Turkish defence minister Hulusi Akar and manager of the National Intelligence Organization (tur. Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT) of this country Hakan Fidan met on 28 December 2022 in Moscow with their Syrian counterparts – Defence Minister Ali Mahmud Abbas and manager of the National Bureau of safety of the Baas Socialist organization – Syrian Region Ali Mamluk. The gathering was chaired by the head of the Russian Defence Ministry Sergei Szojgu.
According to the authoritative communication, the issues of the Syrian crisis, the safety of the Syrian-Turkish border, refugees and "a joint fight against all terrorist organizations on Syrian soil" were discussed, as stated by Reuters by an anonymous typical of the Turkish authorities, to mean both Daesz and YPG (Universal Defence Units, Kurd. Yekîneyen Parastina Gel – the armed forces of Kurdish Autonomous Administration of North and east Syria, popularly called Rozhava), is so to meet the expectations of Damascus and Ankara.
Dasz in the past was unofficially supported by Turkey, while fought by Syria, Russia and the USA. YPG had previously appeared as an armed arm of the Kurdish Democratic Union organization (Kurdish Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD), which is the most crucial component of the anti-government Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), supported by the US and Russia against Daesh, ignored by Syria, and Turkey considered to be a local branch of the Kurdistan Workers organization (Kurdistan Kurdistan Kurdistan Kurdistan Partiya Karkeren, PKK), which Ankara considers to be a terrorist organization.
Turkey changes its strategy
Earlier, on December 15, 2022, Turkish agency Habertürk reported that the country's president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had proposed Russia's president Vladimir Putin to establish a Russian-Turkish-Syrian tripartite diplomatic mechanics for rebuilding Ankara and Damascus's common contacts. It initially had adequate to meet the heads of interviews, then defence ministers, then abroad ministers, and yet the heads of 3 states.
The Turkish initiative was launched after the Istanbul bombing of November 13, erstwhile six people were killed and eighty and 1 individual was injured. The attack was attributed to PKK, and Turkey threatened with another offensive against YPG in Syria. On 24 December 2022, information was published on Turkey's negotiation with Russia of the usage of Syrian airspace for Turkey's impact on Kurdish targets in Rozhava. 4 days later, these trilateral talks were held in Moscow at the level of defence ministers.
Turkey's defence minister H. Akar announced on 4 January 2023 an "extension" launched in March 2020 of joint Russian-Turkish patrols in northern Syria. Turkey's president R. T. Erdoğan announced on 5 January at a press conference in Istanbul a tripartite Turkish-Syrian-Russian gathering at the level of abroad ministers and then heads of state. On 6 January, H. Akar warned Turkey-supported opposition groups in Syria against the "provokations" that would torpedo the standardisation process, while ensuring that Turkey would "not sell" its existing allies.
On Monday, January 9, a Russian typical did not vote by the UN safety Council to extend for another six months the humanitarian corridor from Turkey to northern Syria, despite the deficiency of agreement with Damascus. On January 12, Turkish abroad Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoǧlu announced a gathering with his Syrian counterpart Faisal Mekdad in early February.
Definitiveness of Syria's position
Following a gathering in Damascus with a Russian envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrietiev, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad stated on December 12 that the prerequisite for further talks with Turkey is for her to end the business of the Syrian territory and retreat Ankara's support for the Turkish rebels (whose B. al-Assad called "terrorists" in his statement). The Syrian leader besides added that tripartite meetings should be preceded by bilateral Syrian-Russian coordination meetings. An anonymous origin on the Syrian side cited by Reuters besides reported that Damascus expected advancement in agreeing key issues at the working group level before a ministerial gathering was held.
Following the gathering of president B. al-Assad with Iran abroad Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian in Damascus on 13 December, Syrian abroad Minister Faisal Mekdad stated on 14 December that "the gathering between Asad and Turkish leadership depends on the removal of the reasons for the dispute", adding that it is about the termination of the Turkish business of northern Syria and Ankara's support for the armed opposition in Syria. "We cannot talk about rebuilding average relations with Turkey without removing Turkish occupation," said F. Mekdad.
