After the end of planet War II, Poland came under russian domination, and a period of brutal Stalinism began in the country. For many independency activists, political emigration was the only alternate to the repression of the communist regime. London, Paris, Munich and Rome have become the main centres of activity of the exile structures of the Republic, which have tried to prosecute a political mission to the enslaved homeland to varying degrees. 1 of the most active entities of this activity was the National organization (SN) – a organization with a strong organisational background and a long independency tradition.
In the context of the Cold War, many emigration groups cooperated with the Western peculiar Services, especially with the CIA and British SIS, recognising this as a essential means of combating communism in Poland. 1 of the results of this cooperation was the creation of training centres for couriers and emissaries being transferred to the country.
However, in 1952–1953, a dramatic breakthrough occurred – as a consequence of a disinformation operation conducted by the Ministry of Public safety of the Polish People's Republic (under the code name ‘Cezary’), the secret actions of the Political Council, including the National Party, and mass arrests in the country were revealed. As a result, many conspirators were sentenced to death and the emigration environments were compromised and divided. The Bergu affair, as the series of events began to be called, has become a symbol of the crisis of trust, moral dilemmas and the clash of ideals with geopolitical realities.
Political Council and National organization in Refugee
After 1945, the Polish political scene was rapidly divided. The country was repressed against the independency of the opposition, and the emigration, mainly in London, was shaped by structures continuing the tradition of the Second Republic. The Political Council, established in 1950 as an inter-partisan body coordinating political and intelligence activities, played a key function in this activity. It included 3 main formations: National organization (SN), the Polish Socialist organization (PPS), and the National independency and Democracy organization (NiD).
The National organization was 1 of the oldest and most disciplined emigration groups. Since the beginning of its existence, it has been powerfully related to national movement, and its activists – specified as Zygmunt Berezowski, Edward Sojka and Tadeusz Bielecki – were the backbone of the activities of the Political Council. The SN had extended organisational experience, contacts among the communist communities and strong anti-communist orientation, making them an crucial partner for Western intelligence services.
In the structure of the Political Council, the National organization took control of the alleged The National Department, which was liable for communication with the Polish conspiracy. The head of this department was Edward Sojka, who played a key function in establishing contacts with the American CIA and the British SIS. Sojka, acting on behalf of the SN, concluded a cooperation agreement with the CIA in July 1950 and, in January 1951, with SIS. In both cases, the activities were consulted and accepted by representatives of another emigration groups, including Franciszek Bialas from PPS and Tadeusz Żenczykowski from NiD.
The Political Council, dominated by SN activists, had ambitions not only political but besides operational – intended to actively support the opposition movement in the country. In order to accomplish this, she needed financial, hardware and organizational resources that provided agreements with Western interviews. It was these decisions – seemingly pragmatic – that shortly became the basis for accusations of "agencies" and "death trade" which erupted with full power at the time of the Berg affair.
However, it must not be forgotten that the activities of the SN and the Political Council took place under peculiar historical conditions. In the opinion of many researchers, they were an effort to save the independency of the thought erstwhile Poland was under full control of the communist government and interior opposition was systematically destroyed. Despite controversy, the National organization remained 1 of the most crucial pillars of Polish political emigration.
Cooperation of the Political Council with Western Services
Since the very beginning of the Political Council, 1 of its main ambitions has been to resume effective communication with the Polish People's independency conspiracy. In the context of the deepening Cold War and the deficiency of its own financial resources, it became essential to cooperate with Western countries – in peculiar with American (CIA) and British (SIS) interviews. These relations were operational and financial in nature, and their nonsubjective was clearly defined: to support opposition in the country through the spread of people, financial resources and operational materials.
National organization played a key function in these negotiations, whose representatives gave a speech to the work of the Political Council. Edward Sojka, as head of the National Department, in July 1950 signed an agreement on behalf of the Council with the CIA, which provided broad financial and organisational support for independency activities. In January 1951, he entered into a akin agreement with the British SIS. Both agreements were approved by members of the Council Bureau, including Tadeusz Żenczykowski (NiD) and Franciszek Bialas (PPS), which confirms an inter-partisan consensus on the legitimacy of cooperation with Western allies.
