Space Technologies in State safety Service. How should Poland usage this potential?

The conversation is led by Marcin Wandałowski, editor of the publication of the Civic Congress.

Space technologies are now 1 of the key tools for safety and resilience of the state. At what phase is Poland presently taking advantage of this potential?

Poland has been obtaining a number of satellite data from allies for years and has started building its own systems – we are inactive in this process. However, we are just beginning to decision to the phase of their implementation and operational use. So we can say that we are at a turning point today.

The best illustration of this process is the implementation of the MicroSAR strategy provided by ICEYE. This strategy has just been handed over to the Armed Forces of Poland and is the first solution over which the Polish military exercises full, sovereign control – from satellite operations to data acquisition and usage for operational activities.

Moving on, more satellite systems are planned in the coming years. All these solutions concern Earth observation, which is widely understood intelligence designation and acquisition, as well as crisis management and disaster consequence applications.

What does sovereignty in the field of satellite designation mean in practice? Why is having your own abilities alternatively than relying solely on data and allied instruments so important?

Firstly, with our own satellite system, we are certain that no 1 will be able to cut us off from data access or limit our operational capabilities. In addition, we know in what condition satellites are in, we are aware erstwhile they are performing imagings, whether they are over an area of interest to us and erstwhile we can number on the provision of data.

We're at a turning point. Poland is moving on to the real implementation and operational usage of satellite systems.

In the case of allied data, however, there is always a certain component of uncertainty – not even out of bad will, but simply out of operational priorities, method constraints or crisis situations. Having your own strategy gives you full control of the full process of collecting and utilizing data. In the military area, specified operational sovereignty is absolutely crucial.

Secondly, which may be little apparent but equally important, having satellite capabilities changes the position of the state within NATO and more broadly: the full global safety system. To date, Poland has primarily been the recipient of data obtained from allies. Thanks to our own systems, we can become a state that besides brings its capacity to a common safety system. We can share data, support partners and show that the Polish military has its own independent satellite designation capabilities – it is simply a large capital.

What – from the position of space and safety technologies – do you think are the most crucial lessons from the war in Ukraine that Poland should draw?

Today's conflicts clearly show that 2 issues are crucial: technological advantage and informational advantage – especially erstwhile faced with an opponent with more resources, military numbers or more equipment. In the case of Ukraine, the technological advantage is changing, especially if we look at an highly dynamic arms race in the area of drone systems. On the another hand, the information advantage of the Ukrainian side has been maintained practically since the beginning of the war. It is built on many levels and covers a very wide scope of capabilities – from image designation to communication and communication.

Having your own satellite strategy gives you full control of the full process of collecting and utilizing data. In the military area, specified operational sovereignty is absolutely crucial.

The war behind our east border reminds us in this context that not everything can be effectively implemented from the ground level, where, for example, drone systems are constantly disrupted, neutralized and destroyed. Satellites are much more hard to destruct or disrupt, so they can supply an uninterrupted origin of information and continuity of information.

Today's conflicts clearly show that 2 issues are crucial: technological advantage and informational advantage – especially erstwhile faced with an opponent with more resources, military numbers or more equipment.

At this point, it is worth adding that our satellites have been liable for most of the radar images utilized by Ukraine since the beginning of the war. These data are widely utilized – from designation to targeting and support for operational activities. All indications are that they will be utilized until the conflict is over.

Satellite data and SAR technologies are utilized not only military but besides civil. How can they be utilized in this context? What another sectors can benefit from them and how can they become part of the everyday functioning of the state and not just a tool utilized in crisis situations?

Indeed, in fresh years, discussions around the space sector and satellite imaging have been dominated by military applications. This is evidently due to the geopolitical situation and the importance of these technologies for security. However, it is simply a fact that radar systems can besides be very widely utilized civilly, and ICEYE has been developing products intended for specified applications for years.

One of the most crucial areas in this context is the monitoring of natural disasters – floods, fires or droughts. Satellite data can be utilized both for predicting and predicting risks and for subsequent assessment of the effects of specified events, specified as flood wave reflection or harm coverage analysis. These are very advanced analytical products, which in the planet are utilized on a large scale, especially in regions more susceptible to natural disasters than Poland.

In fresh years, discussions around the space sector and satellite imaging have been dominated by military applications. Radar systems can besides be very widely utilized civilly, for example, to monitor natural disasters or oversee large investments or critical infrastructure.

The second very crucial area is monitoring critical infrastructure and large investments. SAR data can support reflection of wind farms in the Baltic, energy infrastructure or another strategical facilities, both for safety and for monitoring possible risks or irregularities.

