DPRK's actions are condemned by imposing a travel ban on individuals, freezing assets and prohibiting the making available of funds. The sanctions extend to the suspension of exports and imports, the regulation of financial assistance for trade and inspections of all cargoes dispatched to the DPRK. technological and method cooperation has besides been suspended. Further sanctions were imposed in the face of the Russian assault war against Ukraine. In these activities, the function of the safety Council is limited due to Russia's presence as a permanent associate who has the right of veto.[7]

Individual sanctions are besides imposed by South Korea, which in June 2023 identified the DPRK as the main enemy in its national safety strategy. Unilateral sanctions were besides introduced by the United States – including restrictions under the CAATRSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) Act of 2017, and bans on North Korean banks. Similarly, Japan, after a atomic test, introduced a complete ban on imports and exports with North Korea. [8](9)

Intensification of sanctions, peculiarly in the face of the renewed strengthening of relations between Russia and North Korea, raises the question of the effectiveness of blocking economical activity. According to the Korean Peninsula Analyst and Japan analyst Oskar Pietrewicz, we are dealing with a "syndrom of a besieged fortress". Any intervention in an isolated government does not lead to a weakening of interior control, but alternatively strengthens it. Kim Jong Un uses sanctions to present rivals as a threat to parts of the Korean Peninsula, which justifies further restrictions on citizens' freedom.[10]

Furthermore, weakening the totalitarian economy of the state and limiting trade imposes restrictions not only on power but besides on society. The regulation of technological and method cooperation leads to a deficiency of access to modern educational tools and technologies, further exacerbating the backwardness and isolation of society. Even if sanctions do not formally restrict humanitarian aid, they in practice impede the activities of aid organisations due to logistical barriers. Although the Resolution of the European Parliament of 7 April 2022 on the human rights situation in North Korea [11] expressed the request to increase humanitarian aid, peculiarly in combating hunger, in practice transport bans, financial constraints and the deficiency of modern agricultural technologies are making the situation of Koreans worse.

The ban on exports and imports with members of global organisations forces North Korea to strengthen bilateral relations with China. This besides creates an incentive to circumvent global restrictions, utilizing legal gaps and illegal activities. An example is the ban on North Korean vessels entering nipponese ports, which leads to oil smuggling by means of a ‘ship-to-ship’ technique. [12] North Korea, having mediocre oil deposits, must trust on trading partners to get key energy sources. Limited access to global markets, including the deficiency of access to SWIFT, besides leads to cyber attacks. The Lazarus Group[13], most likely linked to the DPRK government, began operations in July 2009, attacking American and South Korean websites. Currently, specified groups regularly conduct cyber attacks on banks and financial institutions to circumvent formal bans and get funding[13].

So we see that the sanctions imposed on North Korea not only hinder the improvement of atomic potential, but besides undermine the improvement of the state in general. Obstruction of trade with an economically isolated state, with already underdeveloped infrastructure, goes hand in hand with closer relations with its historical patrons.

Geopolitical Powers Game – Who Keeps North Korea

The far-reaching consequences of global sanctions and the observed consensus on the condemnation of North Korea's military improvement lead to a key question – does military totalitarianism share trust with someone, and if so, does it bring bilateral benefits?

Historically, the russian Union has undoubtedly played an important, if not crucial, function in providing conditions for the birth of large totalitarianism on the Korean Peninsula. Kim Ir Sen advanced as the leader of the recently formed state during the period erstwhile North Korea was under strong influence of Stalinist Russia. The Soviets controlled the first parliamentary elections, but above all they had a immense ideological influence on the regime's formation. Stalin's cult became an inspiration for the North Korean leader who created his own cult of the individual around him. Like Stalin, Kim Ir Sen reached for culture – art, movie and education – to dominate social life and advance communist ideology in the national edition.[14]

The russian model besides had a key impact on the economy of North Korea, which was organised centrally, and on the construction of the safety apparatus. Similarity was seen, among others, in the strategy of labour camps, where the “enemies of the nation” were kept, or in the usage of political panic in the form of rotational cleansings. The roads of both communist states were importantly separated after Stalin's death. Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech during the 20th legislature of the National Assembly, in which he condemned the cult of the individual, was at odds with Kim Ir Sena's vision. Liberalization of the USSR in the days of Mikhail Gorbachev was besides contrary to the increasingly authoritarian policy of North Korea.[15]

The final blow to the relations of both states was the collapse of the USSR and then the close cooperation of Russia with South Korea. Despite these changes, the historical influences of Russia are now gradually being rebuilt. As Oskar Pietrewicz emphasizes in a joint conversation, North Korea is highly selective in building diplomatic relations. However, this does not mean that the government is absent from global policy. On the contrary, “he carefully watches what is happening, though he does not trust anyone.”[16]

With the improvement of Russian aggression in Ukraine, starting in 2014, Moscow began to intensify its relations with North Korea, recognizing it as a possible strategical partner. Kim Jong Un sees an ally in Russia that, like North Korea, is in an open conflict with the West. Rebuilding these relations weakens the influence of the UN safety Council, where Russia as a permanent associate has veto rights.