As part of this collaboration, the CIA was to pass over a million dollars to be utilized to train emissaries, make channels of communication with the country, and keep the structures of the Political Council. These measures besides served to cover the moving costs of certain emigration parties, including the National Party, which later became the basis for accusations of political dependence on abroad interviews.
Two training centres for couriers and emissaries were set up for the funds provided:
- The "North" Centre – initially in Oerlinghausen, later in Mülheim; led by Kazimierz Tychota, and then by Viktor Zdrzelka.
- "South" Centre – operating successively in Rottach, Munich and yet in Berg (Bawaria); headed by Stanisław Komendowski and later Władysław Furka.
The training included weapons use, message coding, cross-border transmission and camouflage methods. The trained emissaries were then transferred to Poland – mainly with the aid of Western aircraft – to support conspiracy structures specified as the Freedom and independency Association (WiN).
Cooperation with the CIA and SIS was an effort to make an alternate to powerlessness against the repressive government in the country. However, these activities active a immense hazard – not only operational but besides visual. Western interviews acted according to their own priorities, frequently subject to a global anti-communist strategy, and not always compatible with the national interest of Poland. As a result, even the best intentions could have been distorted by the mechanisms of the information war, which with full force revealed the upcoming Bergu affair.
Operation Cezary and deconspiration
The culmination of the Ministry of Public safety (MBP)'s efforts to break down emigration political and investigative structures was a peculiar operation under the code name ‘Cezary’ from 1951 to 1953. Its aim was not only to neutralize the channels of communication with the country, but besides to completely discredit the political communities in exile, with peculiar emphasis on the National organization that dominated the structures of the Political Council and led intelligence activities.
The operation began with the introduction of 2 MBP agents: Jan Ostashewski (acting under the name Paweł Choma) and Wanda Macinska (Wanda Weber) into the training centre in Berg. Their task was to get the widest possible information on the structure and logistics of emigration activities and to make it look like a "disclosure" of the activities of the Political Council. On December 23, 1952, they both reported to the PRL consulate in East Berlin, where they gave evidence that served the PRL authorities for extended repression.
As a result, Communist safety arrested any 230 people in the country, 15 of whom were sentenced to death, and over 50 for a long-term prison. Repressions affected not only couriers sent from the West, but besides people from the national underground who kept in contact with them. A peculiar case was the case of Dionize Sosnowski and Stefan Skrzyszowski, dropped on parachutes at night from 4 to 5 November 1952 in the area of Koszalin. Both were to support the Freedom and independency Association (WiN), but were rapidly worked out and arrested by MBP and then sentenced to death.
The information provided by Ostashewski and Macińska agents included names of emissaries, metastasation routes, warehouse locations and details of the CIA and SIS backing of the centers. Communist propaganda immediately utilized this information to make an image of emigration politicians as “death merchants” who send people to any death, guided by abroad interests. In particular, the National Party, as a organization leading the National Department, was given symbolic work for the operational disaster.
The information run launched by MDP was intended not only to strike the morale of opposition, but besides to rise divisions and suspicions within emigration environments. The effectiveness of this operation was to combine elements of fact (actual financing, real cooperation with the CIA) with brutal manipulation and misinformation. For the authorities of the Polish People's Republic, it was 1 of the most spectacular intellectual operations of the Stalinist period – not only physical but besides symbolic.
Internal voltages: Tychota, Mackiewicz, Zaleski
The shock caused by the deconspiration of the political council's intelligence activities and mass repressions in Poland not only damaged the safety of emigration environments, but besides led to the escalation of interior conflicts, especially around political work for cooperation with the CIA and SIS. Public accusations and attempts to settle the debate, in which the main roles were played by Kazimierz Tychota, Stanisław Mackiewicz and president of Poland in exile August Zaleski.