Interests of Russia
Both Moscow and Ankara depend on Turkish-Syrian standardisation. Iranian and Russian intervention in Syria since 2015 prevented the fall of president B. al-Assad. As of 2016, Russia has animated the Astana Group, which, in addition to Russia itself, has besides developed Turkey and Iran to make a Western-controlled peace agreement that has been pacifying for 12 years. The compromise of Russia in Ukraine in 2022 both hinders Moscow's further animation of the process and creates force to make diplomatic success compensating the Ukrainian disaster.
Interests of Turkey
Turkey awaits its presidential and parliamentary elections in June 2023. Meanwhile, the Turkish economy is in crisis, and inflation, despite its decline in December 2022, remains record-breakingly high. The largest Turkish opposition organization of the Democratic People's organization (tur. Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP) announces peace with Syria. Following the assassination in Istanbul on 13 November 2022, president R. T. Erdoǧan announced "the demolition of the full infrastructure (kurdish) of terrorist groups, from which they derive their strength", so another military operation in Turkey's 30 km safety belt at the confederate border of Turkey. However, Moscow and the USA opposed Turkish military operations.
Interests of Iran and Israel
Russia is besides afraid about the Israeli-Iran escalation in Syria and the transformation of this country into a field of "substitution war" between Tel Aviv and Tehran. W. Putin here seems to proceed the deescalation task in Syria agreed in 2018 at the Helsinki summit with then US president Donald Trump. Meanwhile, on January 2, the Israeli Air Force bombed the Damascus global Airport, temporarily excluding it from use. On January 3, Israeli Prime Minister Beniamin Netanyahu announced his country's "energy action" against Iran's strengthening in Syria, and on January 5, the Israeli Sil Defence profile on Twitter stated the position that it would not let the creation of "Hezbollah 2.0" in Syria.
US Interests
The US maintains 800 soldiers in Syria working closely with SDF. Their aim is to control oil deposits and another natural materials, to support the demoliberous-antifiar political option represented by Rozhava/YPG/PYD, to keep the rebellion You will give at the level of a low-intensity war and prevent the expansion of Iran's influence (the U.S. bombarded Proiranic militia camps in Syria). Washington besides looks reluctantly at the Syrian-Turkish and Syrian-Arab reconcilation (visits of the abroad Minister of the United arabian Emirates – last 4 January) and Iranian-Saudi, aiming to isolate Tehran and Damascus through sanctions (in the case of Syria CEASAR Act).
Obstacles to standardisation in Syria
An obstacle to achieving Turkish-Syrian standardisation (and thus the removal of the conditions for further protracted conflict in Syria) may prove to be a devastating war on Moscow in Ukraine, which may make it hard for Russia to play the function of a ‘broker’ of the Turkish-Syrian agreement and a middleman in Israeli-Syrian relations, preventing Israeli-Iranian escalation in Syria (the Russia's position weakened against Iran – Moscow depends on the supply of drones from Iran utilized in Ukraine alternatively than vice versa, although Iran besides benefits from Russia's transportation of modern western military equipment intercepted in Ukraine).
Factors for standardisation in Syria
The factors conducive to the success of the current standardisation process are interior challenges faced in Turkey by president R. T. Erdoǧan and the comparative helplessness and failure of interest in the region by the US. besides extinguishing, however, bind smoky, pro-liberalization and anti-government demonstrations in Iran to any degree weaken Tehran, which may reduce Damascus's tendency to harden its position and thereby increase the chances of compromise. Finally, the disastrous economical situation destroyed by the twelve-year-old Syrian war, including hyperinflation, may prompt B. al-Assad to prosecute deescalation.
Turkish-Syrian normalization is so theoretically possible, although at the same time practically very hard due to the threat of the collision of non-negotiable interests of the parties (the author of these words remains pessimist with respect to the current standardisation process, although he wishes to be wrong). In a situation of weakening Moscow's position, the good will of the curious parties, Ankara and Damascus, is important. The key to the agreement would be the common agreement to destruct Islamist (Daesh) and leftist-demoliberal (SDF/Rozhava) terrorists respectively, which would besides mean removing the basis for the continued US presence in Syria and the draining of Syrian natural resources by Washington, as well as the deprivation of a possible (kurdish) ally and coordination of Israel's actions against the judaic state and in the defence of Palestinians (anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian are both Turkey, Syria and Iran).
Ronald Lasecki