So I realize that this technology can play a crucial function present besides in the context of hybrid threats...

It's true. In the case of Poland, it is of peculiar importance that SAR systems operate independently of cloudiness and time of day, allowing continuous monitoring even in very hard conditions. In practice, this means that it is comparatively easy to monitor water specified as the Baltic and to observe possible threats to critical infrastructure – whether wind farms, terminals, pipelines – linked to the activity of the alleged shadow fleet.

SAR systems operate independently of cloudiness and time of day, allowing continuous monitoring even in very hard conditions. This allows for comparatively easy monitoring of water specified as the Baltic and to observe possible threats to critical infrastructure – wind farms, terminals, gas pipelines – linked to the activity of the alleged shadow fleet.

Importantly, the usage of radar data goes far beyond military safety or hybrid threats. In the world, they are used, among others, to monitor illegal fishing, discharges of waste into oceans or another illegal activities carried out frequently under cover of night. It is here that the advantage of radar technology is peculiarly visible, due to the fact that satellites of this kind can observe regardless of weather conditions and lighting.

The situation is akin for example erstwhile monitoring illegal logging. In Poland, this is not a large problem, but in regions specified as the Amazon or rainforest areas, it is. Radar data is utilized there for continuous monitoring and detection of specified activities.

Are radar technologies besides able to monitor what is happening below the water surface – for example, possible attempts to harm cables or offshore infrastructure?

Not directly. This issue is more complex due to the fact that effective monitoring of critical infrastructure cannot be based solely on 1 origin of data. In practice, the alleged data fusion is needed, i.e. combining information from different sensors and reflection systems.

In the case of Baltic monitoring, radar data can form the basis of specified a strategy as they let very effective surveillance of activity on the surface of the sea. The radar itself won't show what's going on underwater. On the another hand, it may detect suspicious behaviour in the vicinity of the protected infrastructure – e.g. undersea cables or pipelines – and inform the strategy operator that there is something different going on in a given place.

Then another elements of the strategy are activated – water or underwater sensors, which let to check whether an operation is actually carried out, e.g. descent of divers or sabotage operations. This kind of activity usually does not take respective minutes, alternatively many hours or even days. With various systems, they can be detected and monitored in advance. I believe that specified integrated reflection systems are the future of both the battlefield and the protection of critical infrastructure.

How do you think the model of cooperation between technology companies and the administration should change to make public procurement more focused, not on buying circumstantial products, but on building certain operational capacities?

It's a very broad and hard issue to talk about for hours. There is inactive a lot to do here in Poland, although any elements of the strategy already work. We have mechanisms to support start-ups and young technology companies – both by financing R & D projects and investing in early stages of company development. These processes are already somewhat orderly.

What is more challenging is the later stage, namely the implementation of finished products and their real usage in administration. It is about the ability to identify needs, search for applicable applications and distribute these solutions within state institutions. This looks a bit better in the military sector today, but there is inactive quite a few work to be done in the civilian administration.

The Polish Space Agency could play a very crucial function here – as an institution coordinating the needs of administration and supporting the acquisition and implementation of technologies at various stages of maturity. This would, of course, require appropriate competences and resources.

Poland has both the request and the possible to become the leader of the space domain in the region – primarily in military applications and in the area of security. another countries in our region will look at us through these competences and will be increasingly willing to cooperate.

The function of the Agency has been debated for years, but with the expanding importance of the space sector, stronger coordination is increasingly needed. The current fragmentation and decentralisation of stakeholders in this sector may slow its development.

At the same time, it is besides essential to strengthen education and competences in public administration and companies of the State Treasury, so that institutions can make real usage of the capabilities which Poland already has or will have in the coming years.

Finally, what should be done in the next 2 years to make space technologies a applicable tool for the safety and resilience of the state in Poland, and at the same time an impulse to make national competences and an industrial ecosystem?

I have already partially answered this question earlier, speaking about the function of the Polish Space Agency. The second crucial component concerns the improvement of the state's satellite capabilities, in peculiar in the area of safety and defence. In case of image recognition, respective satellites are not adequate – present the planet is heading for larger constellations, not 2 or 3 objects, but twenty, forty or more satellites. Technology has changed a lot: systems are cheaper and more accessible, and more satellites mean better coverage, more data and more up-to-date information.

This makes countries like Poland realistic about their abilities, not just about joining alliance systems. It seems to me that we have both the request and the possible to become the leader of the space domain in the region – primarily in military applications and in the area of security. another countries of our region will look at Poland through the prism of these competences, wanting to cooperate with us. The increase in interest in cooperation with Poland is already observed today.