Kazimierz Tychota, erstwhile manager of the training centre "North", released from office in late 1952, was 1 of the first to decide to talk publicly. In 1953 he published a series of open letters, including letters addressed to the president of the National organization Tadeusz Bielecki, in which he powerfully criticized the way he conducted the conspiracy activity. He pointed out the deficiency of control, inadequate preparation of couriers, and above all the excessive dependence on American services, which, in his opinion, put people's lives and national interests at risk.
Tychota went further by publishing the brochure “Last Report” in which he accused of being irresponsible and lacking scruples of 8 leading emigration politicians, with the dominant participation of members of the National Party. This paper had a strong impact – it was the first effort to settle the interior settlement of the emigration environment for the Berg affair.
In the same year Stanislaw “Cat” Mackiewicz, a well-known conservative publicist and erstwhile Prime Minister of the Government in exile, besides spoke. In a series of pamphlets entitled “On the Trafficking of Death” and “About the civilian Court on the Traffickers of Death”, Mackiewicz openly accused any politicians – especially from the National organization – of buying the life of conspirators, sending them to almost certain death in the PRL. The publicist called for an independent civilian court to examine the legitimacy and ethics of the decisions taken by the leadership of the Political Council. Although Mackiewicz's pamphlets were emotional and not always precise in fact, they importantly influenced public opinion on emigration, strengthening the communicative about the moral decline of political elites.
The most authoritative and symbolic consequence was the position of the president of the Republic of Poland in exile, August Zaleski, who – despite limited prerogatives – publically challenged the credibility of the Political Council, suggesting that its actions bear the hallmarks of agenthood. In June 1954, the emigration minister of justice Kazimierz Okulic prepared a formal motion to open the case before the civilian Court, but due to the deficiency of an organization mechanics for the administration of justice in the exile environment, the initiative failed. Okulicz, however, published an extended "A set of papers on Berg", to show the scenes of cooperation with the interview and service as historical origin material. Although the paper did not prejudge the guilt, its publication established the conviction that the Bergu case requires a deeper settlement.
Social and political impact of the affair
The Bergu affair was of a multidimensional nature and its consequences reached far beyond the current events of 1952–1954. It was not only a blow to the operational structure of the Political Council, but, above all, a deep crisis of assurance within the Polish emigration environment, as well as an effective tool of communist propaganda, which long challenged the legitimacy of the elites in exile.
As a consequence of the scandal, positions were polarized among emigration politicians and publicists. On the 1 hand, there were voices calling for the settlement of those who, as was claimed, irresponsibly compromised the life of the conspirators and collaborated with abroad services. On the another hand, there were those who defended the activities of the Political Council, indicating that under the conditions of ruthless communist dictatorship cooperation with the West was the only chance to proceed the conflict for independence.
In the National organization itself there have been interior tensions that weakened his authority as the strongest emigration organization. The accusations of joint work for the operational defeat undermined the credibility of leaders specified as Tadeusz Bielecki or Edward Sojka, even though they were not proven to act in bad faith.
Distrust and accusations have led to a halt to cooperation between political parties, making it hard to operate emigration common institutions specified as the Political Council or the Provisional Council of National Unity. Although formally the institutions have survived, their importance in real politics and relations with the country has been greatly weakened.
The scandal was besides seen at an global forum. Communist propaganda, both in Poland and in the West, utilized it to represent exile politicians as CIA tools that cynically sent people to their deaths. For Western emigration partners who had previously financed the activities of the Political Council, the Bergu affair was evidence of limited effectiveness of specified operations and a informing signal in the face of russian counterintelligence operations.
For many people active in conspiracy activities – both in the West and in the country – Bergu's affair had a dimension of trauma. Arrests, executions, and a sense of betrayal have shaken religion in the sense of independence. The atmosphere of suspicion deepened in the communist and emigration environments, and intelligence activities, previously regarded as a patriotic duty, began to be viewed as morally ambiguous.
Consequently, political parties, including the National Party, began to focus more on cultural, educational and historical activities, giving up operational forms of contact with the country. Thus the Bergu affair symbolically closed the phase of active conspiracy on emigration, beginning a fresh chapter in the past of Polish political diaspora – more defensive, little operational, but not little important.
