Renault FT-17 was 1 of the best tanks to appear on the Western Front of the large War. Later, this device in the hands of Polish battleships wreak havoc in the Bolshevik ranks in 1920. However, it was not an easy tank to operate, nor a method maintenance...
Tank Renault FT-17
Logistics as a discipline has its sources in the military, where it primarily refers to transport, supplying troops, and maintaining military equipment and weapons in constant combat readiness. We know from experience that specified action, not only the military, requires appropriate logistical safety which has a decisive impact on the accomplishment of the objectives previously intended.
A very crucial logistics safety subsystem is method security, whose task is to keep military weapons and equipment ready for immediate use. method safety measures in general can be divided into: maintenance and repair (mobile method workshops, method safety wagons), control and repair, evacuation and supply of spare parts. method resources must be utilized efficiently and in accordance with economical principles. During the war, method safety primarily focuses its efforts on restoring equipment damaged in the battlefield. This task is carried out by repair units utilizing weapons and military equipment and evacuation equipment. The effectiveness of these authorities depends on their mobility and the velocity of consequence to the changing combat situation. Their tasks include evacuation of damaged vehicles from the battlefield, placing overturned vehicles, pulling and towing trapped vehicles, providing teams and spare parts, pumping fuel, and providing first aid and evacuation of wounded.
From French soil
The mention to the tasks of modern method safety of combat activities will let me to present and effort to measure the substitutes of these elements operating in the 1st Tank Regiment during the Polish-bolshevik War.
1st Tank Regiment was established by command of the Polish Army in France on 15 March 1919. At the end of this period in Martigny-les-Bains from the French 505th Tank Regiment, the commanding, instructoring and soldiers (French volunteers) and equipment for the formed Polish regiment were transferred. The order ordered the formation of a regiment in the composition of 5 companies (1, 2, 3, 6, 7), whose number and numbering corresponded to the number and numbering of the firearm division in the Army of Polish General Joseph Haller. The following order ordered the organization of 2 battalions of tanks (I and III) to number the corps of that army, with the 1st battalion holding 2 companies, and III to three. On 14 and 22 April, organizational orders were issued, as follows: Regiment Command, 1st and 3rd Battalion Command, 5 tank companies, and a reper-transport section. The second was in today's sense an component of method security. method safety measures were besides envisaged at the level of the tank company. Each company of tanks (24 Renault FT-17 tanks) consisted of: a commander's squad comprising a telephone and sanitary patrol; 3 platoons of 5 tanks (three with 37 mm cannons, 2 with Hotchkiss km); an echelon platoon (water) – 9 tanks: a company commander's tank, 5 spare tanks (reserves) and 3 supply tanks; a reper-transport sub-division (car, 2 semi-truck, 1 truck, a workshop trailer, a half-hour kitchen). The regiment-level reper-transport section had workshop equipment, tools and spare parts, and besides had motorcycles, passenger cars and trucks, as well as tractors and workshop trailers. Overall, the regiment had 120 tanks (72 with cannons and 48 with km), 10 passenger cars, 13 semi-trailers, 18 trucks, 5 tractor trailers, 2 track tractors, 10 motorcycles, 10 bikes, 8 field kitchens and 8 workshop trailers. FT 75 BS wagons were removed from the position of the Polish tank regiment (they performed in the French stage).
At the end of April, a crucial number of Poles from another Blue Army units joined the regiment. Candidate training has started. However, preparing Polish soldiers to take up work positions in the recently formed regiment created many difficulties. The language proved to be a barrier, due to the fact that the French were instructors, as well as the operation of new, unknown combat equipment. On 1–17 June 1919, the regiment along with the last troops of General Haller's Army were transported to the country, assigning him Łódź as a garrison.
Tanks in the Edges
As early as 18 August 1919, a company consisting of 24 tanks was sent by rail to the Lithuanian-Belarusian front. It was unloaded at Jasien Station on 27 August evening. The Company was tasked with participating the following day in the attack on Bobrujsk. She reached the starting position shortly before the attack by the 4th Wielkopolska firearm Regiment, to which she was subjected. The night march was highly exhausting for the company's individual condition. The mediocre condition of the roads caused overheating of engines and excessive fuel consumption, which had to be delivered by submarines, as dense goods vehicles with supplies were swamped in the mud and could not keep up with the tanks. erstwhile entering the fight almost from the march, the tankers received no more information about the enemy. Despite these problems, the first action of Polish tanks was successful. Supporting the infantry, the tanks under the fire of the Bolsheviks broke into the Volchanki River, forced it into the beard (four tanks were trapped in a crazed beard, evacuated after taking the trenches) and entered the trenches of the opponent. By causing panic, they forced the enemy to flee. The Bolsheviks inactive attempted to halt the Polish attack on another trench line under the village of Siemkowo, but besides this time the tanks forced the Bolsheviks to flee.