The strategical partnership with Russia gives North Korea the chance to diversify the sources of key resources, specified as oil and coal, while allowing the government to become independent of China. In return, North Korea offers military support in Russian armed action against Ukraine. According to the Polish Press Agency, in June 2024 Vladimir Putin visited North Korea, where he signed a pact on common defence with Kim Jong Un. In practice, this means involving more than 10,000 North Korean soldiers on the Ukrainian front.[17]

Nevertheless, Russia is not the only strategical partner of North Korea. The second key actor is the People's Republic of China. The function of China as a patron dates back to the Korean War, during which a million volunteers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army supported the government in Pyongyang. Due to individual experience of arrest and conviction of conviction to death, Kim Ir Sen remained skeptical of the Communist organization of China. However, military support from China has established affirmative relations between countries.

Since 1961, both countries have been bound by a treaty on friendship, cooperation and common assistance, which is renewed all 20 years. However, North Korea stressed from the outset that it would not be politically dependent on China, which is reflected in the ideology of self-sufficiency (grunting). For China, maintaining a unchangeable government in Pyongyang is beneficial, as destabilising North Korea could weaken China's position in the region and strengthen US influence and their allies in the Korean Peninsula. [18]

In the economical dimension, North Korea's relations with China are crucial to the endurance of the regime. China provides about 90–95% of North Korea's trade, providing key natural materials specified as oil, coal and food. In return, North Korea exports, among others, an anthracite and inexpensive labour. Despite specified a strong dependence, Pyongyang tries to balance his relationships by diversifying them through cooperation with Russia.[19]

In conclusion, basing North Korea on 2 global powers – China and Russia – allows the Kim Jong Un government to circumvent global sanctions and minimise the effects of isolation. Balanced support from both sides provides the DPRK with a safeguard against external intervention and the anticipation of further improvement of military and atomic potential.

Picky isolationism? Participation of North Korea in global position quo

Despite isolationist policies and expanding sanctions, North Korea is taking action to enable it to function in a limited way within the global position quo. With membership in global organisations, diplomatic talks and selective building of relations with another countries, the Kim Jong Una government maintains a minimum presence on the global stage. Despite the strong emphasis on "exceptionality" and nationalist ideology that ranks the Kim dynasty as self-sufficient, limited diplomatic relations support the regime's long-term goals by legitimizing power internationally.

North Korea's key action in building an global position quo was to join the United Nations, just after South Korea. Although the DPRK is not subject to all UN agendas, it has limited participation in deliberations and debates, allowing it to keep a certain degree of legitimacy as a state. specified action is an chance to present false reports on respect for human rights, trying to divert attention from the real situation in the country. Membership of the global Olympic Committee besides allows representatives to be presented for the Olympic Games. Sporty propaganda diplomacy plays an crucial function in creating an alternate image of the state, directing the attention of the world's public distant from repression against citizens, censorship or hunger. Sports successes are in turn a tool for consolidating national unity within the country, symbolizing the strength and uniqueness of the nation internationally. [20]

As Lee Hyo-jon in The Korea Times notes, North Korea is attempting to decision distant from complete isolation by initiating talks on possible BRICS membership. Statements by the North Korean abroad Minister Choe Son-hui, who elected the BRICS summit alternatively of the UN, signal attempts to participate in the developing fresh global order. BRICS, as an informal group of developing countries, is gaining importance as an alternate to Western organisations. For North Korea, membership of BRICS could mean moving distant from US dollar dominance, introducing fresh currencies and access to alternate trading partners specified as Brazil, India or South Africa, which would reduce dependence on China.[21]

Although membership of BRICS seems remote, North Korea establishes bilateral diplomatic relations to grow information channels and keep its presence in various regions of the world, which legitimises its state status. Examples include diplomatic missions in Europe, specified as embassies in Prague and Warsaw. Despite active sanctions by the European Union, Polish representatives visited Pyongyang in November 2024, symbolising the minimal but strategical maintenance of communication channels. specified actions let the DPRK to further interior isolation, while giving space for selective global cooperation that strengthens the regime.[22]

North Korea is effectively utilizing global diplomatic relations to consolidate its totalitarian regime, minimize isolation and strengthen interior stability. The establishment and maintenance of selected bilateral relations and presence in global organisations specified as the UN let the Kim Jong Un government to legitimize its position on the global stage. Despite severe economical sanctions, the DPRK manipulates the global system, utilizing diplomacy and strategical alliances to circumvent restrictions and safe key resources.

The 3rd article in the cycle will focus on the interior dynamics of the DPRK – military, military and everyday life of citizens in the shadow of the beetle ideology. Questions will be raised about the sustainability of the government in the face of global pressures and how the interior position of North Korea affects its ability to avoid global responsibility. How long will the DPRK be able to keep its position, balancing between isolation and pragmatic interactions with the remainder of the world?

Bibliography

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[10] based on a discussion with the Korean and Japan Peninsula Analyst

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[16] On the basis of a conversation with Dr. Oskar Petrovczych for investigation into this article

[17]Krzysztof Pawliczak, Polish Press Agencyhttps://www.pap.pl/updates/korea-polnocna-i-Russia-enhanced- relations-signed-protocol-o-extension

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[19] Based on an interview with Dr. Oskar Petrovich

[20] The IOC Should aid defend North Korean Athletics Returning From the Paris Olympics | Human Rights Watch 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/09/17/ioc-shock-help-protection-north-korean-athletes-returning-paris-olympics

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