TRIJN and review of evaluations
Following the stormy events related to the Berg affair and many attempts at public accountability of politicians active in the activities of the Political Council, there was a request for a more institutionalised and impartial explanation of the matter. To this end, the Provisional Council of National Unity (TRJN), which is the highest representation of political emigration, set up the Commission in 1955 to consider the issues of communication with the country.
The Commission sought to examine the legality, legitimacy and consequences of the political council's cooperation with the Western peculiar Services, as well as to measure the activities related to the shipment of couriers and emissaries to the country. It consisted of representatives of various emigration environments, which was intended to supply as nonsubjective a position as possible, independent of organization divisions. Although it was not a committee of enquiry in a legal sense, its study had political and moral importance—it was a form of consequence to allegations of "death trade" and the alleged agenturality of emigration politicians.
Main conclusions of the 1956 report
The Commission completed its work on 28 January 1956, publishing a comprehensive report, which stated among others:
- The Political Council had the right, as a typical of legal political parties, to keep communication with the country.
- The financing of activities from external sources, including CIA and SIS, cannot be automatically considered as agent activities, insofar as it served the national interest of Poland.
- Intelligence activities were inevitable under communist dictatorship conditions, and the usage of Western support – understood in the context of the global Cold War.
- No crimes or treason by political council activists, including members of the National Party, were found, although they were acknowledged to have committed organisational errors and to have not decently controlled them.
Despite the rational conclusions of the report, its impact on public opinion was limited. In the emigration environment, distrust and moral ambivalence persisted. Many participants in political life felt that even if there was no formal betrayal, the actions of the Political Council – and especially those led by the National organization of the National Department – were besides risky, poorly prepared and based on besides much trust in abroad intelligence services.
For the National organization itself, the study meant partial rehabilitation – the deficiency of evidence of agenturality allowed to keep authority among parts of emigration environments. However, he could not obscure the impression that the party, as the main organizer of contacts with the country, had incurred political and moral work for the failure of the operation.
Bergu affair in the light of historiography and archives after 1989
The fall of communism in Poland in 1989 opened up fresh opportunities for investigation into post-war political emigration, intelligence activities and spheres of operations specified as “Cezary”. Access to IPN archives, parts of CIA and SIS documentation, as well as private emigration collections allowed historians to have a more comprehensive analysis of the Berg affair and to demytologize many threads that for decades functioned in public opinion in a simplified or biased way.
In the 1990s and after 2000, works appeared that shed fresh light on the origins and course of the Berg affair. Historians specified as Sławomir Cenckiewicz, Wojciech Muszyński or Andrzej Friszke reviewed earlier interpretations, based on MBP documents, agent reports, and CIA files declassified in part under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
These findings show that:
- Operation Cezary was 1 of the most thoughtful and effective counterintelligence actions of the Polish People's Republic, combining infiltration, disinformation and violent propaganda.
- The cooperation of emigration with the CIA and SIS was not only known but besides accepted at political level, although not always accurately understood by all participants.
- The National Party, although in fact liable for directing the National Department, did not act in an agential way and its decisions should be assessed in the context of the political-war realities of that time.
- The misinformation and sabotage of MBP aimed not only at the physical demolition of opposition structures, but besides at the moral disgrace of the emigration elites – and in this aspect were highly effective.
Modern historiography increasingly emphasizes the tragic choice faced by emigration activists: acting under conspiracy conditions without real support from their own resources forced them to search aid from interviews of Western countries. These activities, though at risk, were not a sign of betrayal but a desperate effort to keep communication with the occupied country.
However, this does not mean that the communicative of the Berg affair has been completely depoliticized. It is inactive the subject of ideological disputes and environmental assessments – both on emigration and in Poland. For any it is proof of the moral decline of emigration elites, for others – the ruthlessness and cynicism of russian repression machine.
In the survey there are besides voices relativizing responsibility, stressing that no 1 predicted the effectiveness of MBP operations and that organizational errors were the consequence of limited measures and dramatic operating conditions, alternatively than betrayal or calculating.
Jan Kownacki