The combat actions of the Polish tank company, commanded by the French, were assessed positively by both the regiment commander and the commander of the Wielkopolska Group General Daniel Konarzewski. The company's next task was to support the attack of the 1st Legion Infantry Division on the Dyneburg Subway in the last days of September 1919. As under Bobrujski, the company arrived at the starting point at the last moment, having no anticipation to carry out the diagnosis and replenishment of fuel. It was the deficiency of fuel in the second platoon that prevented the support of the 6th Infantry Regiment, so the Bolsheviks managed to keep a tiny bay on the western bank of the Sound. During the break of the fight, the tanks drove to the bench farm, where the reper-transport division was besides moved. By the end of the day and for most of the night mechanics and crews were busy removing harm in vehicles and replenishing propellant materials, lubricants and ammunition. The Reper-transport Company managed to pull damaged tanks from the battlefield and prepare most of them for the next day. The attack continued the next day. The command of the 3rd platoon was given to the Polish lieutenant officer Józef Jasinski. The soldiers, supporting the infantry, contributed to the capture of the fort guarding the railway bridge to the Cranes and then covered the bomb squads who blew up the bridge. On September 29, 1919, the tanks were loaded into railway cars and sent back to Vilnius. This was the last action of Polish tanks in 1919.
It is hard to clearly measure the participation of tanks in this clash. It is surely essential to criticise the combat safety and logistics of the company, whose tanks were forced to enter the fight on the first day without review, after a long (as for Renault FT), a 12-mile march. Nor was it possible to replenish the fuel that did not arrive in time. The second day of action has already been a complete success, as the combat machines prepared at night were able to effectively support the infantry's assault, overpowering the device weapon station and destroying the engineering firewalls.
In October 1919, the regiment underwent another reorganization involving the departure of French officers. By mid-October all positions in the regiment in a group of commanders, and by mid-November Poles formally took over in the method group.
Roadless and Iron Roads
On February 7, 1920, another organizational order was issued for the regiment (based on French designs) which provided for the following branch composition: command, 2 tank battalions, repair company and spare company (10 tanks). Each battalion counted 2 companies of 24 tanks. The company had 3 platoons of 5 tanks (three with cannon and 2 with km), a reserve platoon (8 tanks) and a company commander's tank. Reorganization completed on May 5.
On 18 May, the 3rd Army was sent to Ukraine over Dniepr 3rd tank company, which led reconnaissance and combat operations on Kiev's frontfields. As a consequence of the Bolshevik counteroffensive and the break-up of the front by the horse of Siemion Budionny (31 May to 1 June), the company was transferred to Koziatnia. From 4 June there, under the command of the 2nd Battalion together with the 4th Company, which arrived from Łódź, organized the city's defence. During this period, damaged tanks with efficient weapons, loaded on railway platforms, were utilized as armored semi-trains. They were utilized to patrol the railway lines of the Koziatyń junction. Defence-delaying actions were then carried out, working with the 12th Infantry Division.
Long marches without the ability to carry out maintenance caused that the 3 company had only a 4th of the tanks moving and planned to send it back for repair. However, the change in the situation on the front caused the company to be placed at the disposal of the Operation Group "Słucz" and later to the 3rd Infantry Division from the 2nd Army of General Kazimierz Raszewski. From 3 to 6 July 1920, both companies fought in the region: Zdołbunów – Equals, leading reverse actions, covered the retreat of the 2nd Army. Tanks were besides utilized on improvised armored trains, from which Cossack troops were shelled with armored cars, including on the railway line: Plaine – Alexandria. Tankers were the last Polish soldiers to retreat from Equal. The efficient tanks of 4 companies were grouped in the Warsaw area, requiring repairs were sent to Łódź. The 3th tank company after the renovation was put at the disposal of the commander of the confederate front, General Wacław Iwaszkiewicz. She was given the task of supporting the 12th Infantry Division in the struggles to keep the Seret River rout, closing the Bolsheviks' way to Lviv.
Panzer mobility
Launched on July 4, 1920, the offensive on the northern front alerted 1 and 2 tank companies of the 1st Battalion stationed close Vilnius. From 9 to 18 July, 1 tank company, which was part of the 2nd Lithuanian-Belarusian Division, participated in the defence of Vilnius. She was then transported to Grodna, where she re-entered the city defence conflict together with already 1 tank company. She supported infantry and artillery troops. However, as a consequence of the advantage of the Bolsheviks (Corpus of the Cavalry of Gaj Chan) the tanks had to leave the city and cross to the right bank of Niemn. From 20 to 26 July both companies covered the retreat of Polish troops on the Augustów way – Kuźnica – Sokołka – Bakuna. Tanks moved mainly on caterpillars (2 company), little frequently on railway platforms (mostly 1 company). Long marches of 2 companies (more than 150 km) caused excessive wear of equipment, sent it to repair Łódź. On the another hand, 1 company further delayed the Bolsheviks northeast of Białystok, defending the bridge on Narwi under the paws on 29 and 30 July. Later, from July 31 to August 3 she fought under Lomza, as well as around Wyszkow and Fat. The tanks were then regrouped to defend Warsaw.
On 7 July, then Major Bogumił Skibniewski, in a letter to the Ministry of Military Affairs, criticized the organization of Polish tanks based on French designs on the basis of the military experience gathered, recognising it as “heavy, not moving adequate and not springy enough”. He besides submitted a fresh task to organize a regiment to increase the mobility and self-sufficiency of smaller combat units (tank platoons) during a longer operation in isolation from his company. He advocated reducing the number of tanks at company level, expanding the means of transport, adding more field workshops and repair parks to the semi-tank battalion (as it was called) and armored cars, and at regiment level.
The Chief Command agreed to the proposal of the 1st Tank Regiment commander and a fresh position was announced on 4 August. It ordered the creation of 3 battalions. Each of them was to have 2 tank companies and a platoon of armored cars (four cars) and a mobile reper-transport park. The reduced (cut) company was to have 2 platoons of tanks. Each of them consists of 8 tanks (including 3 reserve ones). Additionally, in the company's stage, semi-tank platoon was expected, but which (similar to wheeled armored cars) was not assigned to the regiment until the war ended. The reorganisation was carried out gradually, transforming companies coming from the front to the renovation to Łódź.
Bolshevik, go!
As russian armies approached Warsaw, Chief Leader on 11 August 1920 issued an order ordering the collection of all tanks and centering them in a retreat in Prague. Despite large efforts of repair workshops, only 33 tanks were able to defend Warsaw. It was besides not possible to usage tanks (as planned) in a massive way. They were utilized by individual companies, or fundamentally platoons. This forced the operational situation that developed in the Radzymin area on 13 August. Polish troops fighting for this city passing from hand to hand had to support the tanks. They were then assigned to the maneuvering group to take a journey to Minsk Mazowiecki.
After breaking the main resistance, the 2 companies were loaded onto the railway platforms, accompanied by late tanks 4 and 5 companies, after which they were transported to Minsk Mazowiecki. The tanks, remaining on the railway platforms, watched the railway lines of the Minsk junction. On 18 August, they were withdrawn to Warsaw and joined the Major Mieczysław Seweryn Nowicki Group, which set out for Ciechanov. From 21 to 23 August, tanks on platforms and armored trains belonging to the Group fought against units of the 3rd Horse Corps in the area of Mława. On August 25, the tanks returned to Warsaw and no longer took part in the fight. The last action of tanks in the Polish-bolshevik War was the support of the 5th Infantry Division in an attack on Krasne.
When we measure the actions of Polish tanks, we must remember that in conducting the war highly maneuverable, tankers were forced to fight on equipment which was not very busy, slow-track and with a tiny operating radius, which was not adapted to the severe conditions of the battlefield. Due to the mediocre condition of our roads, which could not be followed by trucks and wheeled tractors, tanks carried out most of the marches on caterpillars, which was the main origin of their failure.
The continuous designation of tanks for fresh tasks, as well as the deficiency of time to carry out appropriate handling, resulted in expanding material consumption. The operation of equipment to the last limits, the deficiency of the anticipation of exchanging exploited equipment for fresh ones forced the request to send them frequently to tank workshops in Łódź. Army commanders, who were assigned tanks without knowing their tactical and method capabilities, besides placed excessive tasks on them. The widespread harm to the tanks eliminated them from combat and despite superhuman efforts, the crews could not carry out the task entrusted, exposing themselves to charges of inactivity and disapproval by the superior commanders. Despite all these mistakes and difficulties, the 1st Tank Regiment proved very effective in fighting against the Red Army infantry and cavalry, frequently tipping the scales of triumph on our side.
Franciszek Idkowiak, doctor of humanities in history, worker of the Armored Weapons Museum, branch of the Polish Military Museum
